Judgment :- V. Periya Karuppiah, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant-first accused for the offence under Sections 498(A) and 302 r/w 34 IPC by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu in S.C.No.291 of 1997 dated 13. 2001, sentencing her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and also to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks for the offence under Section 498(A) of IPC and to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC ordered to run concurrently. 2. No appeal has been preferred by the second accused against his conviction and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and also to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks for the offence under Section 498(A) IPC. 3. A-1 and A-2 were made to face the trial for the offence under Sections 498(A) and 302 r/w 34 IPC on the charge that in between 18. 96 and 20.2.97, A-1, the mother-in-law of the deceased-Alamelu @ Ammulu, living in Door No.27, Bangaru Esappan Street, Kanchipuram was having grudge over the deceased on the ground that she did not know cooking and also was not helping her husband, A-2, in the business of weaving and thereby A-1 and A-2 used to harass and torture the deceased and in pursuance of the torture, on 20.2.97 at about 9.00 a.m., in the said house belonging to A-1 and A-2 where the deceased was living, A-1, with an intention to commit the murder of Alamelu, had poured kerosene on the person of Alamelu and lit fire, as a result of which Alamelu sustained burn injuries and was admitted in the Kanchipuram Government Hospital, where she died on 3. 97 in spite of the treatment. 4. The case of the prosecution as put forth through P.W.1, the mother of the deceased, is that the deceased-Alamelu @ Ammulu was given in marriage to A-2 one year and four months prior to the date of occurrence. A-1, A-2 and the deceased were living separately three streets away from the house of P.W.1 and she used to frequently meet her daughter in the matrimonial home. A-1, A-2 and the deceased were living separately three streets away from the house of P.W.1 and she used to frequently meet her daughter in the matrimonial home. On one occasion, she went to the house of A-1 and A-2 and was chatting with her in front of the house for one hour. When A-2 returned to the house after finishing his work, she sent her daughter inside the house since her husband had returned. Within few minutes, the deceased came outside the house crying and when the same was enquired by P.W.1, she replied that her husband had beaten her and asked P.W.1 to take her to her house, as she will be beaten to death. P.W.1 left the deceased in the matrimonial home itself and returned back after stating that the brothers of the deceased will scold her. This was witnessed by A-1 and P.Ws.3 & 4. 5. On the next day i.e., on 20.2.97 around 9.00 a.m., when P.W.1 came outside the house to inform the matter to the neighbour, she saw some people running away stating that her daughter had committed suicide. When P.W.1 visited the place of occurrence, her daughter was taken to Kanchipuram Government Hospital. When P.W.1 visited the hospital, her daughter was lying unconscious and she saw the burn injuries on her face and chest. Thereafter, P.W.1 was informed by her daughter that A-1 had poured kerosene and set her on fire, as she insisted A-2 to take her to the house of P.W.1. 6. Thereafter, P.W.1 lodged the complaint, Ex.P-1 before P.W.13, the Inspector of Police attached to Vishnukanchi Police Station on 22. 97 at 11.00 a.m., which was registered in Cr.No.407 of 1997 for the offence under Section 307 IPC. The First Information Report is Ex.P-12. 7. P.W.7, the duty doctor attached to Kanchipuram Government Hospital, examined the injured woman, brought by A-2, in FS II ward at 10.00 a.m., on 20.2.97 and he issued the wound certificate, Ex.P-4 noting that the deceased has suffered 90% burns with charred scalp hair and pealing of cuticle. He sent intimation to the police under Ex.P-3 and a memo under Ex.P-5 to the Magistrate for recording the dying declaration of the injured woman. 8. He sent intimation to the police under Ex.P-3 and a memo under Ex.P-5 to the Magistrate for recording the dying declaration of the injured woman. 8. P.W.8, the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Kanchipuram, on receipt of intimation under Ex.P-5, reached the hospital at 11.10 a.m., on 20.2.97 but could not record the dying declaration, as the injured was not conscious and fit to give the dying declaration as per the proceedings under Ex.P-7. Thereafter, he again reached the hospital at 9.20 p.m., on the same day on receipt of the memo under Ex.P-6 and, after following the procedures and after ascertaining the fit state of mind of the injured, recorded the dying declaration, Ex.P-8 of the injured woman between 11.10 p.m., and 11.35 p.m., in the presence of the duty doctor, P.W.7 and took the right leg TM of the injured woman as she was illiterate. 9. P.W.13, the Inspector of Police, continuing with his investigation, proceeded to the scene of occurrence on 22. 97 and prepared an Observation Mahazar, Ex.P-2 and also drew a rough sketch, Ex.P-13 in the presence of P.W.5 and another witness. He caused photographs of the scene of occurrence and the photographs and negatives are M.Os.1 & 2 series. He examined P.Ws.1,2 and other witnesses and recorded their statements. He went to Kanchipuram Government Hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased. He also arrested A-1 and A-2 on the same day at 2.30 p.m., 2.00 p.m., respectively in the presence of P.W.6 and in pursuance of the admissible portion of her confession under Ex.P-14, he seized the kerosene bottle, M.O.3, candlewick, M.O.4 and the match box, M.O.5 under the mahazar, Ex.P-15 in the presence of the said witness. He remanded both the accused to judicial custody. As he received intimation under Ex.P-9 on 3. 97 from the hospital that the injured had died at 9.00 p.m., on 3. 97, he altered the offence to one under Section 302 IPC and sent the altered report, Ex.P-16 to the Court as well as to the higher officials. Thereafter, he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 11.30 a.m., and 1.30 p.m., on 3. 97 and prepared the inquest report, Ex.P-17. He sent the body through the Police Constable, P.W.12 along a requisition, Ex.P-10 to the doctor for conducting post-mortem. 10. Thereafter, he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 11.30 a.m., and 1.30 p.m., on 3. 97 and prepared the inquest report, Ex.P-17. He sent the body through the Police Constable, P.W.12 along a requisition, Ex.P-10 to the doctor for conducting post-mortem. 10. P.W.11, Civil Assistant Surgeon attached to the Kanchipuram Government hospital, conducted post-mortem between 2.35 p.m., and 3.30 p.m., on the body of the deceased on 3. 97 and he noted the following:- "The body of a female moderately nourished, lying on its back, tongue with in the mouth and mouth closed. Teeth 8|8 burns lesion present over face, neck, shoulder joint, anterior and posterior chest wall, and from hip right to knee joint on both sides. Whole of the scalp burnt. Heart intact 200 gm, lungs right 250 gms left -200 gms congested. Hyoid bone intact. Stomach - 150 gms, Liver 1200 gms. Gall bladder empty. Spleen-100 gms right kidney 100 gm left kidney 100 gm. All internal organs are congested. Uterus empty." He issued the post-mortem certificate, Ex.P-11 with his opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of septicemia due to burns (90%) 26 to 30 hours prior to postmortem. 11. P.W.13, in the meanwhile, recorded the statements of P.Ws.1,2,3 & 4. He examined the doctors, P.Ws.7,9 & 11 and the photographer, P.W.10 on 3. 97 and recorded their statements. He examined the Head Constable and the Head Clerk and recorded their statements. After completing investigation, he laid the final report against the accused before the Court. 12. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code as to the incriminating materials appearing against them, they denied them as false. No witness was examined and no document was marked on the side of the defence. 13. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu proceeded with the trial by examining P.Ws.1 to 13 and admitting Exs.P-1 to P-17 and M.Os.1 to 5 in support of the prosecution case and after a full-fledged trial had come to the conclusion of convicting and sentencing A-1 and A-2 for the offences as stated earlier and acquitting A-2 of the offence under Section 302 r/2 34 of IPC. Questioning the conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been preferred by A-1. 14. Questioning the conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been preferred by A-1. 14. Mr.A.Abdul Lathif, learned counsel for the appellant would submit in his arguments that the learned trial Judge had come to a wrong conclusion of convicting A-1, the mother-in-law of the deceased-Alamelu @ Ammulu, solely relying upon the dying declaration, Ex.P-8 which is not conclusive in nature, as the dying declaration has been recorded by the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Kanchipuram under suspicious circumstances, which is not sustainable in law. He would further submit that there are several rooms in the house of A-1 and A-2 and the exact place of occurrence has not been shown in the Observation Mahazar, which is contradictory to the evidence and therefore the decision reached by the lower Court is not sustainable on the basis of the dying declaration without any corroborative evidence. He would also submit that the prosecution has not examined any other independent witness namely, the neighbours to corroborate the evidence of the prosecution adduced through dying declaration except P.W.1, the mother and P.W.2, the brother of the deceased who are the related witnesses and the evidence of P.Ws.3 & 4, the persons residing in the same street, is not helpful about the nature of incident. However, the lower Court had come to the conclusion relying upon the dying declaration and had convicted A-1, which is not correct. He would further submit that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8 is not categorical, but affected by tutoring by the relatives of the deceased in order to suit the convenience of their case and such a taint made the dying declaration unreliable and therefore the conviction levelled against A-1 is not sustainable. He would also submit that the judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 2 SCC (Crl.) 36) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case, as in the said judgment, it has been categorically observed that merely because the deceased suffered burn injuries inside the room and her husband, though was present, did not sustain any burn injury, the burden would not shift on the accused-husband to explain the facts and in these circumstances, the dying declaration given by the deceased-wife may be treated only as a piece of evidence and the conviction cannot be based solely upon it. Again he would insist the Court to rely upon the said judgment of the Supreme Court and give the benefit of doubt to A-1. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the Investigating Officer has been very much interested in this case and therefore he has not registered the case under Section 174 Cr.P.C., as the death has been caused within a span of seven years of marriage and the presumption should be due to dowry death and the inquest should have been preferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer and in the absence of such reference to the Revenue Divisional Officer, the case of the prosecution cannot be sustained. For all these reasons, the learned counsel submitted that the conviction and sentence inflicted by the lower Court may be set aside. 15. Mr. V.R. Balasubramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit in his arguments that the dying declaration has been properly recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8. When he went to the hospital for recording the dying declaration in the morning on the fateful day, he saw the injured woman lying unconscious and was not in a fit state of mind to give such dying declaration and therefore he has returned. Subsequently, when the injured had regained consciousness, he went to the hospital on the same day at 11.00 p.m., and, verifying the fit and conscious state of mind of the injured in the presence of the doctor, who has also certified as to the same, had commenced the recording of the dying declaration and in the said dying declaration, the injured has categorically stated that kerosene was poured on her person by the mother-in-law (A-1) and lit fire and therefore she sustained injuries. The said recording of the dying declaration has not been controverted by A-1 in the cross examination to the effect that the same was not recorded in accordance with the procedures enumerated under the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore the dying declaration is perfectly valid in law. He would further submit that there is no inconsistent statement given by the deceased woman subsequent to the recording of the dying declaration and therefore the dying declaration, which is supported by medical evidence, is perfectly reliable and the conviction and sentence passed by the lower Court that A-1 was guilty of the commission of the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC is perfectly alright. He would also cite the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Laxman Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 3 SCC (Crl.) 347) to the effect that the opinion of the doctor in the dying declaration that the deceased at the time of declaration was fully conscious and was in a position to give the statement which was recorded by the Magistrate implicating that the accused had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire is totally reliable when the testimony of the doctor remaining unimpeached in cross-examination. Therefore the said judgment is squarely applicable to the present case, as admittedly the evidence of the doctor as well as the Magistrate remains unimpeached in cross examination. Therefore the learned Additional Public Prosecutor prays for the dismissal of the appeal. 16. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments advanced on either side. It is not in dispute that the lower Court had laid its confidence over the dying declaration, which is corroborated by the medical evidence, to land in the conviction against A-1 for the offence under Sections 498(A) and 302 r/w 34 IPC. The dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.8 on the day of commission of the offence at about 9.00 a.m., and since the injured woman was not in a conscious state of mind, he had returned back and subsequently when the Magistrate was informed that the injured had regained consciousness, he had gone to the hospital and recorded the dying declaration after verifying the conscious and the fit state of mind of the injured in the presence of the doctor who had also certified to that effect in the dying declaration. The said dying declaration is produced as Ex.P-8 and the proceedings of the Magistrate are produced under Exs.P-6 & P-7. The said dying declaration is produced as Ex.P-8 and the proceedings of the Magistrate are produced under Exs.P-6 & P-7. On a careful perusal of the dying declaration, we could see that the Magistrate had put certain questions to the injured woman about her consciousness and after satisfying himself that she was fit enough to give the dying declaration had asked about the incident and in the said incident, the injured woman had told the Magistrate that A-1, mother-in-law, at about 9.00 a.m., on the date of occurrence had poured oil on her person and lit fire and at that time her husband was also present and her mother-in-law used to abuse her and also made her to be beaten by her husband/A-2. It is also spoken by her that her husband had also beaten her. The doctor who was present along with the Magistrate at the time of recording of the dying declaration had certified about the conscious and fit state of mind of the injured woman at the foot of the dying declaration. On going through the evidence of the Magistrate, P.W.8, we could see that the Magistrate had also spoken to the effect that the injured woman Alamelu @ Ammulu was admitted in FS Ward II in Kanchipuram Government Hospital and he had commenced the recording of the dying declaration after ascertaining her fit and conscious state of mind and after getting her answers to the questions put by him and thereafter concluded the recording at about 11.35 p.m., and the duty doctor namely, Dr.V.Kasinathan was also present at that time and he has also certified to that effect. He has also stated that as the deponent was not able to put her signature due to the burn injuries, he had obtained the right leg TM of the injured. When we perused the cross examination done by the accused, it has been only suggested that the dying declaration was given only at the instance of the mother and the sister of the deceased person. .17. There is no doubt that the occurrence had taken place in the house of A-1 and A-2 in the morning around 9.00 a.m. Admittedly, A-1 and A-2 were present along with the deceased-Alamelu. In these circumstances, the statement given by A-2 has to be looked into. .17. There is no doubt that the occurrence had taken place in the house of A-1 and A-2 in the morning around 9.00 a.m. Admittedly, A-1 and A-2 were present along with the deceased-Alamelu. In these circumstances, the statement given by A-2 has to be looked into. He would state that the incident had taken place only in the form of commission of suicide by his wife and she had bolted inside the room and had poured kerosene on to herself and set fire. Whether the said statement will be true can be found from the Observation Mahazar, Ex.P-2. If it is true that A-1 and A-2 had broken the bolted doors and saw the deceased woman lying with burn injuries, there would be broken latches but there is no mention as to the same in the Observation Mahazar. 18. Apart from that, the conduct of A-2 has to be seen at this stage. A-2 had explained about the death of his wife Alamelu to the doctor, P.W.7 at Kanchipuram Government Hospital that she had poured kerosene and set fire on to herself. He had also categorically answered at the time of S.313 Cr.P.C., questioning that his wife had bolted the room inside and poured kerosene and set fire on to herself and when A-1 and A-2 approached her after breaking the doors which were bolted inside, she fainted on the bed and was unconscious. Therefore, on both occasions, he had mentioned that the death of his wife Alamelu was caused due to self-immolation by herself. But we have already seen that the dying declaration of the deceased Alamelu produced in Ex.P-8 has been categorically proved by the Judicial Magistrate, P.W.8 and the same would disclose that A-1 had poured kerosene on the person of the deceased and set fire, which falsifies the version of A-2 given in the statement under S.313 Cr.P.C., as well as to the doctor. Therefore the explanation offered by A-2 is found to be wrong, as the burden is still heavy on the accused to prove that they were not involved in the offence. Therefore the explanation offered by A-2 is found to be wrong, as the burden is still heavy on the accused to prove that they were not involved in the offence. This view of ours is further strengthened by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 1 SCC (Crl.) 80), as it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the accused fails to offer any cogent explanation or offers an explanation which is untrue, then it can be treated as an additional link in the chain of circumstance against the accused to make it complete. Again in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2007) 1 SCC (Crl.) 688), the Supreme Court has held that the failure of the accused to give satisfactory explanation to an incriminating circumstance which was within his special knowledge amounts to failure to discharge the onus which lies on accused and that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against the accused. Therefore the argument put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased woman had committed suicide and the blame has been falsely shifted to A-1 and A-2 that they have committed the murder of the deceased cannot hold water. .19. Moreover, the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.Manis case (2006) 2 SCC (Crl.) 36 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant for the proposition that corroborative evidence should have been sought for convicting the accused cannot be made applicable to the present case, because the deceased woman had sustained burn injuries due to pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire. In that case, the deceased was not a perfectly alright woman, as she was suffering from mental illness, unsoundness of mind and also from depression and was not in good terms with the husband and due to the hormonal imbalance leading to mental stress and strain, had made attempts to commit suicide. The Court had also taken note of the fact that the lady had firstly asked her children who were watching television to go out of the house and thereafter she had bolted the room from inside and when they saw smoke coming from the house, they rushed inside after breaking the doors and the accused-husband was not present in the house. In that background, the Supreme Court has not accepted the dying declaration. .20. Now we have to see whether the conviction and sentence passed by the lower Court can be maintained based upon the dying declaration given by the deceased woman in Ex.P-8 which is corroborated by the medical evidence of the doctor, P.W.7. In this context, the judgment relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in Ashok Laxman Gaikwads case (2006) 3 SCC (Crl.) 347 (supra) can be usefully referred to for the proposition that the conviction can be solely made on the basis of the dying declaration of the deceased provided the person making the declaration was fully conscious and was in a position to give the statement recorded by the Magistrate. The relevant passage of the judgment runs as follows:- ."It is seen from the doctors evidence that the deceased disclosed the history to the doctor that the accused poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire and that the Judicial Magistrate has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. It is also seen from the doctors evidence that before her statement was recorded by the Sub Judicial Magistrate he had examined her and found that she was conscious and in a position to give the statement. Accordingly, the doctor has signed the endorsement appearing on the dying declaration." .21. In the backdrop of the above judgment, we could see that the dying declaration given by the deceased woman in Ex.P-8 has been properly recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, P.W.8 and he has satisfied himself that the deceased was conscious and in a fit state of mind and there was no inconsistency shown to the Court regarding her statement and the same was also corroborated by P.W.7 as he has stated that the same was recorded in his presence and that he has certified as to the fitness of the deceased. Therefore the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Laxman Gaikwads case is squarely applicable to the present case and on that basis, the dying declaration in Ex.P-8 is totally acceptable and the conviction and sentence passed by the lower Court is unassailable. 22. It is ordinarily prudent and reasonable that a person who is dying will not make a false statement implicating persons as such dying declaration is entitled to great weight. 22. It is ordinarily prudent and reasonable that a person who is dying will not make a false statement implicating persons as such dying declaration is entitled to great weight. However, a note of caution can be added that the Court must be very cautious to find out the truthfulness of the dying declaration, as the person who is making the dying declaration is not subjected to cross examination. The ultimate test to rely upon the dying declaration is the truthfulness of the same. As we have found that the dying declaration given by the deceased to the Magistrate is true and there is nothing to indicate of either tutoring or giving a false statement by the deceased, the same can be safely relied upon for sustaining the conviction and sentence of A-1. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that the judgment of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu made in S.C.No.291 of 1997 convicting and sentencing the appellant (A-1) for the offence under Sections 498 (A) and 302 r/w 34 IPC does not call for any interference and it is confirmed. In fine, the criminal appeal is dismissed. It is seen from the records that the appellant-accused is on bail. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu is directed to secure the presence of the accused and commit her to prison to undergo the sentence imposed.