JUDGMENT A common judgment is necessitated by the fact that the three appeals and cross objections arise out of judgment dated 16.12.1989 in O.S.No.119 of 1981 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram. The sole appellant in A.S.No.558 of 1990 is second defendant in the suit. The appellant in other two appeals is fifth defendant in the suit and was also fifth respondent in the final decree proceedings, aggrieved by which he filed A.S.No.1267 of 1998 and A.S.No.13 of 2005. For the sake of convenience the appellants and the respondents are referred to by their status in the suit. 3. Muramalla Narayanamurthy was hereditary village carpenter of Alamuru Village. He was owner and possessor of various extents of agricultural land totally admeasuring about 7 to 8 acres comprised in various survey numbers situated at Alamuru, Edida and Mandapeta Villages. He was also owner of a tiled house at Alamuru Village. He and his wife Ganiraju (first defendant) were issueless. Therefore, both of them adopted Muramalla Ammannaraju (plaintiff) on 20.03.1946 and an adoption deed was duly registered on 07.10.1946. Adopted son-plaintiff; and Narayanamurthy constituted joint family and remained undivided. It appears that after death of Narayanamurthy, Gollavalli Ramakrishnamurthy (second defendant) also claimed to be the adopted son of Narayanamurthy under another registered adoption deed dated 12.04.1969. He allegedly inducted defendant Nos.3 to 7 as tenants. The plaintiff demanded delivery of possession, in vain. The tenants also refused to pay the makta. In this background the plaintiff filed the suit for partition, eviction, possession and mesne profits. He prayed for partition of suit schedule properties into four equal shares and allotment three shares to him and one share to his adopted mother. Defendant Nos.2, 5 and 13 filed written statements. Be it noted that defendant No.13 was subsequently impleaded. He is younger brother of fourth defendant. Their father Somacharyulu is brother of Narayanamurthy.The averments made in the written statements filed by defendant Nos.2 and 13 are almost similar. Both of them deny plaintiff's adoption and his claim for entire suit schedule properties. They further allege that Narayanamurthy executed registered settlement deed on 19.03.1946 conveying items 5 and 6 of plaint A schedule property to them. Second defendant, as noticed supra, set up adoption and relied on registered adoption deed dated 12.04.1969. Both of them deny plaintiff's adoption and his claim for entire suit schedule properties. They further allege that Narayanamurthy executed registered settlement deed on 19.03.1946 conveying items 5 and 6 of plaint A schedule property to them. Second defendant, as noticed supra, set up adoption and relied on registered adoption deed dated 12.04.1969. It is his further case that after death of Narayanamurthy, plaint A and B schedule properties except items 5 and 6 of plaint A schedule devolved on him by reason of his adoption. He, therefore, opposed partition. 4. Fifth defendant contested the case all along. He set up title in himself alleging that items 11 to 13 of plaint A schedule property situated at Edida Village have had been in possession of himself as well as his forefathers for over 70 to 80 years and that they are entitled to the property in their own right. He also denied that he is a tenant of Narayanamurthy and did not accept the adoption of the plaintiff. 5. The trial Court framed six main issues and two additional issues. Important of them are the issues 1 to 4. These involved consideration of the controversy as to whether the plaintiff and second defendant are adopted sons of Narayanamurthy and whether the plaintiff's claim for items 11 to 13 claimed by fifth defendant is barred by time. The other question is with regard to items 5 and 6, which were allegedly conveyed by Narayanamurthy under a registered settlement deed dated 19.03.1946 in favour of defendant Nos.4 to 13. 6. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A1 to A16. P.Ws.2 and 3 were examined to corroborate his evidence. Second defendant examined himself as D.W.1. He marked 10 documents besides producing D.Ws.2 and 3. Fifth defendant after filing written statement did not prosecute his case. He remained set ex parte. Ex.A1 is registered adoption deed dated 20.03.1946 (registered on 07.10.1946) under which Narayanamurthy adopted plaintiff (P.W.1). Ex.B1 is registered settlement deed dated 19.03.1946 executed by Narayanamurthy conveying items 5 and 6 of plaint A schedule property to defendant Nos.4 and 13. Ex.B2 is the registration extract of adoption deed dated 12.04.1969 under which Narayanamurthy adopted second defendant (D.W.1). 7. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, recorded the findings on three questions as follows. Ex.B2 is the registration extract of adoption deed dated 12.04.1969 under which Narayanamurthy adopted second defendant (D.W.1). 7. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, recorded the findings on three questions as follows. The adoption of plaintiff by Narayanamurthy under Ex.A1 is valid and adoption of second defendant under Ex.B2 is in contravention of the provisions of Sections 7 and 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Hindu Adoptions Act, for brevity) and therefore, second defendant cannot take the status of an adopted son. The claim by fifth defendant that he is owner of items 11 to 13 is incorrect and that the suit against him is not barred by time. 8. Second defendant's appeal, being A.S.No.558 of 1990, as seen from the memorandum, is only with regard to items 1,2,3,7 and 14. No grievance is made out with regard to other items. Indeed the Court fee is also paid on the valuation of items with which the appeal is concerned. Be that as it may, though second defendant raised grounds assailing the findings of the trial Court with regard to Ex.A1, having regard to the evidence on record that Narayanamurthy did not obtain consent of his wife before adopting second defendant,it is hit by Section 7 of Hindu Adoptions& Maitainance Act 1956 which makes it mandatory for a male to obtain consent of his wife before taking a child in adoption. Further Section 11(i) of Hindu Adoptions Act lays down a condition that if the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother must not alredy have son or adopted son. By the time Ex.B2 adoption was effected, the plaintiff had already been adopted under Ex.A1 and therefore, the adoption of second defendant is illegal. The learned counsel for second defendant (appellant in A.S.No.558 of 1990) fairly accepts the legal position and does not press the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal in A.S.No.558 of 1990. 9. The learned counsel for second defendant, however, submits that impugned judgment insofar as items 1, 3, and 7 is unsustainable. He would urge that Items 1,3 and 7 are Inam lands in possession of Narayanamurthy and as per the Andhra Pradesh Hereditory Village Officers Act, 1895 (1895 Act, for brevity), they cannot be partitioned. 9. The learned counsel for second defendant, however, submits that impugned judgment insofar as items 1, 3, and 7 is unsustainable. He would urge that Items 1,3 and 7 are Inam lands in possession of Narayanamurthy and as per the Andhra Pradesh Hereditory Village Officers Act, 1895 (1895 Act, for brevity), they cannot be partitioned. Secondly after disposal of the suit, second defendant got ryotwari patta under Section 7(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (Inams Act, for brevity) and therefore, it is exclusive property of second defendant. Lastly when once patta is granted under Inams Act, the same cannot be challenged in civil Court and the jurisdiction is barred under Section 14 of Inams Act. The learned counsel placed reliance on Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu1 and Shiv Kumar Sharma v Santosh Kumari. 10. Deviating a little, the nature and scope of other two appeals may now be noticed. Though appeals are filed against the preliminary decree, this Court permitted the final decree proceedings. The plaintiff, therefore, filed I.A.No.206 of 1996 in O.S.No.119 of 1981 against fifth defendant claiming for a decree for mesne profits in respect of items 11 to 13. An Advocate Commissioner was appointed who submitted report. Fifth defendant objected the same. On consideration of the objections, the learned trial Judge passed orders in said application on 19.03.1998 directing the payment of a sum of Rs.2,03,394/-. Aggrieved by the said order and decree, A.S.No.1267 of 1998 is filed by fifth defendant. Yet again the plaintiff filed another application, I.A.No.1272 of 2002 in O.S.No.119 of 1981 claiming mesne profits. After conducting necessary enquiry, the learned trial Judge, passed orders on 05.11.2004 directing payment of profits in a sum of Rs.3,13,326/-. The said order and decree are the subject matter of A.S.No.13 of 2005 filed by fifth defendant. As noticed supra, fifth defendant also filed Cross Objections in A.S.No.558 of 1990, being Cross Objections (SR) No.31775 of 1991. 11. The learned counsel for fifth defendant, who is cross objector and the appellant in other two appeals, submits that items 11 to 13 are exclusive property of fifth defendant. He would urge that from the time of his forefathers, the family of fifth defendant has been in possession in their own right and he has perfected title by adverse possession. The learned counsel for fifth defendant, who is cross objector and the appellant in other two appeals, submits that items 11 to 13 are exclusive property of fifth defendant. He would urge that from the time of his forefathers, the family of fifth defendant has been in possession in their own right and he has perfected title by adverse possession. Secondly, he submits that the suit filed for partition in respect of items 11 to 13 which are in possession of fifth defendant is barred by limitation. Alternatively the learned counsel for fifth defendant submits that in view of the findings recorded by the trial Court that his client is a tenant, a suit for eviction would not lie and he has to be evicted only under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (Tenancy Act, for brevity). He placed reliance on Sarwan Kumar v Madan Lal Aggarwal and K.Narsimhulu vs Venugopalaswamy Varu. 12. The learned counsel for first respondent in all the matters (plaintiff) argued that fifth defendant, who remained ex parte, cannot file cross objections, especially when second defendant's appeal is restricted only to items 1 to 3, 7 and 14. For this proposition reliance is placed on Hindusthan Bank v Surendra Nath, Vadlamudi Venkateswarlu v Ramamma, Vedagiri v Patttammal, Varanasi Vital Rao v Jallepalli Janardhanarao8 and Banarsi v Ramphal. 13. It is nextly contended that fifth defendant all along did not accept that he is a tenant and claimed ownership. When jural relationship is disputes special officer under Tenancy Act has no jurisdiction to enquire into such issue and necessarily it is only civil Court which can go into such questions and pass decree for eviction of such person, who mala fidely claimed title. In support of the contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Commr. of Survey, Settlements & Land Records, A.P. v K. Saranarayana10, D.Venkata Reddy v B.Bhushireddy, J.J.Lal Pvt.Ltd v M.R.Murali and Balawwa v Hasanabi. Placing reliance on Macharayya v Chintanna14, he contends that 1895 Act is not a bar for partition even if such land is Inam to a Village Officer governed by the said Act. 14. In the background of the case and having regard to the rival submissions of the learned counsel, the following points would arise for consideration. (i) Whether cross objections field by fifth defendant are maintainable? 14. In the background of the case and having regard to the rival submissions of the learned counsel, the following points would arise for consideration. (i) Whether cross objections field by fifth defendant are maintainable? (ii) Whether relief claimed by plaintiff in respect of items 11 to 13 against fifth defendant is barred by time? (iii) Whether jurisdiction of civil Court is barred in view of provisions of Tenancy Act?. (iv) Whether jurisdiction of civil Court under Section 14 of Inams Act is barred insofar items 1, 3 and 7 are concerned? and (v) Whether orders and decrees impugned in A.S.No.1267 of 1998 and A.S.No.13 of 2005 by fifth defendant suffer from any illegality or error on record? Whether cross objections field by fifth defendant are maintainable? 15. The factual position, which is not denied, is that fifth defendant is in possession of items 11 to 13. He filed written statement claiming ownership and denying share. He also claimed to have perfected title by adverse possession. But he remained ex parte and did not lead any evidence. When a party to the suit remained ex parte, can he file appeal or cross objections, especially when unsuccessful second defendant restricted his appeal only to three items of plaint A schedule property. Section 96(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) provides that "an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte." Therefore, nothing prevents fifth defendant to prefer a separate appeal insofar items 11 to 13 are concerned. He did not do so. He filed cross objections. When second defendant restricted his appeal only to items 1, 3 and 7 and did not raise any objections with regard to items 11 to 13 claimed by fifth defendant, in the considered opinion of this Court, fifth defendant cannot maintain cross objections under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC. The learned counsel for fifth defendant relies on Order XLI Rules 22 and 33 CPC. Rule 33 thereof is in general terms and in the nature of residuary power empowering appellate Court to pass any decree even if the appeal is in relation to part of a decree. A perusal of Order XLI Rule 33 CPC does not even remotely indicate that fifth defendant, who remained ex parte, can agitate his grievance with regard to items 11 to 13 by way of cross objections. A perusal of Order XLI Rule 33 CPC does not even remotely indicate that fifth defendant, who remained ex parte, can agitate his grievance with regard to items 11 to 13 by way of cross objections. Order XLI Rule 22 CPC contains an Explanation, which provides that "a respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may file cross objection." The plain meaning is that when an appeal is filed against a finding about which the cross objector has also grievance then only the explanation is helpful. It may be reiterated that A.S.No.558 of 1990 is not against a finding of the trial Court with regard to items 11 to 13. The said appeal is only with regard to items 1, 3 and 7 and therefore, the cross objections filed by fifth defendant are misconceived. 16. In Hindusthan Bank (supra) it was held that a cross objection which seeks to raise a question as between two respondents inter se, and as lateral attack in which the appellant is not concerned or interested, cannot be entertained. In Vadlamudi Venkateswarlu (supra), a Full Bench of Madras High Court after reviewing the entire case law relevant to Order XLI Rule 22 CPC laid down as under. There are decisions of the High Courts of Calcutta, Allahabad and Bombay which construed the section as amended and they are all substantially in agreement. The view expressed therein is that as a general rule, the right of a respondent to urge an objection should be limited to his urging it only against the appellant, but there may be exceptions to the general rule when the appeal opens up questions which cannot be disposed of completely without matters being allowed to be opened up as between co-respondents, vide Ambalal Dalabhai v Bapubhai Dalapatbai [(1896) Bom.H.C. Printed Judgments page 742], Bishun Churn Roy Chowdry v Jogendranath Roy [(1898) I.L.R. 26 Cal.114], Shabiuddin v Deomoorel Koer [(1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal.655], Kallu v Manni [(1900) I.L.R. 23 All.93] and Abdul Ghani v Muhammad Fasih[(1905) I.L.R. 38 All.95]. (emphasis supplied) 17. (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus it may be taken as well settled that Order XLI Rule 22 CPC on a proper construction confers only a restricted right on the respondent to prefer objections to the decree without filing a separate appeal and such an objection should as a general rule be primarily against appellant. In Vedagiri (supra) Hon'ble Justice Nainar Sundaram (as he then was) laid down as under. ...The first defendant, who is the appellant in the present appeal, is admittedly not interested in the C schedule properties and defendant 5 alone is interested in them. The matter also cannot be brought within the concept of exceptional cases as delineated by the Supreme Court. A reading of the explanation does not in any way convey the meaning that by virtue of this, a respondent is enabled to prefer a cross objection against another co-respondent. The very object and reason for the introduction of the explanation is only to empower the respondent in an appeal to file cross objections in respect of a finding adverse to him, notwithstanding that the ultimate decision is wholly or partly in his favour. 18. In Varanasi Vital Rao (supra) this Court reiterated that the cross objection against a co-respondent is not maintainable except in exceptional circumstances, where common grounds are raised against the appellant and the co-respondent and the parties in the suit as well as in the appeal are one and the same. In Banarsi (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether without cross objection by the respondent, could the appellate Court have set aside the decree passed by the trial Court? The Apex Court after referring to the pre and post amended Rule 22 of Order XLI CPC held that a right to file cross objection is the exercise of right to file appeal though in different form. Three situations in which cross objections can be filed and the scope thereof were explained as under. The CPC amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. However, the insertion made in the next of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross- objection against a finding... Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. However, the insertion made in the next of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross- objection against a finding... A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross-objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analysing the provision. There may be three situations: (i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent. (ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent. (iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the respondent. In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross-objection. The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre- amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the respondent to take any cross- objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. 19. Applying the law as above, having regard to the fact that the second defendant's appeal is not in relation to items 11 to 13 and also having regard to the fact that as a co-respondent fifth defendant cannot avail Order XLI Rule 22 CPC as second defendant's appeal is not against the finding of the trial Court with regard to items 11 to 13, the cross objections filed by fifth defendant are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed. Point (i) is answered accordingly against fifth defendant. Whether relief claimed by plaintiff in respect of items 11 to 13 is barred by time? 20. Point (i) is answered accordingly against fifth defendant. Whether relief claimed by plaintiff in respect of items 11 to 13 is barred by time? 20. The trial Court framed an issue as to whether claim against fifth defendant for items 11 to 13 is barred by time. The finding is in the negative. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and deposed that claiming himself as adopted son of Narayanamurthy, second defendant inducted defendant Nos.3 to 12 and that they did not pay makta. He issued notice Ex.A2 dated 19.12.1977 to defendant Nos.2 to 7, which includes fifth defendant. He informed that fifth defendant is tenant of lands at Edida, that the land would fetch a rent of 18 kata bags (one kata bag is 75 Kg) that they are liable to pay the same and that they refused to vacate the lands. Therefore he called upon defendant Nos.2 to 7 to vacate the land and deliver possession. In reply to Ex.A2, fifth defendant sent reply Ex.A3. In his reply, he admitted that he is tenant of Narayanamurthy and that as and when it is proved that plaintiff is legal heir of Narayanamurthy he would pay makta. Though Ex.A3 does not contain any date, registered postal cover shows that it was received by Advocate of plaintiff on 03.1.1978. The suit was filed as informa pauperis on 24.2.1978. This Court therefore fails to understand as to why the suit is barred by limitation. Fifth defendant claimed that he is owner of land but he remained ex parte and he did not adduce any evidence to show his open, hostile and uninterrupted possession for over a period of twelve years before filing of the suit. On the contrary, admissions made by fifth defendant in Ex.A3 would belie any contention made before this Court. Further Narayanamurthy died on 12.8.1977. The succession therefore cannot be said to have opened till that date to enable the plaintiff to seek partition from his mother. The point is therefore decided accordingly against fifth defendant and in favour of plaintiff. Whether jurisdiction of civil Court is barred in view of provisions of Tenancy Act to decree partition? 21. Plaintiff alleged that fifth defendant claims to be tenant of lands at Edida and that in spite of demand to deliver possession, they did not vacate lands. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of plaint contained such allegations. Whether jurisdiction of civil Court is barred in view of provisions of Tenancy Act to decree partition? 21. Plaintiff alleged that fifth defendant claims to be tenant of lands at Edida and that in spite of demand to deliver possession, they did not vacate lands. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of plaint contained such allegations. In written statement, fifth defendant alleged and averred as follows. The plaintiff has no cause of action to file suit against this defendant and it is hopelessly barred by time. Even Muramalla Narayana Murthy never had possession of items 11 to 13 of the plaint schedule within the period of limitation prior to his death and much less the plaintiff or the first defendant. So the plaintiff's suit for possession of the Yedida lands, which are described as items 11 to 13 of the plaint schedule, is barred by time and has to be dismissed in limine. This defendant and his forefathers from the last three generations have been continuing in possession and enjoyment of the Yedida lands shown as items-11 to 13 of the plaint A schedule from the last 70 to 80 years in their own rights and so the plaintiff cannot lay any claim or right over these properties. 22. From the above, there cannot be any doubt that fifth defendant never accepted plaintiff as landlord. Though in Ex.A3 he took such a plea, he made an effort to defeat plaintiff's claim to items 11 to 13 setting up title in him. In such a situation, what is the remedy of a landlord who is rightful owner? Tenancy Act creates a statutory authority designated as Special Officer and confers limited powers on him (see Sections 10, 13and 16). The Special Officer as a creation of statute can only exercise powers conferred by the statute and cannot usurp jurisdiction, which is not conferred. The power to order payment of arrears by tenant, power to direct tenants to partition property and power to decide question whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant, are not specifically conferred by the statute. In such a situation, the suit cannot be said to be specifically barred. The power to order payment of arrears by tenant, power to direct tenants to partition property and power to decide question whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant, are not specifically conferred by the statute. In such a situation, the suit cannot be said to be specifically barred. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in D.Venkata Reddy (supra), when an inferior Court or tribunal is created for deciding facts, legislature may provide that if a certain set of facts exist and are shown to such tribunal, it shall have jurisdiction to do only those things but not otherwise. It will have jurisdiction to decide whether such facts exist or not, but a decision thereon cannot be conclusive. If jurisdiction is exercised even in the absence of jurisdictional facts, the decision is unsustainable. Only such findings in relation to jurisdictional facts are deemed to be conclusive and cannot be questioned in a civil Court. Before Division Bench, it was contended that Special Officer can decide the question whether there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The contention however did not find favour with Division Bench. It was held as follows. The question before us is whether dispute regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant is included within Section 16(1) of the Act so as to give exclusive jurisdiction to the Tahsildar. Even if the dispute which the Tahsildar has jurisdiction to decide under Section 16(1) of the Act is a dispute arising under the Act it must be between a landlord and a cultivating tenant. The Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to decide a dispute which is not between a landlord and a cultivating tenant. Similarly, the Tahsildar has been given the jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the determination of the fair rent or the eviction of a cultivating tenant only if such questions arise between a landlord and cultivating tenant. A reading of this section clearly shows that the necessary condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Tahsildar under Section 16(1) of the Act is the existence of the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant. As stated earlier, the sections of the Act give the Tahsildar necessary power to decide questions or disputes arising between a landlord and his cultivating tenant. As stated earlier, the sections of the Act give the Tahsildar necessary power to decide questions or disputes arising between a landlord and his cultivating tenant. Nothing precluded the legislature from providing that the decision of the jural relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant would also be within the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar. 23. In view of the legal position elucidated by Division Bench as above, plaintiff could not have approached Special Officer for a finding on jural relationship between him and fifth defendant. Be it noted, fifth defendant categorically denied that he is a tenant of plaintiff and set up a title in himself. Therefore the plea of learned Counsel for fifth defendant cannot be accepted. 24. Section 13 of Tenancy Act enables landlord to evict cultivating tenant inter alia on the ground that person in occupation of the land willfully denied landlord's title to the land. In view of this, can there be a decree by civil Court to evict a person in occupation who claimed title in himself? The answer must be in the affirmative. Willfully denying landlord's title is one thing and intentionally setting up title in him by tenant is altogether different thing. Though the analogy may not exactly fit in here, Proviso to Section 10(1) of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act 1960 (Rent Act, for short) contemplates similar situation. It provides that when tenant denies title of landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy and if such denial is bona fide, the Rent Controller loses jurisdiction and he has to relegate landlord to civil Court for eviction of tenant. In such a case, a suit for eviction is not barred. 25. Section 10(1) of Rent Act is in pari materia with similar provision in Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act 1960. The Supreme Court in J.J.Lal Pvt.Ltd (supra) considered jurisdictional conflict between civil Court and Rent Controller, and laid down that, "when once the tenant denies title of landlord, the bar of jurisdiction goes and civil Court can decide entire dispute ignoring the Rent Act." It is beneficial to excerpt the following. The Supreme Court in J.J.Lal Pvt.Ltd (supra) considered jurisdictional conflict between civil Court and Rent Controller, and laid down that, "when once the tenant denies title of landlord, the bar of jurisdiction goes and civil Court can decide entire dispute ignoring the Rent Act." It is beneficial to excerpt the following. By having regard to second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, the bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Court stands lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court enabling such Civil Court to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds on which the Controller could have directed eviction under Sections 10, 14 or 16, notwithstanding the opinion formed by the Civil Court whether the denial of title by the tenant had entailed forfeiture of the lease and notwithstanding the finding of the Civil Court that the claim of permanent tenancy was unfounded. This is how any conflict of jurisdiction between Civil Court and Controller can be avoided by construing Section 10(2) (vii) and Section 10(1) second proviso homogeneously and as part of one scheme. The legislative intent appears to be that denial of title can be decided by the Controller for the limited purpose of finding out whether a ground of eviction is made out but the questions, of the title should be left to be determined by the Civil Court. Once a question of title has arisen between a landlord and a tenant and such dispute is bona fide, the doors of Civil Court are let open to the landlord and therein adjudication, on grounds of eviction otherwise within the domain of Controller, is also permitted so as to avoid multiplicity of suits and proceedings. All the disputes between landlord and tenant would be settled in one forum and the need for prosecuting two separate proceedings before two fora would be eliminated. 26. In the case on hand, fifth defendant did not accept as he is tenant. If his contention had been that though he is a tenant of Narayanamurthy he is not tenant of plaintiff and perfected his title by adverse possession, things would have been different. 26. In the case on hand, fifth defendant did not accept as he is tenant. If his contention had been that though he is a tenant of Narayanamurthy he is not tenant of plaintiff and perfected his title by adverse possession, things would have been different. But his plea is that for over 70 to 80 years his forefathers and himself have been in possession of the land in their own right and therefore he contended that the suit is barred. In stricto sensu, it is not a case falling under Section 13(e) of Rent Act. Therefore a suit is maintainable and as plaintiff cannot be compelled to seek two different remedies from two different fora, i.e., declaration from civil Court and eviction order of Special Officer, applying ratio in J.J.Lal Pvt. Ltd (supra), this Court holds that in the facts and circumstances of this case, civil Court had jurisdiction to decree suit for partition as well as eviction in respect of items 11 to 13 also. The point is accordingly answered against fifth defendant. Whether jurisdiction of civil Court under Section 14 of Inams Act is barred insofar items 1, 3 and 7 in respect of which second defendant allegedly obtained ryotwari patta? 27. The facts necessary for consideration of this point may be noticed. Second defendant did not take the plea that he applied for ryotwari patta under Inams Act or that he got a ryotwari patta. No evidence as such was adduced, even though suit was pending before trial Court from 1981 to 1989. Therefore civil Court had no opportunity to consider the issue. A.S.No.558 of 1990 was filed on 20.3.1990. About three years thereafter, second defendant/appellant filed CMP No.18671 of 1993 seeking permission to raise additional ground to the effect that appellant was granted ryotwari patta on 17.9.1990 by Mandal Revenue Officer, Alamuru, (MRO) and hence decree of trial Court in respect of said lands is unsustainable. Though two documents, namely, ryotwari patta and corresponding proceedings of MRO dated 21.11.1990 are annexed to application, it appears, there is no proper application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC to receive additional evidence. Actually and factually therefore ryotwari patta or corresponding proceedings are not before this Court. If rules of procedure are strictly adhered to, the matter should rest there. 28. Actually and factually therefore ryotwari patta or corresponding proceedings are not before this Court. If rules of procedure are strictly adhered to, the matter should rest there. 28. This Court, however permitted learned Counsel for appellant and learned Counsel for first respondent/plaintiff to make submissions on the assumption that second defendant obtained such ryotwari patta under Inams Act. Section 14 of Inams Act bars jurisdiction of civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of Tahsildar or Revenue Court under Inams Act, "except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of the parties." Learned Counsel for plaintiff submits that patta granted in favour of second defendant is a nullity as the same is not in accordance with provisions of the Act. He would urge that unless a person holds land as inamdar on the date of commencement of Inams Act, such person is not entitled for ryotwari patta under Section 7(1) of Inams Act. Second defendant was not holding the land as inamdar and therefore the patta if any obtained by him is a nullity. When the patta or a decision leading to such patta is a nullity, jurisdiction of civil Court is not barred. This Court having regard to the provisions of Inams Act and case- law noticed hereunder is compelled to accept submission of learned Counsel for plaintiff. 29. In G.C.H.Jagdev v Revenue Divisional Officer15, Justice Gopalakrishnan Nair considered meaning of the expression, "holding such land as inamdar on the date of commencement of the Act" appearing in Section 4(1) of Inams Act. It was contended that the expression, "holding" signifies ownership of the land and a person with long occupation and enjoyment without such ownership cannot be said to be holding such land as inamdar. The plea was accepted by this Court and it is laid down that, "unless a person holds the land as inamdar and not merely as an occupant such person would not be entitled to ryotwari patta." It was observed as under. It is possible in a given case for an utter stranger to squat upon an inam land while the inamdar happens to be away. Such squatting may mature into long occupation or possession over the years. It is possible in a given case for an utter stranger to squat upon an inam land while the inamdar happens to be away. Such squatting may mature into long occupation or possession over the years. I do not think, it is a correct proposition of law to say that such a person is "holding the land as inamdar." If this be the correct position, I do not see how the argument advanced... could be held to be tenable. 30. Applying the above ratio and also having regard to the admitted position that Narayanamurthy as a Village carpenter was allegedly holding items 1, 3 and 7, in which event second defendant has no right to claim patta, and therefore, jurisdiction of civil Court cannot be said to have been barred. This Court is aware that ryotwari patta granted under Inams Act cannot be questioned or set aside by civil Court unless the proceedings are taken out by way of appeal before Revenue Court or revision under Section 14-A of Inams Act. Insofar as question of jurisdiction of civil Court is concerned, the same is not ousted for the reasons, which are given above. Furthermore as held by Supreme Court in Commr. Of Survey, Settlements and Land Records (supra), when a ryotwari patta is allegedly spurious or fraudulent, civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred. It is appropriate to refer to following passage from the judgment. A perusal of the notice issued under S. 14-A of the Act shows that the enquiry was proposed to determine the genuineness or otherwise of the patta relied upon by the respondents. It was, therefore, essentially the allegation of the appellants that the ryotwari patta dated 3-10-1974, was a fraudulent and spurious one, which had weighed with the authorities to issue S. 14-A notice in the terms in which it was done in the present case. Considering the language of that notice and the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the directions given by the Division Bench of the High Court (supra) do not suffer from any error whatsoever and call for no interference at our hands. The determination of the genuineness of the patta in the civil Court, as directed by the Division Bench was a proper course to be adopted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. The determination of the genuineness of the patta in the civil Court, as directed by the Division Bench was a proper course to be adopted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Section 14 of the Inam Abolition Act, which ban the jurisdiction of the civil Court to question the decision of the Tehsildar, the Revenue Court or the Collector under the Act itself, carves out an exception "where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties". The directions given by the High Court (surpa) are, therefore, justified by the provisions of S. 14 itself. 31. A reference may also be made to Dhruv Green Field Ltd v Hukum Singh16 whereunder Supreme Court considered the question when and in what circumstances a suit of civil nature can be said to be barred by a special statute. After making reference to M/s.Kamala Mills Ltd v State of Bombay, Lala Ram Swarup v Shikar Chand18 and Babu Ram v Gram Sabha, Buhavi Supreme Court restated the following principles. (1) If there is express provision in any Special Act barring the jurisdiction of a civil Court to deal with matters specified thereunder the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court shall stand excluded. (2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an examination of the provisions contained therein lead to a conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil Court, the Court would then inquire whether any adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if the answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. If, however, no such adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil Court cannot be inferred. (3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil Court is barred expressly or impliedly the Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is a nullity. 32. Learned Counsel lays emphasis on the third principle as above and submits that when the order made under special statute is a nullity, jurisdiction of civil Court is not barred whether or not the statute specifically or impliedly bars the jurisdiction. 32. Learned Counsel lays emphasis on the third principle as above and submits that when the order made under special statute is a nullity, jurisdiction of civil Court is not barred whether or not the statute specifically or impliedly bars the jurisdiction. He relies on the principles to support his plea that the alleged ryotwari patta was obtained by second defendant without disclosing pendency of suit or without disclosing names of rival claimants entitled to patta or those who have legitimate claim for patta. Having regard to admitted fact that plaintiff or his mother were not parties to proceedings before Inams Tahsildar prima facie, this Court is inclined to accept the submission of learned Counsel for first respondent/plaintiff. In view of the above analysis leading to the reasons as above, this Court holds that submission of learned Counsel for second defendant/appellant in A.S.No.558 of 1990 is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. The point is therefore answered accordingly holding that even if plea of second defendant that ryotwari patta is granted to him, is correct in the facts and circumstances of present case, civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred under Section 14 of Inams Act. Whether orders in decrees impugned in A.S.No.1267 of 1998 and A.S.No.13 of 2005 by fifth defendant suffer from any illegality or error on record? 33. Learned Counsel for fifth defendant/appellant in A.S.No.1267 of 1998 and A.S. No.13 of 2005 submits that learned trial Judge erred in fixing quantity of rent while arriving at mesne profits payable by his client. This Court is not able to countenance submission for the reasons as follows. In both the matters learned trial Judge appointed Advocate Commissioner, who submitted a report on 09.2.1998. During enquiry, fifth defendant pleaded that he leased out items 11 to 13 for manufacturing bricks for the years 1987 to 1991 and that the rent for those years is Rs.14,400/-. The Commissioner found that lease amount for three items was Rs.9,540/-, Rs.10,656/-, Rs.10,692/- and Rs.12,600/- for the years 1987 to 1991 respectively. This amount was found to be less than the amount of rent payable to the land @ 18 kata bags per acre. Insofar as mesne profits for 1966-1967 to 2002-2003 are concerned, again learned trial Judge appointed Advocate Commissioner. He filed report on 27.10.2003 ascertaining mesne profits at Rs.3,13,326/-. While coming to such conclusion the value of Rs.440/- per kata bag was applied. Insofar as mesne profits for 1966-1967 to 2002-2003 are concerned, again learned trial Judge appointed Advocate Commissioner. He filed report on 27.10.2003 ascertaining mesne profits at Rs.3,13,326/-. While coming to such conclusion the value of Rs.440/- per kata bag was applied. A perusal of both the orders does not even remotely indicate that there was any element of surmise or absurdity in calculating mesne profits. 34. When the Court is called upon to calculate mesne profits for agricultural land, Rule 12 of Order XX of CPC provides that the Court may pass a decree for mesne profits based on the rents which are agreed on the property during period prior to institution of the suit or for mesne profits that would accrue from institution of suit till delivery of possession. In either case, formula to be applied is the actual agreed rent for the land in question or the probable rent the land would fetch. In Ex.A3 which is reply to Ex.A2 notice, fifth defendant admits that 56 kata bags amounting to Rs.2,800/- was agreed to be rent for the land. Though learned trial Judge has not referred to this but relied on Commissioner's report, this Court has referred to Ex.A3 only to find out as to the correctness of the amount arrived at by the trial Court. The Commissioner has taken Rs.440/- per kata bag and calculated mesne profits and therefore, this Court does not find any error in the impugned orders in decrees. Learned Counsel has not brought to the notice of this Court any other infirmity nor relies on any decision to support his contention that error has crept into calculation of mesne profits. Therefore both the appeals against the orders directing payment of mesne profits are devoid of any merit. 35. In the result, for the above reasons, impugned judgment and orders of the Court of Subordinare Judge, Ramachandrapuram are confirmed. A.S.No.558 of 1990, Cross-Objections therein, A.S.No.1267 of 1998 and A.S.No.13 of 2005 are dismissed with costs