JUDGMENT S. Ravindra Bhat, J. .1. Plaintiff in this case sues the defendant for a permanent injunction restraining it from letting out the First Floor of the building at B14/A Qutub Institutional Area, Delhi-16 to any third party. The reliefs as originally claimed were the following: .(a) Grant permanent injunction restraining the defendant from letting out the First Floor of building at B-14/A Qutub Institutional Area, Delhi16 shown in the site plan to third party during the tenancy of the plaintiff; .(b) Grant mandatory injunction directing the defendant to allow the plaintiff to use and occupy the premises let out to the plaintiff for the period of tenancy after excluding the period during which the premises remained under sealing. 2. During the course of hearing learned senior counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, on 19.5.2008, upon instructions, stated that prayer B for mandatory injunction to allow the use and occupy the premises would not be pressed and the same was accordingly given up; that was recorded in the order sheet for that day. 3. Briefly the plain averments are that by an agreement/deed, the said premises were let out by the defendant ulandlord on 27.5.2005; the plaintiff claims to have entered into possession the same day. It is contended by the plaintiff that the terms of the tenancy were embodied in the lease deed and it stipulated that it would be for a period of three years. The lease deed did not bear the requisite stamp duty and was also an unregistered one. .4. According to suit averments, the plaintiff alleges that the monthly rent for the premises was Rs. 9,60,000/- and that the defendant was paid an interest free refundable security of Rs. 57,60,000/- and a further amount of Rs. 28,80,000/-towards three months advance rent. It is claimed that the plaintiff was peacefully occupying the premises since the inception of agreement when on 16.11.2005 it was amended. It is claimed that some time in August, 2006 the plaintiff became aware that there was some issue with the Delhi Development Authority concerning the use of the land. It claims to have approached the defendant for a clarification in that regard. In these circumstances on 18.11.2006 it is alleged that without prior notice or intimation the entire building and the suit premises were sealed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and Delhi Development Authority (DDA) officials. It claims to have approached the defendant for a clarification in that regard. In these circumstances on 18.11.2006 it is alleged that without prior notice or intimation the entire building and the suit premises were sealed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and Delhi Development Authority (DDA) officials. The plaintiff alleges that it was unable to take any preventive steps. This unanticipated move resulted in not shifting out the office equipment and accessories necessary for functioning of the office. Its records being sealed in the premises and the sudden closure of its corporate office put the plaintiff to great inconvenience, which gravely affected its reputation and business dealings with its clients. It, therefore, rented alternative accomodation at higher rates. .5. The plaintiff avers that after sealing, the defendant informed it that an application being CM No. 14110/2006 in PIL being W.P. (Civil) No. 4582/2003 was filed before this Court requesting for an order of desealing. It is also claimed that the defendant kept assuring the plaintiff about its taking necessary steps for de-sealing and that Upon such move, the plaintiff would be permitted to occupy the premises. The relevant portions of the said averments are as follows: 12. That the defendant, after sealing, informed the plaintiff that it had moved an application being CM. No. 14110/2006 in PIL being W.P. (Civil) No. whereby the Honble Delhig High Court was requested to order de-sealing. The defendant in the said CM has admitted that the plaintiff was its tenant at the time of sealing. 13. That the defendant kept on assuring the plaintiff that it had been taking necessary steps for desealing of the premises and as soon as the premises are desealing, the plaintiff may occupy the same and further it was assured that the period during which the premises remained under sealing would be ecluded from the lease period. 14. That the plaintiff sent various letters to the defendant regarding desealing and other issues and every time the defendant kept assuring that they were attending the issue at their end and the plaintiff would be able to occupy the premises very soon. 6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the above averments and contended that even though the lease deed is unregistered, nevertheless, it can be looked into for collateral purposes of ascertaining monthly rent. 6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the above averments and contended that even though the lease deed is unregistered, nevertheless, it can be looked into for collateral purposes of ascertaining monthly rent. He also relied upon a copy of the affidavit filed by the defendant before this Court in WP No. 4582/03, particularly para 31. It is contended that in the light of these, the plaintiff is entitled to continue in the premises as a monthly tenant till the arrangement is lawfully terminated in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. .7. It is claimed that such arrangement never ended. Learned Counsel contended that even though the relief of mandatory injunction has been given up nevertheless it is entitled to the injunctive relief i.e. to restrain the defendant from letting out tenanted premises i.e. the first floor at B-14/A Qutub Institutional Area, Delhi to any one. Learned Counsel relied upon the decision reported as Satish Chand Makhan and Ors. v. Govardhan Das Byas and Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 369 and Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop and Sons and Ors. (2000) 6 SCC 394 . It was submitted that those decisions support the plaintiffs positiopi that occupancy through an unregistered lease only means that the status is not of a lessee, but the lease is a monthly one. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to be treated as a lawful occupant and tenant and therefore, the defendants would not, .without first offering the premises to him induct any other person into the premises. 8. The defendants though not served were represented. They contended contended that the suit as framed is not maintainable. It is contended that the averments in the suit have concealed material facts. Learned Counsel submitted that prior to sealing i.e. on 14-17.11.2006 all concerned parties were notified and had vacated the premises. It is also contended that the plaintiff removed all its goods and vacated the premises on 13.6.2006 and the parties settled their accounts subsequently in August, 2006. According to the counsel the premises were desealed permanently on 21.9.2007. In the circumstances, the plaintiff does not possess any legal right to seek induction into the premises as claimed in the present proceeding. 9. The plaintiff has relied upon an unregistered lease in support of its claim. According to the counsel the premises were desealed permanently on 21.9.2007. In the circumstances, the plaintiff does not possess any legal right to seek induction into the premises as claimed in the present proceeding. 9. The plaintiff has relied upon an unregistered lease in support of its claim. It is well settled law by virtue of Section 17 and 49 of the Registration Act this Court cannot look into that document. The plaintiff being aware of this position relied upon the decisions in Antony and Satish (Supra). The question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has made a claim that he is a monthly tenant. 10. The entire tenor of the suit and the averments point to the plaintiff being put into possession by virtue of the lease deed, which had stipulated the tenure of three years. It is a matter of record that the premises were sealed on 18.11.2006. The plaintiff further relies upon an affidavit filed before this Court in the Writ proceedings stating that the premises would have to be desealed. 11. The suit nowhere mentions that the plaintiff is in possession or is entitled to possession in a manner known to law. It did not challenge the sealing as unlawful but accepted it. The plaintiff also does not anywhere state that its moneys or any valuable assets are being retained by the defendants. The plaintiff has to aver and disclose the obligation that the defendant owes to it. In this case apart from stating that the defendant should be restrained from letting out the first floor of the suit premises (which itself discloses implicitly that the plaintiff is not in possession) no further attempt has been made to show to the court, the civil rights upon which such an injunction can be founded. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act reads as follows: 38. Prepetual injunction when granted.--(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. .(2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter-II. .(2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter-II. .(3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiffs right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely: .(a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; .(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; .(c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; .(d) where in injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. 12. To secure injunctive relief, a plaintiff must aver the obligation, founded in some provision of law, or on contract. The suit here discloses neither, since the agreement being unregistered cannot be looked into for that purpose. Also, even if the plaintiff were to set up some semblance of claim over right to lease such property, no obligation owed to it by the defendant not to lease it to someone else has been pleaded. Further, under Section 38(3)(c) the alleged invasion of the plaintiffs right is not incapable of affording adequate relief. 13. From an overall reading of the plaint and material documents, including the affidavit dated 22.11.2006 produced on record, said to have been filed by the defendant, what is apparent is that the plaintiff is relying only on the fact that at some stage it was a monthly tenant but was dispossessed from premises due to a sealing order. The suit does not seek enforcement of, or specific performance of an obligation that the plaintiff has to be put back into possession or that it is entitled to continue even if the original tenure were to end. 14. In these circumstances the court is satisfied that the plaint does not disclose a triable cause of action. The same is accordingly rejected. 15. CS (OS) 875/2008 and pending applications are therefore disposed in these terms. Plaint Dismissed