JUDGMENT : Indrajit Mahanty, J. - In W.P.(C) No. 9676 of 2007, the Petitioner Soubhagya Ranjan Kanungo has sought to challenge the order dated 30.07.2007 passed in T.S. No. 442 of 1994 by the learned Second Addl. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Cuttack, whereas in W.P.(C) No. 15217 of 2007 the Petitioner has sought to challenge the order dated 13.8.2007 passed in C.M.A. No. 117 of 2007 arising out of R.F.A. No. 58 of 2003 by the learned District Judge, Cuttack. Since both the writ applications arise out of the self-same proceeding and the parties are the same, these writ applications are taken-up together for consideration. The Petitioner Soubhagya Ranjan Kanungo was a Defendant in the suit filed by the opposite party Smt. Prafulata Mohapatra before the learned Second Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Cuttack in T.S. No. 442 of 1994. That suit was dismissed by the Judgment dated 30.4.2003 and against the said Judgment, the Plaintiff (opposite party) filed a first appeal before the learned District Judge, Cuttack and same was registered as R.F.A. No. 58 of 2003, that first appeal came to be allowed by the learned District Judge vide his Judgment and decree dated 19.02.2004 and 26.02.2004 respectively with the following direction: Accordingly the Court below shall fix a date calling upon the Appellant to deposit the balance consideration money and file requisite stamp papers for execution of sale deed for a sum of Rs. 60,000/-, failing which suit would stand dismissed on such deposit of balance consideration money and filing of stamp papers within the specified date, the Court below will fix another date, directing the Respondent to execute registered sale deed in favour of the Appellant and registered it on payment of registration fee by the Appellant. In case of default by the Respondent the Court below shall execute the sale deed and present it for registration. Consequent upon execution of the sale deed, the possession of the suit land be delivered to the Appellant by the Respondent, failing which the Appellant do recover possession of the same. All these exercise should be completed within 30th April, 2004. 2. It would be relevant to note that, the Petitioner (Defendant) had preferred a Second Appeal R.S.A. No. 183 of 2004 before the High Court and the same came to be dismissed by Judgment dated 16.5.2007. All these exercise should be completed within 30th April, 2004. 2. It would be relevant to note that, the Petitioner (Defendant) had preferred a Second Appeal R.S.A. No. 183 of 2004 before the High Court and the same came to be dismissed by Judgment dated 16.5.2007. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner (Defendant) thereafter, filed a petition (while the petition u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division)) before the, Second Additional District Court, Cuttack, to rescind the contract on the ground that the same was no more enforceable in law and that the decree had become un-executable. That petition filed by the Petitioner-Defendant came to be rejected by the learned trial Court by an order dated 30.7.2007 with the finding that the Plaintiff (opposite party) had deposited the balance consideration money and stamp duty through challan. That order is the subject matter of challenge in W.P.(C) No. 9676 of 2004. It appears that the Petitioner also preferred a similar application u/s 28 of Specific Relief Act, before the learned District Judge, Cuttack and the same was registered as CMA No. 117 of 2007. That application came to be dismissed by the learned District Judge by an order dated 13.8.2007 which is the subject mater of challenge in W.P.(C) 15217 of 2007. 3. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner herein submitted that the impugned order dated 30.7.2007 passed in T.S. No. 442 of 1994 by the learned Civil Jude on the Petitioner?s application u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, as well as dismissal of similar petition filed by the self-same Petitioner before the learned District Judge in CM.A. No. 117 of 2007 by Judgment dated 13.8.2007 are arbitrary and illegal on account of non-application of judicial mind. In essence, the contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner (Defendant) is to the effect that once the learned District Judge in the first appeal had fixed the date for compliance of the order and further the learned District Judge had extended the period of compliance till 14.5.2004, but since opposite party (Plaintiff) had failed to deposit the requisite stamp paper, the suit was liable to be rejected and the petition u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, ought to have been allowed. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for Petitioner that although the Petitioner had preferred a Second Appeal being R.S.A. No. 183 of 2004 before the Hon'ble High Court and the High Court had issued directions calling for the LCR from the Court below, there being no order of stay being granted by the High Court in the second appeal, there was no legal obstacle on the part of the Trial Court to proceed with the case in terms of under Order 41 Rule 5 Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, learned Counsel submitted that beyond 14.5.2004, the trial Court has no power to execute the sale deed in question in favour of the opposite party Plaintiff and the decree had become inexcusable. 4. Shri Pattnaik, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party-Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that after the Plaintiff had succeeded before the Lower Appellate Court, and Judgment and decree were passed in favour of the Plaintiff on 16.3.2004, the Plaintiff filed two separate challans in terms of order dated 15.4.2004 passed by the Trial Court in T.S. No. 442 of 1994 on which date direction was issued to put up the matter on 19.3.2004 for filing of copy of challan showing deposit. It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid direction, money was deposited with the Nazir of the Civil Court, Cuttack who duly received the same. Accordingly, on 19.3.2004, it is submitted this Plaintiff filed two separate challans i.e. Rs. 30,000/- towards the payment of balance consideration money and Rs. 6,600/- towards the cost of stamp paper and also filed a petition praying therein to serve notices on the Defendant to appear in the Court and to execute the registered sale deed. It is also submitted that the said notice was duly served on the Defendant (Petitioner) on affixture after refusal by the Defendant and that was held by the trial Court to be sufficient. It is further contended that on 9.4.2004, the Petitioner (Defendant) appeared before the Court below and filed a petition to stay further proceeding in T.S. No. 442 of 1994 on the ground of preferring' the Second Appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. It is further contended that on 9.4.2004, the Petitioner (Defendant) appeared before the Court below and filed a petition to stay further proceeding in T.S. No. 442 of 1994 on the ground of preferring' the Second Appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. This petition came to be rejected by the Trial Court and the suit was posted to 14.4.2004 for filing of draft sale deed by the Plaintiff (opposite party) and in terms of the said direction the Plaintiff filed the necessary draft sale deed and the same was duly approved and accepted by the Trial Court and the matter was posted to 13.5.2004 for further order. While the matter stood thus, in the meantime, the Petitioner filed Second Appeal i.e. RSA 183 of 2004 before the Hon'ble High Court and on 13.5.2004 the Petitioner produced a certified copy of the order passed is RSA No. 183 of 2004 before the trial Court by which order the High Gourt called for the Lower Court Record. Mr. Pattnaik, learned Counsel for the opposite party (Plaintiff) submitted that in the above facts and circumstances, the execution of registration of sale deed has been delayed and the Plaintiff-opposite party is no way responsible for such delay. It appears that the Second Appeal filed by the Petitioner (Defendant) i.e. RSA No. 183 of 2004 came to be dismissed by the High Court by Judgment dated 16.5.2007. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-opposite party that it is only after dismissal of the second appeal of the Defendant, the Defendant once again has filed another petition u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, both before the trial Court as well as the learned District Judge, inter alia, praying for declaring the contract agreement rescinded on the ground of non-compliance of the order & decree passed in RFA No. 58 of 2003 by the learned District Judge. 5. I have extensively dealt with the various orders passed from time to time only to highlight the fact that the Defendant-Petitioner's actions lack bona fide. From the facts as set out hereinabove, it would be clear that the Petitioner, after having failed before the High Court in R.S.A. 183 of 2003, has resorted to ingenuous methods and tired to frustrate the execution of the decree. From the facts as set out hereinabove, it would be clear that the Petitioner, after having failed before the High Court in R.S.A. 183 of 2003, has resorted to ingenuous methods and tired to frustrate the execution of the decree. In the present case the Petitioner has filed Petitions u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act both before the trial Court (Civil Judge) as well as the learned District Judge. It appears that by order dated 30.7.2007 the learned trial Court rejected that application and similarly the learned District Judge has also rejected the similar application by an order dated 13.8.2007. From the above, it is crystal clear that the Petitioner has not acted bona fide and has sought to invoke jurisdiction of both the Courts below by filing Petitions u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act. Law is well settled that invoking writ jurisdiction after having multiple proceedings under the same provision of law before the different forums, indicate clear lack of bona fide on the part of the Petitioner and, therefore, justifies the non-exercise of writ jurisdiction in favour of such party. 6. On consideration of the facts of the present case, it is clear that, both the trial Court as well the learned District Judge have come to conclude that the Petitions u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, were misconceived and without any merit. Both the impugned orders indicate that the Plaintiff-opposite party has made the necessary deposits. The learned Civil Judge as well as the learned District Judge have come to hold that the Petitions u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act, filed by the Petitioner (Defendant) merit no consideration whatsoever since the Plaintiff-decree holder has made necessary deposits. Therefore, I am of the view that these writ applications also exhibit clear lack bona fide on the part of the Petitioner. This has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara AIR 1994 SC 7699 which is quoted herein below: ...When the decree specifies the time for performance of the conditions of the decree on its failure to deposit the money, Section 28(1) itself gives power to the Court to extend the time on such terms as the Court may allow to pay the purchase money or other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay. An application for extension of time for payment of balance consideration may be filed even in the Court of first instance or in the Appellate Court in the same suit as the decree of the trial Court stands merged with that of the Appellate Court which decree is under execution. It is to be seen that the procedure is the hand-made for justice; and unless the procedure touches upon jurisdictional issue, it should be moulded to subserve substantial justice. Therefore, technicalities would not stand in the way of subserve substantive justice. 7. It is well settled in law and very often reiterated that the rules of procedure are merely hand-made of justice -and unless the alleged breach of procedure touches upon jurisdictional issues, writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised. Rules of Procedure are to subserve "substantial justice" and therefore technicalities should not be allowed to stand on the way of subserving justice. In view of the aforesaid facts, the writ application merits no further consideration and accordingly dismissed with further direction to the executing Court to take expeditious step to execute the concerned decree. Final Result : Dismissed