JUDGMENT :- Both these Second Appeals challenge common judgment delivered by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal Nos.309/1984 and 334/ 1984 on 31-03-1992. Second Appeal No.389/1992 has been filed against the judgment in Regular Civil Appeal No.309/1984, while other Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment in other Regular Civil Appeal. The present appellants had filed Regular Civil Suit No.260/1975 against the respondents for possession on the basis of title, and the said suit was decreed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati on 27-07-1984. Union of India and its Officers namely Income Tax Officer preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.334/1984 against that decree, while the original defendant no.4 [a private person] preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.309/1984. Both the Second Appeals have been admitted on same questions of law by mentioning that questions no.4, 5, 6 and 8 in memo of Second Appeal are the substantial questions. Those questions are as under :- "4. Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that Ghasiram Gupta was the owner of the suit site in the light of its own finding that the plaintiffs have proved their title over the suit property? 5. Whether the auction sale dated 15th March, 1974 to the extent of the suit site belonging to the plaintiffs, by the Income Tax Authorities for the recovery of tax arrears of Ghasiram Gupta could be said to be legal and proper? 6. Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court was justified in recording finding that the defendant nos.1 and 2 could not be said to be negligent for holding the public auction dated 15th March, 1974 in the light of the specific admission given by the defendant no.2 that he did not decide the objection of the plaintiff no.3 that she is the owner of the suit site? 8. Could the auction sale dated 15th March, 1974 be said to be legal only because the plaintiffs failed to prove the nature of grant in favour of Ghasiram Gupta, especially when there is concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have proved their title over the suit property?" 2. The present appellants had contended that purchase of open plot admeasuring 1364 sq.ft. forming part of plot no.9/ 1 and plot no.2 as described in plaint, was their property and it was given to one Ghasiram as licencee by their father Nathusa. The present appellants had contended that purchase of open plot admeasuring 1364 sq.ft. forming part of plot no.9/ 1 and plot no.2 as described in plaint, was their property and it was given to one Ghasiram as licencee by their father Nathusa. Portion of plot no.9/1 belonged to Nathusa, while plot no.2 was purchased in the name of the plaintiff no.3 [original appellant no.3] - Mainabai. Auction of the said property by Income Tax Department to recover tax arrears from Ghasiram in favour of the present respondent no.4 did not therefore confer any title or interest on respondent no.4 Gopal. The Trial Court accepted this stand and rejected the case of respondents that there was any permanent grant by Nathusa in favour of Ghasiram. It further found that there cannot be any promissory estoppel in view of the evidence which came on record. It therefore, decreed the suit. In two appeals mentioned above, the 3rd Additional District Judge, Amravati found that there was permanent grant in favour of Ghasiram. Name of Ghasiram was mutated in municipal records as occupier and he also paid property tax to the Municipal Council. It further found that in earlier litigation Ghasiram had taken a plea of permanent grant and in spite of such plea plaintiffs had not taken any steps. It applied the principle of promissory estoppel because of silence on the part of the plaintiffs and though it found that the plaintiffs proved their title and that title could not have passed in favour of Ghasiram, as there was no registered instrument, permanent grant was held proved in favour of Ghasiram and that right of Ghasiram stood vested in original defendant no.4 - Gopal, being auction purchaser. 3. In this background I have heard Shri. G. R. Agrawal, Advocate for the appellants/plaintiffs and Advocate Shri. R. K. Deshpande, for respondent no.3[ii] i.e. legal heir of original defendant no.4. No body has appeared on behalf of other legal heirs or on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2. 4. Advocate Shri. Agrawal has contended that plea of permanent grant was not raised by any of the defendants in their written statement and trial court therefore rejected that plea. He points out the issues framed by the trial court and it's consideration as also how the finding of permanent grant have been arrived at by the lower Appellate Court. 4. Advocate Shri. Agrawal has contended that plea of permanent grant was not raised by any of the defendants in their written statement and trial court therefore rejected that plea. He points out the issues framed by the trial court and it's consideration as also how the finding of permanent grant have been arrived at by the lower Appellate Court. He contends that there cannot be any permanent grant as evidence on record is also to the contrary and in any case, as there was no registered document executed in favour of Ghasiram. He contends that the auction therefore did not confer any right upon the auction purchaser and he points out that the plaintiff no.3 - Mainabai specifically had raised this plea before the respondent no.2 Income Tax Officer, but then the said Officer t did not look into that objection and did not consider the documents filed along with it, and thus refused to exercise jurisdiction available to him in Second Schedule framed as per 11 Section 222 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. He n has invited attention to the relevant consideration in this respect and also to the documents on record and stated that Income Tax Department has only gone by possession of Ghasiram and therefore proceeded to auction the premises. He contends that even if it is presumed that only right to occupy given to Ghasiram has been purchased by the defendant no.4, defendant no.4 can also be evicted because of title of the present appellants. He therefore urges that all questions formulated above needs to be answered in favour of the appellants and the judgment of trial court needs to be restored. 5. Advocate Shri. R. K. Deshpande, on the other hand contends that as auction has been conducted in accordance with the provision of Second Schedule and there is no challenge to it, and it has attained finality. As such by merely stating that the title is in appellants, the relief of eviction of auction purchaser cannot be granted by the civil court. He contends that there was permanent grant in favour of Ghasiram and even if there was no such permanent grant, after auction as the sale has become absolute in favour of the auction purchaser, the auction purchaser cannot be evicted in such civil suit. He contends that there was permanent grant in favour of Ghasiram and even if there was no such permanent grant, after auction as the sale has become absolute in favour of the auction purchaser, the auction purchaser cannot be evicted in such civil suit. He points out that the premises were attached by the Income Tax Department on 19-12-1973 and proclamation for its sale was published on 8-2-1974. Auction was conducted on 15-03-1974. The objection was raised only by Mainabai before the Income Tax Officer, who rejected that objection on 2004-1974 while confirming the auction. Sale certificate accordingly was issued in favour of the auction purchaser on 24-04-1974. The Civil Suit for eviction and for possession was filed by the appellant no. 1 and father of the appellant no.2 only on 18-04-1975 and in it Mainabai was joined initially as defendant no.3. She was transposed as plaintiff no.3 on 16-08-1977. It is therefore contended that in such circumstances, filing of objection by Mainabai vide Exh.1l3 on 26-12-1973 cannot and does 10te inure for the benefit of original plaintiff 10:2 and plaintiff no.1. He points out various provisions as contained in the above mentioned Second Schedule, to state that the civil suit as filed was itself not maintainable and the lower appellate court ought to have dismissed the suit even on this count. He further points out that in suit as filed there is no prayer or challenge to the order of Income Tax Officer rejecting the objection of Mainabai on 20-04-1974 or to the confirming of sale in favour of the auction purchaser or to the sale certificate issued on 24-04-1974. In these circumstances the finding of the appellate court that sale is valid has reached finality and it is basically a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with in Second Appeal. It is further argued that merely because title is established, when Ghasiram could not have been evicted, the suit could not have been decreed against auction purchaser. He contends that if nature of grant in favour of Ghasiram was to be disputed, Ghasiram was necessary party. According to him, therefore, there is no substance in these second appeals, and substantial questions as formulated do not arise at all. In any case those questions according to him needs to be answered against the appellants and their suit needs to be dismissed. 6. According to him, therefore, there is no substance in these second appeals, and substantial questions as formulated do not arise at all. In any case those questions according to him needs to be answered against the appellants and their suit needs to be dismissed. 6. In brief reply, Advocate Shri. Agrawal, points out that there was no challenge by any of the parties to the jurisdiction of the civil court and there was no such plea in written statement filed before the trial court. He further points out that even transposition of Mainabai was not questioned and her transposition relates back to the date of the suit in view of the provisions of Section 21 [2] of the Indian Limitation Act. He also places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported at 2000(3) SCC 462 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar) and 1990 Mh.L.J. 1056 (Indira Bhalchandra Gokhale Vs. Union of India), to contend that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to either challenge the auction or to seek any declaration in relation to the order passed by the Income Tax Officer as it was void. He points out that Income Tax Officer admitted that he did not decide the issue of title at all. According to him, as there was no pleas about permanent grant in written statement or about absence of jurisdiction in civil court, the arguments advanced by Advocate Shri. Deshpande, in that respect are misconceived and liable to be rejected. 7. It is apparent that the description of suit property is not in dispute between the parties. The lower appellate court has found that Ghasiram or his legal heirs were not necessary parties to the civil suit filed by the present appellants. The judgment in earlier Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 filed by the appellant no. 1 and original plaintiff no.2 against Mainabai and Ghasiram is on record at Exh.76. The said judgment is dated 08-12-1971. That suit was filed by the original plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 in present suit against Ghasiram and his establishment for obtaining permanent mandatory injunction, damages and cost of the suit. The dispute was in relation to use of passage by Ghasiram for his motor service business and for parking. The said judgment is dated 08-12-1971. That suit was filed by the original plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 in present suit against Ghasiram and his establishment for obtaining permanent mandatory injunction, damages and cost of the suit. The dispute was in relation to use of passage by Ghasiram for his motor service business and for parking. Issue no.2 in that suit was - whether Ghasiram proved that deceased Nathusa permanently gave him the suit site in consideration of Ghasiram agreeing to vacate the house and open site under his lease. The issue has been answered in negative by 2nd Jt. Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amravati. Said Court accordingly directed Ghasiram to remove his buses from passage and permanently restrained him from using it so. It appears that this judgment and decree was then challenged in Regular Civil Appeal No.8/1972, by the original plaintiffs and in Regular Civil Appeal No.20/1972 by Ghasiram and his establishment. The Court of Extra Assistant Judge, Amravati by its judgment and decree dated 13-10-1975 partly allowed the appeal no.8/1972 filed by the original plaintiffs and modified the judgment and decree of trial court and granted them proportionate cost and Rs.500/- as damages. Regular Civil Appeal No.20/1972 filed by Ghasiram was dismissed. The said Appellate judgment is at Exh.77 and in paragraph no. 10 against the case of permanent grant in favour of Ghasiram has been rejected and in paragraph no.11, it is concluded that Ghasiram and his establishment were tress-passers and they had absolutely no title, right or interest in respect of the suit site. In view of these findings, it is obvious that contention of Ghasiram that he was given part of the present suit premises on permanent grant was already negatived by the competent courts by holding him to be tresspasser. Story in the present matter i.e. Regular Civil Suit No.260/1975 pressed into service was again the same. It was contended that Ghasiram who was tenant of Nathusa in respect of major portion of plot no.9/1, obliged Nathusa by vacating that portion because Nathusa had entered into an agreement of sale of that portion with Mahatma Gandhi Market Committee. As a consideration of Ghasiram vacating the said site Nathusa granted him present suit site where he constructed a temporary tin shed for booking office. As a consideration of Ghasiram vacating the said site Nathusa granted him present suit site where he constructed a temporary tin shed for booking office. Theatre was constructed on plot no.2 by the original plaintiffs and a 30 feet wide road [private road] was created as access to it. The site on which Ghasiram constructed his booking office was to the East of this 30 feet wide road and Ghasiram was permitted to park his buses on this 30 feet wide road. The above mentioned Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 was in relation to this 30 feet wide road. In the present Civil Suit (Regular Civil Suit No.260/1975), contention of the plaintiff was that suit site was given to Ghasiram on temporary licence on condition that he would vacate on demand and defence of present respondents, who were defendants therein was of permanent grant. It is obvious that in view of the earlier adjudication Ghasiram was not necessary party at all to the present litigation. In any case Ghasiram did not pay income tax and therefore the premises were auctioned by the Income Tax Department and rights of Ghasiram in relation thereto were purchased by original defendant no.4 - Gopal, represented by the present respondent no.3[i]. Finding of lower appellate court that Ghasiram therefore was not necessary party to the adjudication cannot be faulted with and arguments of Advocate Shri. Deshpande, in this respect needs to be rejected. 8. It is to be noted that, even in the present matter the lower appellate court has found that the Income Tax Department or auction purchaser could not be expected to have knowledge of the transaction between the deceased Ghasiram and Nathusa. This finding is given while accepting the arguments of the appellants why there could not have been any plea of permanent grant by them in their written statement. It is obvious that if permanent grant was to be proved, burden was upon the respondents and they ought to have examined necessary witnesses to discharge it. Auction purchaser has examined Shivcharan son of Ghasiram, as his witness and Shivcharan stated that deceased Nathusa had agreed to provide alternate accommodation to Ghasiram if he vacated the premises at Gandhi Market. He has stated that Nathusa had promised and agreed that alternate accommodation would vest in Ghasiram for ever and accordingly, Ghasiram erected a shed on alternate accommodation and vacated the rented premises. He has stated that Nathusa had promised and agreed that alternate accommodation would vest in Ghasiram for ever and accordingly, Ghasiram erected a shed on alternate accommodation and vacated the rented premises. In crossexamination he accepted that there was no writing between Nathusa and Ghasiram and talks took place initially in the year 1961-62. Shankar Patil (witness no.2 for defendant no.4) and Madhaorao Patil (witness no.3 for defendant) have also been examined by the auction purchaser. But, both these witnesses have not stated anything about the permanent grant. Both these witnesses have deposed about the approach road to the premises of Mahavir Theatre and they state that Mahavir Theatre was not getting licence because there was no approach road to it. Witness no.2 Madhaorao stated that Ghasiram agreed to give approach road on licence and accordingly agreement was executed. He also proved certified copy of the said agreement at Exh.141. The copy of the agreement from civil suit no.748/1968 was shown to him and he denied that he himself and Ghasiram in collusion prepared a false document. He stated that plot no.2 belonged to Ghasiram and passage road was part and parcel of the same plot. It is obvious that all this consideration is of no use in view of the adjudication in Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 in which said document was filed and approach road was found to be encroached by Ghasiram. The original plaintiff therefore got permanent injunction against Ghasiram which attained finality. As found in earlier suit these appellants or their predecessors were not parties to agreement at Exh.141. In short no evidence has been adduced on record to show that Ghasiram was given suit site (involved in the present litigation) on permanent basis. 9. The lower appellate court has rejected the arguments of present appellants of absence of plea in written statement about such permanent grant by observing that Income Tax Authorities were not expected to know about the nature of transaction between Ghasiram and Nathusa and same is applied even to auction purchaser. It has relied upon the testimony of Shivram for this purpose and concluded that suit site was permanently granted to Ghasiram as an alternate accommodation. It further found that relations between Ghasiram and Nathusa were cordial and both were money lenders. It has relied upon the testimony of Shivram for this purpose and concluded that suit site was permanently granted to Ghasiram as an alternate accommodation. It further found that relations between Ghasiram and Nathusa were cordial and both were money lenders. Ghasiram therefore could not have vacated the tenanted premises in the heart of the city unless and until alternate accommodation was given to him permanently. It further found that since 1962 till 1974 plaintiff never paid municipal tax of suit site and Ghasiram paid the same. It further found that the plaintiff also accepted that till 1965-66 name of Ghasiram was recorded as occupant of the site and since that year his name was recorded as owner in the Municipal records. It found that in examination said witness Vijay for plaintiff stated that Ghasiram was Chairman of Municipal Councillor for long term and therefore he managed the entry of his name, was not plausible. Coupled with this, it has relied upon silence observed by the original plaintiffs in respect of the plea of permanent licence by Ghasiram in Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 to apply the principle of estoppel. It further found that the finding in Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 could not operate as res-judicata because site involved in the present suit was not the subject matter of previous suit. 10. The conclusion of the lower appellate court therefore shows that it has arrived at a finding of permanent grant by ignoring the findings delivered in Regular Civil Suit No.748/1968 to which Ghasiram himself was party. The plea of permanent grant by Nathusa was rejected in that suit, and as such on the basis of only the evidence of son of Ghasiram, such a plea could not have been accepted. The reasoning of the lower appellate court that Ghasiram would not have vacated the tenanted premises in Gandhi Market unless and until he was given other premises permanently, cannot be accepted when relations between both the sides were cordial. If Ghasiram wanted a permanent grant he could have then entered into an appropriate arrangement/agreement in writing and could have also got such document registered. As lower appellate court has found that he was money lender and as such he was aware of all such requirements. Similarly, his pleas of permanent grant was rejected by the trial court on 08-12-1971 by holding him to be a tress passer. As lower appellate court has found that he was money lender and as such he was aware of all such requirements. Similarly, his pleas of permanent grant was rejected by the trial court on 08-12-1971 by holding him to be a tress passer. At least thereafter he could have taken appropriate steps to obtain necessary document in relation to suit site. The acceptance of such finding by Ghasiram clearly militates with the logic reported to the lower appellant court. 11. This brings me to consideration of question - whether a permanent grant could have been possible in the facts and circumstances of the case without executing any document. The contention that it was permanent grant has not been raised by any of the respondents in their written statement. The finding in earlier civil suit against Ghasiram is that of a tress passer. Concept of permanent grant would therefore mean creation of right in immovable property and conferring ownership itself indirectly. The conduct of Ghasiram mentioned above, does not show that there was any such permanent grant. If any rights were to be conferred, there ought to have been either sale deed or lease deed duly executed between the parties. If any right, title or interest in immovable property was transferred to Ghasiram, the same could have been done only by written documents duly registered under the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act. As there is no such document it is obvious that the stand of permanent grant cannot be accepted, even in law. Mere entries in municipal property tax register does not clothe Ghasiram with any title or interest in suit property. 12. The contention of respondent no.3[i] is that there was no challenge either to the auction or to order dated 20-04-1974 rejecting the objection of Mainabai and Civil Court could not have taken cognizance of civil suit. The contention of objection before Income Tax Officer namely - Mainabai was transposed as plaintiff no.3 more than three years after the rejection of her objection also can be considered along with this challenge. The auction is regulated by Section 222 of Income Tax Act, 1961. As per the said section Second Schedule of the Act regulates to the procedure. Clause 1 [a] defines certificate, while its Clause [b] defines defaulter. The issuance of recovery certificate against Ghasiram as he was defaulter is not in dispute. The auction is regulated by Section 222 of Income Tax Act, 1961. As per the said section Second Schedule of the Act regulates to the procedure. Clause 1 [a] defines certificate, while its Clause [b] defines defaulter. The issuance of recovery certificate against Ghasiram as he was defaulter is not in dispute. Clause 4 prescribes the attachment and sale of defaulter's immovable property as one of the mode for recovery. Clause 11 permits Tax Recovery Officer to investigate any claim or objection to the adjudication or sale of any property. Under Clause 11[3], the objector is free to adduce evidence to show his interest or possession on the date of adjudication in the property attached. Sub-clause [4] and [5] points out in what circumstances the Tax Recovery Officer can release the property from attachment and in what circumstances the claim can be disallowed. Under sub-clause [6], if the order is passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, the person aggrieved can file a suit in Civil Court to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute. Subject to result of such suit, the order of Tax Recovery has been given conclusiveness. Clause 62 contemplates setting aside of Sale where defaulter has no salable interest, within 30 days of the sale and upon application by purchaser. Clause 63 deals with confirmation of sale and clause 65 deals with issuance of sale certificate. As per clause 65[1], if the sale of immovable property has become absolute, the Tax Recovery Officer has to grant certificate specifying the property sold in the name of person who at the time of sale is purchaser. Provision of clause 6 which deals with the purchaser's title and provisions of clause 7 which deals with bar of suit in certain circumstances, are important and they need to be considered in the background of the above clauses. These provisions read as under: "6. (1) Where property is sold in execution of a certificate, there shall vest in the purchaser merely the right, title and interest of the defaulter at the time of sale, even though the property itself be specified. These provisions read as under: "6. (1) Where property is sold in execution of a certificate, there shall vest in the purchaser merely the right, title and interest of the defaulter at the time of sale, even though the property itself be specified. (2) Where immovable property is sold in execution of a certificate, and such sale has become absolute, the purchaser's right, title and interest shall be deemed to have vested in him from the time when the property is sold, and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. 7. (1) No suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a' purchase certified by the Tax Recovery Officer in the manner laid down in this Schedule, on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of some one through whom the plaintiff claims. (2) Nothing in this section shall bar a suit to obtain a declaration that the name of any purchaser certified as aforesaid was inserted in the certificate fraudulently or without the consent of the real purchaser, or interfere with the right of a third person to proceed against that property, though ostensibly sold to the certified purchaser, on the ground that it is liable satisfy a claim of such third person against the real owner." It is therefore obvious, that in clause 7, suit prohibited is against any person claiming title under purchase certificate issued by the Tax Recovery Officer and such suit has to be on the ground that purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of some one else through whom the plaintiff claimed to attract the bar. Sub-clause [2] does not bar institution of suit to obtain declaration that name of purchaser mentioned in the sale certificate was inserted fraudulently or without the consent of real purchaser. The provisions do not interfere with the right of third person to proceed against the property though sold ostensibly for certified purchaser on the ground that it is liable to satisfy a claim of such third person against the real owner. Therefore nothing in clause 7 prohibits real owner from filing a suit for declaration of his title as against defaulter or also against the purchaser from defaulter. Therefore nothing in clause 7 prohibits real owner from filing a suit for declaration of his title as against defaulter or also against the purchaser from defaulter. The provision of clause 11 [6] expressly permits an objector before the Tax Recovery Officer to institute a suit to establish right which he claims to the property in dispute. It is no doubt true that order of Tax Recovery Officer is declared final subject to institution of such Civil Suit (if any), but then from the scheme of Second Schedule, it is apparent that the said finality is only for the purpose of auction proceedings. There is nothing in second schedule which prohibits a person who has not raised an objection before the Tax Recovery Officer from filing a suit of nature contemplated by clause 11 [6]. The language of clause 6 is very clear. In clause 6[1] a purchaser gets only the right, title or interest of defaulter at the time of sale and even though property itself is specified in the certificate. Thus, though the suit property is mentioned in certificate, purchaser only got right, title and interest of defaulter Ghasiram. Under Sub-clause [2], if such sale becomes absolute, the right, title and interest of purchaser mentioned in sub-clause [1] are deemed to have vested in him from the time when the property has been sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. Sale becomes absolute in manner provided for in clause 63 and 65. Sub-clause [2] clearly states interest of defaulter does not improve or better itself and what purchaser gets is only the right, title and interest of defaulter. This provision in clause 6, therefore expressly permits challenge before Civil Court by real owner for declaration of his right, title and interest in property proceeded against the defaulter's property by Tax Recovery Officer. There is al ways a presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of civil court and such presumption can be refuted by pointing out an express provision to the contrary, or by pointing out that such jurisdiction is taken away by implication. The language of clause 6 clearly militates with contention that order of Tax Recovery Officer becomes conclusive for ever as it was not challenged by filing Civil Suit either by Mainabai or by other appellants. The language of clause 6 clearly militates with contention that order of Tax Recovery Officer becomes conclusive for ever as it was not challenged by filing Civil Suit either by Mainabai or by other appellants. It is apparent that the order becomes conclusive only in relation to purchase by auction purchaser but not in relation to nature of right, title and interest of defaulter in suit property. It is therefore, also obvious that real owner of the property who has not filed any objection as contemplated by clause 11 before Tax Recovery Officer is free to maintain a civil suit for declaration of his title or other rights in accordance with law, and there is nothing in Second Schedule which prohibits him from doing so. 13. Perusal of evidence of original defendant no.2 - Tax Recovery Officer in these facts is important. The said officer has accepted that Mainabai had filed objection before him vide Exh.1l7 and claimed title. A specific question was put to him and said question and its answer is recorded in question - answer form by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati in paragraph no.7. The said portion is as under: "Question: In view of all this, it is not correct to say that the following two questions arose for your decision? (A) That, the disputed site is part and parcel of Nazul Plot nos.2 and 9 ? (B) And whether Mainabai is the owner of this site? Answer: Yes. These questions arose for my decision. It is true I did not decide, any of these questions because that was not necessary. It is true I did not decide any of these issues because according to me there is a presumption that the site goes with a construction and the construction was admittedly that of the assessee." In paragraph no. 11, this Tax Recovery Officer accepted that he did not go into the question of title and still observed in his order that Mainabai did not prove her overriding right to the suit site. He observed that this was in view of the fact that the assessee was in possession of the suit site for more than 20 years. This evidence therefore clearly shows that the witness has gone by ownership of structure and has not considered the specific claim of Mainabai that she was owner of the site. He observed that this was in view of the fact that the assessee was in possession of the suit site for more than 20 years. This evidence therefore clearly shows that the witness has gone by ownership of structure and has not considered the specific claim of Mainabai that she was owner of the site. Perusal of her objection at Exh.117 also reveals that she pointed out registered partition dated 1.1.1973 and also the purchase by sale deed dated 1302-1957 in support of her title. She also pointed out that Nathusa had rented out portion of plot to assessee on which temporary structure was constructed by assessee [Ghasiram]. She also pointed out how civil suit no.748/1968 was filed in relation to a road to the West of the suit site and also filed copy of the said decree with map along with the objection. All this is not gone into by the original defendant no.2 Tax Recovery Officer. 14. It is seen that the Tax Recovery Officer did not go into the question of title at all, though document on record necessitated it. It was not the case of the Tax Recovery Officer that Ghasiram was tenant in relation to site and he was allowed to erect a temporary structure. That was also not the case of the auction purchaser - defendant no.4. For the first time in evidence they came up with a plea of permanent grant. The provision of clause 11 [6], does not require a person objecting to the attachment before the Tax Recovery Officer to challenge the order of Tax Recovery Officer. Such objector can file a suit for establishing his right, title or interest in the property sought to be proceeded against. It is obvious that in present matter in suit filed on 18-04-1975 the effort was to obtain possession by seeking declaration of title. The sale certificate has been issued on 24-04-1974 and suit has been filed on 18-04-1975 itself. Transposition of Mainabai on 16-08-1977 therefore is of no consequence in so far as the present suit is concerned. Other plaintiffs were and are entitled to maintain civil suit itself independent of Mainabai. It was also not necessary to obtain any relief in relation to the order dated 20-041974 passed by the Tax Recovery Officer. 15. Transposition of Mainabai on 16-08-1977 therefore is of no consequence in so far as the present suit is concerned. Other plaintiffs were and are entitled to maintain civil suit itself independent of Mainabai. It was also not necessary to obtain any relief in relation to the order dated 20-041974 passed by the Tax Recovery Officer. 15. In view of these circumstances, it is apparent that the lower appellate court was not right in upholding the auction dated 15-03-1974 in favour of the original defendant no.4 Gopal, as conferring any right, title or interest to continue to occupy the suit property. It is apparent that in absence of auction, the appellants could have evicted Ghasiram from the suit premises on the basis of their title and by auction conducted by the respondent no.1 and 2, the said right did not dilute itself. Also right of Ghasiram did not enlarge into any permanent grant. What defendant no.4 has purchased through auction dated 15-03-1974 is only the interest of Ghasiram i.e. his right to occupy the suit site. But, no fault can be found with the process of auction undertaken by and conducted by the respondent nos.1 and 2 under the provisions of Income Tax Act and hence question nos.5, 6 and 8 need to be answered in favour of the respondent nos.1 and 2. Question no.4 envisages that the Lower appellate Court has held that Ghasiram was owner of the suit site, however, there is no such finding by the lower appellate court and in paragraph 22 it has held that he was only granted the suit site permanently and right, title and interest of Ghasiram vested in defendant no.4 auction purchaser. The lower appellate court has held that the plaintiffs have proved their title and it has not passed to auction purchaser. In view of this, it is also apparent that question as formulated does not fall for consideration. 16. However, as observed above, the finding of permanent grant is not borne out from the record and it tantamounts to indirectly conferring upon Ghasiram ownership and therefore upon the defendant no.4. Hence in view of this, it has to be said that the Lower Appellate Court was not justified in indirectly conferring the ownership upon Ghasiram by holding him to be a permanent grantee. Parties have advanced their respective arguments on this line only. Hence in view of this, it has to be said that the Lower Appellate Court was not justified in indirectly conferring the ownership upon Ghasiram by holding him to be a permanent grantee. Parties have advanced their respective arguments on this line only. Thus the question thus understood needs to be answered in favour of the present appellant by holding that the lower appellate court could not have denied relief of possession to appellant in view of this finding. 17. Thus, Second Appeals need to be allowed and the reversing judgment and decree dated 07-03-1992 delivered by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Amravati needs to be quashed and set aside and the decree dated 27-07-1984 delivered by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati in Regular Civil Suit No.260/1975 needs to be restored. Rule accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Second appeal allowed.