Order M. Y. Eqbal, ACJ.-By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of' India, petitioner, who is defendant in Title Suit No. 33 of 2001, has challenged the order dated 30.8.2006 passed by Sub-Judge, Koderma whereby he has rejected the application filed by the petitioner for admitting certain documents as exhibits. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff-respondents filed Title Suit No. 33 of 2001 against defendant-petitioner and others for declaration that the suit property is joint ancestral property of Babu Ram, the common ancestor of the parties, and also for declaration that in the record of right, entry of name of defendant in Khata No. 911 is wrong and illegal. On receipt of summon, petitioner appeared in the case and filed petition for time for filing written statement. Since defendant did not file written statement within time, he was debarred from filing written statement by order dated 19.5.2005 and the suit was fixed for ex prate hearing. It is worth to mention here that subsequent thereto, petitioner filed application along with written statement with a prayer to recall the order dated 19.5.2005 and to accept the written statement, but the same was rejected. During hearing of the suit, petitioner filed application on 2.5.2006 with a prayer not to accept the halaknama filed by the plaintiff as evidence on the ground that the same is not genuine document. The said prayer was rejected by the Court. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition on 19.8.2006 in the suit with a prayer to permit him to prove the two sale deeds, Register-II of the Office of Anchal Adhikari, Jhumritilaiya, Collection Book of Jhumritilaiya Municipality, Khatian and order sheet and proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr. P.C. The said petition was objected by the plaintiff-respondent. The said petition was rejected by the Court on the ground that the counsel and the petitioner did not press the same. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner swore an affidavit contending inter alia that on 22.8.2006 he pressed the application. However, the Court below after hearing the parties rejected the said petition by passing the impugned order 30.8.2006. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and, Mr. Raj Kumar Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the impugned order. 4. However, the Court below after hearing the parties rejected the said petition by passing the impugned order 30.8.2006. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and, Mr. Raj Kumar Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the impugned order. 4. From perusal of the order, it appears that the Court below refused to accept these documents into evidence mainly on the ground that petitioner sought to adduce the documents by way of his defense. Relevant portion of the impugned order is worth to be quoted herein-below:- "Perused the record, the suit ponds for hearing u/O. VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. and in view of the nature of the suit, the Of. have been permitted to adduce evidence only to the extent of demolishing the plaintiff's case to arrive at just decision of the suit/dispute. The referred document have been filed on 15.6.05 and the sale deed bearing No.5705 with respect to the suit land executed by Of. Nos.-1 and 3 in favour of one Draupati Oevi and sale deed No. 203 relates with the suit land and as such, it is not acceptable in evidence as this documents clearly appears to be in form of defence and besides this it is specific pleadings of the plaintiff that the title deeds stand in the name of of. No. 1 and in the name of father of of. No. 2 and 3 and as such, the petitioner cannot be permitted to adduce evidence with regard to his own defence or admitted fact. Register-II of Municipality and C.C. of order passed in Eviction T.A. No. 2/04 relates with withdrawal of the appeal in between Mast. Sugiya and Of. No. 1 and others with respect to the suit land and the order passed in a proceeding u/s 144 Cr .P.C. relating to the suit property clearly suggests that these documents relates with self-defence of the Of. No. 1 and in the particular case, the of No. 1 cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to establish his own right, title, interest as he has been debarred from filing W.S. or to support specific pleadings of the plaintiff. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances I find no substance in the prayer and accordingly prayer is refused and the petition dated 19.8.06 stand disposed of. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances I find no substance in the prayer and accordingly prayer is refused and the petition dated 19.8.06 stand disposed of. The learned lawyer for of No. 1 has prayed for time as he wishes to move the Hon' ble Court against the order dated 22.8.06. In the facts and circumstances, discussed above, it clearly appears that the prayer is vexatious with lingering attitude. Even if, the petitioner wishes to file Revision Writ, he may do so, but I do not find any reason to adjourn the suit on that ground. Accordingly, the prayer stand disposed of and the of. No. 1 is directed to adduce evidence, if any, by next date. Put up on 5.9.06." 5. Considering the facts of the case and submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties, the moot question that falls for consideration is as to whether the Court below is justified in refusing to accept documents into evidence from the side of the defendant-petitioner who was debarred from filing written statement. Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. as substituted by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act,2002 fixed time limit for filing written statement. According to this provision, defendants may and if so required by the Court, shall within such time as may be specified in that behalf, present a written statement of its defence. Rule 1A of Order VIII has been inserted by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2002. The provision reads as under:- "R. 1A. Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him.-(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents.-(a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory." 6. From bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that where defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession, shall produce the same along-with written statement. Sub-rule (3) of the Rule provides that such document which ought to be produced along-with written statement, was not produced, shall be received in evidence with the leave of the Court. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1A is an exception to the aforesaid rule which says that. the defendant will be at liberty to produce documents for cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses or the said document handed over to the witnesses merely to refresh his memory. 7. Rule 10 of Order VIII is relevant for the purpose of deciding the question involved in this application which reads as under:- "R.10. Procedure when party fails to present written statement called far by Caurt-Where any part from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up." 8. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is manifestly clear that on the failure of the defendant to file written statement in the manner provided under the provision of Order VIII, Rule 1 C.P.C. and also under Order VIII, Rule 9 C.P.C., the Court shall pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such order in relation to the suit. In other words, Rule 10 gives discretion to the Court either to pronounce judgment or to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In other words, Rule 10 gives discretion to the Court either to pronounce judgment or to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. By judicial pronouncement it is now well settled that by reason of non-filing of written statement, defendant is visited with adverse consequences but such failure of defendant in filing written statement cannot be construed to be an admission and cannot ipso facto entitle the plaintiff to get a decree without proof of his case. 9. Before proceeding further to decide the question, I would like to quote few paragraphs of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah and Am. [ AIR 1955 S.C. 425 ], where their Lordships have laid down the principles with regard to interpretation of statute particularly the Code of Civil Procedure:- "16. Now a Code of Procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." Their Lordships further observed:- "32. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." Their Lordships further observed:- "32. We have seen that if the defendant does not appear at the first hearing, the court can proceed ex parte, which means that it can proceed without a written statement; and Order 9 Rule 7 makes it clear that unless good cause is shown the defendant cannot be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared. That means that he cannot put in a written statement unless he is allowed to do so, and if the case is one in which the court considers a written statement should have been put in, the consequences entailed by Order 8 Rule 10 must be suffered. What those consequences should be in a given case is for the court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to determine. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. In some cases an order awarding costs to the plaintiff would meet the ends of justice: an adjournment can be granted or a written statement can be considered on the spot and issues framed. In other cases, the ends of justice may call for more drastic action. 33. Now when we speak of the ends of justice, we mean justice not only to the defendant and to the other side but also to witnesses and others who may be inconvenienced. It is an unfortunate fact that the convenience of the witness is ordinarily lost sight of in this class of case and yet he is the one that deserves the greatest consideration. As a rule, he is not particularly interested in the dispute but he is vitally interested in his own affairs which he is compelled to abandon because a court orders him to come to the assistance of one or other of the parties to a dispute. His own business has to suffer. He may have to leave his family and his affairs for days on end. He is usually out of pocket. Often he is a poor man living in an out of the way village and may have to trudge many .weary miles on his feet. His own business has to suffer. He may have to leave his family and his affairs for days on end. He is usually out of pocket. Often he is a poor man living in an out of the way village and may have to trudge many .weary miles on his feet. And when he gets there, there are no arrangements for him. He is not given accommodation; and when he reaches the court, in most places there is no room in which he can wait. He has to loiter about in the verandah or under the trees, shivering in the cold of winter and exposed to the heat of summer, wet and miserable in the rains: and then, after wasting hours and sometimes days for his turn, he is brusquely told that he must go back and come again another day. Justice strongly demands that this unfortunate section of the general public compelled to discharge public duties, usually at loss and inconvenience to themselves, should not be ignored in the overall picture of what will best serve the ends of justice and it may well be a sound exercise of discretion in a given case to refuse an adjournment and permit the plaintiff to examine the witnesses present and not allow the defendant to cross-examine them, still less to adduce his own evidence. It all depends on the particular case. But broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavor should be to avoid snap decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity of fighting out their cases fairly and squarely. Costs will be adequate compensation in many cases and in others the court has almost unlimited discretion about the terms it can impose provided always the discretion is judicially exercised and is not arbitrary." 10. In the case of Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo [AIR 1989 Supreme Court 162], the Supreme Court considered the nature and scope of rights available to the defendant whose defence has been struck-off under Section 17(3) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. While deciding the question, the Supreme Court considered the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Firstly, Their Lordships observed:- "We agree that full effect should be given to the words that defence against ejectment is struck off. While deciding the question, the Supreme Court considered the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Firstly, Their Lordships observed:- "We agree that full effect should be given to the words that defence against ejectment is struck off. But does this really deprive the defendant-tenant of further participation in the case in any manner? While it is true that, in a broad sense, the right of defence takes in, within its canvass, all aspects including the demolition of the plaintiff's case by the cross-examination of his witnesses, it would be equally correct to say that the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses really constitutes a finishing touch which completes the plaintiff's case. It is a well-established proposition that no oral testimony can be considered satisfactory or valid unless it is tested by cross-examination. The mere statement of the plaintiff's witnesses cannot constitute the plaintiff's evidence in the case unless and until it is tested by cross-examination. The right of the defence to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses can, therefore, be looked upon not as a part of its own strategy of defence but rather as a requirement without which the plaintiff's evidence cannot be acted upon. Looked at from this point of view it should be possible to take the view that, though the defence of the tenant has been struck out, there is nothing in law to preclude him from demonstrating to the court that the plaintiff's witnesses are not speaking the truth or that the evidence put forward by the plaintiff is not sufficient to fulfil the terms of the statute. To us it appears that the basic principle that where a plaintiff comes to the court he must prove his case should not be whittled down even in a case where "no. defendant appears. It will at once be clear that to say that the court can only do this by looking at the plaintiff's evidence and pleadings supplemented by such questions as the court may consider necessary and to completely eliminate any type Of assistance from the defendant in this task will place the court under a great handicap in discovering the truth or otherwise of the plaintiff's statements. For after all, the court on its own motion, can do very little to ascertain the truth or other-vise of the plaintiff's averments and it is only the opposite party that will be more familiar with the detailed facts of a particular case and that can assist the court in pointing out defects, weaknesses, errors and inconsistencies of the plaintiff's case. We, therefore, think that the defendant should be allowed his right of cross-examination and arguments. But we are equally clear that this right should be subject to certain important safeguards. The first of these is that the defendant cannot be allowed to lead his own evidence. None of the observations or decisions cited have gone to the extent of suggesting that, in spite of the fact that the defence has been struck off, the defendant can adduce evidence of his own or try to substantiate his own case." 11. Their Lordships further observed:- "An objection to our above conclusion has been raised on the basis of the provisions of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rules 1, 5 and 10 of this Order have been recently amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. We find nothing in these rules which will support the contention urged on behalf of the respondents. Rule 1 merely requires that the defendant should present a written statement of his defence within the time permitted by the court. Under Rule 5(2), where the defendant has not filed a pleading it shall be lawful for the court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts ,contained in the plaint except against a person under disability but the court may in its discretion require any such fact to be proved. Again under Rule 10 when any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court "shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". It will be seen that these rules are only permissive in nature. They enable the court in an appropriate case to pronounce a decree straightway on the basis of the plaint and the averments contained therein. It will be seen that these rules are only permissive in nature. They enable the court in an appropriate case to pronounce a decree straightway on the basis of the plaint and the averments contained therein. Though the present language of Rule 10 says that the court "shall" pronounce judgment against him, it is obvious from the language of the rule that there is still an option with the court either to pronounce judgment on the basis of the plaint against the defendant or to make such other appropriate order as the court may think fit. Therefore, there is nothing in these rules, which makes it mandatory for the court to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff straightway because a written statement has not been filed. Reference was made before us to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5. This sub-rule, however, has application only in a case where a pleading is filed but does not contain a specific or implicit denial of the averments contained in the plaint or other document to which it is a reply. Rule 5(1) cannot be made use of to sustain the contention that where there is no written statement the court is bound to accept the statements contained in the plaint and pass a decree straightway. These provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, far from supporting the contentions of the plaintiff that a decree on the basis of the plaint should follow a failure to file the written statement, rather indicate a contrary position, namely, that even in such cases, it is a matter for the court to exercise a. discretion as to the manner in which the further proceedings should take place. We, therefore, do not think that the terms of Order 8 in any way conflict with the conclusion reached by us." 12. In the case of Balraj Taneja and Anr. vs. Sunil Madan and Anr. [ (1999)8 S.C.C. 396 ), the Supreme Court discussed elaborately the provisions of Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the fact was that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed a suit in May, 1996 against the appellant for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 6.8.1992 in respect of suit property located in New Delhi. The appellant appeared in Court but despite several opportunities granted to the defendant, written statement was not filed. In that case, the fact was that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed a suit in May, 1996 against the appellant for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 6.8.1992 in respect of suit property located in New Delhi. The appellant appeared in Court but despite several opportunities granted to the defendant, written statement was not filed. The High Court at that point of time decreed the suit under Order VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. and directed the plaintiff to deposit balance sale consideration. The matter went up-to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the appellant-defendant that the High Court had adopted purely a punitive approach which had resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. It was also contended that the suit could not have been decreed under Order VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. only because no written statement had been filed and only facts stated out in the plaint were proved. Allowing the appeal filed by the defendant, the Supreme Court held:- "14. This rule, namely Rule 10, was also amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976). Prior to its amendment, it was held in a number of decisions that the rule can be invoked only in those situations where the court has required the defendant to file the written statement in terms of Rule 9 of Order 8 A few other High Courts had taken the view that this rule would be applicable even to those cases where a written statement was required to be filed under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC. The conflict of decisions has been set at rest by providing specifically under this rule that where a party from whom a written statement is required either under Rule 1 or Rule 9 of Order 8 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. Rule 10 thus governs both the situations where a written statement is required under Rule 1 of Order 8 as also where it has been demanded under Rule 9. Rule 10 thus governs both the situations where a written statement is required under Rule 1 of Order 8 as also where it has been demanded under Rule 9. In both the situations, if the written statement has not been filed by the defendant, it will be open to the court to pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. It is to be noticed that if the written statement is not filed, the court is required to pronounce judgment against the defendant. The words "against him" are to be found in Rule 10 of Order 8 which obviously means that the judgment will be pronounced against the defendant. This rule also gives a-discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". These words are of immense significance, inasmuch as they give a-discretion to the court not to pronounce judgment against the defendant and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. 15. There are thus two separate and distinct provisions under which the court can pronounce judgment on the failure of the defendant to file written statement. The failure may be either under Order 8 Rule 5(2) under which the court may either pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts set out in the plaint or require the plaintiff to prove any such fact; or the failure may be under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC under which the court is required to pronounce judgment against the defendant or to pass such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. 27. In view of the above, it is clear that the court, at no stage, can act blindly or mechanically. While enabling the court to pronounce judgment in a situation where no written statement is filed by the defendant, the court has also been given the discretion to pass such order as it may think fit as an alternative. This is also the position under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC where the court can either pronounce judgment against the defendant or pass such order as it may think fit. 29. This is also the position under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC where the court can either pronounce judgment against the defendant or pass such order as it may think fit. 29. As pointed out earlier, the court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court. In a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant, the court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of the court's satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission the court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression "the court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved" used in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression "may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit" used in Rule 10 of Order 8." 13. In the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya vs. Anil Panjwani [AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2508], the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the defendant has a right to file counterclaim without filing a written statement. Answering the question, the Supreme Court observed:- "26. In the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya vs. Anil Panjwani [AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2508], the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the defendant has a right to file counterclaim without filing a written statement. Answering the question, the Supreme Court observed:- "26. A perusal of the above said provisions shows that it is the Amendment Act of 1976 which has conferred a statutory right on a defendant to file a counter-claim. The relevant words of Rule 6A are:- "A defendant in a suit may in addition to his right of pleading a setoff under Rule 6, ... before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired .... " These words go to show that a pleading by way of counter-claim runs with the right of filing a written statement and that such right to set up a counter-claim is in addition to the right of pleading a set-off conferred by Rule 6. A set-off has to be pleaded in the written statement. The counter-claim must necessarily find its place in the written statement. Once the right of the defendant to file written statement has been lost or the time limited for delivery of the defence has expired then neither can the written statement be filed as of right nor a counter-claim can be allowed to be raised, for the counter -claim under Rule 6A must find its place in the written statement. The court has a discretion to permit a written statement being filed belatedly and, therefore, has a discretion also to permit a written statement containing a plea in the nature of set-off or counterclaim being filed belatedly but needless to say such discretion shall be exercised in a reasonable manner keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case including the conduct of the defendant, and the fact whether a belated leave of the court would cause prejudice to the plaintiff or take away a vested right which has accrued to the plaintiff by lapse of time. 33. So far as the plea of bar as to maintainability of suit for failure to seek further relief is concerned, we cannot find fault with the plaint as framed. 33. So far as the plea of bar as to maintainability of suit for failure to seek further relief is concerned, we cannot find fault with the plaint as framed. The defendant was alleged to be a rank trespasser who was in the process of committing a trespass and was allegedly raising unauthorized construction over the property neither owned nor legally possessed by him. The relief of specific performance is not a further relief to which the plaintiff is entitled or which he could have sought for against this defendant. Thus, from the point of view of the present defendant, we cannot find any such defect or infirmity in the relief sought for by the plaintiff as would render the suit not maintainable and liable to be thrown out at the threshold. But there is substance in the other limb of this submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant-appellant. Even if the suit proceeds ex parte and in the absence of a written statement, unless the applicability of Order 8 Rule 10 CPC is attracted and the court acts there-under, the necessity of proof by the plaintiff of his case to the satisfaction of the court cannot be dispensed with. In the absence of denial of plaint averments the burden of proof on the plaintiff is not very heavy. A prima facie proof of the relevant facts constituting the cause of action would suffice and the court would grant the plaintiff such relief as to which he may in law be found entitled. In a case which has proceeded ex parte the court is not bound to frame issues under Order 14 and deliver the judgment on every issue as required by Order 20 Rule 5. Yet the trial court should scrutinize the available pleadings and documents, consider the evidence adduced, and would do well to frame the "points for determination" and proceed to construct the ex parte judgment dealing with the points at issue one by one. Merely because the defendant is absent the court shall not admit evidence the admissibility whereof is excluded by law nor permit its decision being influenced by irrelevant or inadmissible evidence." 14. In the case of Kailash vs.Nanhku and Others [2005 AIRSCW 2346], after discussing the provision of Order VIII, Rule 1 C.P.C., their Lordships observed:- "27. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. In the case of Kailash vs.Nanhku and Others [2005 AIRSCW 2346], after discussing the provision of Order VIII, Rule 1 C.P.C., their Lordships observed:- "27. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar (1975)1 SCC 774 are pertinent:- "The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to-act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable .... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence-processual, as much as substantive." 15. In the instant case, it appears that after the defendant No.1-petitioner was debarred from filing written statement, an application was filed by the petitioner for review of its early order. While rejecting the said petition by order dated 9.3.2006, the Court below noticed that the suit is in between the members of family and the relief sought was for declaration that the suit property is joint ancestral property. The Court below therefore permitted the petitioner to participate in the hearing and to adduce evidence only to the extent of demolishing the case of the plaintiff for arriving at just decision in the suit. Relevant portion of the order dated 9.3.2006 passed by the Court below is quoted herein-below:- "The present suit is in between the members of a family said to be a joint family and relief has been sought for by the plaintiff to declare the suit property as joint ancestral property. Relevant portion of the order dated 9.3.2006 passed by the Court below is quoted herein-below:- "The present suit is in between the members of a family said to be a joint family and relief has been sought for by the plaintiff to declare the suit property as joint ancestral property. Provision contained in u/o. VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. clearly provides that on non-filing of W.S., the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relating to the suit as it thinks fit. In the instant suit in the light of nature of suit as well as facts pleaded by the plaintiff regarding recording of suit land in the name of defendants and record of right, is felt necessary to ask the defendant NO.1, who is participating in hearing, to adduce evidence only to the extent of demolishing the plaintiff's case to arrive at just decision of the suit/dispute. In view of the facts and circum circumstances, I find no substance in plaintiff's petition to review earlier order. Accordingly, prayer is refused and petition stand disposed of. Put up, hearing on 16.3.2006." 16. It was because of the aforesaid order, defendant No.1-petitioner examined one witness on 22.8.2006 and the case was adjourned for further evidence. The said order dated 9.3.2006 or the order by which the petitioner was allowed to adduce evidence was not challenged by the plaintiff. In the aforesaid premises, when the Court allowed the petitioner to adduce evidence in order to demolish the case of the plaintiff, then at the initial stage, Court below ought not to have debarred the petitioner from adducing documentary evidence. The question whether these documentary evidence will be used to demolish the plaintiff's case or will be used as defence, should have been considered at the time of argument and delivering judgment. While deciding the suit, if the Court below finds that the documentary evidence does not demolish the plaintiff's case, rather make out a defence case, then these evidence could be ignored by the Court. 17. As noticed above, the procedural law designed to facilitate natural justice must be followed and, therefore, parties must be given opportunity to place their record to the extent permissible in law. In my opinion, therefore, the defendant-petitioner should be allowed to adduce evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses in order to demolish the case of the plaintiff. 17. As noticed above, the procedural law designed to facilitate natural justice must be followed and, therefore, parties must be given opportunity to place their record to the extent permissible in law. In my opinion, therefore, the defendant-petitioner should be allowed to adduce evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses in order to demolish the case of the plaintiff. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The Court below is directed to proceed with the matter in the manner directed hereinbefore.