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2008 DIGILAW 574 (PNJ)

Jage Ram v. Hoshiar Singh

2008-02-28

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA

body2008
Judgment Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Hoshiar Singh son of Khem Chand and Braham Parkash son of Inder Singh, respondents, were prosecuted in case FIR No. 221 dated 9.9.1990 registered at Police Station Sadar, Bahadurgarh under Sections 323, 324, 325, 452, 34 IPC. 2. The accused/respondents were tried and have been acquitted by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Bahadurgarh. Aggrieved against the same, Jage Ram, complainant, has filed the present revision petition. 3. Petitioner Jage Ram while lodging FIR has stated that they are five brothers namely, Dharamchand, Ramsvaroop, petitioner himself, Chanderbhan and Rati Ram. It is stated that in the year 1987, on the festival of Holi, his two brothers Chanderbhan and Rati Ram were murdered by Hoshiar Singh, Mahender sons of Khem Chand and Braham son of Inder Singh. There was a dispute between the parties over a passage, which was subject matter of Civil Court. It is stated that in the Civil Court, complainant party has succeeded. The Sessions Court, Rohtak, had acquitted the accused/respondents. The cause of grudge is having lost in Civil Court, accused/respondents on 8.9.1990 at about 10.30 P.M. came in the courtyard of the complainant and by scaling the boundary wall. Both accused/respondents entered the house of complainant and they caused injuries with farsa and jailly. Injured were examined. Thereafter, case was registered. Both the accused/respondents had been arrested. 4. Prosecution submitted a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., thereafter, charges were framed against the respondents/accused and they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution examined PW. 1 Jage Ram, injured. He reiterated his version given in the FIR. PW. 2 Mahabir had corroborated his testimony. Learned trial Court noticed that despite various opportunities given, no witness was examined except Jage Ram as PW. 1 and Mahabir as PW. 2 and prosecution evidence was to be closed by order of Court. 5. Learned trial Court took into consideration that due to absence of medical evidence, no offence under Section 324 & 325 IPC is proved. 6. Learned Court below also took into consideration delay in lodging of FIR and held that since there was a long enmity between the parties, implicit reliance cannot be placed upon the witnesses and they were not being corroborated by any independent source. Findings of the Court below are probable and are based upon appreciation of evidence. 7. 6. Learned Court below also took into consideration delay in lodging of FIR and held that since there was a long enmity between the parties, implicit reliance cannot be placed upon the witnesses and they were not being corroborated by any independent source. Findings of the Court below are probable and are based upon appreciation of evidence. 7. It was held in Mahendra Partap Singh v. Sarju Singh and Anr., relying upon D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, as under: Only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is misappreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them. 8. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, Honble apex Court observed as under: This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Courts power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Courts power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. 9. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This Court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. "In other words" said this Court, "the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 10. Similar view was reiterated by Honble apex Court in Bansi Lal and Ors. v. Laxman Singh. 11. Again, Honble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and Ors. 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and Anr. v. Laxman Singh. 11. Again, Honble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and Ors. 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and Anr. (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. 12. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned Counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. 13. There is no merit. Present revision petition is dismissed.