Judgement PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J. :- This appeal has been preferred at the instance of the writ petitioners from the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge whereby and whereunder the said learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition on merits. 2. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that the lands owned by them and their ancestors were acquired by the State of West Bengal for Durgapur Steel Plant. It has been specifically submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Durgapur Steel Plant Authorities could not utilise major portion of the aforesaid acquired lands and the said appellants are in possession of those unutilised lands. The writ petitioners have challenged the mode of utilisation of the excess lands by the requiring authority namely, Durgapur Steel Plant. 3. Pursuant to the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government at the behest of the Durgapur Steel Plant, several plots of lands had been acquired in the year 1957 and compensation had duly been paid to the concerned land losers. Undisputedly, a portion of the land so acquired at the behest of the Durgapur Steel Plant remained unutilised. Since then, the Government of West Bengal had approached Durgapur Steel Plant for relinquishment of portions of unutilised land for development purposes, i.e. for construction of four lane National Highway as also for transfer of land in favour of Asansol Durgapur Development Authority for carrying out other development activities as per its master plan. Subsequently, by office order dated 5th September, 1994 the Government of West Bengal accorded sanction for resumption of the portions of land unutilised by Durgapur Steel Plant. Out of the portions of land so resumed by the Government of West Bengal, a part thereof was handed over to Asansol Durgapur Development Authority for development purposes. Such resumption by the State Government and subsequent transfer of such resumed land to Asansol Durgapur Development Authority is the subject matter of challenge in the writ application filed on behalf of the appellants herein. 4. It ha been claimed in the writ petition by the writ petitioners, namely the appellants herein that the aforesaid excess unutilised lands should have either been derequisitioned or returned back to them by way of settlement. 5. 4. It ha been claimed in the writ petition by the writ petitioners, namely the appellants herein that the aforesaid excess unutilised lands should have either been derequisitioned or returned back to them by way of settlement. 5. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed by the learned single Judge inter alia by holding that land once acquired vests in the State and the erstwhile owners have no right to question the subsequent utilisation of the said land. 6. In course of hearing, learned senior counsel representing the appellants urged before this Court that in the event the requiring body, i.e. Durgapur Steel Plant was not interested in utilising the land for the original purpose for which it was acquired, it was not open to such requiring body to relinquish the excess land in favour of Asansol Durgapur Development Authority or in favour of any other agency. It is further argued that the requiring body in such an eventuality was duty-bound to dispose of such land by public auction in which the writ petitioners would have the right to participate. The learned Senior Counsel of the appellants referred to and relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 432 : ( AIR 1997 SC 2703 ). The principal claim of the writ petitioners for settlement of land in their favour as mentioned in the writ petition was, however, not pressed. 7. From the records, however, we find that the District Magistrate, Burdwan while attending a joint meeting held in Durgapur on 11th April, 1994 proposed that about 400 acres of land given to the Durgapur Steel Plant might be relinquished by the said Durgapur Steel Plant authorities for the purpose of different developmental work. In response to such proposal, the Managing Director, Durgapur Steel Plant agreed in principle to relinquish the surplus 400 acres of land in favour of the Government of West Bengal. Ultimately, the Steel Authority of India Limited through Durgapur Steel Plant relinquished about 400 acres of excess unutilised lands in favour of the State Government for resumption and subsequent transfer of the same to Asansol Durgapur Development Authority. Ultimately, the Steel Authority of India Limited through Durgapur Steel Plant relinquished about 400 acres of excess unutilised lands in favour of the State Government for resumption and subsequent transfer of the same to Asansol Durgapur Development Authority. The Government of West Bengal took over possession of the said lands from Durgapur Steel Plant through the District Land and Land Reforms Officer, Burdwan on or about 2nd December, 1994 and handed over the same to the said Asansol Durgapur Development Authority. 8. Mr. Sumit Panja, learned counsel representing the Durgapur Steel Plant Authority specifically urged before this Court that Durgapur Steel Plant transferred the unutilised 400 acres of excess land to the State of West Bengal. 9. It is thus clear that the assumption which formed the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the Durgapur Steel Plant Authority relinquished the excess lands in favour of the Asansol Durgapur Development Authority is patently erroneous. The Durgapur Steel Plant Authority did not settle any excess land in favour of the Asansol Durgapur Development Authority. 10. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the excess lands unutilised by the Durgapur Steel Plant were relinquished in favour of the State Government and the same were being utilised by the State Government for other public purposes. 11. The State Government has given the land to Asansol Durgapur Development Authority. The said authority is not working for any private gain but the said authority has been functioning for development of Asansol and Durgapur. In other words the said authority is acting in the interest of the public and the purpose of giving the excess land to the authority comes squarely within public purpose and such use of the land for public purpose other than the original purpose is not illegal. 12. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rudradhar R. Trivedi v. State of maharashtra through The Secretary, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 60 : ( AIR 1996 SC 3457 ) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held : "3...............It is settled law that the land acquired for public purpose can be transferred to another public purpose. Paramount consideration will be service of the public purpose..............." 13. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala (supra), Mr. Paramount consideration will be service of the public purpose..............." 13. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala (supra), Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, learned senior counsel representing the appellants submits that the ands in question should have been put to public auction. Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid decision is set out hereunder : "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provisions of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value." 14. In the instant case, excess lands lying unutilised by the Durgapur Steel Plant were being utilised by the State Government for other public purposes and as such question of auctioning such unutilised lands following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court cannot and does not arise. The proposition of law sought to be propounded by the writ petitioners/appellants, to the effect that excess land must be used for a different public purpose by the same body for whom land was originally acquired, does not find place in the aforesaid judgment relied on by the appellants. The proposition of law sought to be propounded by the writ petitioners/appellants, to the effect that excess land must be used for a different public purpose by the same body for whom land was originally acquired, does not find place in the aforesaid judgment relied on by the appellants. In the aforesaid decision, Supreme Court has clearly held that if the land is acquired for a specific public purpose then after the said public purpose is achieved, excess land can be used for any other public purpose. In any event, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands in question were completed and, therefore, the appellants herein or their ancestors stood divested of all their rights, title and interests therein. 15. Mr. S. P. Sarkar, learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent No. 9 referred to and relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 405 and in the case of Madurai Coats Ltd. v. The Workman of Madurai Coats Ltd., represented by the Secretary, reported in AIR 1977 SC 448 in support of his arguments while opposing the claims of the appellants herein. Mr. Sarkar submits that the lands in question had been acquired long back and, therefore, mode and manner of utilisation of the said lands so acquired for public purpose can be of no concern to the writ petitioners. Mr. Sarkar further submits that the said writ petitioners, namely, the appellants herein having no subsisting legal right in the lands in question cannot maintain the writ application and/or obtain the reliefs prayed for. Mr. Sarkar referred to and relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Ramachandra Dev reported in AIR 1964 SC 685 . 16. In the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically observed : "2................We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification........................" 17. In the case of Madurai Coats Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court held as hereunder : "5...............There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 5(3) declaration." 18. We find merits in the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Sarkar. The appellants herein cannot have any right in respect of the lands in question which undisputedly vests in the State of West Bengal after completion of the acquisition proceedings and payment of the compensation amount. Furthermore, land acquired for a specific public purpose can also be utilised for another public purpose. 19. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has rightly decided the issues raised in the writ petition while dismissing the same on merits and we find no reason to interfere with the aforesaid decision of the learned single Judge. 20. Therefore, we dismiss the instant appeal, the same being devoid of any merit and affirm the judgment and order under appeal passed by the learned single Judge. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there will be, however, no order as to costs. 22. Let urgent Xerox certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates of the parties on usual undertaking. 23. TAPAN MUKHERJEE, J. :- I agree. LATTER : 24. After pronouncement of the judgment, Ms. Debjani Sengupta, learned counsel for the appellants prays for stay of the operation of the said judgment and order. We find no reason to grant such stay. 25. Accordingly, the prayer for stay is refused. Order accordingly.