ORDER M.M. Das, J. - Heard Mr. G. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. N.K. Sahu, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party. 2. The opposite party herein as filed Election Misc. Case No. 98 of 2007 u/s 31 of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 (in short 'the Act') before the Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Bhadrak against the writ Petitioner, who is the returned candidate in the election to the post of Sarpanch of Bhagabanpur Gram Panchayat under Dhamnagar Block in the district of Bhadrak, inter alia, pleading that the Petitioner is a defaulter member of Bhadrak Sub-Division House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. and has failed to pay the loan amount. The Petitioner suppressed such material in his affidavit annexed to his nomination paper. It has been further alleged by the opposite party in the Election Petition that at the time of filing of nomination as he did not have authenticated copy to support his allegation made against the Petitioner, the nomination of the Petitioner was accepted and the allegation made by the opposite party was not enquired into. Accordingly, the opposite party pleaded in the Election Petition that the Petitioner was disqualified to be elected as Sarpanch of the Grama Panchayat u/s 25 of the Act. Written statement has been filed by the Petitioner before the Court below denying the allegation made against him in the Election Petition and specifically stating that he is not a defaulter member of the Bhadrak Sub-Division House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. or that he has suppressed such materials in his affidavit annexed to his nomination paper and he was not disqualified from being elected as Sarpanch. However, it has been stated in the written statement that the Petitioner, who is the opposite party in the Court below appeared to be the Assistant Registrar Co-operative Society, Bhadrak in Dispute Case No. 680 $2003-04 and contested the claim made against him. On 12.12.2003, the said Assistant Registrar adjourned the case without fixing any date and it was ordered that the date would be communicated later on, but no further communication was made to the Petitioner. It was for the first time the Petitioner learnt about the passing of the order by the Assistant Registrar from the averments made in the Election Petition. It was for the first time the Petitioner learnt about the passing of the order by the Assistant Registrar from the averments made in the Election Petition. Thereupon, he contacted his Advocate, who on enquiry informed the Petitioner regarding disposal of the said, dispute case, upon which the Petitioner made queries the Office of the Assistant Registrar and obtained the certified copy of the order and has filed an appeal against the said order before the Appellate Tribunal. He specifically pleaded that no notice has town served upon him after the order was passed by the Assistant Registrar in the said dispute case and, as such, he was not aware abut passing of the said order and after coming to know of the same, he has challenged the said order in a properly constituted appeal, which is subjudice. It was, therefore, contended in the written statement that no finality can be attached to the order/award passed by the Assistant Registrar in the dispute case. 3. During pendency of the Election Case, on behalf of tire election Petitioner (opposite party herein), a notice said to have been served on the present Petitioner was called for and on perusal of the said document, the Petitioner alleged that he could come to know that the signature appearing in the said notice, in support of acknowledgement of the same, is not his signature and the said signature has been forged. The Petitioner, therefore, filed an application, inter alia, making a prayer to send the notice for comparison with the admitted signature of the Petitioner to the handwriting expert. Learned Court below by order dated 08.11.2007 directed that the said petition will be consider at the time of the hearing of the case. When the case was made ready for hearing, the Petitioner, who is the opposite party in life Court below, filed another petition for sending the notice, marked as Ext.4, for comparison with his admitted signature, by a hand writing expert, contending therein that the issue regarding service of notice was the most important issue in the case and the learned Court below by its order dated 23.05.2008 rejected the said petition filed by the Petitioner. The said order has been annexed as Annexure*5 to the petition. Being aggrieved by the said order under Annexure-5, the Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate relief. 4. The said order has been annexed as Annexure*5 to the petition. Being aggrieved by the said order under Annexure-5, the Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate relief. 4. Before issuance of rule in this writ application, the opposite party has suo motu appeared in the case through his counsel. 5. Mr. G. Mishra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently argued that Section 25 of the Act prescribes the conditions on which a person shall be disqualified for being or nominated as a Sarpanch or any other member of the Grama Panchayat constituted under the Act. Section 25(1)(1) provides that a person being a member of a Cooperative Society, who has failed to pay any arrear of any kind accrued due by him to such Society before filing of the nominal paper in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, would be construed to be disqualified for being elected or nominated as a Sarpanch or any other member of the Grama Panchayat; provided that in respect of such arrears, a bill or a notice has been duly served upon him and the time, if any, specified thereon has expired (emphasis supplied). Mr. Mishra, therefore, submitted that since the election Petitioner (opposite party herein) has filed the Election Petition on the sole ground that the Petitioner has earned disqualification under the above Clause (1) of Sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act, it is essentially the only issue to be decided in the case, as to whether, a bill or notice was duly served upon the Petitioner and upon such service, the time granted in such notice has expired and the Petitioner has failed to pay the arrear dues. He, therefore, submitted that it being the only issue on which, the case is to be decided. It was incumbent upon the Court below to allow the prayer of the Petitioner and send the disputed signature in the notice Ext.4 to be compared with the admitted signature of the Petitioner by a handwriting expert. Mr. He, therefore, submitted that it being the only issue on which, the case is to be decided. It was incumbent upon the Court below to allow the prayer of the Petitioner and send the disputed signature in the notice Ext.4 to be compared with the admitted signature of the Petitioner by a handwriting expert. Mr. Mishra contended that this is not a case where the Court should take the responsibility to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature of the Petitioner and should have sent the same for comparison by a handwriting expert, for doing complete justice between the parties and effectually deciding the sole issue involved in the case. In support of his contention, Mr. Mishra, relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Gobind Ch. Panda v. Darsan Ch. Rout and Ors. 35 (1969) CUT 1108 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O. Bharatan Vs. K. Sudhakaran and another, . 6. Mr. Sahu, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party, per contra, submitted that the learned Court below has not committed any illegality in rejecting the prayer of the Petitioner and refusing to send the disputed signature in the notice under Ext.4 to the handwriting expert for being compared with the admitted signature of the Petitioner. He further submitted that it is always open for the Court to compare the disputed signature and come to a finding whether the signature belongs to the same person or not. In support of his submission, he also relied upon the decision in the case of O. Bharathan (supra). Both the parties also relied upon the decision in the case of Murarilal v. State of M.P. AIR 1980 S.C. 531 . 7. On perusal of the impugned order under Annexure-5, it is seen that the learned Court below analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case came to a conclusion as follows: In the present facts and circumstances and the admitted evidence of the O.P. it is crystal clear that the O.P. was well aware of the disputed case before filing of nomination paper and also he has admitted that he has not repaid loan amount due on him as against the decree in dispute case No. 680/03-04. So, in this case, the signature in Ext.4 to my mind, is not relevant at all for sending it to the hand-writing expert for comparison and this process, if exercised, will, certainly, take longer period and by that time, the terms of the Sarpanch will, certainly, be over. Further, in view of the Hon'ble Court's direction in writ petition case No. 12859/07 wherein this Court is directed to dispose of the matter/case as expeditiously as possible, I am not inclined to allow such petition filed by the Opp.Party. That apart, the Court being an expert of the experts can verify and compare in bare eyes of these signature for the limited purpose in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 8. The learned Court also took note of the decision in the case of O. Bharathan (supra) and on the ground that the facts of the said case is completely different from the case in hand, did not rely upon the same. It further appears that the learned Court below, taking note of the fact that the Petitioner has disputed the signature on the notice, held that such dispute has got no meaning in view of the admission of the Petitioner (opposite party in Court below) that he is well aware of the result of the dispute case much before filing of nomination paper. He further held that the alleged signature whether disputed or admitted is in no way relevant to the present case. In the case of Gobind Ch. Panda (supra), a Bench of this Court, while dealing with similar question as raised in the present case, have categorically held that in election law, the plea of disqualification has to be established by the election Petitioner against his rival. The entire burden to establish such disqualification would be on the election Petitioner, who seeks to challenge the election on the ground that a disqualification is attached to the elected candidate and the evidence required to establish the existence of such disqualification must be conclusive. The entire burden to establish such disqualification would be on the election Petitioner, who seeks to challenge the election on the ground that a disqualification is attached to the elected candidate and the evidence required to establish the existence of such disqualification must be conclusive. The Hon'ble Judges after referring to the decision in the case of Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1954 SC 211 and relying upon the ratio of the said decision, where it was laid down by the Apex Court that it is well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate, who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law, and then examining the provision u/s 25(1)(l) of the Act, held that the arrears must have accrued due in order that the disqualification may arise. The use of the word 'accrued' clearly goes to indicate that the legislature intended to provide that there must have been a due on the basis of a determination. 'Accrued' means, according to the dictionary, "to arise or spring as a natural growth or result"; "coming as a natural accession or result; arising in due course". It refers to "the existence of a present enforceable right" or "fixed" or "assessed and determined". It was further held that the use of word "accrued" in the aforesaid section of the Act clearly gives indication that the disqualification is contemplated to arise only when there has been an ascertainment of the dues and the Society has the right in present to recover the said amount and in spite of quantification of the liability and consequent notice of demand to pay, the concerned person has defaulted (emphasis supplied). A mere demand raised by the Co-operative Stores on the basis that a certain sum of money is payable by the Petitioner when he refutes his liability to pay the same cannot give rise to a position when it can be said that a certain amount has "accrued due" to the stores. It is no doubt true that in the facts of the said case there was no ascertainment or quantification of amount due by any statutory authority out the demand was raised basing on an audit of the accounts of tire Co-operative Stores. It is no doubt true that in the facts of the said case there was no ascertainment or quantification of amount due by any statutory authority out the demand was raised basing on an audit of the accounts of tire Co-operative Stores. In the said case, the Court laid down that the relevant disqualification under the Act would arise if the following conditions are satisfied. (a) Arrears to a Co-operative Society of which the person against whom disqualification is alleged was a member; (b) He has failed to pay the arrears of any kind which have accrued due by him to such Society before filing of the nomination paper; (c) A bill or notice in respect of such arrears has been duly served on him, and (d) The time, if any, specified therein has expired any yet he continues to be in arrears. 9. Even accepting in the facts of the present case, that the amount due has been determined by the Assistant Registrar in the dispute case against the Petitioner herein but it is seen that the Petitioner having not accepted the said ascertainment has filed a properly constituted appeal against the said order in the dispute ease. Further as per the proviso to Sub-section (1)(l) of Section 25 of the Act, a bill or notice in respect of such arrear has to be duly served on the defaulting party and the party should have failed to pay the amount due within the time stipulated in the notice, to incur the disqualification under the said provision. Hence, admittedly in the present case the onus lies heavily in the election Petitioner (opposite party herein) to establish conclusively that the ingredients as mentioned above have been satisfied so as to hold that the successful candidate (Petitioner herein) has earned a disqualification. 10. In the case of O. Bharathan (supra), the Supreme Court was examining a final order passed in an election dispute raised against the elected candidate to the Kerala Legislative Assembly from one of the constituencies in the said State. While appreciating the evidence adduced in the said case, the Apex Court in paragraph-14 of the said Judgment held as follows: Notwithstanding the above fact, namely, the learned Judge while doubting the testimony of the witnesses, instead of confronting them in a legal way to get the truth, jumped to his own conclusion. While appreciating the evidence adduced in the said case, the Apex Court in paragraph-14 of the said Judgment held as follows: Notwithstanding the above fact, namely, the learned Judge while doubting the testimony of the witnesses, instead of confronting them in a legal way to get the truth, jumped to his own conclusion. The learned Judge in the course of appreciating the scope of Section 73 of the Evidence Act and having given a finding that u/s 73 of the Evidence Act a disputed signature could be compared only with the admitted signatures, proceeded to compare the signatures found in the counterfoils to find out whether both the signatures were to be by the same person. The Supreme Court further proceeded to hold that on the peculiar facts of this case, the learned Judge erred in taking upon himself the task of comparing the disputed signatures on the counterfoils without the aid of an expert or the evidence of persons conversant with the disputed signatures. In the case of Murarilal (supra), the Supreme Court dealing with an appeal was examining the acceptability of an expert evidence under various Sections of the Evidence Act and in that context relying upon earlier decisions of the Supreme Court laid down that there is no rule of law nor any rule of prudence, which has crystallized into a rule of law, that opinion evidence of handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. It was further held that having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought and wherever the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. 11. The above question though has not arisen yet in the case, but is being dealt with as such questions are frequently required to be met with by the subordinate Court. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. 11. The above question though has not arisen yet in the case, but is being dealt with as such questions are frequently required to be met with by the subordinate Court. The Supreme Court further held in the said decision that the argument that the Court should not venture to compare writing, itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force as Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the persons by whom it purports to have been written. The Supreme Court expressed its anxiety by holding that if it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. The Hon'ble Judges have also considered that there may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard and there may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. Such duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is no expert and where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. 12. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. Such duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is no expert and where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. 12. On considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and keeping in the view the law as laid down in the aforesaid decided cases, this Court is of the opinion that since the onus lies heavily on the election Petitioner (opposite party herein) to prove the allegation levelled against the writ Petitioner conclusively and as it is a sound principle of justice that the successful candidate who has won an election should not be lightly interfered with and the Petitioner seeking such interference must strictly confer to the requirement of law, the learned Court below has failed to exercising its jurisdiction to appoint a handwriting expert as prayed for by the writ Petitioner by erroneously holding that the Petitioner having admitted that the amount has been ascertained in the Judgment passed in the dispute case, it is not a fit case to send the disputed signature to a handwriting expert. The impugned order under Annexure-5, therefore, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. 13. However, keeping in view that in a previous proceeding before this Court, the election case was targeted to be completed within a specified period, it is directed that the learned Court below shall send the disputed signatures of the Petitioner in the notice vide Ext.4 and his admitted signature either appearing in the pleadings or in the Vakalatnama to a handwriting expert for his opinion immediately at the cost of the writ Petitioner. The handwriting expert should be directed to render his opinion thereon within a period of forty-five days from the date of sending of the said signatures to him along with the writ to furnish his opinion. Upon receiving the report of the handwriting expert, the learned Court below shall proceed in accordance with law to dispose of the election petition as expeditiously as possible preferably by the end of November, 2008. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. Final Result : Allowed