Judgment NAVIN SINHA, J. 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Counsel for the State. The Petitioner who was a Havildar at the relevant point of time is before this Court assailing the Order of the Appellate Authority imposing punishment of one black mark under Rules 835 and 837 of the Bihar Police Manual.The Rules describes it as a major punishment. 2. The Petitioner was placed under suspension and departmental proceedings were initiated against him. A charge based on preliminary enquiry and recording statement of certain witnesses was that while posted as House Guard at the residence of District Magistrate, Madhubani he regularly used abusive and un parliamentary languages against the Commandant, Bihar Military Police 13, Darbhanga and complained that it was because of the Commandant that the Petitioner could not be promoted to the post of Jamadar and in this manner he had suffered financial loss to the extent of fifty thousand rupees. The charge, therefore, was of using abusive language in discipline and lack of moral character. The Petitioner denied the charges. Four of the prosecution witnesses supported the charges.The Enquiry Officer returned a finding of guilt. Thereafter, the same Commandant vis a vis whom the charges were framed against the Petitioner, entered the role of Disciplinary Authority and after consideration of the show cause of the Petitioner visited him with the punishment of dismissal by Order dated, 1st August, 2000 and that nothing beyond subsistence allowance shall be payable for the period of suspension. 3. The Appellate Authority on having been petitioned by Order dated, 22nd June, 2001 set aside the Order of dismissal but imposed the punishment of one black mark.The period from the date of dismissal to reappointment was directed to be treated as extraordinary leave under Rule 180(a) of the Bihar Service Code as special leave. That nothing beyond what had been paid was payable. The Petitioner preferred a memorial against the Appellate Order which has also been rejected primarily on the ground of delay. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner firstly urged that the Order of punishment was vitiated as having been passed by the same Commandant vis a vis whom charges were framed against the Petitioner.The said Commandant being an interested person, reasonableness and fairness demanded that he could not assume the role of Disciplinary Authority and impose any punishment upon the Petitioner. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner firstly urged that the Order of punishment was vitiated as having been passed by the same Commandant vis a vis whom charges were framed against the Petitioner.The said Commandant being an interested person, reasonableness and fairness demanded that he could not assume the role of Disciplinary Authority and impose any punishment upon the Petitioner. In so far as the Appellate Order is concerned, learned Counsel submitted that the Appellate Authority has himself arrived at the finding that a joint petition by the four Constables against the Petitioner appeared to be part of conspiracy when no other person on duty had complained about the use of unparliamentary language by the Petitioner. This conspiratorial joint petition propelled the Commandant to adopt an attitude with regard to the Petitioner. The Appellate Order further notices that the materials of cross-examination have not been discussed and properly considered by the Enquiry officer. Even the prosecution witness apart from the aforesaid four who deposed against the Petitioner only stated that the Petitioner used to be grumble that because of punishment he could not be promoted to the post of Jamadar. Nothing further was. stated by the witness attributed to the Petitioner vis a vis the Commandant. Learned Counsel for the State supporting the Appellate Order submitted that the punishment has already been reduced and justice has been meted out to the Petitioner. There was no occasion for the writ Court to interfere any further. 5. One of the fundamental principles of law is that justice must not only be done but must appear to be done. In this process of justice appearing to be done reasonableness and fairness of procedure is a necessary concomitant. Any procedure which raises doubts with regard to fairness hits at the very root. If the Commandant was the subject of the charges himself, he could not have sat in Judgment over the issue. At root would be the real possibility of bias in the background that he himself was the subject matter of charges. This would raise a presumption in the mind of any reasonable person of serious likelihood of bias. If the Commandant was the subject of the charges himself, he could not have sat in Judgment over the issue. At root would be the real possibility of bias in the background that he himself was the subject matter of charges. This would raise a presumption in the mind of any reasonable person of serious likelihood of bias. To this Court it would be extremely difficult to visualize a situation where the Commandant stepped out of his own skin as person against whom the Petitioner is alleged to have used abusive language while deciding the show cause of the Petitioner and the quantum of punishment to be imposed. This Court is satisfied that the mind of any reasonable human being in the position of the Commandant was liable to be clouded on the issue. In any event it is virtually impossible for this Court to segregate the acts of the Commandant as the subject matter of the charge and the acts of the Commandant as a Disciplinary Authority. The Commandant acted as a Judge and the executioner both. The Order was, therefore, clearly unsustainable. If the initial Order of punishment itself was contrary to law what transpired before the Appellate Authority cannot lend credence to a Order originally in valid. 6. To the contrary what transpires on the facts of the present case is that the likelihood of bias on the part of the Commandant for reasons as discussed above, has virtually found favour with the Appellate Authority when he arrives at a finding of excessive punishment to hold that the allegation by four House Guards was made in a conspiratorial manner which led the Commandant to adopt an attitude towards the Petitioner. Perhaps nothing more is required to be discussed at this stage with regard to the legality of the Order of punishment. Further more, the Appellate Order itself states that the Order of the Enquiry Officer was not detailed and did not contain any discussion of the defence of the Petitioner. More over, this Court finds substance in the contention of the Counsel for the Petitioner that the surviving prosecution witness after conspiratorial witnesses are removed itself did not attribute any unpariiamentarily language to the Petitioner vis a vis to the Commandant but only that the Petitioner had complaint of loss of promotion. 7. More over, this Court finds substance in the contention of the Counsel for the Petitioner that the surviving prosecution witness after conspiratorial witnesses are removed itself did not attribute any unpariiamentarily language to the Petitioner vis a vis to the Commandant but only that the Petitioner had complaint of loss of promotion. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if the Order of the Disciplinary Authority itself was bad in law there will be clearly no occasion for this Court to allow the Appellate Order to stand on the reasoning that it has reduced the quantum of punishment. In any event, this Court on discussions of the matter on merits arrives at the conclusion based on the finding of the Appellate Authority that the Order of punishment of one black mark was not sustainable. In pursuance of the Order of dismissal having been set aside, the Petitioner has already been reinstated in service. The Appellate Order dated, 22nd June, 2001 imposing the punishment of one black mark is hereby set aside. The writ application stands allowed.