JUDGMENT Asok Potsangbam, J. 1. The writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.03.2007 passed by the learned Single Bench in W.P.(C) No.5964 of 2006, and the facts which are necessary for disposal of the writ appeal are stated in brief as follows : 2. It is not in dispute that the petitioner's husband, late Saleh Ahmed Mazumder, joined the Office of the Joint Director, Animal Husbandry & Vety. Department, Cachar, Silchar w.e.f. 6.8.1980 as LDA-cum- Typist and the services of late Mazumder was terminated by an order dated 2.3.1990 and thereafter, he died on 12.12.1992. 3. Due to serious illness, late Mazumder was on different kind of leaves for his absence from duty and as his health condition deteriorated. As contended by the respondent/petitioner, leave on medical ground was applied for w.e.f. 1.7.1985. However, by an order dated 2.3.1990, the service of the petitioner's husband was terminated and against the resultant vacancy, one Smt. Lailee Begum who was not made a party in the writ petition, was said to have been appointed on regular basis. 4. On account of financial hardship being faced by the writ petitioner, a representation dated 4.12.1995 was filed by her to the Accountant General, Assam, for family pension, through the Joint Director, A.H. & Vety., Silchar Zone, Cachar, Assam, who forwarded the same on 15.2.1996. It is the further case of the respondent/writ petitioner that another application dated 30.7.1996 was submitted to the Director, A.H & Vety. Department, Govt. of Assam for favour of forwarding her family pension papers. After having failed to obtain the family pension on the ground that the husband of the petitioner was terminated from service, W.P.(C) No.5964 of 2006 was filed before a Single Bench some time in December, 2006, with the following prayers : (A) a writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued setting aside/quashing the impugned termination order dated 2.3.90 (Annexure-A to the writ petition), issued by the Director of A.H. & Vety. Deptt., Govt. of Assam-the respondent No. 2. (B) a writ in the nature of Mandamus should not be issued directing/commanding the respondents to grant Family Pension and other service benefits as her husband was in service for a period of 9 years 6 months and 28 days w.e.f. 6.8.80 to 2.3.90. 5. Deptt., Govt. of Assam-the respondent No. 2. (B) a writ in the nature of Mandamus should not be issued directing/commanding the respondents to grant Family Pension and other service benefits as her husband was in service for a period of 9 years 6 months and 28 days w.e.f. 6.8.80 to 2.3.90. 5. Disputing and controverting the averment and contention of the respondent/writ petitioner, the appellant/respondent filed an exhaustive affidavit wherein the following facts were unfolded before the court : (a) The petitioner's husband, late S. A. Mazumder, availed of the following leaves : (i) 40 days' earned leave, (ii) half pay leave for 40 days; and (iii) extraordinary leave w.e.f. 2.4.1984 to 3.6.1984 and the aforesaid leaves was extended upto 30.6.1985 on medical ground without any medical certificate; (b) From 1.7.1985, late Mazumder did not submit any leave application for his absence from duty. As late Mazumder was not responding to the requests of the Office of the Joint Director, A.H. & Vety. Silchar Zone, Cachar, Assam, to attend office, no option was left to the appellant/respondent but to serve public notice to late Mazumder and the said notice was also published in the issue of "Assam Tribune" dated 1.2.1986, "Dainik Pranta Jyoti & Sonar Cachar" asking him to resume duty. However, late Mazumder remained unauthorisedly absent from duty w.e.f. 1.7.1985 to 16.2.1990, i.e. about 4 years 7 months 15 days. Having taken into consideration the facts stated above, the services of late S.A. Mazumder was terminated by an order dated 2.3.1990 and in the affidavit it was asserted that the termination was in accordance with the established norms and service rules and there was no illegality in the termination order. (c) It is also asserted in the affidavit that the representation dated 27.9.2006 which is alleged to have been made by the respondent/writ petitioner through the Joint Director A.H. & Vety. Deptt, Silchar Zone, Cachar, was never received by the office of the Director of A.H. & Vety. Department, Assam. It was also put on record that the vacancy caused by the termination of late Mazumder had already been filled up and accordingly it was prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. Deptt, Silchar Zone, Cachar, was never received by the office of the Director of A.H. & Vety. Department, Assam. It was also put on record that the vacancy caused by the termination of late Mazumder had already been filled up and accordingly it was prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. The learned Single Bench held that the termination order dated 2.3.1990 was issued without any notice to the respondent/writ petitioner and as such it had affected the opportunity and the right to say in the matter and such requirement being a principle firmly embedded in the jurisprudential values, the same must be upheld by the court. The learned Single Bench despite having noticed the inordinate delay of about 16 years 10 months in approaching the High Court by way of a writ petition, as referred to above, the delay was ignored while entertaining the writ petition and thereafter, the termination order dated 2.3.1990 was interfered with and further held that the late husband of the petitioner should be deemed to have continued in service till his death which occurred on 12.12.1992. It is, further, directed that the family pension of the petitioner should be should be computed including the arrear amount and the same be paid without any further delay. 7. The judgment and order dated 27.3.2007 and the direction given therein are challenged in this appeal by impugning the same. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner. 9. Apart from the contentions and counter contentions raised by the parties as discussed above, one pertinent issue which emerges for consideration of the court, is whether the learned Single Bench is justified in entertaining the writ petition wherein the termination order dated 2.3.1990 was challenged, after the lapse of 16 years 10 months and that too without any explanation for the delay and laches. Secondly, whether the termination order of late Mazumder can be challenged by the respondent/writ petitioner in a collateral manner as done in the writ petition. We have given our anxious thought to the rival submissions of the parties and we will now examine the aforesaid issues in the light of the judicial pronouncement on delay and laches by the Apex Court. 10. We have given our anxious thought to the rival submissions of the parties and we will now examine the aforesaid issues in the light of the judicial pronouncement on delay and laches by the Apex Court. 10. Admittedly, the termination order of late Mazumder was issued on 2.3.1990, i.e. during his life time and before his death occured on 12.12.1992. In fact, there was a period of about 2 years between the date of termination from service and the date of expiry of late Mazumder. The termination order was neither challenged nor was there any request for review of the termination order by the administrative authority during the aforesaid two years, i.e. during the life time of late Mazumder, and these facts would, perhaps, demonstrate that the late Mazumder who had the locus to challenge his termination order, had no grievance against the termination order. Be that as it may, more pertinent question confronting the court is whether the learned Single Bench is justified in entertaining the writ petition, which was filed almost after 17 years, (precisely 16 years 10 months) and grant those reliefs as discussed above. 11. The Apex Court has considered and elaborately laid down the principles as to whether the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be invoked when there is unjustified latches and undue delay, in State of Maharastra v.Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 . Para-14 of the judgment is quoted below : 14. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decisions of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blameworthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a Welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a Welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article226 of the Constitution by a person against the Welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 12. In the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. 12. In the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. the Apex Court held that delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable and discretionary jurisdiction by the court and further observed that though no period of limitation is provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. In the aforesaid case, the writ petition which was filed after a lapse of 17 years was entertained and relief was granted by the High Court, but the judgment of the High Court was reversed in appeal by the Apex Court by holding that, in the circumstances, the High Court should not have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in view of the undue and unjustified delay of 17 years and relief so granted by the High Court was also declared unsustainable. 13. In the instant case, the writ petition was filed after 16 years 10 months from the date of the order dated 2.3.1990, impugned before the learned Single Judge, terminating the services of late Mazumder, who died on 12.12.1992. It is not in dispute that late Mazumder, during his life time, had not taken any grievance against his termination order dated 2.3.1990. There is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner herself had taken any prompt legal action to remedy her grievances either before any court of law or before any administrative authority except the fact that an application was submitted to the Accountant General, Assam, for grant of family pension. There is no material leave alone any statement, which could have justifiably prevented the petitioner from approaching the court for 16 years 10 months. 14. On perusal of the writ petition, we do not find any explanation, with regards to the laches and delay in approaching the High Court by filing the writ petition. The impugned judgment and order also does not disclose any justifiable and acceptable reason for ignoring the unjustified laches and undue delay of 16 years 10 months while entertaining the writ petition by the learned Single Bench, in exercise of its equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and grant those reliefs. The impugned judgment and order also does not disclose any justifiable and acceptable reason for ignoring the unjustified laches and undue delay of 16 years 10 months while entertaining the writ petition by the learned Single Bench, in exercise of its equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and grant those reliefs. Having considered the law laid down by the Apex Court, as referred to and extracted above, and also having considered the facts situation as discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the entertainment of the writ petition and grant of reliefs by the leaned Single Bench, are unsustainable in law. 15. Though we have strong doubt whether the writ petitioner can challenge the termination order dated 2.3.1990 in a collateral way inasmuch as the grievance of the petitioner as focused in the writ petition is only against the refusal to grant pension/pensionary benefits, we are not deciding this issue as we find the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on the other issue of delay and laches. For the reasons and law laid down by the Apex Court, as discussed herein-above, we are satisfied that the appellant has made out a case for interference with the impugned judgment and order dated 27.3.2007 passed by the learned Single Bench in W.P.(C) No. 5964 of 2006 and accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 27.3.2007 is hereby set aside. 16. Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed.