JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - This revision petition has been filed against the order dated 29.8.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehabad, vide which the revision filed by the complainant-Smt. Shanti Devi was accepted and the case was remanded to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehabad, by ordering that all the accused including the petitioner be charge-sheeted. 2. FIR No. 773 dated 17.12.1997 under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner and others at Police Station Sadar Fatehabad. The complainant in the present case is one Smt. Shanti, daughter of Jagmal of Village Ayalki. The allegation in the complaint made was that the lease rights (Dawami) of land measuring 99 kanals 7 marlas, situated in village Ayalki, were purchased by her from Balwant Singh, Kulwant Singh, Paramjit Singh and Tarlochan Singh sons of Bhan Singh of village Dhani Majra through registered deed dated 30.6.1986 on the basis of which mutation No. 73 dated 2.5.1990 was entered. 3. The accused Jagmal and Sigarata also purchased similar rights through registered deed dated 21st September, 1981 regarding half share in the above land in equal shares and mutation No. 78 dated 2.5.1990 was entered on the basis of the said deed. 4. A decree of exchange was passed in favour of accused Jagmal regarding his purchase of Dawani Lessee Rights on 28th of April 1990 and mutation No. 231 dated 24-5-1996 was entered regarding the said decree. Thus it was claimed that Jagmal became owner of half share in the above described land on the basis of lessee Dawani Rights, whereas complainant had 1/4th share out of total land measuring 99 Kanals 7 Marlas. 5. Though another civil court decree dated 22-11-1990 was passed by the Civil Court, Fatehabad, but no mutation with regard to that decree was entered in the revenue record. There is also allegation of passing of other civil court decrees. 6. 5. Though another civil court decree dated 22-11-1990 was passed by the Civil Court, Fatehabad, but no mutation with regard to that decree was entered in the revenue record. There is also allegation of passing of other civil court decrees. 6. The allegation of the complainant was that accused Jagmal conspired with accused Gian Parkash Naib Tehsildar, Prithvi Singh, Patwari and Kewal Krishan, Retired Kanungo in order to cause harm to the complainant and with a view to give benefit to accused Jagmal and Sigarata, Gian Parkash, Prithvi Singh and Kewal Krishan were said to have entered mutation No. 140 on 4th of March, 1992 on the basis of decree dated 14-12-1991 titled as Shanti v. Sigrata with mala fide intention. The said mutation was entered in the name of the accused instead of entering it in the name of complainant-Shanti Devi. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-accused before the learned trial Court was that no offence has been made out against the petitioner and in any case the prosecution was hit by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as no prior sanction from the competent authority was sought before taking cognizance of the offence. 8. Learned trial Court came to the conclusion that on perusal of mutation No. 140 dated 4-3-1992 it is quite evident that Patwari and Kanungo accused made reports in form of entries upon the said mutation in due discharge of their official duties. This fact was proved from the report of Prithvi Singh, Patwari, dated 4-3-1992 made on mutation No. 140, wherein he has stated that change in entries is required regarding Pattedari Dawani rights, on the basis of order of the civil Court. Then Kanungo made his own report as per records. Thereafter accused Ram Parkash, Naib Tehsildar, passed a specific order on the mutation to the effect that in Jalse-am decree holder Sigarata came present along with Bishna Ram, Phulla Ram, Lambardar and produced a copy of decree- sheet of the civil Court with regard to transfer of Pattedari rights (Dawani rights) along with possession and admitted possession to be correct. Thereafter accused Ram Parkash, Naib Tehsildar, passed a specific order on the mutation to the effect that in Jalse-am decree holder Sigarata came present along with Bishna Ram, Phulla Ram, Lambardar and produced a copy of decree- sheet of the civil Court with regard to transfer of Pattedari rights (Dawani rights) along with possession and admitted possession to be correct. It was further stated in the order of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade that on the basis of decree in question Pattedari rights alongwith possession stood entered and accepted in the name of Smt. Sigrata on the basis of the decree in question from that of Smt. Shanti. A specific note of civil court decree passed in civil suit No. 98 of 29-01-1991 decided on 14-2-1991 by the Court of Shri S.C. Goyal, the then learned Additional Senior Sub Judge, Fatehabad was also mentioned in column No. 13 of the said mutation. 9. The learned trial Court also noticed that as the reports were based on the civil court decrees which are pending in the Revenue Court, the petitioner could not have ignored the same. Thus the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that no case of commission of any offence was made out against the accused Gian Parkash, Naib Tehsildar, Prithvi Singh Patwari and Kewal Krishan. 10. The learned trial Court further arrived at a conclusion that Gian Parkash, Naib Tehsildar, was acting as Revenue Officer at the time of entering the mutation and, therefore enjoyed the special protection under, Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code Thus no charge was framed by the trial Court against the petitioner. However, in the revision petition the learned Additional Sessions Judge ordered the framing of charge against the petitioner. 11. The learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that at the stage of framing of charge, learned Judicial Magistrate was required to see only prima facie evidence on the file to charge-sheet respondent Nos. 2 to 4 along with respondent Nos. 5 and 6 for commission of offence for which they have been challaned and the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate granted benefit of those provisions which were not available to the accused. Therefore, the order has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 12. 2 to 4 along with respondent Nos. 5 and 6 for commission of offence for which they have been challaned and the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate granted benefit of those provisions which were not available to the accused. Therefore, the order has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 12. The learned Additional Sessions Judge further came to the conclusion that the respondents were removable from their service, without even sanction of the State Government what to talk of by the Govt. and, therefore, learned Judicial Magistrate was not required to give benefit of the said provisions to them. 13. The leaned Additional Sessions Judge also came to the conclusion that there as nothing on the file to show that it was the part of the duty of the respondents to commit offence like entering into conspiracy, fabricating of revenue record to commit fraud and forgery and thus reversed the findings and remanded the case for trial as referred to above. 14. Mr. A.S. Sullar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the position of the petitioner as a public servant cannot be disputed as he performs adjudicatory functions while sanctioning the mutation. The matters for decisions are referred to by the competent public authority. Thus for all intents and purposes, he would be a public servant. Even otherwise, the petitioner would be protected under the Judges (Protection) Act where the definition of a Judge is as under :- "2. In this Act "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designed as a Judge but also every person - (a) who is empowered by law to give any (in) legal proceeding a definite judgment, or a judgment which if not appealed against, would be definitive, to judgment which, is confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in Clause (a)." 15. This Court ii he case of Ram Parkash v. State of Haryana, 2000(2) CRC(Criminal) 732 has been pleased to hold that Patwari is entitled to protection under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code Therefore, the findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that protection of Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code was not available to the petitioner, as he was removable from service without even sanction of the State Government, cannot be accepted and it has to be held that the benefit of Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code was available to the petitioner as held by the learned trial Court. 16. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Balram Har Prasad Choubey v. Ashwani Kumar Yadav, 2002(1) RCR(Criminal) 31, wherein the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court has been pleased to hold that when order of mutation was passed by Naib Tehsildar in exercise of power under Land Revenue Act, he acts as a Judge and he cannot be prosecuted on the ground of aiding and abetting main accused alleged to have committed offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 by getting the same mutated as owner of land. This judgment fully supports the case of the petitioner. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the of Director of Inspection and Audit v. C.L. Subramaniam, 1994(3) RCR(Criminal) 503, contended that when the act constituting the offence is an outcome of discharge of official duties, then sanction under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code would be required. 18. In the present case, sanction of mutation was an official act performed by the petitioner, and therefore, it cannot be said that to prosecute the petitioner, sanction was required from the competent authority before cognizance could be taken by the Court. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kishor Roy v. Kamaleshwar Pandey, 2002(3) RCR(Criminal) 873, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- "A. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 197 - Police Officer making a false case - Complaint against the officer - No sanction for prosecution required at the summoning stage. B. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 197 - Prosecution of Public Servant - Sanction for prosecution whether required Law summed up : (1) offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. (2) there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. (3) for invoking protection under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused, complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, and the official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. (4) if the case as put forth by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped. (5) question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance, may be immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. (6) there can be cases when it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to be defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty - In such eventuality question of sanction be left open to be decided on the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of trial. (7) Need for sanction under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as complaint is lodged. This question may arise at any stage of the proceedings - Question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage." 20. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, was that the act complained of against the petitioner is such which cannot be separate from discharge of official duty and, there has been a reasonable connection with performance of the duties by him and thus the cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in absence of sanction could not be taken. Therefore, the learned trial Court was right in not framing the charge against the petitioner. 21. Therefore, the learned trial Court was right in not framing the charge against the petitioner. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, 2004(2) Apex Criminal 712, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- "Section 197 - Sanction for prosecution of public servant - Some excess committed by Public servant in discharge of his official duty - It will not deprive him of protection of Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code 22. Mr. Ashwani Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant- respondent, on the other hand, contended that the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot be faulted with as no sanction was required as the allegations of conspiracy and mala fides have been alleged against the petitioner. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent was the official acts not done bonafide cannot attract the protection of Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code as the conspiracy and forging the documents cannot be said to an official duty. 24. Learned counsel for the complainat-respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Parkash Singh Badal and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2007(1) R.A.J. 71, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under : "The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if granted, to confer on the government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. The protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained in element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but when it was committed by a pubic servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can he involved (invoked ?) it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not immediately get attracted on institution of the complaint case." 25. Learned counsel for the complainant-respondent also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P., 1997(2) RCR 539 to contend that the illegal act of sanctioning a mutation in connivance was not an official act while acting in discharge of duty. Therefore, sanction under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code was not required. 26. Therefore, sanction under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code was not required. 26. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Center for Public Interest Litigation and another v. Union of India and another, 2005(3) Apex Criminal 711as well as the judgments of this Court in the case of B.B. Singhal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2007(1) RCR(Criminal) 93 and Sat Pal Joshi v. State of Punjab, 2007(3) RCR(Criminal) 193. 26. On a consideration of the matter, I find force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Balram Har Prasad Choubey (supra) has authoritatively laid down that Naib Tehsildar cannot be prosecuted for the offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468, Indian Penal Code merely because he sanctioned mutation on the basis of certain documents which constitute an offence under the said Sections of the Indian Penal Code. This judgment squarely covers the case of the petitioner. 27. It may further be noticed that the Honble Supreme Court in the case of N.K. Gogle v. Sanwal Das alias Sanwal Mal Ahuja, 1999(3) SCC 284, has been pleased to lay down that a complaint against Tehsildar without sanction under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code is not competent as if an act is done in discharge of official duty. Thus the reading of the aforesaid judgments cited before me seems to have settled the law with regard to sanction i.e. if an act, which constitutes an offence, is outcome of discharge official duty, though the power may have been exercised in excess, the provisions of Section 197 would stand attracted and a public servant cannot be prosecuted without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority. In case the offence alleged is one, which has no connection with the official duty of a public servant, in that event, no sanction would be required. In case the offence alleged is one, which has no connection with the official duty of a public servant, in that event, no sanction would be required. When this proposition is tested in the instant case, it may be noticed that the allegation against the petitioner that he sanctioned the mutation on the basis of certain reports submitted to him by the subordinate officers, merely because allegations of conspiracy and forgery are levelled against the petitioner, it would not take the case out of purview of Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code The learned trial Court, therefore, was right in not framing the charge against the petitioner for want of sanction. The findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code would not apply in the case of petitioner, as he was removable from service without even sanction of the Government, cannot be accepted as he was protected under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Therefore, the sanction was must in the present case. 28. For the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed. The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehabad, is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored. Petition allowed.