Judgment J.R. Vora, J.—The instant appeal is preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is directed against the judgment and order rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad City, Court No. 5 on 20.9.2000 in Sessions Case No. 115 of 1999 wherein learned trial Judge convicted the appellant accused in Sessions Case for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment of life and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one week. 2. The prosecution case as has been disclosed, the deceased in the incident was Minaben, aged 17 years and the daughter of Kamlaben P.W. 1. Kamlaben along-with her two sons and daughter Minaben were staying on rent in House No. 30/2, Jaishankar Society, Post Office Street, Thakkarbapanagar, Ahmedabad. The husband of Kamlaben was serving as Cook in the hotel at Highway at Kalol. It appears that there was cluster of 4 - 5 houses where Minaben was staying and there was only one common lavatory for all the occupants who were tenants in such houses. Adjoining to lavatory, the house of the father of the accused was situated and accused was staying there. On 17.12.1998 deceased Minaben had been to lavatory at about 10.30 p.m. While she was coming out of lavatory, she shouted and called Kamlaben and it was noticed by Kamlaben that the accused inflicted the blows by knife (Rampuri Chappu) on the body of Minaben one by one. Kamlaben immediately went to Minaben and after taking her in her hands in embrace, Minaben was brought to her house. It was noticed that deceased Minaben was profusely bleeding and had injury on left shoulder, on hands, on the back etc. One neighbour Nirmalbhai Soni was sent to call the Doctor and one Dr. Malani came and declared that Mina had died. The crowd was gathered there. It appears that one Gangaram - neighbour of Kamlaben informed the police from the public booth about the incident at about 23.40 hours. This information received by the police at Naroda Police Station was recorded by Police Constable Hirabhai Budharbhai P.W. 8. Malani came and declared that Mina had died. The crowd was gathered there. It appears that one Gangaram - neighbour of Kamlaben informed the police from the public booth about the incident at about 23.40 hours. This information received by the police at Naroda Police Station was recorded by Police Constable Hirabhai Budharbhai P.W. 8. Accordingly, the information which was recorded is placed on record at Exhibit 22 which indicates that Gangarambhai informed that at Thakkarbapanagar, Post Office Street one girl named Minaben Naranbhai has been murdered and it was requested to send the police. Vardhi Exhibit 22 was given to Pruthvisinh Bhavansinh Makwana, ASI working at Naroda Police Station at the relevant juncture and in pursuance of this vardhi, P.W. 9 Pruthvisinh Makwana visited the place of offence and found that deceased Minaben was lying dead and, therefore, inquest panchnama was prepared and he recorded complaint of Kamlaben. Thereafter, investigation was handed over to one Thapabhai Kanaiyabhai who was PSI of Naroda Police Station at that juncture and he was entrusted with the investigation of the crime being registered on 18.12.1998. He drew the panchnama of scene of offence; recorded the statements of various witnesses; the accused was arrested on 18.12.1998 from the house of her sister and was found injured and was sent to Dr. Dipakkumar Jagani P.W. 5. The clothes of the accused were seized from the house of sister of the accused on the same day vide panchnama Exhibit 33. The blood stained earth while preparing of scene of panchnama was collected from the scene of offence by this witness. The postmortem of the dead body of Minaben was performed by Dr. Hasumatiben Patel on 18.12.1998. The clothes recovered from the body of the deceased and blood sample in sealed condition in the bottle collected from the body of the deceased were sent to the police by Dr. Hasumatiben Patel. This witness Thapabhai Kanaiyabhai, thereafter, sent all muddamal to Forensic Science Laboratory on 04.01.1999 and on receiving the opinion, filed the chargesheet against the present appellant accused in the Court of concerned Magistrate. The offence being triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was handed over to the learned trial Judge. It was registered as Sessions Case No. 115 of 1999. 3. The offence being triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was handed over to the learned trial Judge. It was registered as Sessions Case No. 115 of 1999. 3. Learned trial Judge framed the charge vide Exhibit 2 on 06.08.1999 against the accused and he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and produced on record voluminous documentary evidence. Thereafter, when the prosecution evidence was over, incriminating circumstances against the accused were brought to the notice of the accused and the statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The case of the accused was of total denial. Learned trial Judge, thereafter, heard the prosecution as well as defence and came to the above conclusion to convict the accused and sentenced him for imprisonment of life. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned Advocate for the appellant Mr. Upadhyay vehemently urged that learned trial Judge has erred in coming to the conclusion to convict the accused even though there was no sufficient evidence to connect the accused with the crime. It was vehemently submitted that all the evidence led by the prosecution was in the nature of circumstances and the prosecution failed to prove not only the whole chain, but each circumstance of the chain. It is submitted that as against the accused, four types of circumstances are proposed to be proved by the prosecution to link him with the crime. It is submitted that four circumstances are; (1) The evidence of two witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 Kamlaben and P.W. 2 Dilipbhai Mohandas wherein they noticed the accused running away from the scene of offence; (2) so called statement of the accused before the Doctor in Exhibit 14 that he was injured while stabbing on the previous day at Thakkarbapanagar, Ahmedabad; (3) discovery of weapon; and (4) Forensic Science Laboratory opinion as to finding of blood on the pant of the accused and knife. 5. It is submitted that evidence of both the witnesses to the extent that they noticed the accused running away from the scene of offence is not at all believable. Our attention was drawn to the panchnama of scene of offence wherein the house of the deceased was situated at the location wherein for going to common lavatory, it was necessary to go through 2 - 3 other houses. Our attention was drawn to the panchnama of scene of offence wherein the house of the deceased was situated at the location wherein for going to common lavatory, it was necessary to go through 2 - 3 other houses. It was also argued that, originally, as per the prosecution case, this witness was the complainant and the prosecution projected the witness as eye-witness, but the witness did not support that prosecution case and stated to the extent that she had seen the accused running away from the spot at the time of incident. It is submitted that other witness Dilipbhai Mohandas is a maternal uncle of the deceased and he also stated only to the extent that he noticed the accused running towards the market having knife in his hand. It is submitted that this witness also does not state to have seen the commission of the crime. It is submitted that none of these witnesses have been declared hostile and in the examination-in-cross, contradiction in both the witnesses emerges and P.W. 2 Dilipbhai Mohandas admitted certain facts which he has not stated to the police. It is submitted that both these witnesses are highly interested witnesses, because one is mother and other is maternal uncle and though independent witnesses were available, none has been examined by the prosecution. It is submitted that note worthy it is that P.W. 1 Kamlaben does not aver the presence of P.W. 2 in her deposition. Even, the Doctor, who examined the deceased in the first point of time, has not been examined by the prosecution. It is submitted that, therefore, it would be highly unsafe to place credence on any of these witnesses even to the extent that both of them saw the accused running away from the place of offence. 6. For the second circumstance, i.e. admission of the accused before P.W. 5 Dr. Dipakkumar Jagani in the history, it is submitted that the history given by the accused to P.W. 5 is confession and is hit by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act (“the Act” for short). It is submitted that the accused stated in the history as per the prosecution case that while stabbing by Rampuri Chappu at 20.30 hours at Thakkarbapanagar, Jaishankar Society, he got injury by the same Chappu in his hand is inculpatory statement so as to constitute confession and P.W. 5 Dr. It is submitted that the accused stated in the history as per the prosecution case that while stabbing by Rampuri Chappu at 20.30 hours at Thakkarbapanagar, Jaishankar Society, he got injury by the same Chappu in his hand is inculpatory statement so as to constitute confession and P.W. 5 Dr. Dipakkumar admitted that the accused brought by the Police Constable was under the police custody and the Police Constable buckle number of which was given by P.W. 5 was all the while present when the history was noted. The statement in history of the accused amounts to confession and hit by Section 27 of the Act and, therefore, not admissible as statement of accused in police custody. Learned Advocate for the appellant relied upon four decisions in this respect. (1) In the matter of Koli Madha Jina & Others vs. State of Gujarat, as reported in 1985 GLH 49 ; (2) In the matter of Kishore Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, as reported in 1990 Criminal Law Journal 2289; (3) In the matter of Mohammad Dwara Rawther Ismail vs. State of Kerala, as reported in 1982 Criminal Law Journal 2102, the decision of Kerala High Court; and (4) In the matter of Aghnoo Nagesia vs. State of Bihar, as reported in AIR 1966 SC 119 . 7. It is also stated that in view of the decision as reported in 1990 Criminal Law Journal 2289, in this case also, it is the design of Investigating Agency to circumvent the bar of Section 27 of the Act and, therefore, ambiguous statement in the history is recorded. Alternatively, it is also argued that if the statement is not confession and it is admitted to evidence, then it has to be seen in toto and in totality of the circumstances. It is submitted that P.W. 5 is not credit-worthy witness to the extent that he examined the accused after 15 hours of his arrest and at that time also, bleeding injury was noted by the Doctor which is improbability. It is submitted that in examination-in-cross, P.W. 5 Mr. Jagani in clear terms submitted that injury was possible by only double sharp edged weapon while according to the learned advocate, weapon of the crime is chappu, a single edged weapon. It is submitted that in examination-in-cross, P.W. 5 Mr. Jagani in clear terms submitted that injury was possible by only double sharp edged weapon while according to the learned advocate, weapon of the crime is chappu, a single edged weapon. Therefore, even if the statement of the accused is relevant as admission then also the evidence in this respect is not reliable and so the circumstance is also not proved by the prosecution. 8. For the third circumstance, it has been urged as to discovery of weapon that only panch examined of the discovery panchanama at Exhibit 33 i.e. P.W. 10 Kantibhai has turned hostile. The discovery panchanama has not been properly proved even by the Investigating Officer i.e. P.W. 11 P.I. Thapabhai Kanaiyabhai. It is submitted that otherwise also there is contradiction in the story of the prosecution that if the accused ran away from the scene of offence along-with chappu and was arrested from the house of his sister, then when he concealed chappu at attic of his house, therefore, even according to the serological report of Forensic Science Laboratory, if the blood group of the deceased is found on such discovered weapon, it is not helping the prosecution and the weakest kind of evidence. 9. For the fourth circumstance against the accused about the Forensic Science Laboratory’s report Exhibit 30 wherein from the weapons recovered from the accused through discovery panchanama and from the cloth i.e. pant recovered from the accused through the panchanama Exhibit 20 which is arrest panchanama, an attempt has been made to prove that blood group of the deceased was found in serological report Exhibit 30 of Forensic Science Laboratory. It is submitted that in the report, though it is so narrated from the pant and knife recovered from the accused was found with blood group ‘B’ of the deceased, such evidence is not reliable for the reason of serious discrepancy that according to the forwarding letter which is placed on record, sample No. 6 which contained the seal of the Medical Officer was containing 120 cc of blood of the deceased. In post-mortem note also which is proved through P.W. 6 Dr. Hasumatiben Patel, it is established that the said doctor extracted 100 cc of blood from the body of the deceased. In post-mortem note also which is proved through P.W. 6 Dr. Hasumatiben Patel, it is established that the said doctor extracted 100 cc of blood from the body of the deceased. It is submitted that in the report of Forensic Science Laboratory particularly, acknowledgment letter placed on record indicates that in all six parcels were received through Forensic Science Laboratory on 11.1.1999 and sample ‘F’ which was the blood sample and was sealed by the Medical Officer and was labelled as ‘blood sample of deceased Minaben, on opening, it contained 50 ml., of blood’ while on sample it was mentioned that it was 120 ml., blood the sample was containing. When it was forwarded, the seal was found in tact. Therefore, it is submitted that though by forwarding letter and when sealed, the blood sample of the deceased containing 120 ml., blood allegedly was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory but when this was opened by the Forensic Science Laboratory, only 50 ml., blood was found though seal was in tact and hence this discrepancy is not established evidence of the Forensic Science Laboratory beyond doubt against the accused. It is submitted that the concerned officer who analyzed the sample was not examined by the prosecution. Thus, according to the learned Advocate for the appellant, all the four circumstances which are sought to be proved against the accused are not so capable circumstances or complete chain to prove the guilt of the accused. It is submitted that even the trial Judge came to the conclusion that so far P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were concerned, reasonable doubt can be given to the accused but on account of his admission which was very substantial evidence against the accused and considering cumulative effect of the circumstances, the accused came to be convicted by the trial Court. It is submitted that the trial Court has erred in coming to the conclusion that whatever stated by the accused before P.W. 5 in the shape of history was admission and not confession and the said confession is hit by Section 27 of the Act because it was recorded in the presence of the police. It is therefore, submitted that there is no direct evidence against the accused and the circumstances are not proved beyond doubt, learned trial Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the accused and the appeal be allowed accordingly. 10. It is therefore, submitted that there is no direct evidence against the accused and the circumstances are not proved beyond doubt, learned trial Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the accused and the appeal be allowed accordingly. 10. As against that, learned APP Mr. Dabhi submitted that all the four circumstances were proved against the accused by the credible evidence. The evidence of P.W. 1 Kamlaben who was mother of the deceased and the evidence of P.W. 2 Dilipbhai maternal uncle of the deceased is blotless and to the extent that both had seen the accused running from the scene of offence which is fortified by the admission he made before P.W. 5 Dr. Jagani. Learned APP submitted that the history submitted by the accused to P.W. 5 Dr. Jagani is not hit by Section 27 of the Act but the history as an admission under Section 21 of the Act is proved beyond doubt. Learned APP also placed reliance on many decisions in respect of the history recorded by P.W. 5 that in such circumstances, whatever stated by the accused is not confession and not hit by Section 27. The prosecution has not proved the history under Section 21 of the Act and that is substantial evidence against the accused not only as to his presence at the scene of offence but his admission that while stabbing at a particular hour at a particular place, he got injury. In respect of Forensic Science Laboratory evidence, learned APP Mr. Dabhi relied upon the decision in the matter of State of Rajasthan vs. Vinod Malhotra, as reported in 1997 CrLJ 1488 . On the strength of that, it is submitted that if the seal is found in tact by the Forensic Science Laboratory, there is no reason to suspect the evidence on that ground. Two more decisions relied by learned APP are in the matter of Krishan Lal vs. State of Haryana, as reported in 1996 Cr.L.J.1401 and in the matter of Vahaji Ravaji Thakore and another vs. State of Gujarat, as reported in 2004 CrLJ119. The decision of this Court has also been relied by learned APP. Two more decisions relied by learned APP are in the matter of Krishan Lal vs. State of Haryana, as reported in 1996 Cr.L.J.1401 and in the matter of Vahaji Ravaji Thakore and another vs. State of Gujarat, as reported in 2004 CrLJ119. The decision of this Court has also been relied by learned APP. It is submitted that the evidence of discovery of knife though the panch has turned hostile has been proved through the evidence of the Investigating Officer and while the accused was arrested, his clothes were recovered and seized by the police and out of that clothes, pant worn by the accused was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. It is submitted that both these articles i.e. pant of the accused worn at the time of committing of the crime and the knife recovered from him contained blood stains of the group of the deceased. This is clinching circumstantial evidence against the accused. What is stated by the accused before P.W. 5 is not confession but admission is vehemently urged and reliance is placed on certain decisions and they are in the matter of Kanda Padayachi vs. State of Tamil Nadu, as reported in AIR 1972 SC 66 , in the matter of Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. The State of Rajasthan, as reported in AIR 1963 SC 1094 , in the matter of Chandran and Another vs. State of Kerala, as reported in 1986 CrLJ 1865 and the decision of the High Court of Kerala in the matter of State of Kerala vs. Ammini and Others, as reported in 1988 CrLJ 107. It is, therefore, urged that conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court to the appellant is proper and requires no interference. 11. It is necessary to notice the evidence led by the prosecution during the trial before the same is reappreciated. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses and the documentary evidence was also produced on the record to establish the case. 12. P.W. 1 the mother of deceased Kamlaben did not support the First Information Report filed by her which is Exhibit 9. Originally the case of the prosecution in Exhibit 9 is that Kamlaben noticed the accused inflicting knife blows on the body of Mina by the accused. 12. P.W. 1 the mother of deceased Kamlaben did not support the First Information Report filed by her which is Exhibit 9. Originally the case of the prosecution in Exhibit 9 is that Kamlaben noticed the accused inflicting knife blows on the body of Mina by the accused. In her deposition at Exhibit 8, she stated that on the day of incident at about 10.30 hours, the deceased had been to lavatory and after some time she heard shouts of Minaben calling herself and, therefore, she rushed near lavatory; took Minaben in her embrace and noticed that the accused was running from there. Thereafter, Minaben was brought to the house and it was found that she had many injuries. The doctor was called who declared Minaben died. In examination-in-cross, the location of lavatory and the house situated there has been asked; the witness was confronted with the previous statement in the complaint and it has been proved that in her complaint, she did not state that she heard shouts of Minaben calling her. There are other contradictions also like after incident she visited the house of the accused etc. According to her, thereafter, the police was called and the complaint was given by her. 13. P.W. 2 examined at Exhibit 10 Dilipbhai Mohandas happened to be the maternal uncle of the deceased Minaben. According to him, on 17.12.1998 at about 10.30 p.m., the incident had occurred. Kamlaben happened to be her cousin sister and therefore, on that day after taking dinner at his house, he was proceeding towards the house of Kamlaben just to ask her health etc. At that time, he heard shouts; he noticed that the accused, with knife in the hand, was running towards the market and the accused was chased by him. He identified the accused in the Court. Minaben was shouting the name of Ghanshyam. Her sister Kamlaben was also shouting; he inquired from Kamlaben and Minaben and both of them had stated that Ghanshyam had inflicted knife blows and had run away. Thereafter, one neighbour Nirmalbhai was requested to call the doctor and the doctor came and declared Minaben to be dead. Thereafter, the police was called who had recorded his statement. He stated that the accused was making illicit demand and Mina was refusing and, therefore, the incident had occurred. Thereafter, one neighbour Nirmalbhai was requested to call the doctor and the doctor came and declared Minaben to be dead. Thereafter, the police was called who had recorded his statement. He stated that the accused was making illicit demand and Mina was refusing and, therefore, the incident had occurred. In examination-in-cross, he stated that his house and the house of Kamlaben were situated at the distance of 1 and 1/2 kms. The crowd of five persons was gathered at the scene of offence. He admitted that in his statement before the police, he did not say that Minaben was shouting the name of accused and Minaben and Kamlaben both, on inquiring, had replied that the accused had run away after inflicting knife blows. This is the evidence of P.W. 2. 14. P.W. 3 Rajabhai Dayaram examined at Exhibit 11 was though eye-witness has not supported the prosecution case and has turned hostile to the prosecution. P.W. 4 Hareshkumar Bhandubhai examined at Exhibit 12 is a panch of panchanama Exhibit 30 of the scene of offence. He also turned hostile against the prosecution. 15. P.W. 5 Dr. Deepakkumar C. Jagani Exhibit 14 stated that on 18.12.1998 at 13.20 p.m., he had examined one Ghanshyambhai D Pithani (accused) under the police yadi from Naroda police station. The patient had given him the history and he had recorded the same. According to the doctor, the patient gave history that while stabbing by Rampuri chakku at 22.30 hours at Thhakkarbapanagar, Jaishankar Society, he got injury by the same chakku in his hand. According to the witness, on examination, it was found that the patient had incised wound over flexor aspect of index and middle pholanx distle phalovges each 1/4 x 1/4 x 1/4 cm with sharp edge and bleeding. The witness stated that the patient was referred to surgical unit to Dr. P.N. Kathariya and accused had no other injuries. He produced on record the certificate in this regard at Exhibit 15. The injury was simple in nature and the injury was possible by Rampuri chakku. In his examination-in-cross, he denied the suggestion that if a man is stabbed with Rampuri chakku, normally the injury would cause to the last two fingers. He stated that the injury which the accused had was possible only by double sharp edged weapon. The injury was simple in nature and the injury was possible by Rampuri chakku. In his examination-in-cross, he denied the suggestion that if a man is stabbed with Rampuri chakku, normally the injury would cause to the last two fingers. He stated that the injury which the accused had was possible only by double sharp edged weapon. He also admitted that the accused was produced before him along-with the police constable and his buckle No. was 4369 but he could not remember his name. He also admitted that police personnel brought the patient was present throughout when he took the history and examined the patient and was present also when the patient was forwarded to the surgical ward. He also stated that at the time of examination, the injury was bleeding though the injury was not minor but was simple in nature. 16. P.W. 6 Dr. Hasumatiben examined at Exhibit 16 conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of Minaben on 18.12.1998 between 9.00 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. She produced on record the post-mortem at Exhibit 17. According to her, the patient had the following external injuries. “(1) IW over dorsum of Rt hand 1.5 cm below wrist joint 5 cm x 2 cm medial and vessles cut. (2) Stab wound over right side abdomen in illic tissue 3 cms x 2 cms x 3 cms aboveilliac harden cavity deep. (3) IW over left forearm of L/3 postro lateral aspect 1 cm x ½ cm muscle deep. (4) Linear abrasions over left upper arm post aspect at elbow joint 1 x 1 1.10 cms. (5) Linear abrasions over left niple and a post aspect 2 cms x 1.10 cm just above elbow. (6) IW over left anterior axillary fold 3.5 cm x ½ cm cavity deep. (7) IW over Rt Sepular region 1 cm x ½ cm x 5 cm posterior to posterior axillary fold. (8) IW over left side chest back 7 cms below angle of scapula 2.5 cm x 3 cms. (9) IW over left side chest back lower Part 2.5 cms x 3 cms. (10) IW over Rt lumber region 2 cms lateral to vertebra column at L1 2 cm x 1 cm.” According to the doctor, she had the following internal injuries. “3rd intercostal muscle cut thorasic cavity full of blood on left side axillary vessel cut. Cut on the left lung axillary. (10) IW over Rt lumber region 2 cms lateral to vertebra column at L1 2 cm x 1 cm.” According to the doctor, she had the following internal injuries. “3rd intercostal muscle cut thorasic cavity full of blood on left side axillary vessel cut. Cut on the left lung axillary. Heart was empty at 230 g Abdomen cavity & Pelvic capacity full of blood. Blood clot over omentum & peritonim.” According to the doctor, the injuries were ante-mortem and external injuries Nos. 2,6,7,8 and 9 were sufficient to cause the death in ordinary course of nature. The injuries were possible by sharp cutting weapon like knife. In post-mortem note, she stated that the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of other injuries over the body. She has been cross-examined by the defence wherein the possibilities have been asked, suggested and denied by the witness; though witness stated that if the said injured person is taken from one place to another for few feet away in a standing position, there would not have blood stained marks on the ground. 17. P.W. 7 Raju Chanduji examined at Exhibit 19 is a panch of panchnama at Exhibit 20 by which pant of the accused on arrest was seized by the police. He has not supported the prosecution case. P.W. 8 Hirabhai Bhudarbhai examined at Exhibit 21 was in-charge of Police Station of Naroda on the day of incident at about 23.40 hours on 18.12.1998. He received vardhi from the public telephone from the person named as Gangarambhai and it was informed to him that at Thakkarbapanagar in the street of Post Office, the girl named Minaben Naranbhai, aged about 14 years had been murdered. He recorded that vardhi which he produced at Exhibit 22 and ASI Makwana was sent by him at the scene of offence. 18. P.W. 9 Exhibit 23 Prathvisinh Bhavansinh Makwana stated that in pursuance of vardhi at Exhibit 22, he reached at the place of incident and found that Mina had died. He arranged to draw inquest panchnama which is placed at Exhibit 34 and recorded the complaint of the mother of the deceased Kamlaben. He has produced the same at Exhibit 9. Thereafter, investigation was handed over to Police Inspector Mr. Parmar. He arranged to draw inquest panchnama which is placed at Exhibit 34 and recorded the complaint of the mother of the deceased Kamlaben. He has produced the same at Exhibit 9. Thereafter, investigation was handed over to Police Inspector Mr. Parmar. He has been cross examined in which he stated that as soon as he reached at the scene of offence, Kamlaben narrated the manner of incident to him. He did not record that information immediately, but first he made arrangement to draw inquest panchnama and thereafter the complaint was recorded. According to him, though there were persons around the place of incident, but he did not record the statement of any of them even though there were two to three persons present who had seen the incident. At about 2.30 a.m. on 18.12.2008, he transferred the investigation to Investigating Officer Mr. Parmar. P.W. 10 Kantibhai Bhalabhai is a panch witness of panchnama of discovery which is placed at Exhibit 33. This panch has turned hostile against the prosecution and has not supported the prosecution case as to discovery of weapon from the accused. P.W. 11 Thapabhai Kanaiyabhai has been examined at Exhibit 34 and he was Investigating Officer. He recorded the statements of the witnesses; drew the panchnama and submitted the chargesheet. He has been cross examined by the defence in detail. 19. This is all is the evidence of the prosecution as referred above oral as well as documentary. 20. The trial Court came to convict the accused because though the trial Court did not place reliance on discovery panchnama and also observed that the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 on appreciation is the circumstantial evidence only and if the evidence is that only, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. But, according to the trial Court the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 has to be weighed in cumulative manner along-with the admission of the accused made by him before P.W. 5 in the history that while stabbing at the place of offence, he (accused) got injury. Learned trial Judge also took into consideration again cumulative effect of Forensic Science Laboratory evidence wherein pant recovered from the accused as well as knife recovered from the accused found blood group of the deceased. Learned trial Judge negatived the argument of the defence that whatever stated by the accused before P.W. 5 Dr. Learned trial Judge also took into consideration again cumulative effect of Forensic Science Laboratory evidence wherein pant recovered from the accused as well as knife recovered from the accused found blood group of the deceased. Learned trial Judge negatived the argument of the defence that whatever stated by the accused before P.W. 5 Dr. Jagani was confession and was hit by Section 27 of the Act. Learned trial Judge also not considered the contention of the defence in respect of Forensic Science Laboratory evidence that there were discrepancies in the quantity of the blood sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. 21. This Court has undertaken the complete and comprehensive appreciation of all vital features of the case and entire evidence on record, with reference to reasonable probabilities arising out of the case. We have taken into consideration the contentions raised by both the sides in this appeal and reasoning and conclusion of the trial Court. 22. There is no manner of doubt that the whole case against the appellant rests upon the circumstantial evidence. Substantial change during the trial was made by the witnesses in the original prosecution case. It was the prosecution case that Kamlaben noticed the incident and she was eye-witness of inflicting knife blow by the accused upon Minaben. This version has not been adhered to by the complainant which is in Exhibit 9 complaint, but she stated to the extent that she noticed the accused running away when she went to Minaben. Likewise, the evidence of P.W. 2 against the accused is to the extent that he also witnessed the accused running away from that spot with knife in his hand. There is no other direct evidence except the evidence of discovery, Forensic Science Laboratory report and admission made by the accused before P.W. 5 which is noted at Exhibit 15 and hence, the whole prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law relating to the circumstantial evidence is well settled. In cases where the evidence is of circumstantial in nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The law relating to the circumstantial evidence is well settled. In cases where the evidence is of circumstantial in nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved by the prosecution. In other words, there must be chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. In deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, Court has to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the combined effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is, or, are not decisive. In short, each component or circumstance not only should be self sufficient and fully established beyond doubt, but their total effect should be such that they may lead unerringly to the guilt of the accused. Each fact, i.e. each circumstance must be proved individually and only thereafter, sum total of the proved facts has to be taken into consideration. Though this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed in the case resting upon the circumstantial evidence alone, it must prove each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, however, extravagant and fanciful it might be. The Apex Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra as reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 summarized and established how the evidence of prosecution with the case is resting and circumstantial evidence be evaluated and on what principles. These principles are as under. “(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. These principles are as under. “(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned `must or should’ and not `may be’ established; (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused; and (vi) where the various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. If the aforesaid various conditions are fulfilled, only then a Court can use as false explanation or a false defence as an additional link and not otherwise. As observed earlier, if the circumstances proved are consistent either with the innocence of the accused, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. However, in applying this principle, distinction must be made between the facts, called primary or basic and others. In regard to the proof of basic primary facts, the Court has to judge the evidence in the ordinary way. It has to consider the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves a particular fact or not and if that fact leads to the inference of guilt of the accused person or not. In dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. Although there should be no missing links in this case. Yet it is not essential that every one of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence adduced and some of these links may have to be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these inferences or presumptions, the Court must have regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct and their relations to the facts of the particular case.” 23. In drawing these inferences or presumptions, the Court must have regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct and their relations to the facts of the particular case.” 23. Having noticed the principles to be applied to the case based on circumstantial evidence, this Court proposes to discuss and reappreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 24. First, we shall appreciate the evidence of two witnesses P.W. 1 Kamlaben and P.W. 2 Dilipbhai. The exact say of these witnesses is that they saw the accused running away from Jaishankar Society. There is no other direct evidence of any witness of having seen the crime being committed. Though the trial Court also did not place much reliance on the evidence of these two witnesses but the trial Court considered cumulative effect. Now, when we reappreciate the evidence, we find that the story which P.W. 1 stated before the Court is altogether different from the original she stated before the Police. The fact is required to be noted herein that the complaint Exhibit 9 was not held to be FIR by the trial Court because before that vardhi was given by one Gangaram to Naroda police station about the commission of cognizable offence wherein it was mentioned that Minaben was murdered. The trial Court, therefore, considered Exhibit 22 vardhi to be FIR. We do not disagree with the trial Court in this respect and, therefore, Exhibit 9 though is exhibited but is nothing more than the statement under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, witness Kamlaben did not adhere to the story of having seen the accused inflicting blows on deceased Minaben, and she says that Minaben addressed her and called her has also not been stated by the witness in her statement Exhibit 9. So, only evidence which emerges or the prosecution relies coming from this witness is to the extent that the witness saw the accused running away from the spot. Now considering the totality of the case, this is not connecting evidence for the guilt of the accused. If the evidence of this witness is taken as it is, it would not lead to inference that the crime was committed by the accused only because he was seen by Kamlaben having run from the spot. Now considering the totality of the case, this is not connecting evidence for the guilt of the accused. If the evidence of this witness is taken as it is, it would not lead to inference that the crime was committed by the accused only because he was seen by Kamlaben having run from the spot. This is so because it is an admitted fact the residence of the accused was nearby lavatory where the incident occurred. Otherwise also, if the evidence of Kamlaben is considered for trustworthiness, it is found that for going towards lavatory, she was required to cross two-three houses and it was not probably for the witness to see the accused running from the vicinity of the scene of offence as lavatory was situated behind the house of this witness. Moreover, Exhibit 9 which was initially treated as FIR was read over to her in which she has stated that she had seen the actual crime to be committed by the accused and running away and when the contents were confronted to this witness in categorical terms, she stated that she did not know about the incident having taken place as was mentioned in Exhibit 9, meaning thereby, that contradictory statements of this witness about even seen the accused running away from the spot is emerging and, therefore, when the circumstantial evidence is considered as per the principles settled above, this circumstance cannot be taken to be proved beyond doubt as against the accused indicating that it was the accused and the accused only who had committed the crime. It is noteworthy that this witness has not been declared hostile by the prosecution. While P.W. 2 stated in his deposition that he noticed the accused running away towards the market and was chased by him though he identified the accused. It is not made clear by the witness that from where he noticed the accused running away either from the scene of offence or from somewhere else from nearby the neighbourhood. While P.W. 2 stated in his deposition that he noticed the accused running away towards the market and was chased by him though he identified the accused. It is not made clear by the witness that from where he noticed the accused running away either from the scene of offence or from somewhere else from nearby the neighbourhood. He says that Kamlaben and Minaben both conveyed to him that Ghanshyam had inflicted blows on Mina also does not inspire confidence because he admitted in examination-in-cross that this factum had not been stated by him in his police statement and this is the contradiction going to the root of the prosecution case and hence deposition of this witness is required to be considered and appreciated in the above background. Witness Dilipbhai appears to be the witness who at the very juncture of time reached at the house of Kamlaben being his cousin brother and his evidence is therefore, the evidence of relative and interested witness. His mere say that he noticed the accused running towards the market with knife in his hand, if taken as it is, is not sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. If the evidence of both these witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 is appreciated together, we find that P.W. 1 Kamlaben does not refer that the accused had knife in his hand while he was running and noticed by her. It is pertinent to note that Kamlaben P.W. 1 does not refer even to the presence of P.W. 2 Dilipbhai Mohandas either at the time of incident or even thereafter. Therefore, this is the contradiction and the evidence falls short which is the circumstance in the nature to connect the accused with the crime. We are unable to come to the conclusion that this evidence is so trustworthy that does not leave room at all for consideration that the accused might have been only passing through because his residence was situated just near the lavatory. Therefore, what is stated by P.W. 1 and 2, if taken as it is, the circumstance which is on record as narrated by these two witnesses is not conclusive in nature and so complete as to consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Therefore, what is stated by P.W. 1 and 2, if taken as it is, the circumstance which is on record as narrated by these two witnesses is not conclusive in nature and so complete as to consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. It is necessary that the circumstance from which conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved by the prosecution and such circumstance must be conclusive in nature. While considering this circumstance as against the accused, we find the gap left in the chain of evidence that only because P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 saw the accused running, it could not be said that such circumstance is so complete that it would lead in all probabilities to the guilt of the accused. The probable reason for the accused being there and going away is obvious and admitted that the accused was staying near the lavatory and was not intruder or outsider and, therefore, in our view, this circumstance is not proved by the prosecution beyond doubt as against the accused, to be the reliable link of chain of circumstantial evidence. 25. The second circumstance is in respect of the history given by the accused to P.W. 5 Dr. Deepakkumar C Jagani. This establishes that as per the prosecution case, the incident occurred at 10.30 p.m., on 17.12.1998. The accused was arrested immediately somewhere at about 7.45 a.m., on 18.12.1998 and was produced before the doctor i.e. P.W. 5 Dr. Jagani at 13.20 hours. He stated before the police as under : “While stabbing by Rampuri chakku at 22.30 hours at Thhakarbapanagar Jaishankar Society got injury by the same chakku in his hand” This is the history given by the accused to P.W. 5 and P.W. 5 not only deposed before the Court but also noted in the medical certificate which is placed at Exhibit 15. The controversy which was raised by the defence before the trial Court and before this Court also is in respect of whether the statement of the accused is confession so as to put bar under Section 27 of the Act because P.W. 5 admitted in his evidence that while he noted the history, all the while one Police Head Constable was present. Learned Advocate for the appellant vehemently urged that almost all ingredients of the crime have been stated by the accused and in the presence of the police officer and, therefore, the evidence is confession in the presence of the police officer and is hit by Section 27 of the Act. As stated above, four decisions are also cited by the learned Advocate for the appellant in this regard. So far as what is confession and what it means to is well settled by catena of decisions. We need not refer all these decisions to burden this judgment. In short, what is confession is an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence. It must be noted that it is clear law that admission of fact, however, incriminating but not by itself establishing the guilt of the maker of such admission would not amount to confession within the meaning of Sections 24 to 26 of the Act. The admission of fact is one thing and clear-cut admission of offence by a person charged with the offence is altogether different thing. Now, looking to the nature of the statement which the accused has made before the doctor P.W. 5, in no manner it can be said that it is an admission of guilt by a person charged with the offence. What is found in the statement of the accused is this much only that there was some stabbing by Rampuri chakku at 20.30 hours at Thakkarbapanagar, Jaishankar Society and he got injury by the same chakku in his hand. If the statement is taken as it is, no inference at all can be drawn that the accused was saying that he inflicted injury to Minaben for which he has been charged in this prosecution case. One cannot make out anything that who was doing stabbing and whether it was the same knife by which blow was inflicted to deceased Minaben. Undoubtedly, therefore, the statement made by the accused before P.W. 5 falls short of labelling the same as confession. The trial Court, therefore, rightly held that what is stated by the accused in the history is not confession and, therefore, not hit by Section 27 of the Act. Undoubtedly, therefore, the statement made by the accused before P.W. 5 falls short of labelling the same as confession. The trial Court, therefore, rightly held that what is stated by the accused in the history is not confession and, therefore, not hit by Section 27 of the Act. We also cannot accept the argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant in this respect and the decisions cited by the learned Advocate would not help him, on the facts of this case. Only because the time of incident and the place of incident has been mentioned by the accused broadly, it cannot be inferred that these are sufficient ingredients by which the accused incriminating himself. It must be noted that the incident occurred near the lavatory of that Jaishankar Society, that is not mentioned in the history. It is not mentioned in the history that what was the nature of stabbing. It is not mentioned in the history that by the same chappu referred in the history, the blows were inflicted upon Minaben. We cannot, therefore, come to the conclusion that substantial incriminating circumstances are admitted by the accused in the history and, therefore, it is confession. We also cannot agree with the learned Advocate for the appellant that to circumvent the bar under Section 27 of the Act, the police and P.W. 5 joined hands and this type of statement was recorded which would not amount to confession. We do not find single circumstance in the evidence that P.W. 5 who had been independent witness and that constable for investigating agency had special interest to rope the accused by designing the evidence in any manner. What has been stated by the accused has been recorded by P.W. 5. 26. When the statement as given by the accused to the Doctor as stated above is falling short of confession, but under Section 21 of the Act, it can be proved against the accused as an admission of fact and this admission is proved sufficiently by the prosecution. Now, what is required to be seen is, this circumstance is sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. When we appreciated fully and after taking the view that the history was admission under Section 21 by the accused, even then, it is not sufficient circumstance to link the accused with the crime charged against the appellant. Now, what is required to be seen is, this circumstance is sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. When we appreciated fully and after taking the view that the history was admission under Section 21 by the accused, even then, it is not sufficient circumstance to link the accused with the crime charged against the appellant. There are some discrepancies and reasonable hypothesis emerging from the evidence destroying the probabilities that from this evidence, it could certainly be inferred that the crime was committed by the accused and the accused only. Firstly, as stated above, from the admission of the accused, nothing could be made out to connect him with the blows inflicted upon deceased Minaben. Only time at 20.30 hours and the name of the society would not link the accused beyond doubt with the crime. What stabbing was taken place, who stabbed to whom etc., have been omitted by the accused in his admission. So, such admission is not capable of automatic inference that Minaben was attacked by the accused and accused only. The second discrepancy which we find is this that the incident in question occurred at 22.30 hours on 17.12.1998 and after 15 hours of the incident, the accused came to be examined by P.W. 5 and at that time, he had bleeding injury as has been admitted clearly by P.W. 5. That injury was not minor but certainly simple injury. Now in these circumstances, if the admission by the accused is considered, the question which arises is whether simple injury had it been caused at the time of incident with Minaben, would it be possible that the said simple injury would be bleeding all throughout for 15 hours till P.W. 5 examined the accused, meaning thereby that there is reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with the guilt of the accused that he might have got injury somewhere during these 15 hours. Unfortunately, the age of the injury has not been asked either by the prosecution or the defence. One more reason for discarding this evidence to establish the guilt of the accused is that P.W. 5 in clear terms stated that the injury caused to the accused could be caused by sharp edged weapon but it must be double edged and the injury could be possible only by the double sharp edged weapon. One more reason for discarding this evidence to establish the guilt of the accused is that P.W. 5 in clear terms stated that the injury caused to the accused could be caused by sharp edged weapon but it must be double edged and the injury could be possible only by the double sharp edged weapon. Now, the prosecution projects the weapon of crime knife is certainly not double edged weapon. So, even if this aspect and this circumstance against the accused, if taken as it is, and is appreciated in proper perspective, it is not proved beyond doubt that firstly stabbing referred by the accused in his evidence was stabbing connected with the death of Minaben. Even if Thakkarbapanagar, Jaishankar Society is referred in admission, it cannot be inferred that the same place of offence i.e. common lavatory behind the house of the complainant etc. and other tenants was referred by the accused. Inference of guilt from the circumstantial evidence would be justified only when all incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or guilt of any other person. The circumstance must be complete and must not be capable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. When there are discrepancies as described by us in this particular piece of evidence, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that whatever stated by the accused as history to the doctor, even if it is an admission under Section 21 of the Act is capable to indicate guilt of the accused only. On probabilities, if the circumstance is considered while stabbing Minaben, it would not be probable that the accused would get such injury. Therefore, this circumstance as has been established against the accused does not help the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. 27. While considering two other circumstances, i.e. discovery and Forensic Science Laboratory report which indicate the blood group of the deceased on both these articles, i.e. on knife and pant of the accused and appreciating this evidence, it is clearly revealed that the evidence of discovery from the accused of knife has not been proved beyond doubt. This is so because P.W. 10 Kantibhai Bhalabhai examined at Exhibit 32 - the panch of discovery panchanama Exhibit 33 did not support the prosecution case at all. This is so because P.W. 10 Kantibhai Bhalabhai examined at Exhibit 32 - the panch of discovery panchanama Exhibit 33 did not support the prosecution case at all. True that the hostile witness and especially the hostile panchas is the common phenomena and the prosecution case cannot be thrown out on that count only but in this particular case, discovery has not been established even by the evidence of the investigating officer properly so as to come to the conclusion that discovery was sufficiently proved irrespective of panchas did not support the prosecution case. When we appreciate the evidence of P.W. 11 Thapabhai Kanaiyabhai at Exhibit 34 in respect of discovery, he only stated as under. “The accused was arrested on 18.12.1998 at 7.45 hours. He voluntarily was prepared to show the weapon and the panchanama was drawn in the presence of two panchas and muddammal weapon was seized. Exhibit 33 is that panchanama”. This fact in no stretch of reasoning be said to be sufficient evidence to establish discovery of weapon. Section 27 of the Act is exception to the general rule that the confession of the accused before the Police Officer is not admissible in evidence. What is required to be proved is the information received from the accused and that information can be proved through the discovery which is effected in pursuance of that discovery. If the fact is discovered in pursuance of the information supplied by the accused, then it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that how and what information the accused provided and how and what discovery was effected and how the discovery related to the information supplied by the accused. None of these ingredients is proved by the prosecution in the present case in respect of discovery and, therefore, the evidence of discovery is not at all proved as against the accused in respect of knife upon which the blood group of the deceased was found. When the discovery is not proved from the accused of the weapon, the blood upon such weapon even if it belongs to the deceased is of no use to the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. This circumstance, therefore, also does not indicate the guilt and only the guilt of the accused. 28. When the discovery is not proved from the accused of the weapon, the blood upon such weapon even if it belongs to the deceased is of no use to the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. This circumstance, therefore, also does not indicate the guilt and only the guilt of the accused. 28. So far as the Forensic Science Laboratory evidence in regard to pant of the accused is concerned, though it is the case of the prosecution that serological department of the Forensic Science Laboratory found blood stains on the pant of the accused which was seized by the police when the accused was arrested. According to serological opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory, these blood stains on the pant of the accused were of ‘B’ group which belongs to the deceased. Learned Advocate for the appellant made an attempt to show the discrepancy that in the post-mortem note, it has been mentioned by P.W. 6 Dr. Hasumatiben Patel that she had collected 100 cc blood from the body of the deceased which was sealed in the bottle and was forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The forwarding letter of the police to the Forensic Science Laboratory is placed on record at Exhibit 28. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that sample No. 6 in the sealed blood bottle of the deceased wherein the investigating officer refers that the blood was of 120 ml., of the deceased in that sealed bottle. Again learned Advocate for the appellant brought our attention to the forwarding and acknowledging letter of the Forensic Science Laboratory placed on record wherein it has been stated that, that sample which is referred as sample No. 6 and the Forensic Science Laboratory refers to the sample as sample ‘F’. It is mentioned that though the seal was of medical officer and it was also mentioned that it was blood sample of the deceased but only 50 ml., blood was found in that sample in contradiction of whatever the doctor mentioned in the post-mortem note and the investigating officer noted in the forwarding letter Exhibit 28. It is the submission on behalf of the appellant that on account of these discrepancies and since the Scientific Officer has not been examined, this evidence is also of no avail to the prosecution. As against that, learned APP Mr. It is the submission on behalf of the appellant that on account of these discrepancies and since the Scientific Officer has not been examined, this evidence is also of no avail to the prosecution. As against that, learned APP Mr. Dabhi relied upon certain decisions and stated that when the seal was found intact by the Forensic Science Laboratory, the question of quantity of the blood would not arise at all and the accused has not explained how the blood of the deceased was found on the pant of the accused. 29. When we appreciate this piece of evidence, we find that irrespective of what was the quantity of the blood forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory and received by it, what is material is by that evidence can it be clinchingly said that the accused had committed crime and there was no other reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the accused. It is the prosecution case itself that the accused had also injury in his finger. That injury was by sharp cutting weapon. Not only that, P.W. 5 deposed that even after 15 hours that injury was bleeding. In these circumstances, it was the duty of the prosecution to eliminate all hypothesis of innocence of the accused to the extent that the prosecution ought to have proved beyond doubt that blood group of the accused was not ‘B’ group and that stains on the pant of the accused was not the blood of the accused himself. It is an admitted fact that blood group of the accused has not been ascertained. It has also been admitted in the evidence that the accused had also bleeding injury. It is, therefore, reasonable hypothesis that upon pant of the accused, there might be his own blood because he had bleeding injury. This fact is incompatible with the guilt of the accused and hence this fourth circumstance upon which the prosecution case rests also could not be proved beyond doubt. 30. The motive is not relevant to the crime as established beyond reasonable doubt by the cogent evidence but when the case rests upon the circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the prosecution must prove the motive. P.W. 2 in his evidence stated that the intention of the accused was to gratify his illicit demand and Mina had refused and, therefore, the incident occurred. P.W. 2 in his evidence stated that the intention of the accused was to gratify his illicit demand and Mina had refused and, therefore, the incident occurred. This motive projected by the prosecution is not proved beyond doubt. This is so because had it been that P.W. 1 mother of the deceased Kamlaben must have stated so because she would be the first person to know such fact. The motive further is being attempted to be established by the evidence of P.W. 2 whose evidence is the weakest kind of evidence as we have discussed above and hence we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in fact the prosecution failed to prove the motive behind the crime beyond reasonable doubt. 31. In view of the above discussion, the benefit of doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. As stated above, the prosecution case squarely rests upon the circumstantial evidence and, therefore, the prosecution must prove that circumstances from which inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established. When we appreciate the evidence against the accused, we find that none of the circumstances individually could be established by the prosecution cogently and firmly. Further, such circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused but as appreciated by us, none of the circumstances is so complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused. The law requires that such circumstances should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be in-consistent with his innocence. Seeing the accused running away from the scene of offence is not the circumstance so complete eliminating any other explanation of innocence of the accused and so consistent with the guilt of the accused. Likewise, even if accused made admission before the doctor, the admission is such that it is capable of explanation of hundred hypothesis than that of only the guilt of the accused. Only referring stabbing and the name of Jaishankar Society at the time of incident would not itself in all probabilities lead to the guilt of the accused. While the evidence of discovery and Forensic Science Laboratory both also raise hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Only referring stabbing and the name of Jaishankar Society at the time of incident would not itself in all probabilities lead to the guilt of the accused. While the evidence of discovery and Forensic Science Laboratory both also raise hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Such circumstance even if taken cumulatively fail to form chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that in all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. This is so because each individual circumstance must be cogently and firmly established by which inference of guilt can be inferred and then cumulative effect of such circumstance can be noted but this is the case wherein it is not possible to form the chain of circumstances of the guilt of the accused because each so called link of chain could not be established beyond doubt. 32. In view of the above, we come to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant. It appears that learned trial Judge only going with the admission made by the accused before P.W. 5 and then took the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 in aid with observation that otherwise the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 would not be sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. Though learned trial Judge did not rely upon the evidence of discovery, but as cumulative circumstance, the evidence of Forensic Science Laboratory about finding of blood stain of ‘B’ group on the pant of the accused was considered by the trial Court but as we have reappreciated the evidence above, neither the admission made by the accused before P.W. 5 nor the evidence of Forensic Science Laboratory, both themselves sufficient to indicate the guilt of the accused and the question of considering cumulative effect of each circumstance would not arise. In the matter of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, as reported in AIR 1952 SC 343 , it was observed in Para 10 as under : “Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken the tenders to his house, the prosecution in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above. No direct evidence was adduced in proof of those facts. No direct evidence was adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was placed by the prosecution and by the Courts below on certain circumstances, and intrinsic evidence contained in the impugned document, Exhibit P-3A. In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore, it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg. V. Hodge, (1838) 2 Lewin 227) where he said : “The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.” It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In spite of the forceful arguments addressed to us by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State we have not been able to discover any such evidence either intrinsic within Exhibit P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the Courts below have just fallen into the error against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case.” 33. For the reasons recorded, this appeal is allowed. For the reasons recorded, this appeal is allowed. The above judgment and order impugned in this appeal of convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment of seven days is set aside and accused Ghanshyam @ Ganio Dayaldas Pithani Sindhi is acquitted of the charges levelled against him under Section 302 of IPC in Sessions Case No. 115 of 1999. The accused is directed to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required to be detained in jail for any other purpose. The order passed by the trial Court in respect of muddamal is not interfered with.