Judgment : ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. (1) TWO appeals were filed against the judgment and order dated January 19, 2006 passed by the learned Single judge while disposing of a contempt proceeding. (2) ONE Pranab Kumar Sengupta was appointed a Primary Teacher on march 21, 1973 in Basak Bagan Primary School, Patipukur, Calcutta (now under the District Primary School, 24-Parganas North). (3) AT the prevalent time the school being an urban school was guided by west Bengal Urban Primary Education Act, 1963. According to Pranab since he was appointed in an urban school in early part of 1973 he was to be guided under the said Act of 1963 and the State authorities including the director of School Education were the proper authorities to approve his appointment. He made several representations for approval of this appointment. However, his prayer was not considered. Ultimately he filed a writ petition in 1993 being C. O. No. 13320 (W) of 1993. The learned Single judge by judgment and order dated April 11, 1994 allowed his writ petition after holding that since he was working for last 20 years at meagre monthly salary of Rs. 22. 50 there was no bar and/or impediment to direct the respondent No. 2 being the Director, School Education to accord approval. His Lordship ultimately directed all the respondents in the said writ petition including respondent No. 2 to grant approval of appointment to Pranab and release all consequential benefits admissible to him in accordance with law. State preferred an appeal from the said judgment and order of the learned single Judge. State, however, did not proceed with the said appeal and allowed the same to be dismissed for default. (4) PRANAB filed a contempt application. The learned Single Judge in the contempt application held that since State did not contest the said proceeding and did not prefer any appeal from the judgment and order they should carry out the direction of the Court. The learned Single Judge observed, "the Director of School Education, however, although is not a competent authority to grant such approval is hereby directed to see that an appropriate order be passed by the Chairman, District Primary School Council, Calcutta". It was contended before us that two matters were heard by the learned single Judge analogously. The other matter pertained to Calcutta Primary school Council. It was contended before us that two matters were heard by the learned single Judge analogously. The other matter pertained to Calcutta Primary school Council. Hence, His Lordship through inadvertence directed Calcutta district Council instead of 24-Praganas (North). (5) TAKING advantage of the mistake 24-Parganas (North) District Council did not adhere to such direction which resulted in a second contempt proceeding where rule was issued. The Council filed an appeal that was disposed of by the Division Bench in which one of us (Justice Ashim Kumar Banerjee)was a party. The Division Bench did not interfere at the stage when rule was only issued and granted liberty to the appellants to file appropriate affidavit before the learned Single Judge. Accordingly affidavit was filed before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge disposed of the second contempt application by directing the Primary School Council to accord approval to Pranabs appointment. Hence, this appeal by the Council. (6) SIGNIFICANT to note, State, however, complied with the direction of the learned Single Judge. The Director, School Education accorded approval to the appointment and asked the Council to take appropriate steps for regularisation of his appointment. The Assistant Secretary, Education department vide memo dated August 14, 2001 asked the Director to take appropriate steps so that the Council would take appropriate steps for release of salary to Pranab. (7) BEING aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge to the extent where His Lordship did not direct payment of arrear salary Pranab filed a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. The Apex Court dismissed the said application on March 28, 2008. (8) MR. Pabitra Kumar Basu, learned Counsel appearing for the Council and its Chairman being the appellants above named, contended that two appeals were filed for abandoned caution one being mandamus appeal and the other being contempt appeal against the self-same judgment of the learned Single Judge. (9) MR. Bose contended that neither the Council nor the Chairman was a party to the writ petition. Hence, order, if any, passed on the said application was not binding upon the Council and that too 24-Parganas (North) as the learned Single Judge while disposing of the first contempt application issued a specific direction on Calcutta, DPC and not 24-Parganas (North). According to Mr. Hence, order, if any, passed on the said application was not binding upon the Council and that too 24-Parganas (North) as the learned Single Judge while disposing of the first contempt application issued a specific direction on Calcutta, DPC and not 24-Parganas (North). According to Mr. Bose, Rule 11 empowered the Chairman to issue appropriate appointment letters on the basis of the panel prepared and approved by the appropriate authority. It was also prescribed under Rule 11 that appointment in any other method was invalid. Hence, the learned Judge could not have directed the appellants to accord approval to the appointment of Pranab contrary to Rule 11. Mr. Basu also contended that once the writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge there could be no further direction in a contempt proceeding in addition to the original order passed in the writ proceeding. Mr. Basu lastly contended that under 1930 Act the District School board was the proper authority. District Primary School Council was the successor-in-interest under the 1973 Act and as such there could be no devolution of interest from the Director, School Education to the Council as erroneously held by the learned Single Judge. In this regard he drew our attention to section 105 of the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973. Mr. Bose lastly contended that sympathy should not over ride law and the learned Judge could not have moulded the relief without adhering to the procedure laid down in law. In this regard he relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1996, Volume-II, Calcutta High Court notes, page 415 [debirani Bhattacharjee and Ors. vs. District Inspector of schools (SE) Burdwan and Ors. ]. (10) MR. Bose in support of his contention also relied on the following decisions: (i) 1991, Volume - II, Calcutta High Court Notes, page 174 (Ranjugopal mukherjee and Ors. vs. Ramapada Mahalder and Ors.) (ii) 2000 Volume -II, Calcutta Law Journal, page 215 (Pradip Kumar Roy chowdhury vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (iii) 2001, Volume-I, Calcutta High Court Notes, page 347 (Bomkesh chandra Jana and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (iv) Unreported decision in FMA No. 2956 of 2002 dated January 4, 2006. (11) MR. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (iv) Unreported decision in FMA No. 2956 of 2002 dated January 4, 2006. (11) MR. Amal Basu Chowdhury, learned Counsel appearing for the State contended that the State already complied with the direction of this Court as would appear from the letter of the Assistant Secretary of the State as well as Director, School Education. Hence, it was incumbent upon the council to adhere to the direction issued by the State in this regard. In effect Mr. Basu Chowdhury supported the respondent, Pranab indirectly. (12) MR. Shaibalendu Bhowmick, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner above named, while opposing the appeal contended that 1973 Act came in force in 1994 whereas Pranab was appointed in the early part of 1973 and his writ petition was disposed of prior to 1973 Act coming into force. Hence, provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereunder had no application in the instant case. (13) HE also contended that the West Bengal Rural Primary Education act, 1930 had no application since Pranab was appointed in urban school which was guided by 1963 Act. Under 1963 Act there was no specific guideline for appointment. Hence, learned Single Judge rightly directed the Director, school Education (Primary) to accord approval. (14) MR. Bhowmick further contended that assuming that the order of the learned Single Judge disposing of the writ petition was erroneous the appellants were not entitled to question the propriety of the said order in a contempt proceeding and the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting their contentions. Mr. Bhowmick further contended that earlier the urban school were guided by 1963 Act whereas rural schools were guided by 1930 act. By introduction of 1973 Act in 1994 a composite and comprehensive Act was enacted to control the primary education through out the State. However, Pranab was appointed in March, 1973 and as such he was guided by 1963 Act which had no specific guideline for appointment. The learned single Judge did not commit any mistake in directing the Director, School education to accord approval to his appointment. (15) MR. Bhowmick also drew our attention to various correspondence wherefrom we find that the District Primary School Council had on two occasions paid salary under the threat of contempt. They also agreed to comply with the direction of this Court. (15) MR. Bhowmick also drew our attention to various correspondence wherefrom we find that the District Primary School Council had on two occasions paid salary under the threat of contempt. They also agreed to comply with the direction of this Court. Hence, they were not entitled to question the order passed in the second contempt proceeding. Mr. Bhowmick also contended that the main order disposing of the writ petition attained finality when the mandamus appeal filed by the State was dismissed. Hence, neither the Court in a contempt proceeding could go beyond the said order nor was it open to the appellants to question the propriety of the same. He also contended that to administer complete justice the Contempt Court was competent enough to issue additional directions in a contempt proceeding. In this regard he relied on three Apex Court decisions reported in 2004, volume -VII, Supreme Court Cases, page 261 (P. N. Ram vs. State of jharkhand); 2006, Volume -VI, Supreme Court Today, page 185 (State of Orissa and Am. vs. Aswini Kumar Baliarsingh); 2007, Volume -V, Supreme court Today, page 775 (Santanu Chaudhuri vs. Subir Ghosh). (16) IN support of his contention Mr. Bhowmick also relied on the following decisions: (i) 1977, Volume - I, Supreme Court Cases, page 1 (Jai Singh vs. Union of India); (ii) 1983, Volume - III, Supreme Court Cases, page 284 (Y. V. Randaiah, state of A. P. vs. J. Sreenivasa Rao); (Hi) 1996, Volume -I, Calcutta Law Journal, page 230 (Basudeb Bag and anr. vs. Bhaskar Chandra Kar and Ors.); (iv) All India Reporter, 1996, Supreme Court, page 302 (T. R. Dhananjaya vs. J. Vasudevan); (v) 1999, Volume - VI, Supreme Court Cases, page 18 (Delhi Development authority vs. Skipper Construction and Anr.); (vi) 2000, Volume - VI, Supreme Court Cases, page 566 (Ajaib Singh vs. Tulsi Devi); (vii) 2001, Volume - V, Supreme Today, page 278 (Dhurandhar Prasad singh vs. Jai Prakash University and Ors.); (viii) 2004, Volume -VI, Supreme Today, page 194 (Balvant N. Viswamitra and Ors. vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (D) Through Lrs. and Ors.); (ix) 2004, All India Reporter, SCW, page 119 (Basic Shiksha Parishad and anr. vs. Sugna Devi and Ors.); (x) 2008, Volume -I, Supreme Today, page 256 (Hindustan Petroleum corpn. Ltd. vs. Ashok Ranghba Ambre). (17) WHILE replying to the contentions raised by the respondent, Mr. vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (D) Through Lrs. and Ors.); (ix) 2004, All India Reporter, SCW, page 119 (Basic Shiksha Parishad and anr. vs. Sugna Devi and Ors.); (x) 2008, Volume -I, Supreme Today, page 256 (Hindustan Petroleum corpn. Ltd. vs. Ashok Ranghba Ambre). (17) WHILE replying to the contentions raised by the respondent, Mr. Basu contended that since the Council was not a party to the original proceeding the contempt proceeding was not maintainable as against them. He also contended that the original order was never served on the Council and hence there could be no question of committing contempt of the same by council who was not a party to the original proceeding. He also contended that the directions given by the learned Single Judge was contrary to Rule 11 and as such was nullity in the eye of law. He prayed for setting aside of the order of the learned Single Judge. (18) MR. Basu also tried to contend that that learned Judge erred in giving direction upon the Council to approve the appointment without holding the chairman guilty of contempt. Such argument of Mr. Basu was wholly untenable as it was the duty of the Court to see that its orders were implemented and for implementation of an order the Court could use the process of contempt specially when there was no mode of execution of the courts order in writ jurisdiction. In this regard we may refer to the Apex court decision in the case of Santanu Choudhury (supra). (19) TO appreciate the controversy let us draw a complete picture by taking recourse to the relevant events chronologically. (20) IN March, 1973 Pranab was appointed as a Primary Teacher in Basak bagan Primary School under the Dum Dum Municipality. The school was situated in urban area when 1963 Act was in force. No specific guideline was prescribed in the said Act with regard to the appointment of Primary teacher. (21) PRANAB filed his writ petition, inter alia, praying for approval of his appointment based on a Government notification. Learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition in 1994 when the comprehensive Act of 1973 was not in force. His Lordship directed approval of Pranabs appointment through the Director, School Education. State preferred an appeal, however, did not proceed with the same and allowed the same to be dismissed. Learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition in 1994 when the comprehensive Act of 1973 was not in force. His Lordship directed approval of Pranabs appointment through the Director, School Education. State preferred an appeal, however, did not proceed with the same and allowed the same to be dismissed. (22) ON a composite back drop it is crystal clear that the order of the learned Single Judge attained finality and no Court or any litigant can question the same. (23) WHO would then be obliged to comply with the order? His Lordship directed the Director, School Education who already approved the appointment. Whatever be the effect of such approval Director could not be blamed for non-compliance as he performed his part of the job. In the first contempt the learned Single Judge through inadvertence directed Calcutta council to consider the prayer for approval. Pertinent to note, the order passed in the first contempt petition also attained finality. That time order was not complied with compelling Pranab to file the second contempt petition. Learned Single Judge issued Rule. Council then preferred appeal where the Division Bench did not interfere. In this backdrop could it be said that the order need not be complied with as it was illegal? We are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the answer must be in the negative. (24) COUNCIL was not a party in the writ proceeding. The Council could not be a party to the writ proceeding as it was not in existence on the day when the order was passed. Pertinent to note, the comprehensive Act of 1973 came in force in 1994 after passing of the said order by the learned Single judge. The District Primary School Council was established under the said act of 1973. It is true that they inherited the legacy from the District School board set up under the Rural Act of 1930. There was no School Board for the urban part. Hence, the learned Judge was right in observing that there had been a devolution of interest from the Director to the District Council. Assuming it was not correct there could not be any vacuum. Under the 1963 Act the urban primary education was being controlled by the State through the Director, School Education and other Government officials. There was neither any Council nor any Board to govern them. Assuming it was not correct there could not be any vacuum. Under the 1963 Act the urban primary education was being controlled by the State through the Director, School Education and other Government officials. There was neither any Council nor any Board to govern them. Hence, when the comprehensive Act of 1973 came in force and District Council took charge it presupposes that they took charge from those Government officials having control of the primary education prior to the 1973 Act coming into force in the urban areas. Mr. Bose made strenuous submissions that the order passed by the learned Singk Judge was illegal and as such the order was a nullity. Weare afraid, we are unable to accept such contention. Mr. Bose strenuously relied upon the unreported decision of the Division Bench in FMA No. 2956 of 2002 where the appeal was filed against the original order. In the instant case the State preferred appeal from the original order and thereafter did not pursue the same. The Council came to know of the said order after filing of the contempt proceeding. They could have preferred appeal from the original order. They did not do so. Hence, they were not entitled to challenge the legality and validity of the original order which admittedly attained finality. (25) WE also intend to examine the controversy from another angle. Rightly or wrongly one order was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. So long the said order was subsisting no litigant could avoid the said order and flout the same. It is the duty of the Court to see that its orders are obeyed by all and sundry. (26) IN the instant case order was passed by the learned Single Judge in 1994. State accepted the said order subsequently and complied with such direction as would appear from the subsequent act of the Director of School education as well as Assistant Secretary, Education Department. Council could not avoid the said order on the plea that they were not parties as they could not be made parties when the said order was passed. They were creation of statute being Act of 1973 which took care of the earlier Urban act of 1963 by the provision of repeal and savings. Hence, it was the bounden duty of the Council to comply with the said direction. They were creation of statute being Act of 1973 which took care of the earlier Urban act of 1963 by the provision of repeal and savings. Hence, it was the bounden duty of the Council to comply with the said direction. (27) THE appeals, thus, fail and are hereby dismissed. There would be, however, no order as to costs. (28) URGENT xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied for. Appeals dismissed.