JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This review application Under Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the review-Petitioners themselves seeking review of the order dated 17.09.2007 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.R.P. No. 04 of 2000. 2. Heard argument of Shri D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Shri S. Deb, learned senior counsel for the Respondents. 3. In my considered opinion, a brief resume of the facts leading to filing of the review application is necessary. The Petitioners are the decree-holders. Nearly five decades ago the predecessor-interest of the Petitioners had filed Rent Suit No. 3 of 1960 against one Basanta Das for recovery of arrear rent and his ejectment on the ground of default in making payment of the rent. The suit was decreed on 10.11.1960. However, during the pendency of the suit as well as post decree, the suit land was successively transferred to one Shri Sushital Dhar and Smt. Hemalata Dhar. After the death of Akhil Chandra Ghosh, one of the decree- holders, the fact of the decree did not come to the knowledge of his successors. The fact of the decree could be discovered on 05.12.1988 and thereafter the execution case was filed on 02.03.1989. During the execution proceeding, both the sides filed a few miscellaneous applications. One of the orders, relevant for the purpose of deciding the revision and review application is that the decree was amended vide order dated 31.03.1990 Under Section 152of Code of Civil Procedure. After this amendment of the decree, the last purchaser of the suit land Smti. Hemalata Dhar was impleaded as a judgement-debtor. Finally the execution case was dismissed vide order dated 08.12.1999 on 2 (two) grounds. Firstly, it has been held that the decree is barred by limitation and secondly, that the decree was fully satisfied and as such the execution proceeding is not maintainable against the same decree. 4. The aforesaid order dated 08.12.1999 passed by die Executing Court was challenged by the decree-holders by way of filing revision application Under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. This revision application has been dismissed vide order dated 17.09.2007, which is under review. Since the order is brief, the entire order is reproduced below: 17.9.2007 None present for the parties. The aforesaid order dated 08.12.1999 passed by die Executing Court was challenged by the decree-holders by way of filing revision application Under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. This revision application has been dismissed vide order dated 17.09.2007, which is under review. Since the order is brief, the entire order is reproduced below: 17.9.2007 None present for the parties. It appears that by order dated 11.3.2007 in C. M. Application No. 33 of2007, the legal heirs of the second Petitioner Jawahar Lal Ghosh have been impleaded as Petitioners. This revision petition has been filed against the order dated 8.12.1999 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kailashahar, North Tripura in Case No. 9 Ex.(T)/99 whereby the execution petition has been rejected on the ground that the ex-parte decree passed on 10.11.1960 in Rent Suit No. 3 of 1960 has been fully executed in Execution Case No. 45 of 1962. The second execution case has been preferred after a period of 29 years, which has been rejected on the above ground. There being no apparent jurisdictional error in the impugned order, this revision petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed without any order as to cost. 5. Shri D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Executing Court committed manifest illegality in holding that the decree was time barred. According to the learned Counsel, since the decree was amended in the month of March, 1990, the execution proceeding was within the period of limitation. The learned Counsel also submitted that the second ground for dismissing the execution case that the decree was satisfied long ago is also ex-facie incorrect inasmuch as prior to 1990 the decree was only for recovery of arrear rent whereas after amendment, the decree-holders woe entitled to recover the possession of the suit land as well. However, this Court failed to appreciate the aforesaid illegalities in the order of the Executing Court and as such there being apparent error of facts and law, the order deserves to be reviewed. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners also relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Lily Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , Board of Control for Cricket in India and Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners also relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Lily Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , Board of Control for Cricket in India and Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741 and the judgment of Gauhati High Court rendered in the case of State of Tripura v. Tripura Government Pensioners' Association, reported in 2006 (2) GLT 688: (2006) 3 GLR 532. 7. On the other hand, Shri S. Deb, learned senior counsel for the Respondents has vehemently objected to reopen the case. The learned Counsel contended that there is no error apparent on the face of the record nor the Petitioners have shown sufficient reason to review the order dated 17.09.2007. The learned Counsel urged that parameters of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure is confined to examine the orders of subordinate court if there is any jurisdictional error and having not found any jurisdictional error this Court has rightly dismissed the revision application. The learned Counsel for the Respondents emphasized that the extraordinary power of the Court to review its order on the ground of "any other sufficient reason" cannot be stretched beyond certain limit so as to dilute the basic grounds of review enumerated under Order 47, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Counsel for the Respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Privy Council rendered in the case of Chhajju Ram v. Neki and Ors. AIR 1922 P C. 112, Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev, Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 52, M/S. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 , M. Ahammedkutty Haji v. Tahsildar, Kozhikode, Kerala, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 351 , Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78 and the latest judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta AIR 2008 SCW 4294 . 8. Admittedly, the Petitioners could not have challenged the impugned order dated 17.09.2007 in any court since no statutory appeal is permitted against the order of dismissal of the revision application. 8. Admittedly, the Petitioners could not have challenged the impugned order dated 17.09.2007 in any court since no statutory appeal is permitted against the order of dismissal of the revision application. Under Order 47, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure if he applicant can satisfy either of the pre-conditions laid down under Clauses (a), (b), (c) and that there is discovery of new evidence, which could not be produced earlier despite due diligence, or that there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record he can seek review of the order or judgment from the same Court. After the enactment of new Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1908, the scope of review appears to have been stretched by incorporating an additional ground in the words of "any other sufficient reason". In my considered opinion, an aggrieved party seeking review of an order need not be insisted to prove sufficient reason for reviewing its previous order with the same rigor which is required to establish the remaining criteria enumerated under Order 47, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. 9. In the case of Lily Thomas (supra) their lordships have held that if the administration of justice demands review of an order, the procedural law of justice must bend itself to do that. The trend setting observations of the Apex Court deserve to be quoted in this order, which are as below: The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Aijunsinghji held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error.... 10 In the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the hidden grounds of review of an order under the words "sufficient reason" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The scope of review jurisdiction under OrderXLVII of Code of Civil Procedure has been explained in these words: Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefore. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code are wife enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit." 11. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Moran Mar Bassellos Catholicos (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondents has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of BCCC (supra) and has held that the law enunciated therein that the scope of review is much more restricted than that of an appeal is not universal. 12. The width and breadth of review jurisdiction also fell for consideration before die Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das (supra). 12. The width and breadth of review jurisdiction also fell for consideration before die Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das (supra). In this case their lordships have held that the prayer for review of an order must be within four corners of the grounds laid down under Order 47 of Code of Civil Procedure and no order can be reviewed on the ground that the party could not highlight all the aspects of the case properly. Essentially, this authority is based on Exception to Order 47 Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits review on the ground of amendment of the law or subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case. However, in the case before me, the Petitioners have not pleaded that they could not place the case properly. On the other hand, it is a case where the impugned order was passed in absence of representation of either party. In this way, the authority of the Apex Court cited on behalf of the Respondents is distinguishable on facts. 13. In the case of M. Ahammedkutty Haji (supra) cited on behalf of the Respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the powers of rectification of house tax provided Under Section 15of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975. In that context, it has been observed that an error should be apparent on the face of the record, patent, manifest or self-evident to correct the assessment. Their lordships further observed that if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment or order is correct or not, the error cannot be described as an error on the face of the record. 14. In the recent judgment of Kamal Sengupta (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has culled out the principles of review. The relevant criterions of review as enumerated by the Apex Court are extracted below: (i) * * * (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing Order 47, Rule 1has to be interpreted in the light of the other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing Order 47, Rule 1has to be interpreted in the light of the other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) * * * (vii) * * * 15. In the case of M/s. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that review of a judgment is a serious step and the Court should be reluctant to reopen the case and render a fresh decision. Their lordships have held that normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by a Court is final and departure from this principle should only be in exceptional circumstances. 16. In the case of Chhajju Ram (supra) the Hon'ble Privy Council had the occasion to examine contours of the words "sufficient reason" incorporated under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. After delineating the differences of review powers prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877 and 1908. Their lordships have held that the court cannot travel beyond the parameters laid down in Rule 1 under the garb of any other sufficient reason. The relevant observations of the Privy Council are as below: But their lordships are unable to assume that the language used in the Codes of 1877 and 1908 is intended to leave open the questions which were raised on the language used in the earlier legislation. They think that Rule 1 of Order XLVII must be read as in itself definite of the limits within which review is today permitted, and that reference to practice under former and different statues is misleading. Son construing it they interpret the words "any other sufficient reason" as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. 17. Son construing it they interpret the words "any other sufficient reason" as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. 17. A survey of the authorities with regard to jurisdiction of the court to review its order and judgment makes it clear that although the review jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously and sparingly only when substantial case of miscarriage of justice is made out but at the same time the grounds laid down under Order 47 of Code of civil Procedure cannot be put in a strait jacket formula. There can be no wrangle on the legal position that a party cannot seek review of a judgment on merit or on the plea that the judgment is de-horse to the pleadings etc. In other words, review is permissible only if (i) there is discovery of new evidence; (ii) there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) there is any other sufficient reason. The view taken by the Hon'ble Privy Council that the "sufficient reason" must have nexus with other grounds v. enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 of of Code of Civil Procedure has also been approved in the case of Kamal Sengupta (supra). 18. Coming to the case in hand, I notice that the order under review was passed ex parte and this is the special feature of this review application. Besides this, the revision application has been practically dismissed in limine without adverting to the grounds raised in the revision application. I have already mentioned earlier that the order of the Executing Court was challenged on the ground that neither the execution proceeding was hit by the statutory period of limitation nor the decree was fully satisfied as has been held by the Executing Court. With due respect, the learned Judge did not address the aforesaid grounds raised by the Petitioners. In the absence of representation by either party, the learned Judge prima facie found that the execution of the decree was beyond the period, of limitation. In other words, neither the plea of the Petitioners that the decree was within time after its amendment in the year 1990 nor the plea that the decree was fully satisfied were examined under the impugned order. In other words, neither the plea of the Petitioners that the decree was within time after its amendment in the year 1990 nor the plea that the decree was fully satisfied were examined under the impugned order. Hence, not only there is error apparent on the face of the record but I find no hesitation to hold that it is a clear case wherein this Court must invoke its inherent powers enacted in the form of "any other sufficient reason" Under order XLVII Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the impugned order. I am also of the view that if the review prayer is not accepted, the Petitioners would depart from the judicial process with a message that justice does not seem to have been done to them. Having regard to the nature and circumstances under which the revision application was disposed of it appears to me that essentially, the prayer of the Petitioners is to restore the revision application for hearing it on merit and it is not a clear case of review simplicity. 19. For the reasons set out here-in-above, the review prayer is accepted. The impugned order dated 17.09.2007 is hereby set aside. The revision application being CRP No. 4 of 2000 shall be heard on merit.