Judgment A. L. Dave, J.—Leave to amend prayer Clause(d) by deleting the words “issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus in the interim” appearing in the first line of Clause(d) of the prayer. Amendment to be carried out forthwith. 2. Pursuant to the bomb blasts in Ahmedabad on 26.07.2008, several offences came to be registered with several Police Stations. The cases were investigated and charge-sheets have been filed in some of the cases. The petitioner is shown as an absconding suspect/accused in at least three charge-sheets(others, if any, we have no material before us to know) filed by the police in respect of the following offences:— (1) Shahibaug Police Station C.R.-I No. 236/08. (2) Khadia Police Station C.R.-I No. 71/08. (3) Sarkhej Police Station C.R.-I No. 181/08. It appears that he came to be arrested in connection with the offence registered with Shahibaug Police Station on 22.11.2008 and was produced before the Special Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 11, Ahmedabad, who is assigned the work of dealing with the Bomb Blast cases by a notification of the High Court dated 2nd September, 2008. The Investigating Agency sought him to be remanded to police custody and he was remanded to police custody from 23.11.2008 to 01.12.2008 by the Magisterial Court. It then appears that he was, thereafter, arrested in connection with Khadia Police Station C.R.-I No. 71 of 2008 and was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate on 02.12.2008 and, in that connection, he was sought to be remanded to police custody. Again by order dated 02.12.2008, he was remanded to police custody from 02.12.2008 to 10.12.2008. 2.1. Again, it appears that he was arrested in connection with Sarkhej Police Station C.R.-I No. 181 of 2008 and produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 11.12.2008 and was remanded to police custody from 11.12.2008 to 18.12.2008, pursuant to a prayer made by the Investigating Agency. 3. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order granting his remand to police custody by order dated 0212.2008 and remand to police custody by order dated 11.12.2008, has preferred this petition. The total challenge in the petition is grant of remand of the petitioner to police custody beyond the period of 15 days by about eight days. 3. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order granting his remand to police custody by order dated 0212.2008 and remand to police custody by order dated 11.12.2008, has preferred this petition. The total challenge in the petition is grant of remand of the petitioner to police custody beyond the period of 15 days by about eight days. The petition purporting to be one under Articles 21, 226 and 227 of the Constitution is preferred seeking the following reliefs :— “(a) To issue a writ of Habeas Corpus or in the nature of Habeas Corpus commanding the Respondents for the production of the body of the Petitioner and declare that the custody since 09.12.2008 of the petitioner has been without any jurisdiction. (b) To issue a writ of certiorari or in the nature of certiorari and hold that the Hon’ble Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 11 was without jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 11.12.2008 and to set aside and quash the impugned order. (c) To issue a writ of certiorari or in the nature of certiorari and hold that the Hon’ble Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 11 was without jurisdiction to pass the order dated 02.12.2008 as being without jurisdiction after 09.12.2008 and hence hold that the custody of the petitioner illegal and be pleased to partially quash and set aside the order dated 02.12.2008. (d) To issue necessary directions directing the Respondent not to prefer any such application under Section 167(1) CrPC in those cases connected with the 26.07.2002(sic) till the survival of this petition and be pleased to send the petitioner in judicial custody at once. (e) Be pleased to direct the Respondent to furnish a copy of the being 1st C.R. No. 181/2008, Sarkhej Police Station to the Petitioner. (f) Be pleased to dispense with the requirement of the Affidavit of Petitioner as the Petitioner is presently in police custody in FIR being 1st C.R. No. 181/2008, Sarkhej Police Station at Gaekwad Haveli Police Station Compound, Raikhad, Ahmedabad City. (g) Pass any orders/further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in order to do substantial justice.” 4. The petition is founded on a premise that, as per settled law, an arrestee can be remanded to police custody for a maximum period of 15 days in the whole in connection with an offence or with offences forming part of same transaction. The petition is founded on a premise that, as per settled law, an arrestee can be remanded to police custody for a maximum period of 15 days in the whole in connection with an offence or with offences forming part of same transaction. In the instant case, the three offences registered against the petitioner are claimed to be forming part of the same transaction and, therefore, the Magistrate could not have remanded the petitioner to police custody for a period exceeding 15 days in the whole, whereas by passing three different orders dated 23.11.2008, 02.12.2008 and 11.12.2008, in respect of three offences registered with three different Police Stations, the Magistrate has remanded the petitioner to police custody for a period which exceeds the stipulated limit of 15 days. According to the petitioner, this violates his right to life and liberty and, therefore, he has approached this Court with this petition. 5. Learned Advocate, Dr. Mukul Sinha, appearing with learned Advocate, Mr. Somnath Vatsa, submitted that the petition is founded on pure legal submissions and not on factual matrix except certain basic and undisputable facts forming part of court proceedings. He submitted that, if the provision contained in Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is examined, it is clear that an accused can be remanded to police custody in respect of an offence for a maximum period of 15 days in the whole. This provision has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of C.B I. Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni, AIR 1992 SC 1768 and it has been held that this limit of 15 days would be applicable to an offence or different offences forming part of same transaction. He submitted that, as per the prosecution case, as emerging from the charge-sheet papers of the three offences indicated hereinabove, it is clear that all the three offences are alleged to have been committed in furtherance of a conspiracy and, therefore, though the offences have occurred at different places, they would form part of same transaction and, therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have remanded the petitioner to police custody for a period exceeding 15 days. His order remanding the petitioner to police custody for a period exceeding 15 days was, therefore, without jurisdiction. According to Dr. Sinha, it is not a case of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction but want of jurisdiction. His order remanding the petitioner to police custody for a period exceeding 15 days was, therefore, without jurisdiction. According to Dr. Sinha, it is not a case of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction but want of jurisdiction. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has been illegally or unlawfully confined to police custody and, therefore, the prayer for writ of habeas corpus. 5.1. Dr. Sinha submitted that the term “forming part of same transaction” is not forming part of Section 167, but has been arrived at on the basis of various judicial pronouncements, which held that even if the offences are committed differently, may be at different places and may be at different times, if they are arising out of the same transaction or they are committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, they would form part of the same transaction. In support of his submissions, he has relied on following decisions:— (1) Purshottamdas Dalmia vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 . (2) Balbir vs. State of Haryana & Another, (2000) 1 SCC 285 . (3) Ajay Aggarwal vs. Union of India & Others, (1993) 3 SCC 609 . (4) Vivek Gupta vs. C. B. I. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 628 . He, therefore, submitted that the petition may be entertained and appropriate directions may be given. During course of arguments, Dr. Sinha pointed out that the petitioner was remanded to police custody till 3.30 P.M. on 18.12.2008 and, therefore, the relief in the form of protection against remand to police custody in connection with other offences registered in respect of the bomb blasts may be granted. 6. The petition has been opposed to by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Bhatt, appearing on advance copy. He submitted that this petition for habeas corpus would not be maintainable for the reason that the petitioner has been remanded to police custody by an order of a competent Court and his whereabouts are very well known. He submitted that, if the petitioner is aggrieved by the order in question, he has an alternative remedy to challenge the same before appropriate forum. He submitted that, if the petitioner is aggrieved by the order in question, he has an alternative remedy to challenge the same before appropriate forum. He further submitted that, though there may be an allegation of conspiracy, may be the same in all the cases, the incidents are different, the persons involved therein may be different and the persons affected thereby would be different and, therefore, it cannot be said that the limit envisaged in Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for remand to police custody would be applicable in respect of the accused persons for all the cases as if they are one offence or offences forming part of same transaction. He submitted further that the matter is still at the investigation stage and the outcome of the investigation is yet not known so far as the petitioner is concerned and, therefore also, at this juncture, the petition may not be entertained on a presumptive premise that all the offences are arising out of the same transaction or are forming part of the transaction. Mr. Bhatt submitted that sending an accused to police custody or to judicial custody for that matter does not amount to violation of Article 21, a right to life or liberty. It is only a reasonable restriction on that right introduced by due process of law. He relied on the decision in the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni & Another vs. Union of India & Others, (2002) 2 SCC 210 , Janardhan Reddy vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 in support of his submissions. 6.1. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the petitioner has prayed for a writ of habeas corpus besides prayer for a writ of certiorari as well as a writ of mandamus. As per High Court Rules, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus would go to a Division Bench whereas a petition for the other writs would go to a Single Judge and, therefore, this petition may not be entertained. He also submitted that the petitioner should prefer either a revision or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution to challenge the orders, which may have hurt him, but then the forum would be different. He submitted that since the petitioner has alternative remedy, this Court may not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction by entertaining this petition. He, therefore, submitted that the petition may be dismissed. 7. He submitted that since the petitioner has alternative remedy, this Court may not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction by entertaining this petition. He, therefore, submitted that the petition may be dismissed. 7. In rejoinder, learned Advocate, Dr. Mukul Sinha, submitted that be it a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or for a writ of any other nature, the forum is the High Court and individual Benches cannot be considered as different forums. He submitted that when a petitioner seeks issuance of writs of various nature, he cannot be expected to file different writ petitions on the same facts and a common petition may be entertained. Dr. Sinha submitted that the concept of reasonable restriction is not contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution unlike Article 19. He also submitted that the submission that each occurrence is an independent offence, as submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, is not in consonance with the version of the Investigating Agency, as emerging from the charge-sheet papers. He, therefore, submitted that the petition may be appropriately entertained. 8. We have taken into consideration the submissions made before us. We find that the petition is principally a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari is sought by way of an ancillary relief and a mandate on the respondent not to ask for police remand in other cases is sought in the form of an interim relief rather than a substantive relief. 9. What emerges from the reading of the petition and the statements made on behalf of the petitioner is that, undisputedly, the petitioner’s whereabouts are known. He was remanded to police custody till 3.30 P.M. on 18th December, 2008. Obviously, thereafter, he would be produced before the Magistrate for appropriate orders. Sending of the petitioner to police custody is sought to be branded as an order without jurisdiction. This argument is advanced to support the maintainability of this petition and to canvass absence of alternative remedy. 9.1. The contention cannot be accepted for the reason that Court No. 11 of Metropolitan Magistrate Court has been specially empowered to deal with bomb blast cases. The Magistrate, therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain the remand application and pass appropriate orders remanding the accused either to police custody or to judicial custody as envisaged under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate, therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain the remand application and pass appropriate orders remanding the accused either to police custody or to judicial custody as envisaged under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is seen, Sub-section(2) provides that the Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit. It further provides that, if the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to the Magistrate having such jurisdiction. 9.2. In facts of the present case, therefore, it is not correct to say that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the order. Court No. 11 of Metropolitan Magistrate Court has been specially assigned the work of dealing with cases relating to the bomb blasts vide notification No. A.1244/2008(1) dated 02.09.2008 of the High Court of Gujarat. The question that is raised before us is a question of interpretation of law as may be applicable to the facts of each case and, therefore, even if what is contended by the petitioner is accepted, the order or orders in question cannot be said to be orders without jurisdiction. At the most, they would be orders passed upon erroneous exercise of powers which are vested in him. 9.3. However, we find that it is too early to hold that the cases registered against the petitioner in respect of the bomb blasts will have to be treated as a single offence or as offences forming part of same transaction because the three offences referred to hereinabove are at the stage of investigation so far as the petitioner is concerned and the report under Section 173 or Section 169 is yet to be filed. The charge-sheet papers, which are produced before us, relate to a report under Section 173 qua the accused shown in Column No. 1 of the said charge-sheet and, therefore, unless and until the investigation is concluded and report is filed, it would be premature to conclude that all the three offences have to be treated as offences forming part of same transaction. In this regard, we may also observe that conspiracy is an independent offence punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. We may refer to the decision in the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni & Another vs. Union of India & Others, (2002) 2 SCC 210 , where the Apex Court, while dealing with finance companies accepting deposits from a large number of persons and not repaying the same, held that in such cases, since the parties were different, the amounts of deposit were different and the period for which the deposits were accepted were also different, each individual deposit agreement constituted an independent transaction. In that case also, Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was made applicable in the charge sheet. In the instant case also conspiracy is alleged, the consequences are different and, therefore also, it is too early to say in absence of filing of charge-sheet that they are part of same transaction. 10. We have examined the decisions relied upon by learned Advocate, Dr. Mukul Sinha, and we find that those decisions would not be applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that they are all dealing with cases at a stage after filing of charge sheet. In the instant case, the case is at the stage of investigation, i.e. under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure where the decisions relied upon are in respect of Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the decisions would not be applicable. 11. The resultant effect is that the order of the Magistrate cannot be considered to be an order without jurisdiction and, therefore, it cannot be said that writ jurisdiction is the only jurisdiction which would be available to be resorted to for challenging that order. It may be an erroneous exercise of powers invested in the learned Magistrate. 12. The petition, though nomenclatured as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, cannot be treated as such for the reason that the petitioner cannot be said to have been illegally or unlawfully detained or confined because he has been remanded to police custody by a judicial order of a competent Criminal Court. An error in exercise of jurisdiction cannot be equated with want of jurisdiction. Confinement to police custody in such a situation cannot be considered as illegal or unlawful. 12.1. An error in exercise of jurisdiction cannot be equated with want of jurisdiction. Confinement to police custody in such a situation cannot be considered as illegal or unlawful. 12.1. Secondly, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued for the reason that it would amount to interfering with the process of law, i.e. the investigation process. 12.1.1. Thirdly, the prayers made in the petition do not ask for setting the petitioner at liberty forthwith. It only prays for change of custody of the petitioner from one under police to judicial custody. The contention, therefore, that it is a question of liberty of an individual cannot be accepted. What is prayed is that the petitioner may be sent to judicial custody at once. 12.1.2. There is no allegation of any violation of principles of nature justice or any ill-treatment by the Investigating Agency or any defect in the procedure followed/due process of law. In our opinion, therefore, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. 12.2. Similarly, a writ of certiorari, which is sought, also cannot be issued for the reason that the order in question cannot be considered as an order without jurisdiction, as discussed hereinabove. Therefore, the reliefs in terms of Paragraphs(a),(b) and(c) of the prayer clause cannot be granted. 12.3. So far as prayer(d) is concerned, which is in the form of interim relief and prays for a direction to the respondent not to prefer any application under Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in those cases connected with 26.07.2002(sic 2008) till survival of the petition and to send the petitioner to judicial custody at once, the same cannot be granted for the reason that the first part, though by way of interim relief, is in the form of a blanket relief, in absence of any material in respect of other offences registered in connection with 26.7.2008 bomb blasts. The second part of the relief, i.e. for sending the petitioner to judicial custody at once, if granted, would be interfering with the judicial process, which cannot be done in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, this relief runs contrary to the prayer for a writ of habeas corpus. 12.4. The second part of the relief, i.e. for sending the petitioner to judicial custody at once, if granted, would be interfering with the judicial process, which cannot be done in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, this relief runs contrary to the prayer for a writ of habeas corpus. 12.4. So far as prayer(e) is concerned, a copy of the F.I.R. can be obtained by applying for a certified copy thereof and no special orders are required to be passed by this Court. 12.5. Last but not the least, so far as prayer(f) is concerned, we have already heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner by dispensing with the affidavit since the petition is founded mainly on legal aspects. 13. As a result of the foregoing discussion, none of the reliefs prayed for in the petition can be granted. The petition must fail and stands dismissed. 14. We may hasten to add that whatever observations which are made hereinabove are purely for the purpose of examining this petition and will have no bearing on the criminal proceedings pursuant to the bomb blast incidents of 26.07.2008 in Ahmedabad.