JUDGMENT Per S.K. GANGELE, J. The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the orders of Industrial Court dated November 10, 2005 Annexure PIS and Labour Court dated October 13, 2004 Annexure P/7. The respondent No. 1 was engaged on daily wage basis on January 23, 1992. She had been performing the work of typist. As per respondent, her services were terminated with effect from February 28, 2000 without giving any opportunity of hearing and without any departmental enquiry. The respondent filed an application before the Labour Court under the provisions of M.P.I.R. Act 1960. She pleaded, that she had been engaged as daily wager typist on January 23, 1992 and disengaged with effect from February 28, 2000 without any notice. The provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 were not complied with. The, petitioner had been performing manufacturing' work and it engaged more than 100 employees. It was specifically stated in the application that the petitioner had been in construction business and it had been constructing houses laying, down several (sic) pipelines and constructing' roads and thereafter selling the houses to the consumers. The petitioner in its reply admitted the fact that the respondent was engaged on daily wage basis and her services were, terminated with effect from February 28, 2000. It has further been stated that she had been paid retrenchment compensation of Rs. 18,309/equal to 15 days wages of a year and also salary for the period of one month. It was further stated, that the Government issued a direction to terminate services of daily wager employees who were engaged after December 31,1988. Consequently, the services of the respondent were terminated. 2. Before the Labour Court the respondent tendered her evidence and stated that she was engaged on daily wage basis on January 23, 1992 as typist and disengaged with effect from February 28, 2000. She further stated that more than 100 employees had been working in the department and it was engaged in development of land, construction of houses, laying down of pipelines and construction of roads. It had been selling the aforesaid houses to the consumers. On behalf of the petitioner one Mr. D.K. Sawle, who was working as Assistant Engineer at the relevant time was examined. He in his cross-examination admitted the fact that no permission was obtained from the appropriate Government before termination of services of the respondent. It had been selling the aforesaid houses to the consumers. On behalf of the petitioner one Mr. D.K. Sawle, who was working as Assistant Engineer at the relevant time was examined. He in his cross-examination admitted the fact that no permission was obtained from the appropriate Government before termination of services of the respondent. He further admitted that more than 100 employees had been working in the Office and the Board was engaged in developing of land and construction of roads and houses, which were sold to the consumers. 5 The photocopies of the attendance registers of the respondent were also produced by the Board before the Labour Court from January 1992 upto February 2000. It is clear form the attendance registers that the respondent had been continuously working as daily wager typist. She was also paid the salary to this effect. 3. On the basis of the above evidence, the Labour Court has held that the termination of 5 services of the respondent was in violation of the provisions of industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No proper permission from the appropriate Government was taken by the Board before terminating the services. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement with 50% back wages. The aforesaid findings have been affirmed by the Industrial Court in appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both the Courts have committed an error of law in allowing the application of the petitioner. The Board paid retrenchment compensation as per law. Because it wanted to reduce the strength of its staff who were surplus. Contrary to this, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that the provisions of chapter- V (B) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are applicable in the present case because the petitioner was engaged in manufacturing process and that provisions have not been complied with before terminating services of the respondent. It has further been stated that the provisions are penal in nature, hence both the Courts have rightly ordered reinstatement with 50% back wages. 5. From the evidence of the petitioner witness Assistant Engineer and documentary evidence produced by the Board and statement of the respondent No. 1 it is clear that the respondent was engaged as daily wager typist on January 23, 1992 and disengaged on February 28, 2000. 5. From the evidence of the petitioner witness Assistant Engineer and documentary evidence produced by the Board and statement of the respondent No. 1 it is clear that the respondent was engaged as daily wager typist on January 23, 1992 and disengaged on February 28, 2000. As per the petitioner, it complied the provisions of Section 25-F of the 30 Industrial Disputes Act and paid retrenchment compensation of Rs. 18,308/- to the respondent. Witness of the petitioner admitted the fact that more than 100 employees had been working in the respondent Board and the work of the petitioner was of development of land construction of houses, roads, lying pipelines and other construction. It has been setting the houses to the consumers. 6. Chapter V (B) of Industrial Disputes 40 Act, 1947 prescribes special provisions relating to retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. Section 25-K of the Industrial Disputes Act prescribes conditions for application of Chapter- V (B) which is as under: "25-K Application of Chapter V-B- (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in 50 which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than (one) hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. Industrial establishment has been defined in Section 25-L which is as under: 25-L Definitions-For the purpose of this Chapter, - (a) industrial establishment' means- (i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948); (ii) a mine as defined in clause U) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (33 of 1952); or (iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951)." 7. Section 2(m) of the Factory Act 1948 defines factory as under: (m) "factory" means any premises including the precinct thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,- and Section 2(K) of Factory Act, 1948 defines manufacturing process, which is as under: (k) "manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power, or (iv) composing types for printing by letter-press, lithography, photo-gravure of other similar process or book binding (or) (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or 1 vessels, (or) (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage: 8. It is clear from the aforesaid definations that manufacturing process means making, altering, repairing and adopting any article and substance with a view to use, sale, transport deliver or disposal. In the present case the petitioner was constructing houses. It had been using raw material for the purpose of construction of houses and also developing the land and constructing roads. Thereafter the petitioner has been selling the newly constructed houses to the consumers. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court' in Lal Mohammad and Others v. Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd and Others AIR 1999 SC 355 : (1999) 1 SCC 396 : 1999-1-LLJ-317 has held as under with regard to manufacturing process: "While railway lines are being constructed on a given site no article or substance is being made or repaired, maintained, finished etc. Raw materials like railway sleepers, bolts and loose railway rails when bought by the construction company from open market and brought on site are articles Visible to eyes and are movable articles. These articles are adapted for their use. Their use is for ultimately laying down a railway line. Raw materials like railway sleepers, bolts and loose railway rails when bought by the construction company from open market and brought on site are articles Visible to eyes and are movable articles. These articles are adapted for their use. Their use is for ultimately laying down a railway line. In that process sleepers, bolts and rails would get used up. If that happens, the definition of 'manufacturing process' dealing with adaptations of these articles for use would squarely get attracted. It is true that the ultimate product of this exercise or process is the bringing into existence a railway track which is embedded in the earth which cannot be sold, transported, delivered or disposed of like a movable property. However, as the definition is worded, it cannot be said of necessity that any end product which results after adapting any raw-material, article or substance "with a view to its use" must necessarily result into a movable final product or a commodity. It has to be kept in view that the definition of 'manufacturing process' in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act has nothing to do with manufacturing of goods which may attract excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. For the definition of "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) end product may be goods or otherwise. It is not necessary that the end product must be marketable. Even accepting that the final product namely, construction of railway line embedded in earth is not the subject-matter of sale, transfer, delivery or disposal, still the raw materials which are adapted for their use with a view to constructing railway line which is the final product could be said to have fallen within the sweep of the definition of the term 'manufacturing process' as found in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act. All the workers employed by the construction company would squarely attract the definition of the term 'workmen' as found in Section 2(1) of the Factories Act as they are working for remuneration in a manufacturing process carried out by the project. Thus all the requirements of the term 'factory' as defined by Section 2(m) of the Factories Act are satisfied on the facts of the present case." 10. Thus all the requirements of the term 'factory' as defined by Section 2(m) of the Factories Act are satisfied on the facts of the present case." 10. Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ardeshir H Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 29 : 1961-11LJ-77 (SC) has held as under with regard to manufacturing of salt from sea water that whether it is manufacturing process or not: "The sea water in the sea never becomes salt merely on account of the play of sun's rays on it. Labourers are employed for (i) admitting sea water to the reservoirs by working sluice gates, sometimes at night also, or the pump; (ii) filling crystallizing beds; (iii) watching the density of brine in the crystallizing beds; (iv) seeing that the density does not exceed certain limits and that salts other than sodium chloride (common salt) are not formed; (v) scraping and collecting salt crystals; (vi) grading the salt crystals by 'sieving' and (vii) putting salt into gunny bags. It follows that it is due to human agency, aided by natural forces, that salt is extracted from sea water. The, processes carried out in the Salt Works and described above, come within the definition of 'manufacturing process' in Section 2(k) inasmuch as salt can be said to have been manufactured from sea water by the process 1 of treatment and adaptation of sea water into salt. The sea water, a non-commercial article, has been adapted to salt, a commercial article. Case law discussed." 11. From the above principle of law laid down by Hon 'ble Supreme Court it is clear that construction of houses by the petitioner for the purpose of selling comes within the definition of manufacturing process. The respondent was working with the petitioner at the relevant time. Hence, she was a worker. The witnesses of the petitioner himself admitted that more than 100 employees were working in the Office. Hence provisions of Chapter- V (B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had to be followed before retrenching and terminating the services of the respondent No.1. The respondent was working with the petitioner at the relevant time. Hence, she was a worker. The witnesses of the petitioner himself admitted that more than 100 employees were working in the Office. Hence provisions of Chapter- V (B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had to be followed before retrenching and terminating the services of the respondent No.1. The provision of Section 25(N) of the Industrial Disputes Act prescribes conditions precedent for retrenchment of worker which are as under: "25.N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.-(1) No workman' employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year 3 under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,- (a) the workman has been given three months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of4 notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this Section referred to as the specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf. (2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application also be served simultaneously• on the workman concerned in the prescribed manner. 12. It is clear from the aforesaid legal provisions that the petitioner has not followed the mandatory provisions of Section 25-N of I.D Act, 1947 before terminating and retrenching the service of the respondent, hence findings recorded by both the Courts are as per law. 13. With regard to payment of wages, it is clear that the respondent was engaged on daily wages in the year 1992 and she was disengaged in the year 2000. She had worked for more than eight years continuously. The petitioner did not obtain any permission from the appropriate Government before terminating services of the respondent as required under Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. She had worked for more than eight years continuously. The petitioner did not obtain any permission from the appropriate Government before terminating services of the respondent as required under Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Looking to the above facts, in my opinion respondent will be entitled 25% back wages from the date of termination of services up to the date of passing of the order by the Labour Court and thereafter full back wages. Consequently, petition of the petitioner is disposed of with the following direction: (i) The orders of the Labour Court Annexure PI7 and Industrial Court Annexure P/5 are upheld upto the extent of awarding reinstatement to the respondent to the extent that the respondents shall be entitled 25% back wages from the date of termination of services upto the date of passing of the order of the Labour Court and thereafter full wages as applicable. No order as to cost.