JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri K.L. Grover, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ramesh Singh, Counsel for the appellants and Sri Syed Wajid Ali, Counsel for the caveator/respondents. 2. This is defendant’s second appeal. The plaintiffs/respondents instituted a suit for injunction against the appellants restraining them from interfering in the disputed property and also claiming themselves to be owner in possession. The defendants/appellants filed their written statement and claimed their right over the property on the basis of Will to be executed by one Irfan original owner. The ownership of the plaintiffs was specifically denied. The suit was decreed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No. 14, Saharanpur, on 18-8-2007, which was challenged in a Civil Appeal No. 54 of 2007. The appeal was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Saharanpur, vide judgment and decree dated 25-1-2008. 3. Counsel for the appellants has framed a number of substantial questions of law but he advanced argument on the following substantial questions of law, which are quoted as under : “(1) Whether to prove a Will both the witnesses of the Will are required to be produced? (2) Whether a Will executed in favour of a person of different religion requires registration? (3) Whether Section 169 of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, restrained some Bhoomidhar with transferable right from bequeathing his property or any part thereof since the fact of the instant case is not covered by an exception of Section (2-A) of Section 169 of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act?” 4. Admitted position in the instant case is that suit for injunction was instituted by the plaintiffs/respondents but not seeking any declaration. Defence set up by the defendants/appellants was that they are owner in possession on the basis of Will. Both the Courts below recorded finding against the defendants holding that Will was not reliable. 5. Counsel for the appellants has emphatically argued that since one of the attesting witnesses of Will was produced and examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, claim of the defendants could not be thrown over board for want of registration of Will and for non-production of both the witnesses. 5. Counsel for the appellants has emphatically argued that since one of the attesting witnesses of Will was produced and examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, claim of the defendants could not be thrown over board for want of registration of Will and for non-production of both the witnesses. No doubt, law provides that if one of the witnesses of Will has been examined, there is no necessity to examine the other witness also but witness produced in support of the Will, has to be necessarily reliable and believed by the Courts. 6. Emphasis laid by the Counsel for the appellants is that Courts have given completely a novel findings that the appellant No. 2 Bishambhar Singh being a Hindu could not be beneficiary of the property of a person, who is a Muslim. 7. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs/respondents that admittedly the testator Irfan died in the year 1991 and the names of the plaintiffs were mutated. An application for recall of the order of mutation was moved at the behest of the appellant No. 2 Bishambhar Singh, who was Pradhan of the village and subsequently by the appellant No. 1 claiming herself to be sister. The application was dismissed. Besides, proceedings under Section 229-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act was instituted in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Ist Class, Nakud, vide suit No. 233 of 1999, Gulfana v. Furkan and others, which was dismissed on 18-5-2007. The judgment of the said suit was adduced as documentary evidence as paper No. 247-C. Nothing in rebuttal has been placed on record to controvert the said arguments. Besides, it is also brought to my notice that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are alleged to be owner in possession on the basis of sale-deed executed by brother of the deceased Furkan. Written statement filed by Smt. Gulfana, appellant No. 1 in original suit No. 439 of 1995, Smt. Gulfana and others v. Abdul Qadir, in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) Saharanpur, it is admitted that the sale-deed has been executed by Maqsood, Furkan and Arif in favour of Abdul Qadir and Mohd. Imran. This fact has also been admitted in cross-examination by D.W. 6 Bishambhar Singh. The Courts below were not inclined to place reliance on the statement of Kundan, one of the attesting witnesses. Imran. This fact has also been admitted in cross-examination by D.W. 6 Bishambhar Singh. The Courts below were not inclined to place reliance on the statement of Kundan, one of the attesting witnesses. The two Courts have categorically recorded a finding and concluded the plaintiffs/respondents to be owner in possession. These findings are finding of fact. The claim of the defendants is that ‘Will’ was executed in their favour by the testator was, on account of the reason that they had taken care during his illness in his last days was not accepted and believed by the Courts. While discarding the said plea of the appellants, the finding arrived is on the basis of statement of Bishambhar Singh which clearly reveals that at the time of death, Irfan was only 45 years old, therefore, there was no reason for him to count his last days; besides, he was not suffering from any such disease, which was likely to be fatal. There is no evidence on record to show and prove as to what amount was spent by Bishambhar Singh to help the testator in getting his treatment by the ‘Hakeem’ and, therefore, the appellants have failed to discharge their burden to establish their claim that Will was legally executed to the exclusion of the legal heirs. Serious doubts have been expressed regarding the validity of ‘Will’ and its execution which is the sole basis of appellant’s claim. 8. Reasons given by the Courts below at the very outset are that after death of Irfan and mutation of names of the plaintiff/respondents, an application was given by Bishambhar Singh on 20-4-1993 for setting aside the order dated 4-1-1992 mutating their names on the ground that half of the land has been bequeathed by the deceased Irfan in favour of Bishambhar Singh and other half in the name of his sister Smt. Gulfana. Another application 15-C-I was given by Smt. Gulfana wherein she has stated that Irfan died issueless and he was always ill. She and her husband used to look after Irfan, therefore, Will was executed in her favour. 9. On perusal of the said application, it does not inspire any confidence and also there is not even a whisper regarding half of the property bequeathed to Bishambhar Singh. She and her husband used to look after Irfan, therefore, Will was executed in her favour. 9. On perusal of the said application, it does not inspire any confidence and also there is not even a whisper regarding half of the property bequeathed to Bishambhar Singh. The appellants have not been able to satisfy the Courts below regarding this anomaly in the two applications given separately to recall the order dated 4-1-1992 mutating the names of the plaintiffs/respondents. Authenticity of statement of the witnesses is also doubted by the two Courts because out of the two attesting witnesses, Kundan was produced, who gave an affidavit subsequently, wherein he denied execution of the Will in favour of the appellants and also disowned his thumb impression on the said document. Other oral evidence of notary adduced by the defendants has also not been substantiated and, therefore, I am of the considered view that the two Courts below have very well scrutinized oral as well as documentary evidence before arriving at a definite conclusion. Submission advanced on behalf of the appellants that they were found in possession by the S.D.M. in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that they were in cultivatory possession as a consequence of the alleged Will in their favour. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellants has emphasized that the order passed under Section 145, Cr.P.C. was challenged in revision. The revisional order passed in favour of the plaintiffs has been challenged in writ petition No. 818 of 2004, which is still pending. Proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. cannot be a conclusive proof of execution of a valid Will and continuous cultivatory possession. It is only a preventive measure to ensure peace if there is an apprehension of breach thereof. 11. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the order of the temporary injunction was challenged in another writ petition, which was dismissed on 1-11-2001 is sufficient to establish the defendant’s possession and, therefore, no decree for injunction could be granted. Any interim order can never be made a basis for arriving at a final conclusion regarding right of parties. 12. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents has submitted that findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be set aside on flimsy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and without there being any question of law. Any interim order can never be made a basis for arriving at a final conclusion regarding right of parties. 12. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents has submitted that findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be set aside on flimsy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and without there being any question of law. In the instant case, arguments of the Counsel for the appellants are factual in nature and by no stretch of imagination can constitute substantial questions of law. Re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible. Inference of the facts from recital or content of the document or after sifting oral evidence does not leave any scope of re-appraisal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. 13. The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of Section 100, C.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that cannot be sufficient for interference under Section 100, C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph No. 7 of the case of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 , is quoted below : “7. .....We have noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of Section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some Judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of Section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of Section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal. This Court in Paras Nath Thakur v. Mohani Dasi, held : (AIR p. 1205 para 3). It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, on second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact.” 14. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact.” 14. Similar view has been expressed in a number of other decisions by the Apex Court in the cases of Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and others, JT 2004 (5) SC 54; Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60 ; Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others, 2006 All. C.J. 1481 (SC) and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . 15. The Apex Court in the recent case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , ruled that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law, but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law, must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not? The same view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju v. Mariamman, (2005) 2 SCC 500 . 16. The judgments under challenge cannot be interfered. The second appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. ————