Judgment : ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. (1) BOTH these appeals relate to identical judgments passed in two writ petitions on the same day. Hence both ace disposed of by this common judgment. (2) THE writ petitioners/appellants were enrolled with the Employment exchange. They alleged that the District Primary School Council did not permit them to participate in the selection process for the post of primary school teachers as they were not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. On perusal of the records it appears that the writ petitioners were not sponsored as they were juniors to the candidates sponsored by the employment Exchange. The appellants/writ petitioners approached the learned Single Judge by filing two writ petitions being W. P. No. , 14524 (W)of 2006 and W. P. No. 14525 (W) of 2006 with the identical contentions that once they were enrolled as unemployed youth having eligible qualification for the post of Primary School Teacher they must be allowed to participate in the selection process irrespective of the fact that they were not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. They contended that in view of various decisions of the Apex Court and also of this Court the Council was under obligation to publish employment notice inviting applications from all eligible candidates. They also challenged the provisions of the West Bengal Primary school Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2001 which restricted the Primary school Council from considering any candidate not being sponsored by the employment Exchange. The learned Single Judge relied on His Lordships own judgment and order in other writ petitions dealing with the identical issue and held that the writ petitioners were not entitled to get any relief as prayed for in the writ petition. Hence, this appeal. (3) MR. Madan Lal, learned Counsel appearing in support of the appeals contended as follows :- (i) Once the writ petitioners had the eligible qualifications for the post of Primary Teacher they must be allowed to participate in the selection process. (ii) Salary of the Primary Teacher were being paid from public exchequer. Hence, it was the duty of the Council as well as the State to find out best qualified candidates for the said post. If the appellants were found better qualified than the sponsored candidates there was no reason why they should be kept out of consideration. (ii) Salary of the Primary Teacher were being paid from public exchequer. Hence, it was the duty of the Council as well as the State to find out best qualified candidates for the said post. If the appellants were found better qualified than the sponsored candidates there was no reason why they should be kept out of consideration. (iii) The Rules of 2001 initially did not impose* any fetter with regard to the consideration of the sponsored candidates only which was introduced by way of amendment made in 2005. Such amendment was irrational and not justifiable. (iv) Since all the eligible candidates including the appellants as well as sponsored candidates belonged to one class being registered unemployed youth eligible for the post of primary teachers the State was not entitled to create different class within the same class which was contrary to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of The State of Orissa and Anr. v. N. N. Swamy and Ors. reported in All India Reporter, 1977, SC Page 1237. (v) The restrictions imposed by the amended rules was unreasonable and as such was liable to be struck down. (4) IN support of his contention Mr. Lal cited the following decisions :- (i) 1952, SC Reporter, Page 284 (State of West Bengal v. Habib mohammad) (ii) AIR 1977, SC, Page 1237 (The State of Orissa and Anr. v. N. N. Swamy and Ors.) (iii) AIR 1978 SC, Page 597 (Meneka Gandhi v. Union of India) (iv) AIR 1983 SC, Page 130 (D. S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India) (v) 1992, Volume-Ill, SCC, Page 63 (Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veerajah and Ors.) (vi) AIR 2002 SC, Page 1503 (Bibhudatta Mohanty v. Union of India and Ors.) (vii) AIR 2002 SC, Page 1533 (Ashutosh Guptav. State of Rajasthan and Ors.) (5) MR. P. S. Deb Burman, learned Counsel appearing for the Council on the other hand contended that identical issue was dealt with by the Apex court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. N. Hargopal and Ors. reported in 1987, Volume-Ill, Supreme Court Cases, Page 308. The Apex Court rejected the identical contentions therein. Hence, the appellants were not entitled to any relief and the learned Single Judge rightly rejected so. (6) MR. v. N. Hargopal and Ors. reported in 1987, Volume-Ill, Supreme Court Cases, Page 308. The Apex Court rejected the identical contentions therein. Hence, the appellants were not entitled to any relief and the learned Single Judge rightly rejected so. (6) MR. Samiran Giri, learned Counsel appearing for the State while opposing the appeals contended that there was no appropriate pleading challenging the recruitment rule. The seniority rule was also not under challenge. In absence of appropriate averments on that score the appellants were not entitled to challenge the impugned rule which was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge. (7) MR. Tapabrata Chakraborty, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the learned Advocate General contended as follows :- (i) Section 60 of the said Act of 1973 conferred power upon the primary School Council to appoint teachers subject to prescribed conditions. In terms of Section 106 State was, empowered to make rules. Accordingly Rules were framed obligating the Council to consider only the sponsored candidates. Such provision could not be said to be unguided or excessive delegation of power. (ii) If all registered candidates were considered for the posts it would cause immense difficulty for the Council inasmuch as huge number of eligible candidates would come within the zone of consideration making the process absolutely impossible. (iii) The Apex Court in the case of Excise Superintendent reported in 1996 Volume-VI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 216 relaxed the law by directing wide publicity of the vacancies. Such direction was issued under Article 141 of the Constitution and hence could not be applied in the instant case as the selection process was conducted strictly in accordance with the statutory Rules. (8) MR. Tapabrata Chakraborty also relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Union of India v. N. Hargopal (Supra). (9) WE have considered rival contentions of the parties. We have perused the judgment and orders under appeal. (10) RULE 8 of the Recruitment Rule 2001 as amended in 2005, inter alia, stipulated that for the purpose of preparation of panel for eligible candidates, the Employment Exchange shall be requested to send names of candidates at the ratio of 1:10 basis. It is not the case of the appellants that Employment Exchange adopted pick and chose policy or discriminated amongst egistered unemployed youths. The Employment Exchange sponsored candidates in terms of Rule 8 at the ratio of 1:10 maintaining seniority. It is not the case of the appellants that Employment Exchange adopted pick and chose policy or discriminated amongst egistered unemployed youths. The Employment Exchange sponsored candidates in terms of Rule 8 at the ratio of 1:10 maintaining seniority. The appellants/writ petitioners were admittedly juniors to the sponsored candidates. Hence, they were not called. Identical issue was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v, N. Hargopal and ors. (supra), the Apex Court observed, "the Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the employment Exchange. The object of the Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and the most efficient and to provide an opportunity to the worker to have his claim for appointment considered without the worker having to knock at every door for employment. The Act only places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may occur in his establishment before filling these vacancies. " (11) THE Apex Court further observed, "insistence on recruitment through Employment Exchange advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16. The object of recruitment to any service or post is to secure the most suitable person who answers the demands of the requirements of the job. In the case of public employment, it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in the matter of employment. There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointments as he likes, a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Articles 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. The submission that Employment exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. In the absence of a better method of recruitment any restriction that employment in government departments should be through the medium of Employment Exchanges does not offend articles 14 and 16. " (12) IN our view, the issue raised by the appellants, herein needs no interference in view of the Apex Court observation quoted supra. (13) WE also wish to view this problem from a different angle. " (12) IN our view, the issue raised by the appellants, herein needs no interference in view of the Apex Court observation quoted supra. (13) WE also wish to view this problem from a different angle. Employment Exchange is set up by the Government to record and register unemployed youth and their respective qualifications so that they may be considered for employment maintaining seniority. The impugned rule obligates the Council to inform the concerned Employment Exchange so that appropriate number of eligible candidates are sponsored by Employment exchange and they are considered for employment. If we consider the employment Exchange rules we would find that a complete procedure is prescribed to maintain transparency and to avoid chance of discrimination. An eligible candidate once registered with the Employment Exchange cannot be ignored in the matter of sponsoring by superseding him at the time of consideration. Here the sponsored candidates are admittedly senior to the appellants. They were sponsored for the post. Chance of the appellants would come after the sponsored candidates and at the appropriate time they would also be considered for the appropriate post as per their eligible qualifications. We do not find the impugned rule as irrational or illogical, rather it protects the interest of similarly circumstanced persons having them registered with the concerned Exchange. Thus we find reasonable justification in restricting consideration only through Employment Exchange and by maintaining seniority. (14) WE, therefore, do not find any scope of interference with the conclusion arrived at by His Lordship. (15) IN this regard we may refer to the seven Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of In Re: Special Court Bill, 1978. The Honble chief Justice observed, "the classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to tie found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that differentia must have a rational relations to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that differentia must have a rational relations to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. " (16) THE appeals thus fail and are hereby dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.