JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. The owner has assailed the award dated 12.5.2000 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla in M.A.C. No. 27-S/2 of 1996 titled as Menoka Manna v. Gian Chand Negi. 2. The challenge is primarily on the finding returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 3. 3. On 26.9.1995 Dalip Kumar Manna was travelling in vehicle (Gypsy) No. HP 02-4217, which met with an accident near Kumarsain, District Shimla, H.P. He sustained injuries and had to be admitted to the State Hospital (Indira Gandhi Medical College & Hospital, Shimla). The vehicle owned by Gian Chand Negi, the appellant herein was being driven by Lekh Raj Dhiman. The injured continued to get treatment in hospital, but unfortunately on 1.10.1995 he succumbed to the injuries. At the time of his death, Dalip Kumar Manna, was 42 years of age and was serving in South Eastern Railway at Shalimar, Howrah (West Bengal) as Senior Goods Clerk and was drawing salary of Rs. 4,011. 4. His legal representatives filed a petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') claiming compensation of Rs. 10,00,000. 5. The petition was opposed by the owner on the ground that the accident took place due to mechanical failure of the vehicle. The factum of the accident; the vehicle being driven by driver Lekh Raj Dhiman; injuries sustained by Dalip Kumar Manna due to which he died were not disputed. 6. The vehicle was insured by the owner with Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., who opposed the liability on the ground that since the driver was not possessing a valid and an effective driving licence to drive the transport vehicle, hence the material terms and conditions of the policy stood breached. The insurer pleaded collusion between the claimants and the owner. 7. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues : (1) Whether Dalip Kumar Manna died on account of rash and negligent driving of vehicle of respondent No. 1? OPP (2) If issue No. 1 is proved, to what amount of compensation and from whom are the petitioners entitled? OPP (3) Whether the respondent No. 1 had contravened the terms and conditions of the insurance policy? If so, with what effect? OPP 8. OPP (2) If issue No. 1 is proved, to what amount of compensation and from whom are the petitioners entitled? OPP (3) Whether the respondent No. 1 had contravened the terms and conditions of the insurance policy? If so, with what effect? OPP 8. Appreciating the material on record, oral and documentary the Tribunal, while deciding issue No. 1 referred to and relied upon the statement of Dr. V.K. Misra, PW 1; Puran Chand, Head Constable, Police Station, Kumarsain, PW 2; Mohd. Idarish, Sr. Clerk in the office of Area Manager, South Eastern Railway, Shalimar, Howrah, PW 4 and claimant No. 5 Amar Manna, PW 3 and came to the conclusion that the driver of Gypsy Lekh Raj Dhiman, RW 1, had driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner which was the cause of the accident in which Dalip Kumar Manna not only sustained injuries but later succumbed to the same. 9. There is no challenge to the said finding of the Tribunal by any of the parties herein. 10. On the question of compensation, while deciding issue No. 2, Tribunal after referring to and relying upon the salary certificate, Exh. PW4/B proved by PW 4 as also the documents of dependency proved by PW 3 being ration cards, Exh. PW3/M1 to Exh. PW3/M3; school certificates, Exh. PW3/M4 to Exh. PW3/M8 proving the age of the claimants and considering the age of the deceased and that of the dependants determined the compensation payable to die claimants at Rs. 5,76,000 as loss of dependency and Rs. 15,000 towards consortium. Thus a sum of Rs. 5,91,000 was awarded by the Tribunal in favour of the claimants. 11. While apportioning the said compensation, Rs. 1,91,000 was awarded in favour of the mother, Rs. 1,00,000 each was awarded in favour of the dependent sisters being claimant Nos. 2 and 3 and Rs. 50,000 each was awarded in favour of the brothers being claimant Nos. 4 to 7. 12. Learned Tribunal while awarding the compensation has adopted the unit system. 13. It has been proved on record through statement of PW 3 that the deceased was eldest member of the family and had not got married as he had desired to marry his younger sisters first. The dependency certificate, Exh. PW3/L and ration cards, Exh. PW3/M1 to Exh. PW3/M3, proved the fact that claimants were living together. 13. It has been proved on record through statement of PW 3 that the deceased was eldest member of the family and had not got married as he had desired to marry his younger sisters first. The dependency certificate, Exh. PW3/L and ration cards, Exh. PW3/M1 to Exh. PW3/M3, proved the fact that claimants were living together. However, in the statement of PW 3 it has come that he has his independent income and looks after the family now. In this view of the matter, in my view a sum of Rs. 50,000 each awarded in favour of brothers cannot be awarded. At the time of death the deceased was a young man of 43 years, his mother claimant No. 1 was approximately 59 years of age and sisters 33 years and 31 years were not only unmarried but were having no income and were absolutely dependent upon the deceased. 14. However, in my view the brothers being claimant Nos. 4 to 7, all major, cannot be said to be dependent and as such, the compensation has to be worked out afresh. 15. Taking the proven income of the deceased, Exh. PW4/B to be Rs. 4,011 or say Rs. 4,000 and deducting 1/3rd from the same, the income for the purpose of loss of dependency comes to Rs. 2,667 or say Rs. 2,800. Considering the age of all the three claimants, in my view, multiplier of 16' would be just, fair and reasonable, therefore, the claimant Nos. 1 to 3 would be entitled to Rs. 2,800 x 12 x 16 = Rs. 5,37,600 on this count. The loss of consortium of Rs. 15,000 under the circumstances is just and adequate, Thus the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 5,52,600 plus interest as awarded by the Tribunal. The said amount would be apportioned as under: Claimant No. 1--Mother Rs. 2,00,000 Claimant Nos. 2 and 3--Sisters Rs. 1,76,300 each The impugned award is modified to the aforesaid extent. 16. On issue No. 3, the Tribunal held that the driver was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the transport vehicle. The finding was arrived at on the basis of testimony of Rajvinder Kaur Sandhu, RW 4; Uttam Singh, RW 2 and V.K. Nalwa, RW 3. It was found that the endorsement on the driving licence, Exh. On issue No. 3, the Tribunal held that the driver was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the transport vehicle. The finding was arrived at on the basis of testimony of Rajvinder Kaur Sandhu, RW 4; Uttam Singh, RW 2 and V.K. Nalwa, RW 3. It was found that the endorsement on the driving licence, Exh. RW1/A, proved on record by the driver, RW 1 was fake and, therefore, the driver was not authorised to drive the transport vehicle. It was also held that the vehicle in question did not have a valid fitness certificate and route permit at the time of occurrence of the accident. Accordingly, there were material breaches of the terms and conditions of insurance policy, Exh. RW3/A and as such, the insurer was not liable to indemnify the insured. 17. Having perused the record, I am of the considered view the findings returned by the Tribunal on the said issue are erroneous. Statement of RW 2, RW 4 is with regard to the endorsement and the validity of the licence to drive a transport vehicle. Even RW 3 has partly deposed to the said effect. Be that as it may be, the legal position is otherwise. As to whether the driver could have driven the transport vehicle at the time of accident, without any endorsement is a question which is no longer res integra. 18. The accident took place on 26.9.95. The driving licence to drive light motor vehicle (non-TPT and TPT also), Exh. RW1/A was issued on 20.5.1994, which was valid up to 23.12.2014. 19. A Full Bench of this Court while deciding Prem Singh v. Baldasi 2010 ACJ 725 (HP) took into account the decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Annappa Irappa Nesaria and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 464 , wherein it has been held that a person possessing a valid driving licence to drive a light motor vehicle would be authorised to drive a 'light transport vehicle' which includes a 'light passenger carriage vehicle' and 'light goods carriage vehicle'. In effect, the reference by the court was answered by holding that the driving licence permitting the holder of the licence to drive a light motor vehicle also entitled him to drive a transport vehicle. In effect, the reference by the court was answered by holding that the driving licence permitting the holder of the licence to drive a light motor vehicle also entitled him to drive a transport vehicle. Even though it is not so specified in the judgment but the court was dealing with the statute as it stood prior to its amendment w.e.f. 28.3.2001. 20. In the present case endorsement was not legally required. 21. Thus the finding returned by the Tribunal that there was no valid endorsement on the driving licence to drive the vehicle in question and the finding that in the absence of any endorsement from the transport authority the driver could not have driven the transport vehicle is erroneous and it is held that Lekh Raj Dhiman, who was driving the vehicle at the time of the unfortunate accident was possessing a valid and effective driving licence and was entitled to drive the vehicle in question at the relevant time. 22. In the written statement, the insurer nowhere took the defence that the vehicle in question was being plied without any fitness certificate or route permit. No specific issue on this count was also framed by the Tribunal. It appears that it was only during the stage of arguments that learned Counsel appearing for the insurer took up this point. I am saying so for the reason that even while leading its evidence none of the witnesses examined by the insurer deposed to the said effect. In fact V.K. Nalwa, RW 3, Manager of the Branch, which had issued the policy, has categorically deposed that in terms of the policy, there is no requirement of fitness of the vehicle. This witness has not deposed anything with regard to the route permit. 23. The findings of the Tribunal that vehicle was neither having a fitness certificate nor a valid route permit are based on the testimony of V.K. Nalwa, RW 3, who proved on record letter Exh. 'Y' and report of the investigator Rajeesh Kumar Dhiman, Exh. 'X'. The said documents are mere photocopies. Exh. 'Y' is a letter dated 21.3.1996 issued by Secretary, State Transport Authority, annexed with Exh. 'X', which only records that vehicle in question had been passed up to 14.6.1995. These documents, in my view, were not proved, in accordance with law. The author of the report Exh. 'X' or the letter Exh. 'X'. The said documents are mere photocopies. Exh. 'Y' is a letter dated 21.3.1996 issued by Secretary, State Transport Authority, annexed with Exh. 'X', which only records that vehicle in question had been passed up to 14.6.1995. These documents, in my view, were not proved, in accordance with law. The author of the report Exh. 'X' or the letter Exh. 'Y were not examined by the insurer. These are not public documents nor any permission was sought to prove the same by secondary evidence. Therefore, they cannot be looked into Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 745 . This Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. V. Bimla Devi and Others, (2006) ACJ 402, held that the documents, driving licence and the insurance policy, could not be looked into without having been properly proved in accordance with Evidence Act. Even RW 3 through whom the said documents were sought to be proved has not deposed anything with regard to either fitness of the vehicle or the validity of the route permit. 24. 'Burden of proof and 'onus of proof are such expressions which are totally distinct from each other. Burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof does shift. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. 'Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, namely, (i) the 'burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings and (ii) the 'burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. The first remains constant, but the second shifts. [See Ishar Sahani and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, (1993) ACJ 858. 25. Learned Counsel for the respondents has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , to contend that the Evidence Act would not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. 26. In the said case Apex Court was dealing with a case of departmental inquiry instituted against the employee and held as under : The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by Tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. 26. In the said case Apex Court was dealing with a case of departmental inquiry instituted against the employee and held as under : The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by Tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the inquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied upon against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the inquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. 27. The aforesaid ratio, however, stood explained subsequently by the Apex Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Others, (1971) 2 SCC 617 , as under : An attempt is, however, made by the learned advocate for the appellant to persuade us that as the Evidence Act does not strictly apply the calling for of the several documents particularly after the employees were given inspection and the reference to these by the witness Ghosh in his evidence should be taken as proof thereof. The observations of Venkatrama Iyer, J. in Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , to which our attention was invited do not justify the submission that in labour matters where issues are seriously contested and have to be established and proved the requirements relating to proof can be dispensed with. The case referred to above was dealing with an inquiry into the misconduct of the public servant in which he complained he was not permitted to be cross-examined. It, however, turned out that he was allowed to put questions and that the evidence was recorded in his presence. The case referred to above was dealing with an inquiry into the misconduct of the public servant in which he complained he was not permitted to be cross-examined. It, however, turned out that he was allowed to put questions and that the evidence was recorded in his presence. No doubt the procedure prescribed in Evidence Act by first requiring his chief-examination and then to allow the delinquent to exercise his right to cross-examine him was not followed, but that enquiry officer, took upon himself to cross-examine the witnesses from the very start. It was contended that this method would violate the well recognised rules of procedure. In these circumstances it was observed : Now it is no doubt true that the evidence of respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by Tribunal even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the inquiry and if they do so their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that which obtains in a court of law. But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand, what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced in a court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise are, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When appellant produced the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entry by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. When appellant produced the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entry by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the inquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. This is both in accord with principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure under Order 19, CPC and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate these general principles. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except insofar as Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed therein permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witness who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants an inspection, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection insofar as that is relevant to the inquiry. The applicability of these principles are well recognised and admit of no doubt. (Emphasis supplied) 28. In the present case, the documents Exhs. 'X' and 'Y' were placed on record much after the recording of the statement of the owner. He had no opportunity to rebut the same. The said documents are not the originals but only photocopies. Therefore, they cannot be looked into for want of having been proved on record. 29. The Apex Court in 2000 ACJ 469 (SC) while dealing with a case arising out of a Motor Vehicles Act, has held that production of photocopy of a document was not sufficient to prove the genuineness of the document, particularly, when the same is under challenge. 30. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. 29. The Apex Court in 2000 ACJ 469 (SC) while dealing with a case arising out of a Motor Vehicles Act, has held that production of photocopy of a document was not sufficient to prove the genuineness of the document, particularly, when the same is under challenge. 30. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 297 , the Apex Court has held as under : (102) The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows : xxx xxx xxx (iii) The breach of policy conditions, e.g., disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in Sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle, the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches of the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply 'the rule of main purpose' and the concept of 'fundamental breach' to allow defences available to the insurer u/s 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case.... (Emphasis supplied) 31. From the material on record, it cannot be proved that the burden stood discharged by the insurer. 32. In my view, the insurer having failed to prove that there was any material breach in the terms and conditions of policy, the finding of the Tribunal needs to be reversed on issue No. 3. Thus in the absence of any breach of the insurance policy, the insurer is held liable to indemnify the insured and pay the compensation to the claimants. The same be paid within four weeks from today. 33. Mr. Rakesh Dhaulta, the learned Counsel appearing for claimants referred to a decision in Sri Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Another Vs. Smt. Mushtari Begum and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 667 , to contend that even if the appeal of the insured was dismissed, the insurer could be directed to pay the amount to the claimants and recover the same from the claimants. Since the appeal stands allowed, no necessary direction in this regard is required to be issued. 34. For the foregoing reasons, appeal is allowed. The impugned award of the Tribunal is also modified. There shall be no order as to costs.