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2008 DIGILAW 611 (DEL)

Anil Kumar v. Ram Kishan

2008-05-30

RAJIV SHAKDHER

body2008
JUDGMENT : RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. 1. This is an appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the judgment dated 21.4.1999 corrected by an order dated 27.5.1999 passed in Suit No. 740 of 1992 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). 2. In the judgment in appeal the Claims Tribunal has awarded the appellant a total compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,80,000/-. However, the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum has been awarded only on a sum of Rs. 30,000/-. Apart from other issues this itself has been raised as a separate issue in the appeal, which I shall deal with in the later part of my judgment. 3. Before I deal with the issues raised in the appeal, the following facts which are relevant for disposal of the appeal are set out hereinafter: On 21.6.92 the appellant accompanied by his mother was standing in one of the lanes to his house situated in Jaffar Pur Kalan, New Delhi, when a truck bearing registration No. HR 26-A 7646 (hereinafter referred to as 'the offending vehicle') entered the lane and hit the petitioner on his right leg. The appellant at this point of time was seven (7) years of age. As a result of this accident, the appellant suffered grievous injury to his right leg which got crushed because of the impact. The appellant was admitted to Deen Dyal Upadhyay Hospital and thereafter referred to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital where he lay admitted till 16.7.1992. 4. The gravity of the appellant's injury was such that on the very day of accident, i.e., 21.6.1992 the doctors had to operate upon his right leg and consequently the appellant's leg above the right knee was amputated. 5. This resulted in permanent disability. As found by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment, the extent of disability has been pegged at 60 per cent in respect of the right lower limb. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant through his father and natural guardian, Rajbir Singh instituted an action in the Tribunal. The said action was instituted on or around 18.12.1992. The action was registered as Suit No. 740 of 1992. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant through his father and natural guardian, Rajbir Singh instituted an action in the Tribunal. The said action was instituted on or around 18.12.1992. The action was registered as Suit No. 740 of 1992. In the said suit the owner who was driving the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time was arrayed as respondent No. 1 whereas; the insurance company, i.e., United India Insurance Co. Ltd. was arrayed as the respondent No. 2. 7. Before the Tribunal, respondent No. 1 did not file any written statement nor did he lead any evidence to oppose the claim of the appellant. On the other hand, respondent No. 2 filed a written statement opposing the claim of the appellant. 8. By an order dated 28.1.1998 the Tribunal framed the following issues: (1) Whether the petitioner got injuries because of rash and negligent driving of truck No. HR 26-A 7646 by R1? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any amount of compensation, and if so, for what amount and from whom? (3) Relief. 9. Thereafter, the Tribunal set down the matter for trial. In support of his case the appellant examined three witnesses, i.e., his mother Shakuntla, PW 1, his father Rajbir Singh, PW 3 and a constable Rajpal Singh, PW 2 to prove the F.I.R., Exh. PW 2/1, placed on record. The testimony of the mother, PW 1 was recorded on 28.1.1998 and that of the father was recorded on 8.9.1998. 10. Respondent No. 1 was proceeded ex parte. At this stage it is important to note that both respondents did not lead any evidence in the matter. 11. The Tribunal decided the first issue in favour of the appellant; inasmuch as, based on the testimony of PW 1 and the other evidence which went un-rebutted unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that the appellant No. 1 had sustained injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by respondent No. 1. The relevant part of the Tribunal's judgment with respect to this issue is extracted herein below: ...A perusal of the testimony of Shakuntla shows that no suggestion was put to her that Ram Kishan was not driving the offending truck and that the offending truck had not caused this accident. The relevant part of the Tribunal's judgment with respect to this issue is extracted herein below: ...A perusal of the testimony of Shakuntla shows that no suggestion was put to her that Ram Kishan was not driving the offending truck and that the offending truck had not caused this accident. In fact a suggestion was put to her that this accident was not caused due to the fault of the truck driver. This suggestion was denied by the witness. The testimony of Shakuntla does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. The presence of Shakuntla on the spot is not doubtful. An F.I.R. was recorded by the police immediately after the accident on the statement of this witness. Ram Kishan the truck driver, respondent was a resident of her own village and she knew him prior to the accident. She had no animus to depose against the respondent No. 1. I have no hesitation in holding that this accident was caused in the manner narrated by Shakuntla. Petitioner was standing in one of the lanes of the village. The offending truck had entered the said lane and was being driven at a high speed. Apparently respondent No. 1 was rash and negligent in driving the offending truck. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner had received injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of truck No. HR 26-A 7646 by R1. 12. I have perused the reasoning and the conclusion of the Tribunal and see no reason to differ with the same. This is more particularly so, as the respondents have not led any evidence to rebut the stand of the appellant. 13. As regards the issue of compensation, the Tribunal after perusal of evidence placed before it, came to the conclusion that appellant is entitled to compensation in the total sum of Rs. 1,80,000/-. The breakup of the compensation awarded is set out in para 14 of the judgment in appeal. The relevant portion of which reads as follows: (14) Thus, in all I grant the following sums under the different heads: (1) Expenses on treatment/purchase of medicine Rs. 5,000 (2) Conveyance charges Rs. 10,000 (3) Pain and agony Rs. 10,000 (4) On special diet Rs. 5,000 (5) Compensation on account of permanent disability Rs. 1,00,000 (6) Compensation for marital prospects Rs. 50,000 Total Rs. 1,80,000 (rupees one lakh eighty thousand). 14. 5,000 (2) Conveyance charges Rs. 10,000 (3) Pain and agony Rs. 10,000 (4) On special diet Rs. 5,000 (5) Compensation on account of permanent disability Rs. 1,00,000 (6) Compensation for marital prospects Rs. 50,000 Total Rs. 1,80,000 (rupees one lakh eighty thousand). 14. In respect of interest the Tribunal, as noted hereinabove, has awarded interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum but only on Rs. 30,000 out of Rs. 1,80,000/-. awarded from the date of filing of the petition till its realization. No interest has been awarded on the balance compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-. 15. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. The said appeal was filed on 19.7.1999. 16. The counsel for the appellant in support of his appeal has made the following submissions: (i) A reading of provisions of Section 158(6) read with Section 166(4) would lead to a conclusion that the role of the Claims Tribunal is inquisitorial in nature and hence; whether or not any evidence is placed before the Tribunal it is really for the Tribunal to enquire and determine as to what ought to be a fair and just compensation in case of death or even of personal injury. In this regard, the learned Counsel has also relied upon provisions of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act to demonstrate that the Tribunal in determining what it considers 'just' compensation is required to follow a summary procedure and to that end is empowered to take assistance of any persons having special knowledge. A reference was also made to the provisions of Order 16, Rule 14 of the CPC which empowers court to summon witnesses whenever it deems necessary. (ii) The second submission which is a corollary to the first is that, in the instant case, the Tribunal ought to have enquired on its own as to what would be the 'loss of income' which the appellant would suffer in the future on account of the disability suffered due to the accident. In this context it was submitted that the appellant in the very least would have earned a sum of Rs. 4,000 p.m. given the value of rupee at the relevant point of time; which on account of disability would get reduced to a loss of income of about Rs. In this context it was submitted that the appellant in the very least would have earned a sum of Rs. 4,000 p.m. given the value of rupee at the relevant point of time; which on account of disability would get reduced to a loss of income of about Rs. 2,000 p.m. Thus the learned Counsel for the appellant went on to submit that on annualisation of the monthly loss of income it could be capitalized, keeping in mind the age of the appellant, with a multiplier of eighteen (18). By this calculation according to the learned Counsel, the appellant ought to recover as compensation for 'loss of income' a sum of Rs. 4,32,000/- (i.e., 4,000 x 50 per cent x 12 x 18). It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that if the court is so pleased to award the appellant the said compensation for 'loss of income', the appellant would not press his claim for interest on this amount. (ii) (a) Learned Counsel for the appellant, in the alternative submitted that in any event, the Tribunal ought to have relied upon the provisions of Second Schedule to the Act to award pecuniary damages for 'loss of income' that the appellant would suffer in future on account of injuries sustained. The learned Counsel submitted that if recourse is taken to the provisions of serial No. 6 and serial No. 5(b) of the Second Schedule to the Act then, the Tribunal ought to have ascertained the future 'loss of income' as at least Rs. 15,000 per annum. Given the age of the appellant on the date of the accident was seven (7) years then; the proper multiplier would be 15. He further submitted that based on the notional loss of income as per serial No. 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act and given the multiplier of 15 for victims below 15 years of age, which if, discounted by the disability factor as per part 5(b) of the Second Schedule to the Act read with Schedule I, Part II, item 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, then the total compensation on account of 'loss of income' which the Tribunal ought to have awarded would be Rs. 1,57,500. 1,57,500. It is his submission that this sum ought to have been awarded in the very least with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till realization. While, these were the only two substantive alternatives submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant in respect of compensation on account of 'loss of income' a third alternative was also submitted for consideration of the court which is the same as the second alternative, except that in this case the rate of interest demanded is 12 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till realization. (iii) The third submission with respect to pecuniary damages is that while appellant has no grievance with respect to sums awarded for medical expenses and special diet, the Tribunal ought to have granted a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- towards future expenses on conveyance seeing the age of the victim and also; accordingly an additional sum of Rs. 35,000 towards expenditure for replacement of his artificial leg. (iv) Fourth submission of the counsel for the appellant is related to non-pecuniary losses. It is the submission of the appellant that he ought to have been awarded a minimum of Rs. 1,00,000/- for pain and suffering and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- towards compensation for loss of marital prospects; as against, Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 50,000/- respectively granted by the Tribunal. In addition to the above the appellant submits that an additional sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards loss of amenities should also have been awarded in the instant case, looking at the age of the appellant. 17. In support of his submissions, the counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following judgments: (a) B. Imtiaz Ahanied Vs. G. Banumathi and Another, (2003) ACJ 142 (b) Nitin Walia Minor through (Sh. Vijay Pal Walia) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2001) ACJ 462 (c) Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Nirmala Devi and Others, (1979) SCC (Cri) 996. (d) Shashendra Lahri Vs. UNICEF and Others, (1997) 11 SCC 446 (e) R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551 18. The first case cited by the learned Counsel for appellant is B. Imtiaz Ahanied Vs. G. Banumathi and Another, (2003) ACJ 142. Smt. Nirmala Devi and Others, (1979) SCC (Cri) 996. (d) Shashendra Lahri Vs. UNICEF and Others, (1997) 11 SCC 446 (e) R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551 18. The first case cited by the learned Counsel for appellant is B. Imtiaz Ahanied Vs. G. Banumathi and Another, (2003) ACJ 142. This case has been pressed into service to demonstrate the quantum of compensation granted by the court under various heads. Reliance has been placed on para 7 at page 145 and para 12 at page 146 of the judgment. The second case cited is that of Nitin Walia Minor through (Sh. Vijay Pal Walia) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2001) ACJ 462 .This is a case where a three-year old child's arm got bitten off by a tigress on his visit to the zoo. The claimant had filed a suit for compensation on the ground of negligence against the State and Zoological Park Authority. This Court after considering the entire circumstances and law on negligence awarded the plaintiff a compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The third case cited by learned Counsel for the appellant is Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Nirmala Devi and Others, (1979) SCC (Cri) 996 This case was pressed into service to highlight the observations of Supreme Court that, in determining the quantum of compensation the approach should be 'liberal', as against 'niggardly'. The fourth case Shashendra Lahri Vs. UNICEF and Others, (1997) 11 SCC 446 was cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant to demonstrate that in a case of disability arising on account of injuries sustained in a motor accident which resulted in amputation of leg, the Supreme Court had awarded a compensation of over Rs. 4,00,000/-. The point to be noted in the said judgment is that the claimant was a brilliant student, pursuing the B.Com. course and was 17 years of age. Furthermore, evidence had been led to establish that, had he continued his education, he could have had a good academic career. The last case, R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551 , cited by the appellant's counsel was a case where the claimant met with an accident which resulted in his becoming a paraplegic on account of injuries sustained by him. The last case, R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551 , cited by the appellant's counsel was a case where the claimant met with an accident which resulted in his becoming a paraplegic on account of injuries sustained by him. Based on facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, the Supreme Court awarded a consolidated sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities. 19. In rebuttal the counsel for respondent No. 2, i.e., United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Mr. K. Venkatraman has submitted that even though there is no dispute as to the extent of injury suffered, the provisions of Section 163A read with Second Schedule to the Act will apply only if the injured was working and the resultant injury had led to reduction in the working capacity of the claimant. The counsel for the respondent further submits that in view of the fact that there is no evidence on record, the compensation granted by the Tribunal is more than adequate. He further submits that since this was a case where the appellant-claimant was a child, the Multiplier Table would not be applicable. 20. The respondent in support of his submissions relied upon the judgment of a single Judge of this Court passed in the case of Om Parkash v. Davender Singh M.A.C. Appeal No. 654 of 2007; decided on 5.11.2007. On perusal of the facts of the said case it is clear that the court declined to grant the loss of future income as claimed, on account of the lack of evidence on record which possibly, could have been adduced to establish the period for which the claimant in that case was unable to attend to his vocation as a result of injuries sustained in the accident. 21. It is the submission of the counsel for the respondent that appellant-claimant is required to produce relevant evidence in support of his claim none of which was produced before the Tribunal. Therefore, the view of the Tribunal cannot be found fault with and deserves to be sustained. 22. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, my opinion in the matter is as follows: As regards the first contention of the learned Counsel for appellant there is no gainsaying that the role of the Tribunal is inquisitorial in nature. Therefore, the view of the Tribunal cannot be found fault with and deserves to be sustained. 22. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, my opinion in the matter is as follows: As regards the first contention of the learned Counsel for appellant there is no gainsaying that the role of the Tribunal is inquisitorial in nature. The Tribunal is empowered under provisions of Section 166(4) read with Section 158(6) of the Act to treat any information of accident which results in death of or bodily injury to any person, as an application for compensation. Tribunal after receipt of such application is required u/s 168 of the Act to give an opportunity to the defendants which includes the insurer, who wish to oppose the claim. The underlying principle of Section 168 of the Act is crystal clear. The defining feature of the provision is that the Tribunal in determining the compensation is required to arrive at a figure of damages after an inquiry which is fair and just in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The provisions of Section 169 of the Act also make it clear that in proceeding with the inquiry, the Tribunal is to follow a summary procedure and in doing so, it is empowered to enforce the attendance of any witness or production of any document or choose any one or more persons who possess special knowledge on any aspect of the matter to bring to fruition its inquiry. In this regard, see the observations in the case of Muktesh Sawhney v. D.T.C. F.A.O. No. 201 of 1999; decided on 9.5.2008, wherein the role of the Tribunal in the context of Section 166(4) and Section 158(6) has been dealt with and also the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 274 The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case while discussing a claim for enhancement of compensation, observed that there was no fetter on the Tribunal/court in awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed. In this context, the Supreme Court discussed the provisions of sections 166(4) and 158(6) of the Act. The relevant observations are contained in paras 15 to 21 and para 29 which read as under: (15) Mr. In this context, the Supreme Court discussed the provisions of sections 166(4) and 158(6) of the Act. The relevant observations are contained in paras 15 to 21 and para 29 which read as under: (15) Mr. P.K. Chakravarty, the learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company, in support of his contention that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award higher amount of compensation than what is claimed even though it is not likely to cause prejudice to the insurance company, heavily relied upon the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Dr. Urmila J. Sangani Vs. Pragjibhai Mohanlal Luvana and Others, (2000) ACJ 1125. In that case, the High Court after considering relevant decisions on the subject had observed thus: ...We may also mention that when the claimant feels that he is entitled to more compensation than what is claimed in the petition, it is always open to him/her to amend the claim petition and if the same is in consonance with the equity, justice and good conscience, there is no reason why the Claims Tribunal should not grant amendment. Before compensation more than claimed is awarded, the opposite parties should be put to notice, the requisite additional issues should be raised and the parties should be permitted to adduce their evidence on the additional issues, but if no such opportunity is given, the procedure would obviously suffer from material irregularity affecting the decision. (16) From the aforesaid observations it cannot be held that there is a bar for the Claims Tribunal to award compensation in excess of what is claimed, particularly when the evidence which is brought on record is sufficient to pass such award. In cases where there is no evidence on record, court may permit such amendment and allow to raise additional issue and give an opportunity to the parties to produce relevant evidence. (17) In support of her contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant Ms. Kiran Suri referred to the decision of Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Another Vs. (17) In support of her contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant Ms. Kiran Suri referred to the decision of Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Another Vs. Kisan Gangaram Hire and Others, (1987) MhLj 452 wherein the court dealt with a similar contention and observed thus: (8) What is further necessary to note is that what gives a cause of action for preferring an application for claim for compensation is the accident by motor vehicle or vehicles and not a particular, monetary loss occasioned by such accident. While the compensation in all no fault claim cases is fixed and uniform, in fault claim cases the losses may vary from case to case. The particular losses are merely the consequence of the accident which is the cause of action. This being so, the amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further the amount of compensation claimed cannot always be calculated, precisely. In many cases it can at best be a fair estimate... (18) The High Court observed that in all such cases, it is necessary to keep the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on grounds not stated earlier or for more amounts under heads already specified in the application. (19) The aforesaid decision of the High Court of Bombay was relied on and referred to by Orissa High Court in Mulla Md. Abdul Wahid Vs. Abdul Rahim and Another, (1994) ACJ 348 and G.B. Patnaik, J. (as he then was) had observed that the expression 'just compensation' would obviously mean what is fair, moderate and reasonable and awardable in the proved circumstances of a particular case and the expression 'which appears to it to be just' vests a wide discretion in the Tribunal in the matter of determining of compensation. Thereafter, the court referred to the decision in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Northern India Transport Insurance Co., (1971) 1 SCC 785 and held that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture, and if this is so, then it will be unreasonable to expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages or compensation that it would be entitled to. The court also held that there are no fetters on the power of the Tribunal to award compensation in excess of the amount which is claimed in the application. (20) Similarly, High Court of Devkinangan Bangur and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1995) ACJ 1288 observed that the grant of just and fair compensation is statutory responsibility of the court and if, on the facts the court finds that claimant is entitled to higher compensation, the court should allow the claimant to amend his prayer and allow proper compensation. (21) For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M.V. Act, there is no restriction that Tribunal/court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/court is to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases there is no question of claim becoming time-barred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 166, even report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation under the M.V. Act. If required, in appropriate cases, court may permit amendment to the claim petition. XXX XXX XXX (29) In this view of the matter, in our view, it would be difficult to hold that for future medical expenses which are required to be incurred by a victim, fresh award could be passed. However, for such medical treatment, the court has to arrive at a reasonable estimate on the basis of the evidence brought on record. In the present case, it has been pointed out that for replacing the artificial leg every two or three years, the appellant would be required to have some sort of operation and also change the artificial leg. At that time, the estimated expenses for this were Rs. 18,000/- and the High Court has awarded the said amount... 23. In view of above, in my opinion, as regards first contention of learned Counsel for the appellant it cannot but be accepted that the Tribunal is empowered to carry out an inquiry to arrive at a fair and just compensation. But the question is what would be the contours of the inquiry? 23. In view of above, in my opinion, as regards first contention of learned Counsel for the appellant it cannot but be accepted that the Tribunal is empowered to carry out an inquiry to arrive at a fair and just compensation. But the question is what would be the contours of the inquiry? To my mind the inquiry should firstly lead to collation of evidence and relevant material. And in this respect who better than the claimant himself. There may be cases where the Tribunal may have to extend the requisite assistance on this aspect but all the while it will have to keep in mind the dividing line between its role as an inquisitor and adjudicator. And secondly, any evidence or material which is brought on record will have to be put to the other side in consonance with the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, so that it is in a position to meet the case of the claimant. The remaining contentions of the appellant will thus be examined by me in the light of aforesaid principle. 24. As regards the second contention of learned Counsel for appellant, it is his case that while awarding the pecuniary damages, the Tribunal ought to have awarded the damages for 'loss of income'. In my view, while broadly the submission of the learned Counsel for appellant has to be accepted, but what is to be borne in mind is, that the pecuniary damages for 'loss of income' are usually divided into the 'special damages' and 'general damages'. The special damages are awarded for 'loss of income' on actual basis, in the case of personal injury, from the date of the accident till the date of the trial. As regards the period after the date of the trial, the courts/Tribunal would award general damages which are necessarily estimates based on relevant material placed on record. 25. In the instant case, the appellant on the date of the accident was seven (7) years of age. There could have been no possibility of any special damages being awarded for actual loss of income. The Tribunal could, in the instant case, have only awarded loss of future income based on evidence or the material brought on record. The appellant has proved that the child who was in class II on the date of the accident had a good academic record. The Tribunal could, in the instant case, have only awarded loss of future income based on evidence or the material brought on record. The appellant has proved that the child who was in class II on the date of the accident had a good academic record. Reliance in this regard is placed on Exh. PW1/C, i.e., report card of the child issued by the Mid-fields School situated at Rawata Mor, New Delhi, in which the appellant was admitted at the relevant time. However, the position in the case of personal injury as regards future loss is required to be examined on the date of the trial. The issue in this case with regard to the loss of future income would have to be examined firstly in the light of the alternate submissions made by the learned Counsel which are noted by me in para 16 (ii) hereinabove and second, that in choosing the appropriate multiplier should the age of the appellant be taken on the date of accident or on the date of trial. 26. Let me begin with by dealing with the first alternative whereby the learned Counsel for appellant has submitted that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month be considered as the possible loss of future income. According to me, this figure will have to be rejected because there is neither evidence placed on record to substantiate the same nor is recourse taken to any statutory basis to enable me to accept the said figure. I, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the first alternative. 27. Insofar as second and third alternatives are concerned, before I set out to discuss them, it would be beneficial to note the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Act and observations in two judgments mentioned hereinafter by me, on the powers of the courts/Tribunal to take recourse to the Second Schedule to the Act. Serial Nos. 5 and 6 referred to in Second Schedule to the Act read as follows: (5) Disability in non-fatal accidents: The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents: Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty-two weeks. Serial Nos. 5 and 6 referred to in Second Schedule to the Act read as follows: (5) Disability in non-fatal accidents: The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents: Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty-two weeks. Plus either of the following: (a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payable shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or (b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above. Injuries deemed to result in permanent total disablement/permanent partial disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. (6) Notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident: (a) Non-earning persons Rs. 15,000 p.a. (b) Spouse Rs. 1/3rd of income of the earning/surviving spouse. In case of other injuries only 'general damages' as applicable. 28. A perusal of the provisions of serial Nos. 5 and 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act would show that where a person suffers from a permanent partial disablement his claim is divided into two periods. The first period to my mind is relatable to loss of income for actual period of disablement which is limited to the period not exceeding fifty-two weeks while, the second, which, in addition to the first is determined by multiplying annual loss with a multiplier appropriate to the age of the victim on the date of determination of compensation. 29. In the instant case, the first part is perhaps not applicable, the appellant being a child of seven years of age, it can be safely said he would not have been earning any income therefore, one would not be required to guesstimate as to what would be the loss of income. Insofar as the second period is concerned, in the absence of evidence some inquiry ought to have been made as to whether any material could have been gathered, as in the present case, in the form of provisions found in the Second Schedule to the Act. Insofar as the second period is concerned, in the absence of evidence some inquiry ought to have been made as to whether any material could have been gathered, as in the present case, in the form of provisions found in the Second Schedule to the Act. But whether in making the inquiry, the Tribunal could have taken resort to the Second Schedule to the Act would depend upon the fact whether or not there was material placed on record by the appellant. In the instant case admittedly, there is very little evidence to go by except the report card of the appellant when he was studying in class II. Given this state of affairs, could the Tribunal have taken guidance of the provisions contained in serial Nos. 5 (b) and 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act to determine compensation for future loss of income, in order to arrive at a just and fair compensation. In this regard the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Abati Bezbaruah Vs. Dy. Director General Geological Survey of India and Another, (2003) 3 SCC 148 , are relevant. The observations in para 11 at page 682 of the judgment may be quoted with profit. The same read as follows: (11) It is now a well settled principle of law that the payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided for under the Second Schedule should not ordinarily be deviated from. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down the guidelines for determination of the amount of compensation in terms of Section 166 thereof. Deviation from the structured formula, however, as has been held by this Court, may be resorted to in exceptional cases. Furthermore, the amount of compensation should be just and fair in the facts and circumstances of each case. 30. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rattan Lal Mehta Vs. Rajinder Kapoor, (1996) ACJ 372, Jagannath Rao, C.J., (as he then was) in paras 36 to 38 of the judgment has observed as follows: (36) Question arises as to whether the multiplier in the Table appended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which is prospective, can also be of relevance in respect of accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994, on which date the Table came into force. In our opinion, the statutory Multiplier Table is clearly relevant for the following reasons: (37) ...That is why we are of the view that even in regard to cases of accidents prior to 14.11.1994, i.e., the date from which the Table in the Second Schedule brought in by the Amending Act, 1994, has come into force, it will be open to the courts/Tribunals to take the multiplier as per the said statutory Table as relevant. (In fact, the objection or dispute must come from the tortfeasors or the insurance companies. Even if they do raise an objection, we may say from experience that the defendants need not be apprehensive of a higher award on the basis of the 1994 statutory Table, because difference in each multiplier over a period of 10 years will be higher only by small fractions ranging between 0.25 and 0.50 generally). (38) If the above procedure enunciated by us based on the statutory multiplier provided by Parliament is applied, we can steer clear of conflicts in the multipliers applied by the courts on the judicial side in several cases. This approach of ours will help in rationalising awards, remove ad hocism in selection of multipliers based on the individual preferences. A whole range of discrimination between case and case can easily be avoided. That is why we have taken pains to give reasons as to why the statutory Multiplier Table provided for prospective use can also be used for accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994. 31. A conjoint reading of the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Act and observations made in the judgment mentioned above leave no doubt in my mind that in absence of any other material on record, there is no fetter on the power of the Tribunal or the court to take guidance of the Multiplier Table, in particular, in the instant case the provisions set out in serial Nos. 5 and 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act. The provisions of serial Nos. 5 and 6 provide that in case of disability arising out of the non-fatal accidents, which result in permanent or partial disablement so far as the future loss of income is concerned, the same can be calculated, in respect of a person whose income is not specified, by taking a notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum. 5 and 6 provide that in case of disability arising out of the non-fatal accidents, which result in permanent or partial disablement so far as the future loss of income is concerned, the same can be calculated, in respect of a person whose income is not specified, by taking a notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum. In the case of permanent partial disablement, the said annual loss after being capitalized by an appropriate multiplier is required to be discounted at a rate which is dependent on the loss in earning capacity as provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; if applicable. 32. As regards the second sub-point, which is while choosing an appropriate multiplier should the age of the appellant be taken on the date of the accident or on the date of the trial. The consistent view of the courts in this regard is that, in the case of personal injury, the multiplier appropriate to the age of the victim on the date of the trial is to be taken. The rationale being that the victim having survived between the date of the accident and the date of trial, in determining the loss of future income the ascertainment of the appropriate multiplier would have to be made with regard to the age of the victim on the date of the trial. In this regard, see observations of M.J. Rao, J. (as he then was) in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans. Corporation Vs. G. Ramanaiah ), at para 30 which reads as follows: (30) Before leaving this part of the discussion, I have to emphasise a certain difference between claims by parents in cases of death of children and cases of claims by injured children. It will be noticed that in cases of death of children, because the parents are older and the dependency will not last till the total expected period of life of the child, the multiplier is to be selected on the basis of the age of the parents. But, in the case of injured children, the claim being not by the parents but by the child himself, there is no question of selecting the multiplier appropriate to the parents' age. The multiplier appropriate to the age of the injured child at the date of trial will have to be selected. But, in the case of injured children, the claim being not by the parents but by the child himself, there is no question of selecting the multiplier appropriate to the parents' age. The multiplier appropriate to the age of the injured child at the date of trial will have to be selected. Point No. 2 (31) It is argued for the appellant that Multiplier Tables have to be prepared separately for fatal accident cases and separately for injury cases and that there cannot be a single Table for both fatal and non-fatal cases. (32) (I) Obviously, the doubt here is as to why, in cases of injuries, the multiplier suitable to the age of the injured person at the time of accident, is not selected. Now, in the case of a fatal accident, the uncertainties of the future are to be 'estimated' with the aid of the mortality rates, right from the date of death. There is, in fact, no dispute on this score. However, in the case of an injured person, if the matter could, perhaps, be brought up before Tribunal on that very day of accident, the Tribunal could say, 'well, the future of the injured person from tomorrow is uncertain' and, having regard to the general average mortality, take a multiplier suitable to the date of accident. Unfortunately, on account of the lengthy legal procedures involved in adjudication, there is considerable time-lag between the date of accident and the date of adjudication. In such cases, the future (which was uncertain on the date of accident) would have unfolded itself up to the date of evidence and if the injured person is still alive on the date of evidence, there is no need to go back to the mortality rate or chances of death of the injured person for the past period up to the date of evidence. The evidence of the injured person or someone on his behalf proves that he is very much alive on that date. Hence the mortality rates become relevant only for the period after the date of trial. Once the trial is over, the future of the injured person is the subject of uncertainty depending on the future mortality rates, such mortality rates being identifiable with reference to the age of the injured at the trial or rather soon after the trial. Hence the mortality rates become relevant only for the period after the date of trial. Once the trial is over, the future of the injured person is the subject of uncertainty depending on the future mortality rates, such mortality rates being identifiable with reference to the age of the injured at the trial or rather soon after the trial. This is what is meant by saying that the future earnings in the case of dead person have to be 'estimated', and they are 'estimated' on the basis of a multiplier based on the age at the time of death in the accident. Likewise, the estimation in the case of an injured person starts only for the period after the trial. Up to that date, the injured being alive no question of uncertainty of life or estimation arises. (The loss of salary or wages from date of accident to date of trial can be computed on an 'actual basis'). If the period between date of accident and date of trial is (say) 2 years the actual loss in wages for 2 years can be worked out. But if at the date of trial, he is (say) 20 years, the future earnings (from date of trial) have to be computed with reference to mortality rates and converted to present value. This is to be done by applying a multiplier suitable to his age at the trial. (II) In fact, it is logically and mathematically unthinkable (nay, impossible) to have separate Multiplier Tables for fatal and non-fatal cases because for each age (at death or at trial in accident case) the basic material, namely, the mortality rates and the conversion rates will be the same. There is no change in basic data so far as the period from which the 'estimate' for future is to be made. If still one wants separate Tables, they have to be only specified as follows: (a) Fatal accident cases: (b) Injury cases: (a) Fatal accident cases: (b) Injury cases: Age (at of date of death Multiplier Age (at date of trial) Multiplier 15 20.16 15 20.16 20 19.14 20 19.14 25 17.95 25 17.95 30 16.51 30 16.51 35 14.81 35 14.81 40 12.79 40 12.79 45 10.45 45 10.45 50 7.68 50 7.68 55 4.27 55 4.27 59 0.97 59 0.97 Future 'estimate' is from date of death. Future 'estimate' is from date of trial only. Future 'estimate' is from date of trial only. (III) Actuaries or mathematicians will be surprised if somebody seeks different Tables of Multipliers for fatal and non-fatal cases. In England also, Multiplier Tables have been prepared since 1967 and again now in 1984 by the British Government and there is always one Table-which is used in fatal cases and non-fatal cases as well. It is clear that the multiplier in cases of death is to be chosen, from the same Table, with reference to the age of the deceased at his death or with reference to the age of the injured at the trial, (the loss up to trial being computed on actuals without the need to take future uncertainties into account because the injured is alive till the trial in flesh and blood and there is no uncertainty about it till the trial). If one looks into Kemp & Kemp on Damages (1967) at the Multiplier Tables (then prepared by Mr. Prevett), pages 40 to 51, it will be seen that the multipliers are given for 'age at trial' for injured persons. So is the case of the Multiplier Tables prepared by the British Government in 1984 in its HMSO (see Munkman on Damages, 1985, pp. 224 to 236) where the multipliers are for 'age at trial'. There is only one Table. One will not find any separate Tables for fatal cases. If one looks into these Tables in any standard textbook one will understand the basic fallacy in this argument. Likewise, in Pension Commutation Tables prepared by Government of India for commuting future pensions, the same Table given in the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1971 and 1981 has to be used for selecting the multiplier, be it for superannuation or for voluntary retirement [they are prepared at real interest rate of 5 1/2 per cent per annum]. (IV) Such a question as the one raised here arose before the House of Lords also in Graham v. Dodds 1984 ACJ 181 (HL, England) and was cleared. (IV) Such a question as the one raised here arose before the House of Lords also in Graham v. Dodds 1984 ACJ 181 (HL, England) and was cleared. Lord Bridge of Harwich extracted the dictum of Lord Fraser in Cookson v. Knowles 1979 ACJ 216 (HL, England), as follows: In a personal injury case, if the injured person has survived until the date of trial, that is a known fact, and the multiplier appropriate to the length of his future working life has to be ascertained as at the date of trial. But in a fatal accident case, the multiplier must be selected once and for all as at the date of death, because everything that might have happened to the deceased after that date remains uncertain. There, there was fortunately no doubt that only one set of Multiplier Tables is available and the question was whether in the case of fatal accident, the age of the deceased at the time of his death was relevant or whether (as in an accident case) the age at the trial (if the deceased had lived) should be applied. It was clarified by Lord Fraser that in fatal cases, it was the multiplier suitable to the age of the deceased at the time of accident that was relevant and in accident cases, the age at the trial. (V) In Munkman: Damages for Personal Injuries and Death, 1985, p. 139, it is observed: At this point, there is a difference for the living plaintiff, whose expectation of life is calculated at the trial because he is still alive. Under a death claim, the expectation is fixed once for all at death. (VI) In Jain S. Goldrein & Margaret R. de Haas: Personal Injury to Litigation (Practice & Procedure), 1985, p. 35, dealing with injury cases, it is stated: The multiplier: (1) The starting point. The starting point is the number of years it is anticipated that the plaintiff's disability will last, assessed...close to the date of trial and (at p. 123), dealing with fatal cases, it is stated: What is the multiplier? (1) From which date to assess: The relevant date for the assessment of the multiplier is that of death... (2) Why is that date chosen! The justification for such date is best explained by the following passage of Lord Fraser in Cookson v. Knowles 1979 ACJ 216 (HL, England) (already extracted above). (1) From which date to assess: The relevant date for the assessment of the multiplier is that of death... (2) Why is that date chosen! The justification for such date is best explained by the following passage of Lord Fraser in Cookson v. Knowles 1979 ACJ 216 (HL, England) (already extracted above). (3) Starting point: When calculating a multiplier, the starting point is the number of years that the dependency may be expected to have lasted had the deceased continued to live, taking into account the particular age of the deceased... (VII) In Gujarat High Court a Division Bench consisting of P.D. Desai, J. (as he then was) and M.K. Shah, J. in Bharat Premjibhai Vs. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad and Another, (1979) ACJ 264 accepted that in injury cases, the loss up to date of trial (evidence) can be exactly computed on actuals with the question of estimation arises only for the uncertainties after the date of trial and that for injury cases, the multiplier is to be selected on the basis of the age of the victim at the trial. Dealing with injury cases, P.D. Desai, J. (as he then was) observed (at p. 272): Where the plaintiff is paid wages or a salary, it is usually possible to calculate this loss exactly, in which case the loss is treated as special damages... It thus appears to be the well settled practice of the English courts to award damages for loss of earnings under two distinct heads-special damages for the loss of past earnings and general damages for the loss of prospective earnings. The dividing line between the two kinds of damages is the time that the case comes on for hearing and not the date of the presentation of the claim petition. There is no reason why the same practice should not be followed in our Tribunals. Of course, once this practice is adopted, the years' purchase factor or the multiplier for awarding damages for future loss of earnings will have to be selected bearing in mind, inter alia, that the loss of earnings for the period between the date of presentation of the petition and the date of trial having been already provided for as special damages, the period of prospective loss would pro rata stand reduced. It was held that the date of trial should be the date of the deposition of the victim or of his witness who speaks to his earnings (and to the fact that he is alive). In all Gujarat reported cases, it will be seen that in injury cases, the special damages up to date of trial are computed as actuals and the multiplier is selected only for the future uncertain period with reference to the age at the trial. (VIII) In fact, Rule 533 (and Explanation thereto) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules also contemplates that in injury cases, the computation of actual loss of earnings has to be made up to date of trial separately and future loss of earnings separately from date of trial. Explanation to Rule 533 reads as follows: Rule 533... Explanation: For the purposes of the above sub-rule; (I) 'Special Damages' is one which has to be specially pleaded and proved. It consists of out of pocket expenses and loss of earnings down to the date of trial and is generally capable of exact, substantial calculations; and (II) 'General Damages' is one which the law implies and which is not specifically pleaded. It includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like and if the injuries suffered are such as to lead to continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss of earning power. (IX) The age with reference to which a multiplier is chosen may vary from one situation to another. It may be (a) the age at death in fatal cases; (b) age at the time of trial in injury cases; (c) age of a person at his superannuation for computing pensions; (d) age of a person at the time of voluntary retirement for commuting pensions; (e) age of parents, at the time of death of a child because dependency will last only for the remaining period of life of the parents, etc. (I shall work out certain examples after competing point No. 4). 33. In the instant case, since the appellant was on the date of accident seven years of age and on the date of conclusion of the evidence led by the appellant approximately, 13-14 years of age, a multiplier of 15 would apply. (I shall work out certain examples after competing point No. 4). 33. In the instant case, since the appellant was on the date of accident seven years of age and on the date of conclusion of the evidence led by the appellant approximately, 13-14 years of age, a multiplier of 15 would apply. In personal injury cases as against cases of fatal accidents (i.e., death) the relevant date would be the date on which the evidence in the matter is closed while determining the appropriate multiplier since the victim in any event has survived till that date which to my mind would also be age for determination of compensation, an expression also which finds mention in serial No. 5 (a) of the Second Schedule. The 'loss of income' from the date of accident till the date of trial is normally calculated on actual basis, therefore, in calculating the multiplier to ascertain future loss of income the proper date is the date of (sic conclusion of) trial. 34. In view of the discussion above, thus, I have to agree with the counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal ought to have determined the loss of income based on a notional income of at least Rs. 15,000/- per annum and to it applied a multiplier of 15. 35. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the Multiplier Table is applicable only to a person who is in employment or employable on the date of accident and hence by this logic not applicable to a child, in my view, fails in the face of the concept of awarding future losses and provisions of the Multiplier Table. A bare perusal of the Multiplier Table would establish that it does apply not only to persons who are employed or are employable on the date of the accident but also to those who are not in such a position. If what is submitted by the counsel for respondent was indeed the correct position, then the Second Schedule to the Act would not have provided for notional income in serial No. 6 to 'non-earning persons' or even a 'spouse'. There is no conceivable rationale in not applying the yardstick of notional income given in Second Schedule to the Act to a child. The very first entry in the Multiplier Table begins from zero to 15 years. This submission of counsel is thus rejected. There is no conceivable rationale in not applying the yardstick of notional income given in Second Schedule to the Act to a child. The very first entry in the Multiplier Table begins from zero to 15 years. This submission of counsel is thus rejected. The other submission of counsel of the respondent that there should have been some evidence on record leads us nowhere, for the reason that Tribunal or court is required to make an inquiry, where possible, in cases where the claimant has not been able to place the evidence or material on record. This submission of the learned Counsel of the respondent has no merit and hence, is rejected. 36. Thus with respect to aspect of loss of future income only other point which requires to be decided is the determination of the percentage of loss in the earning capacity. One course could be to apply the provisions of serial No. 5 (b) of the Second Schedule to the Act which, in turn, refers to Schedule I of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in the case of persons suffering with permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement. In the instant case there is a permanent disability to the extent of 60 per cent which the appellant has been able to prove by placing reliance on Exh. PW1/A. The relevant extract of the disability certificate reads as follows: Anil Kumar s/o Rajbir Singh, aged 7 years, male, r/o Vill. and P.O. Zaffar-Purkalan, New Delhi-110073 has been examined vide ortho No. 23478/92 dated 9.9.1992. He is a case of post-traumatic amputation above knee through lower third of femur. His disability is 60 per cent (sixty per cent) in relation to right lower limb and permanent. He is an orthopaedically handicapped person. Sd/- (Dr. A.K. Khare) Ortho Surgeon. 37. Item 18 of Schedule I to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant in respect of the injury suffered by the appellant provides for a disability factor of 70 per cent. As against this the disability certificate issued to the appellant categorically states that the disability suffered is 60 per cent. In my view, the provisions of 5 (b) would get triggered only in the absence of clear evidence. In the instant case, disability certificate is available. As against this the disability certificate issued to the appellant categorically states that the disability suffered is 60 per cent. In my view, the provisions of 5 (b) would get triggered only in the absence of clear evidence. In the instant case, disability certificate is available. It is only where even though the injury is known but the injured person or the claimant is unable to place a disability certificate on record or prove the extent of reduction in earning capacity by any other means then perhaps resort could be taken to Schedule I of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 38. Therefore, in my view, the appellant is entitled to compensation for loss of income by taking into account notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum which would be proper in view of the falling value of the money over a period of time; to this a multiplier of 15 ought to be applied. The product of the two ought to be discounted at 60 per cent given the disability suffered by the appellant. The net result would be that the appellant would be entitled to the compensation for 'loss of income' equivalent to Rs. 1,35,000/-, i.e., Rs. 15,000 x 15 x 60 per cent. 39. As regards other heads of claim; namely, that Tribunal ought to have granted a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- for conveyance and another Rs. 35,000/- for replacement of artificial leg, as against Rs. 10,000 granted for conveyance and nothing awarded for replacement of artificial leg by the Tribunal; my view is that insofar as conveyance is concerned, there is nothing available on record to demonstrate as to the amount spent during the period of treatment. There is also no evidence to the effect that the appellant would require visits to the doctor in future for advice or treatment. On account of paucity of evidence, I do not find that there is any error in the judgment of the Tribunal on this account. The same holds good for claim made on account of replacement of artificial leg by appellant. There is once again nothing in the form of evidence to suggest that the appellant requires replacement of the artificial leg. The claim for Rs. 35,000 in this respect, is thus, not sustainable. [See observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 274 40. There is once again nothing in the form of evidence to suggest that the appellant requires replacement of the artificial leg. The claim for Rs. 35,000 in this respect, is thus, not sustainable. [See observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 274 40. Apart from the above, me appellant has also preferred claim of Rs. 4,50,000/- on account of non-pecuniary damages. As against this, the Tribunal has for non-pecuniary damages awarded the following sums: (a) Pain and agony Rs. 10,000 (b) Compensation on account of permanent disability Rs. 1,00,000 (c) Compensation for marital prospects Rs. 15,000 41. I must confess that a head such as compensation on account of 'permanent disability', is vague as in the end the entire award for compensation stems from and pertains to 'permanent disability' though the appellant has suffered a permanent partial disability. Therefore, in a sense the quantum of damages granted under aforesaid heads have to be looked at in totality. Now looked at in this context and given the fact that the material placed for establishing a claim for non-pecuniary damages was deficient save and except to the extent that in PW l's testimony it has come out that the appellant had to undergo a surgery and was in the hospital for nearly a month between the date of the accident and his discharge; there was no other material before the Tribunal to come to a conclusion as to what would be the proper compensation in the present case. In this regard the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Lata Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 are apposite. The Apex Court in that case stressed that even in personal injury cases where a claim for non-pecuniary damages is made, the claimant is required to place 'relevant material' on record for the court or Tribunal to award proper compensation in a given case. The Apex Court awarded a conventional sum of Rs. 50,000 in that case. The observations of the Supreme Court on this aspect of the matter are contained in para 13 which are extracted herein below: ...In examining the question of damages for personal injury, it is axiomatic that pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads of damages are required to be taken into account. 50,000 in that case. The observations of the Supreme Court on this aspect of the matter are contained in para 13 which are extracted herein below: ...In examining the question of damages for personal injury, it is axiomatic that pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads of damages are required to be taken into account. In case of pecuniary damages, loss of earnings or earning capacity, medical, hospital and nursing expenses, the loss of matrimonial prospects, if proved, are required to be considered. In the case of non-pecuniary losses, loss of expectation of life, loss of amenities or capacity for enjoying life, loss or impairment of physiological functions, impairment or loss of anatomical structures or body tissues, pain and suffering and mental suffering are to be considered. But for arriving at a particular figure on each of the aforesaid heads, the claimant is duty-bound to produce relevant materials, on the basis of which, a determination could be made, as to what would be the best compensation. 42. In view of the discussion above, I award insofar as the pain and agony is concerned a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. As against other heads the compensation awarded to the appellant seems proper. I, therefore, would not like to interfere with the compensation awarded on account of 'permanent disability' and marital prospects due to the state of evidence placed before the Tribunal. 43. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed. The appellant would, thus, be entitled to compensation under the following heads: (1) Loss of income Rs. 1,35,000 (2) Expenses on treatment/purchase of medicine Rs. 5,000 (3) Conveyance charges Rs. 10,000 (4) Pain and agony Rs. 50,000 (5) Special diet Rs. 5,000 (6) Compensation on account of permanent disability Rs. 1,00,000 (7) Compensation for marital prospects Rs. 50,000 Total Rs. 3,55,000 (Rupees three lakh and fifty-five thousand) 44. Insofar as payment of interest is concerned, the Tribunal has confined payment of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum only on a sum of Rs. 30,000/-. The interest on this sum of Rs. 30,000/- is, however, directed by the Tribunal to be paid from the date of filing of petition till its realization. In the judgment of the Tribunal there is no discussion as to the rationale for granting interest only on a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as against the entire amount of compensation awarded. 30,000/-. The interest on this sum of Rs. 30,000/- is, however, directed by the Tribunal to be paid from the date of filing of petition till its realization. In the judgment of the Tribunal there is no discussion as to the rationale for granting interest only on a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as against the entire amount of compensation awarded. In my view, the appellant is entitled to interest on the entire amount awarded to him in the instant case. The logic for the same is quite simple. The appellant would rightly argue that insofar as he is concerned, he should have got what is justly due to him on the date when he had instituted an action claiming compensation for the injury caused to him. The delay, if any, for award of compensation is not on his account. Tribunal has not in its judgment given any reason as to why interest has been granted only on Rs. 30,000/- as against the entire sum awarded to the appellant. I accordingly direct that appellant be paid interest on the entire amount. 45. The next issue is as to whether the appellant should be paid compensation at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the accident as claimed before me or at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition which is the rate fixed by Tribunal. As noted above, the Supreme Court in the case of Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 274 , has now expanded the boundaries of law by holding that the Tribunal or the courts are entitled to grant compensation even beyond the amount claimed by the victim in order to arrive at a fair and just compensation. Furthermore, on the aspect of interest the Supreme Court in the case of Manalal Prabhudayal v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. III (2006) ACC 715, has observed the award of interest is in the discretion of the court, if it is otherwise reasonable and not ex facie bad in law. The judgment further goes on to say that the appellate court would refrain from exercising its discretion in varying the rate of interest. Ltd. III (2006) ACC 715, has observed the award of interest is in the discretion of the court, if it is otherwise reasonable and not ex facie bad in law. The judgment further goes on to say that the appellate court would refrain from exercising its discretion in varying the rate of interest. In the said judgment the Apex Court set aside the High Court judgment reducing the rate of interest granted by the arbitrator for various periods at an uniform rate of 12 per cent per annum. The observation of Justice C.K. Thakker on this aspect of the matter are contained in para 12 of the judgment being relevant are extracted below: (12) Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserved to be allowed by granting relief to the appellant firm. It is well settled that award of interest is in the discretion of court. Normally, when interest is granted, appellate, revisional or writ court would not interfere with exercise of discretion unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. It is equally well settled that like grant of interest, rate of interest is also in the discretion of the court and in the absence of any agreement between the parties, usually, the court would not interfere with rate of interest unless it is convinced that the direction of the lower court was ex facie bad in law. 46. On the aspect of the interest the observations of Justice AR. Lakshmanan (as he then was) in the case of Abati Bezbaruah Vs. Dy. Director General Geological Survey of India and Another, (2003) 3 SCC 148 , being relevant are also extracted below: (18) Three decisions were cited before us by Mr. A.P. Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in support of his contentions. No ratio has been laid down in any of the decisions in regard to the rate of interest and the rate of interest was awarded on the amount of compensation as a matter of judicial discretion. A.P. Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in support of his contentions. No ratio has been laid down in any of the decisions in regard to the rate of interest and the rate of interest was awarded on the amount of compensation as a matter of judicial discretion. The rate of interest must be just and reasonable depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and taking all relevant factors including inflation, change of economy, policy being adopted by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time, how long the case is pending, permanent injuries suffered by the victim, enormity of suffering, loss of future income, loss of enjoyment of life, etc., into consideration. No rate of interest is fixed u/s 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Varying rates of interest are being awarded by Tribunals, High Courts and the Apex Court. Interest can be granted even if claimant does not specifically plead for the same as it is consequential in the eyes of law. Interest is compensation for forbearance or detention of money and that interest being awarded to a party only for being kept out of money which ought to have been paid to him. No principle could be deduced nor any rate of interest can be fixed to have a general application in motor accident claim cases having regard to nature of provision u/s 171 giving discretion to the Tribunal in such matter. In other matters, awarding of interest depends upon the statutory provisions, mercantile usage and doctrine of equity. Neither Section 34 of CPC nor Section 4A(3) of Workmen's Compensation Act are applicable in the matter of fixing rate of interest in a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act. The courts have awarded interest at different rates depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, in my opinion, there cannot be any hard and fast rule in awarding interest and the award of interest is solely on the discretion of the Tribunal or the High Court as indicated above. 47. In view of the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the two judgments mentioned hereinabove as also given the fact that inflation is at 7.5 per cent, I would award, consistent with rate fixed by the Tribunal, interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. 48. In these circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed. 47. In view of the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the two judgments mentioned hereinabove as also given the fact that inflation is at 7.5 per cent, I would award, consistent with rate fixed by the Tribunal, interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. 48. In these circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed. The respondent No. 2 shall pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 3,55,000/- (rupees three lakh and fifty-five thousand) with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of petition till realization after adjusting payments made in the interregnum within a period of four weeks. There shall be no order as to costs.