Judgment :- (1) PETITIONER, Dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta, filed an instant application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying for quashing of the proceeding being CGR No. 2166/2007 pending before the learned Court of chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South). This relates to ballygunge P. S. Case No. 132 dated 11th July, 2007 under Sections 420, 406, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. O. P. No. 2, Bank of Baroda, as complainant, filed an application before the learned Court of A. C. J. M., Alipore with the prayer for direction upon Officer-in- Charge, Ballygunge Police Station to investigate into the matter after treating the said application as FIR under section 156 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (2) ALLEGATIONS made in the said application may briefly be summed up as follows :The accused, Dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta, is the Chairman-cum-Managing director of Ruby General Hospital Limited, hereinafter referred to as borrower company. The said company availed of a cash credit loan of Rs. 1,50,00,000/-from the petitioner during October, 2003 from its S. S. I. Kasba branch. The said company was regular in servicing the interest and maintaining the cash credit loan account bearing mo. CC5281058 in terms of the agreement entered into by it with the petitioner till such time a change of management of the borrower company took place some time in August, 2006 and the accused person took over as Managing Director of the borrower company. The accused person with a motive to deprive and cheat the petitioner of its legitimate dues hatched out conspiracies and make false commitments verbally and in writing which he deliberately failed and neglected to comply with, in breach of trust and with a purpose to cheat the legitimate dues of the petitioner which is a huge public money. By letter dated 6th September, 2006, the petitioner referred to clause 133 of the Articles of Association of the borrower company, while claiming that he, as the Managing Director, was authorized to operate, meaning thereby that the bank accounts of the borrower company can be operated either by the Managing Director independently or any person authorized by the Board. He further submitted a letter on the even date, duty signed by him, in his capacity as Managing Director and requested for issuance of fresh cheque books for all the accounts including the cash credit account bearing no. He further submitted a letter on the even date, duty signed by him, in his capacity as Managing Director and requested for issuance of fresh cheque books for all the accounts including the cash credit account bearing no. CC-5281058 of the borrowing company held with the petitioner. The accused person assured to ratify his actions in the aext Board meeting of the borrower company. Relying on his statement fresh cheque books of all the accounts including that of the cash credit account bearing no. CC-5281058. on the existing terms and conditions were issued and operation in the said cash credit account was started. But in the next Board meeting held on 16th September, 2006, the matter was not placed for ratification. (3) AFTER assuming charge as Chairman-cum-Managing Director, the accused person in furtherance of his scheme of conspiracy to deprive the petitioner of its legitimate dues and with an unlawful purpose to divert the funds of the borrower company, opened a current account of the borrower company with UTI Bank, Garia Branch, Kolkata without seeking any approval from the petitioner in gross violation of the Reserve Bank of India norms and in absolute breach of the terms of the agreement with, the petitioner. This, was immediately objected to by the petitioner and necessary correspondences were met with the accused person as well as UTI Bank The accused person was directed to refrain from carrying out such illegal operation of the current account operated by him of the borrower company in UTI Bank, Garia Branch without paying the dues of the petitioner. (4) THE accused person in spite of his undertaking dated 6th september, 2006, supported a contrary resolution adoptedin the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 22nd December, 2006 containing non-ratification and non-adoption of the cash credit loan to the tune of Rs. 1,50,00,000/-availed of by the borrower company from the petitioner One Mr Arun Saihi, an alternate director of the borrower company, met the Deputy General Manager of the petitioner bank on 18. 01. 2007 and unequivocally agreed to start operating the cash credit account No. CC-5281058 of the borrower company held with the petitioner and promised to regularize the same with immediate effect. The accused person acting through the said Mr. Arun Saini made a false representation to the petitioner in the meeting held on 18th January, 2007. 01. 2007 and unequivocally agreed to start operating the cash credit account No. CC-5281058 of the borrower company held with the petitioner and promised to regularize the same with immediate effect. The accused person acting through the said Mr. Arun Saini made a false representation to the petitioner in the meeting held on 18th January, 2007. But in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 22nd December, 2006, a resolution was adopted declining thereby the legitimate dues of the petitioner, meaning non-ratification of the said cash credit loan account. The accused person, thus, proceeded with a mala fide intention to cheat and misappropriate the petitioners money to the extent of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- and interest thereon and thereby cheated the petitioner and thus committed offences under Sections 420, 406, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The recovery of the said amount and the interest thereon demands effective search and seizure of the documents lying with the accused person and his interrogation following arrest and this can only be done by the police authorities. Learned Additional Chief judicial Magistrate, 24-Parganas (South), by order dated 7th July, 2007, forwarded the said complaint to O. C. Ballygunge Police Station for registration of a case and investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure treating the said complaint as FIR. (5) THE present case has rather a chequer background and it is, perhaps, necessary to refer to the same for proper appreciation of grievances as ventilated in the present application/on 2nd April, 1991, Ruby General hospital Ltd. was incorporated at the instance of the petitioner and one Dr. Benode P. Sinha. During 1994-96, the petitioner supplied second hand medical equipments worth approximately Rs. 3. 05 crores from USA in accordance with sanction granted by Secretariat of Industrial Approvals, Government of india as part of his capital contribution. On 9th February, 1996, Shri Sajal dutta, the brother of the present petitioner, by Board meeting stripped the petitioner and Dr. Sinha of their powers in the company and the petitioner was, thus, made the non-executive Chairman from the earlier designation of the executive Chairman. The said Sajal Dutta appointed himself as a new Managing director on 16th February, 1996. On 9th February, 1996, Shri Sajal dutta, the brother of the present petitioner, by Board meeting stripped the petitioner and Dr. Sinha of their powers in the company and the petitioner was, thus, made the non-executive Chairman from the earlier designation of the executive Chairman. The said Sajal Dutta appointed himself as a new Managing director on 16th February, 1996. On the following day i. e. on 17th February, 1996, without issuing any proper notice to the petitioner and other shareholders, at the instance of Shri Sajal Dutta an extraordinary general meeting was convened and it was allegedly resolved in the said meeting that fresh shares would be issued and allotted in favour of the company, which were in the control and management of Shri Sajal Dutta. Another Board meeting was convened on 24th February, 1997 and it was resolved that the petitioner had vacated the office of Directorship of the company. (6) THIS led the petitioner and Dr. Sinha to file a joint petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act before the Company Law Board, new Delhi. The said application dated 22nd November, 1997 was disposed of by the Company Law Board by order dated 29th October, 1999 whereby all the aforesaid acts had been declared as illegal. The said order of the Company law Board was challenged by the company by preferring an appeal on 13th December, 1999. On 14th December, 1999, the Honble Court passed an interim order restraining the company from convening any meeting of the Board of Directors without leave of the Court for a specified, period. On 14th June, 2000, an application was filed on behalf of the company seeking leave of the honble Court to agree to the proposal for restructuring of the debt of IDBI, By order dated 26th July, 2000, the Honble Court declined to grant such leave. The petitioner inspected the records of the Registrar of Companies on 2nd april, 2004 and it was detected that the company availed cash credit limit of rs. 1,50,00,000/-from Bank of Baroda, Kasba Gol Park Branch, allegedly creating charge on moveable and immoveable assets of the company. The petitioner filed an application with the Bank of Baroda on 16th April, 2004 seeking copies of documents executed and filed by company for obtaining cash credit limit. 1,50,00,000/-from Bank of Baroda, Kasba Gol Park Branch, allegedly creating charge on moveable and immoveable assets of the company. The petitioner filed an application with the Bank of Baroda on 16th April, 2004 seeking copies of documents executed and filed by company for obtaining cash credit limit. The Bank of Baroda, by letter dated 27th April, 2004, informed that all documents had been handed over to the company. On 31st March, 2005, the Honble Court set aside the order passed by the Company Law board. This was again challenged before the Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) No. 3471 of 2006. By judgment dated 11th August, 2006, the Supreme court set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and the petitioner and Dr. Singh were reinstated in the management and control of the company. It was further declared that the Board resolutions prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner were null and void and position dated ante 19th April, 1995 was restored. (7) IN pursuant to the said order of the Apex Court, the petitioner assumed charge of the company on 27th August, 2006. On 28th August, 2006, the petitioner by a letter requested the Bank of Baroda to stop payments of all cheques issued by the previous management. The petitioner, by subsequently letter dated 6th September, 2006, requested the Bank of Baroda to allow operation of the current accounts of company by him since he was then the chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company and as per Articles of association, he was authorized to operate the bank accounts of the company. In response to the request made by the company, the Bank of Baroda handed over copies of documents on 8th September, 2006 allegedly executed by the company in the year, 2003 in connection with the cash credit facilities to the company. On 15th September, 2006, Mr. M. K. Datta, the Company Secretary and the Financial Controller of the company confirmed in his own hand-writing that the records received from Shri Sajal Dutta, who was heading the previous management of the company, had discrepancies, manipulation and fabrication. The said letter dated 15th September, 2006 was followed by another letter dated 31st March, 2007. The letter dated 3rd April, 2007, thus was sought to be retracted. The said letter dated 15th September, 2006 was followed by another letter dated 31st March, 2007. The letter dated 3rd April, 2007, thus was sought to be retracted. (8) ON 16th September, 2006, in pursuant to the direction of the Honble supreme Court, the first Board meeting of the Board of Directors was convened. It was unanimously resolved that the minutes of the alleged meeting of the board purported to be held on 26th October, 1999 would not be confirmed for want of verification of facts and the same was postponed to the next meeting for consideration. Another meeting was convened on 22nd December, 2006. It was resolved by majority in the said meeting that since the minutes of the board dated 9th August, 1999 were fabricated and manipulated, the said minutes of the Board meeting held on 26th October, 1999 seeking to confirm such minutes could not be confirmed The agenda containing confirmation of the last minutes of 9th August, 1999 through board meeting on 26th October, 1999 was not confirmed. The petitioner company filed a civil suit on 13th March, 2007 being Title Suit No. 13 of 2007 before the learned 3rd Court of Civil judge (Sr. Divn.), Alipore against the members of the previous management, the Bank of Baroda and accommodating creditors, who allegedly facilitated siphoning of money by issuing false invoices without supplies. The learned court passed an interim order of injunction on 13th March, 2007 in terms of prayers (a) and (b). The said application for injunction was allowed in favour of the company and the petitioner by order dated 25th April, 2007. Being aggrieved by the said order, Shri Sajal Dutta and the Bank of Baroda preferred separate appeals on 25th April, 2007. On 12th July, 2007, the Honble Court declined to grant any stay upon the order of injunction dated 25th April, 2007. (9) MR. Amit Bhattacharjee, as learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned trial Court initially granted an order of interim injunction and thereafter, after rejecting an application under Order 39 Rule 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made such interim order absolute. Referring to the order of injunction passed by the learned trial Court, it was submitted that this was more or less in the line of the stand taken by the Honble Supreme court thereby restoring the petitioners position w. e. f 19th April, 1995. Referring to the order of injunction passed by the learned trial Court, it was submitted that this was more or less in the line of the stand taken by the Honble Supreme court thereby restoring the petitioners position w. e. f 19th April, 1995. (10) MR. Joymalya Bagchi, appearing as learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order of the Honble Court is, thus, more or less in tune with the judgment of the Apex Court and prima facie in favour of the petitioner. Attention of the Court was invited to the allegations made in the written complaint, which was directed to be treated as FIR. It was submitted that there could be no dishonest representation. He submitted that there was no delivery of any property except cheque books etc. which in any event the bank of Baroda was legally bound to deliver. It was contended that the FIR does not indicate any wrongful loss. According to him, there could be no offence under Section 467 or 468 of the Indian Penal Code. On behalf of the petitioner, learned Counsel expressed wonder as to how the brother, Shri Sajal Dutta, could be left out in the said FIR. (11) ON the other hand, Mr. Milon Mukherjee, appearing as learned counsel for the O. P. No. 2, at the very outset, submitted that question of quashing of FIR could hardly arise as that can only be done in rarest of the rare cases. He submitted that the judgment of the Apex Court was limited with reference to only three aspects. Referring to Section 195 of the Companies act, it was submitted that there could be nothing wrong on the part of the Bank of Baroda in granting cash credit facility. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in a very curious manner, the arrangement with the Bank of Baroda was certainly stopped taking plea of resolution of the Board of Directors and separate arrangement was made with the UTI and that too, without settling accounts with the Bank of Baroda. It was submitted that the resolution of the Board in august, 1999 was never set aside by the Apex Court and as such, it continues to be remain in force. (12) MR. It was submitted that the resolution of the Board in august, 1999 was never set aside by the Apex Court and as such, it continues to be remain in force. (12) MR. Mukherjee submitted that the documents and materials sought to have been relied upon by the petitioner cannot be a matter for consideration at this stage, while dealing with an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (13) MRS. Ghosh, appearing as learned Counsel for the O. P. /state, submitted that investigation of the case as made till 27th July, 2007 reveals that Ruby General Hospital Limited has availed of cash credit loan facility from the Bank since the October, 2003 based on a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors on 9th August, 1999 against hypothecation of stocks, receivables and book debts as primary security and second charge on the land and building of the borrower company. The company was maintaining a good relationship in respect of the said accounts. In August, 2006, in pursuant to the order passed by the Apex Court, the accused Dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta took over the charge as Chairman-cum-Managing Director and the earlier Chairman-cum-Managing director became an ordinary Director. In August, 2006, Dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta stopped all operations with the Bank of Baroda in their cash credit account and other current account. It was submitted by mrs. Ghosh that on 6th September, 2006, the accused dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta approached the Bank and sought for a new cheque book on the companys account with the precondition that this action would be ratified in the next Board meeting to be held on 16th September, 2006. He gave an undertaking in his own handwriting that such action would be placed for ratification in the following Board meeting. But in the Board meeting dated 22. 12. 2006, Dr. Dutta did not place the matter for ratification and the new cheque book, which was issued by the bank to the accused on 6. 9. 2006, was not used. The accused person opened a new current account in the name of borrowers company with UTI Bank, Gariahat Branch on 18. 9. 2006 and started operation of the said account behind the back of the complainant bank, thus depriving the complainant bank from recovering its legitimate dues. Mrs. 9. 2006, was not used. The accused person opened a new current account in the name of borrowers company with UTI Bank, Gariahat Branch on 18. 9. 2006 and started operation of the said account behind the back of the complainant bank, thus depriving the complainant bank from recovering its legitimate dues. Mrs. Ghosh further mentioned that the investigation was stopped w. e. f. 27th July, 2007 along with the order of stay passed by this court. (14) IT was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in order to proceed with the investigation for the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise. (15) MR. Bagchi, in this context, referred to the decision in the case of state of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillal and Anr. , as reported in AIR 1973 SC 326 . The apex Court in the said case upheld the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court. In the case of Ajaymitra v. State of M. P. and Ors., as reported in JT (2003)1 SC 418, the Apex Court took into consideration the scope of section 482 of the Cr. P. C. (16) REFERRING to the decisions in the cases of Jeswantrai Manilal akhaney v. The State of Bombay, as reported in AIR 1956 SC 575 , G. V. Rao v. L. H. V. Prasad and Ors. , as reported in JT (2000)2 SC 627 : 2000 C Cr LR (SC) 302, State of W. B. and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors. , as reported in air 1982 SC 949 , the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Mitra (Supra) held that if the allegations made in the complaint, even they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute any offence, the complaint and the FIR registered in pursuance thereof are liable to be quashed. (17) IT was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the allegations in the complaint petition must, prima facie, show inducement of the victim by the accused by making a representation. (Ref: Anil Ritolla @ A. K. Ritolia v. State of Bihar and Anr. (17) IT was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the allegations in the complaint petition must, prima facie, show inducement of the victim by the accused by making a representation. (Ref: Anil Ritolla @ A. K. Ritolia v. State of Bihar and Anr. , as reported in JT (2007)11 SC 147 : (2007)2 C Cr LR (SC)672. (18) IN the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar and Anr. , as reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 , the apex Court held that any breach of contract would amount to cheating only if intention to cheat was existing at the very inception. If such intention developed later on, the same would not amount to cheating. (19) THE commencement of investigation in a cognizable offence by a police officer is subject to two conditions, firstly, the police officer should have reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence as required by section 157 (1) and secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an investigation even before he starts an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157 (1). Thus, the police officer has to satisfy himself only on the allegations mentioned in the first information before he enters on an investigation as to whether those allegations do constitute a cognizable offence warranting an investigation. (Ref: State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., as reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 ). (20) DERIVING inspiration from the decision in the case of J TH Zwart and ors. v. Indrani Mukherjee, as reported in 1990 C Cr LR (Cal) 1, it was contended that the basic facts and materials on which the allegation is founded are required to be stated in the complaint. (21) IT cannot be denied that apart from deception the other essential ingredient so as to constitute an offence under Section 420 of I. P. C. is the deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss and when with such intention, deception is practised and delivery or property is induced then the offence under Section 420 of I. P. C. can be said to have been committed. It is well settled that in absence of any averments in the complaint so as to infer fraudulent or dishonest inducement having been made by the petitioner, pursuant to which the respondent parted with his money, it cannot be said that the petitioner had cheated the respondent. (22) RELYING upon the decision in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. , as reported in JT (2007)11 SC 499, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Courts must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking a private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurize the accused. (23) THE Apex Court in the case of Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd. and Anr. , as reported in (2006) 1 SCC (Cr) 746, held that from mere failure of a person to keep up promise subsequently, a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promises cannot be presumed. A distinction has to be kept in mind between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement. The subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent, dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. The substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere use of the expression cheating in the complaint is of no consequence. (24) IT was categorically submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in absence of any dishonest misappropriation, Section 403 of I. P. C. would not be attracted. (Ref : U. Dhar and Anr. v. The State of Jharkban and Anr. , as reported in JT (2003)1 SC 172. (25) THE Apex Court in the case of All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and Anr. , as reported in (2007)7 Supreme 334 , observed that the allegations made in the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence. It was observed that the allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefor. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and Anr. , as reported in (2007)7 Supreme 334 , observed that the allegations made in the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence. It was observed that the allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations do prima facie exist. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. The Apex Court held that criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The Courts while exercising power under Section 482 of cr. P. C. should also strive to serve the ends of justice. (26) IN response to the challenge, Mr. Milon Mukherjee on behalf of the o. P. /bank of Baroda submitted that it is not necessary that the complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. (Ref : Rejesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Ors. , as reported in 1999 C. Cr. LR (SC) 234. (27) MR. Mukherjee categorically mentioned that mere pendency of a civil suit cannot be a ground for quashing of a criminal proceeding for the offences, which include an offence under Section 420 of I. P. C. In this context mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of Vitoori Pradeep Kumar v. Kaisula Dharmaiah and Ors. , as reported in 2004 SCC (Cr) 440. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of Vitoori Pradeep Kumar v. Kaisula Dharmaiah and Ors. , as reported in 2004 SCC (Cr) 440. (28) IT was emphatically submitted on behalf of the OP. No. 2 that it is not permissible to quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. by appreciating the evjdence. The High Court cannot appreciate the evidence, but can evaluate material and documents on records to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Inviting attention of the Court to the decision in the case of State of M. P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. , as reported in 2004 SCC (Cr) 353 : 2004 C Cr LR (SC) 127, it was submitted that the High Court cannot look into the materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial while dealing with an application under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. (29) IT is true that inherent jurisdiction though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. It may be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. (30) OBSERVATION of the of the Apex Court in the said case may be reproduced as follows :- "it is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. " (31) THIS was further relied upon in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, as reported in (2006)2 SCC (Cr) 272. Mr. Mukherjee relying upon the decision in the case of Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and ors. , as reported in (2006)2 SCC (Cr) 310 : (2006)2 C Cr LR (SC) 11, submitted that a criminal proceeding should not be quashed in exercise of power under section 482 to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Mr. Mukherjee relying upon the decision in the case of Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and ors. , as reported in (2006)2 SCC (Cr) 310 : (2006)2 C Cr LR (SC) 11, submitted that a criminal proceeding should not be quashed in exercise of power under section 482 to stifle a legitimate prosecution. It was further submitted that this court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision where entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when evidence not collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved; whether factual or legal, cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. (32) REFERENCE was made to the decision in the case of State of karnataka and Anr. v. Pastor P. Raju, as reported in (2006) 3 SCC (Cr) 179 : (2007)1 C Cr LR (SC) 1, while submitting that Section 482 of Cr. P. C. saves inherent powers of the High Court and such a power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This power can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings pending in any Court but the power cannot be exercised to interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in a cognizable offence. The Apex court in the said case relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Union of india v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 C Cr LR (SC) 752. (33) IN the case of State of Karnataka (supra) the High Court quashed the entire proceedings initiated against the respondent on the ground that as the investigating agency had not obtained previous sanction of the Central government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate as required by Section 196 (1-A) of Cr. P. C. , the initiation of criminal proceedings against the respondent was bad in law. (34) THE factual backdrop of the present case is significantly different. It cannot be denied that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. (Ref : Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] AC 495). (35) LORD Halsbury in the said case observed a case is only authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to flow logically from it. (36) IT is not everything said by. a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. Among the propositions of law enunciated by the judge while giving a decision, only those which he appears to consider necessary for a decision are said to form part of the ratio decidendi and thus to amount to more than an obiter dictum. (37) IT is, perhaps, needless to mention that Article 141 of the Indian constitution clearly lays down that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The Apex Court in the case of Ashwaini Kr. Singh v. Public Service Commission, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2662, held that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not being read as Euclids Theorem or as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Undoubtedly it is the legal proposition flowing from the judgment which has the binding effect and there can be no doubt that the High Court is bound to honour and interpret the supreme Court judgment itself for applicability in a case. (38) WHAT emerges from the decisions as referred to by the learned counsel for the parties is that this Court in exercise Of its power under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, this Court can very well quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its such inherent power under Section 482. Where the allegations in such complaint do not even disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code, such power can very well be exercised. This Court may not be justified in playing the role of a passive onlooker where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the person. In view of the observations made in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, as reported in 1992 SCC (Cr) 426, a criminal proceeding can very well be interfered with when it is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (39) IN the factual backdrop of the present case, it is crystal clear that there has been bitter dispute essentially between the two brothers i. e. the present petitioner, Dr. Kamal Kumar Dutta and Shri Sajal Dutta. There are allegations that taking advantage of the situation that the petitioner, Dr. Dutta and his friend Dr. Singh are residents of USA, the bother of the petitioner initially was running administration of the Ruby General Hospital Ltd. How far shri Sajal Dutta utilized such absence of the petitioner in getting various resolutions passed by the Board of Directors, is certainly not a matter for consideration by this Court in response to the present application. The Court, however, cannot ignore the fact that there had been litigations fought in different venues and at different levels. It is amply clear that by virtue of an order passed by the Apex Court, the present petitioner took charge as Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the ruby General Hospital Ltd. In view of the pendency of the civil suit, there remains disputes and conflicts of different nature and magnitude. This, by no stretch of imagination, suggests that this Court cannot even take into consideration the allegations made in the petition of complaint, which was directed to be treated as FIR. This, by no stretch of imagination, suggests that this Court cannot even take into consideration the allegations made in the petition of complaint, which was directed to be treated as FIR. The allegations made therein certainly do not indicate any sort of dishonest intention or any deception on the part of the petitioner so far the transaction between the borrower company and the present O. P. No. 2 is concerned. (40) AFTER taking charge as a Managing Director, it was well within the authority of the present petitioner to ask for fresh cheque books. It is certainly strange that O. P. No. 2, while filing the petition, as complainant did not even remotely seek to implicate Shri Sajal Dutta, the brother of the present petitioner. He was virtually left out the scene. Moreover, as it appears from the said petition of complaint that the present O. P. No. 2 rather did not have any complaint whatsoever regarding its dealing with the borrower company till taking over charge as Managing Director by the present petitioner. How far his opening of accounts with UTI Bank is in violation of the RBI guidelines cannot be a matter of scrutiny by this Court within the scope and ambit of the present application. The fact that a civil suit is pending cannot certainly be a ground for quashing of the criminal proceeding. But in order to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of Court, this Court can very well take into consideration such admitted facts. But how can this Court ignore that the allegations made in the petition of complaint even if taken at their face value do not prima facie constitute any cognizable offence not to speak of the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467 and 468 of I. P. C ? Mere reference to the said penal provisions in the petition of complaint, in absence of disclosure of facts constituting the said offences, cannot justify continuation of a criminal proceeding. (41) IN the considered opinion of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case as well as for the reasons discussed earlier, continuation of the criminal proceeding will be an abuse of the process of court. Thus, in order to secure the ends of justice, such a criminal proceeding deserves to be quashed. (41) IN the considered opinion of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case as well as for the reasons discussed earlier, continuation of the criminal proceeding will be an abuse of the process of court. Thus, in order to secure the ends of justice, such a criminal proceeding deserves to be quashed. (42) ACCORDINGLY, the present application being C. R. R. No. 2709 of 2007 be allowed. (43) THE case being C. G. R. No. 2166 of 2007 pending before the learned court of C. J. M. , Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) arising out of Ballygunge Police station Case No. 132 dated 11 th July, 2007 under Sections 406, 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code be quashed. (44) THE present petitioner, accused person, if on bail be released from such bail bond at once. (45) SEND a copy of this judgment to the learned Court of C. J. M., Alipore, 24Parganas (South) for information and necessary action. (46) CRIMINAL department is directed to supply certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, to the learned Counsel for both parties as expeditiously as possible after due compliance with the legal formalities.