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2008 DIGILAW 614 (PNJ)

Anil Dhawan v. Gurnam Singh

2008-03-03

M.M.S.BEDI

body2008
Judgment M.M.S.Bedi, J. 1. Through the instant petition, inherent powers of this Court have been evoked under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to seek the quashing of a private complaint (annexure P-4) filed by respondent Gurnam Singh and the summoning order annexure P-2 dated August 25, 2005 for trial under Section 323/341 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The summoning order annexure P-2 reads as follows :- "Heard on the summoning of accused and file perused. On careful consideration of complaint and evidence, a prima facie case punishable under Sections 323/341 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code is made out against all the 4 accused. No detailed reason are required to be given for summoning the accused on account of clear law laid down in the judgment reported as U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., 2000(2) RCR(Crl.) 421 (SC). Let all the 4 accused be summoned to face trial under the aforesaid provisions of law for 23.2.2006 on filing of necessary PF etc. within 7 days." 2. Through there was no reason for the trial Court to avoid referring to the facts and express the reasons for summoning the accused on appreciation of preliminary evidence, yet the trial Court opted to summon the petitioners without even mentioning the ground which had persuaded the Court for summoning the petitioners to face trial. The petitioners questioned the legality and propriety of the summoning order under Sections 323/341/34 IPC before the Sessions Court, on the grounds that the respondent had concealed the true facts having violated the order under Section 144 Cr. P.C. debarring the collection of five or more persons on October 15, 2002 when the Chief Minister had visited Shahbad. On the instigation of respondent, the mob was led and damage was caused to the Government property including the jeep of the SHO, Pehowa. The police jeep was set on fire by pouring petrol on it. The respondent had been booked in a criminal case, FIR No.349 dated October 15, 2002, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 188, 283, 332, 353, 341, 427, 436, 506 and 120-B IPC read with Sections 3/4 PDP Act 1984. As the mob was led by respondent, to avoid the wrath of crowd, he was taken to CIA, Kurukshetra to avoid any untoward incident. As the mob was led by respondent, to avoid the wrath of crowd, he was taken to CIA, Kurukshetra to avoid any untoward incident. Statutory protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. was put-forth in the revision but the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra, dismissed the revision petition vide order dated January 16, 2007 holding that no documents tendered by the petitioners could be taken into consideration unless and until the petitioners took part in the proceeding. The revisional Court held that the statement of respondent-complainant and three other witness indicated that the complainant was confined by the police and fist and slap blows were given to him. Regarding the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. , the revisional Court held that illegally confining a person and giving him slap and fist blows cannot be considered as part of official duties. The petitioners have sought the quashing of the complaint, annexure P-4 summoning order annexure P-2 and the order of revisional Court annexure P-1 dated January 16, 2007. 3. The short question which is required to be determined in the present petition is as to whether the respondent had been illegally detained and assaulted by the petitioners or that the said act of the petitioners i.e. illegally detaining the respondent and assaulting him could be said to an act in official course of duty and whether sanction is necessary for prosecuting the petitioners who are admittedly holding ranks of Addl. S.P., Inspector and A.S.I. of the Police. 4. A reference to the allegations in the complaint annexure-4 are relevant. The relevant allegations in context to Sections 341 and 323 IPC for which the petitioners have been summoned are to the effect that the complainant was President of Bhartiya Kisan Union, District Kurukshtera. The Election of Director, Zone V Shahbad Sugar Mill was to be held on October 11, 2002. The complainant-respondent being President of Bhartiya Kisan Union had been fighting for the rights of farmers, agriculturists and other poor persons and was a representative of the people to the Government. The complainant- respondent was apprehending foul play and corrupt practices during the elections in favour of few candidates including one Banarsi Dass. Election was held on October 11, 2002 in the premises of Shahbad Sugar Mill. The complainant-respondent remained present there along with his agents and caught 150 persons casting bogus votes. The complainant- respondent was apprehending foul play and corrupt practices during the elections in favour of few candidates including one Banarsi Dass. Election was held on October 11, 2002 in the premises of Shahbad Sugar Mill. The complainant-respondent remained present there along with his agents and caught 150 persons casting bogus votes. Said fact was brought to the knowledge of the person on the spot including SDM, Pehowa. The complainant and all his supporters were forcibly pushed out of the polling booths by the supporters of Banarsi Dass, who was sponsored by Indian National Lok Dal with the patronage of the officers on the spot, namely, SDM, Pehowa, DSP Pehowa and DSP Kurukshetra. The complainant was forcibly pushed out of the polling booth. Forcible possession of the polling booth was taken and bogus votes unlawfully and illegally were casted in favour of Banarsi Dass and illegal booth capturing was done. A physical procession was taken out by the complainant and 250 persons in front of Shahbad Police Station and a dharna was held which continued upto October 15, 2002. It is mentioned in the complaint that on October 15, 2002, the Chief Minister was scheduled to visit and hold a function "Sarkar Apke Dwar". The complainant and others wanted to protest against the illegal means adopted on October 11, 2002 and wanted to express their resentment. When the Chief Minister was in Rest House at 11.30 a.m. the respondent was arrested by the police and thereafter other persons were lathi charged in the presence of the complainant including several other persons were also arrested. The respondent-complainant was taken to CIA Staff, Kurukshetra at about 8.30 p.m. Petitioner No. 1 was DSP at that time. He came there and asked petitioner No. 2 Inspector, petitioner No. 3 SI and petitioner No. 4 ASI to take the respondent out of room and strip him naked and beat him to teach a lesson for protesting before the Chief Minister. The complainant was forcibly stripped at the instance of Inspector Ranbir-petitioner No.2. Petitioner No. 4 Siya Nand gave a kick on the back of complainant-respondent. The respondent fell down then Ranbir Singh and Rajinder Singh (petitioners No. 2 and 3) started giving beatings to the complainant with kicks and fists. The complainant was forcibly stripped at the instance of Inspector Ranbir-petitioner No.2. Petitioner No. 4 Siya Nand gave a kick on the back of complainant-respondent. The respondent fell down then Ranbir Singh and Rajinder Singh (petitioners No. 2 and 3) started giving beatings to the complainant with kicks and fists. Petitioner No. 2 Ranbir Singh and petitioner No. 3 Rajinder Singh gave slaps, kicks and fist blows on different parts of the body besides hurling filthy abuses. Rajinder Singh petitioner No. 3 forcibly removed his turban and pulled his hairs. When the respondent was being beaten, his brother Gurdip Singh and Tara Singh came to see him. Wen they intervened and asked CIA Staff as to why they were beating the respondent, they asked to flew away otherwise they would meet the same consequence. The respondent was made to stand without clothes for two hours and thereafter he was made to dress himself. It was cold. He was not given any blanket or bed sheet. Next morning, he was taken for medical check up and was produced before the Court. The abovesaid complaint was filed on the basis of illegal detention, acts of beatings, stripping, defamation, insult and reputation etc. in exercise of misuse of power. 5. Since the revisional Court had refused to took into the documents produced before it, the petitioners have produced few important documents which are relevant for the just decision of this petition. The plea which has been raised by the petitioners before the revisional Court as well as before this Court is that on October 11, 2002 election as stated by respondent was held for the post of Directors of Shahbad Sugar Mill. On October 14, 2002, a notification annexure P-6 imposing Section 144 Cr.P.C. was issued by District Magistrate, Kurukshetra. By virtue of said notification dated October 14, 2002, it was notified that there was likelihood of annoyance, obstruction and injury to the person and danger to him of life and property and disturbance of public peace and tranquility within the limits of District Kurukshtra due to dharna/agitation by Bhartiya Kisan Union from October 14, 2002 at Shahabad and in District Kurukshetra. Therefore in exercise of powers vested in him by virtue of Section 144 Cr.P.C., 1973 the District Magistrate, Kurukshetra, Abhilaksh Likhi, prohibited the gathering of five or more persons carrying of weapons of offence like fiream, sword, lathi, barcha, jellis, gandasis, knives and other weapons. The order was promulgated in the District of Kurukshetra on the beat of drums by announcement through the publicity van of the Public Relations Department by affixing copies of the order on notice board in the District Courts, Sub Division and Tehsil Courts and public areas as well as police stations. On October 15, 2002, the complainant and his muscle men formed unlawful assembly and encircled the police station, Shahbad. National Highway No. 8 popularly known as G.T. Road was blocked. At that time the complainant and persons accompanying him were carrying lathis and other dangerous weapons. And they started pelting stones on the police people posted over there to maintain law and order. The respondent and his accomplice attacked not only the police force but also damaged Government vehicle No. HR07-C-1616 and set ablaze the official vehicle of the Station House Officer, Police Station, Pehowa by means of petrol. In process of wielding the weapons by the unlawful assembly, Const. Maha Singh, Const. Amar Singh and Cost. Subash Chand sustained multiple injuries. The officials on duty apprised the unruly mob by means of loud-speaker, fitted on the police vehicle, with regard to imposition of Section 144 Cr.P.C. by the District Magistrate, but of no avail. The Station House Officer, Shahbad requested in writing the Duty Magistrate to grant permission for a light lathi charge in order to control the unruly mob and their illegal activities. The Duty Magistrate asked for the report from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who also endorsed the request of the SHO. Thereupon the Duty Magistrate ordered for the light lathi charge. The application moved by the SHO, the report submitted by the Dy. S.P. and the order of the learned Duty Magistrate has been placed on record as annexure P- 7. A perusal of the order annexure P-7 dated October 15, 2002 indicates that the Duty Magistrate had recorded his satisfaction that the situation had become out of control. The crowd should not be permitted to damage the public property and it required to be depressed physically. Light lathi charge was permitted below knee level. A perusal of the order annexure P-7 dated October 15, 2002 indicates that the Duty Magistrate had recorded his satisfaction that the situation had become out of control. The crowd should not be permitted to damage the public property and it required to be depressed physically. Light lathi charge was permitted below knee level. Special caution was also mentioned that children and women should be treated properly and carefully. Therefore police officials swung into motion and arrested the complainant and other persons and registered an FIR No. 349 dated October 15, 2002, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 188, 283, 332, 353, 341, 427, 436, 506 and 120-B IPC as well as under Section 3/4 PDP Act at Police Station Shahbad. The respondent was got medically examined from the Medical Officer prior to his production before illaqa Magistrate on October 16, 2002. Nothing significant was pointed out except one abrasion on the forearm and two complaints of pain on non-vital parts of the body. After thorough investigation, the respondent and other people were found to have committed offence under Section 188 IPC for violating the order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the challan was presented before the illaqa Magistrate. The respondent and his accomplice were charge sheeted under Section 188 IPC. The respondent and other accused admitted their guilt and on the basis of their confession recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra on November 28, 2002, they were held guilty and sentenced under Section 188 IPC. Copy of the conviction order has been placed on record as annexure P-5. On the basis of the above said pleas, quashing of criminal complaint and summoning order and the order passed by the revisional Court annexure P-1 has been prayed for. 6. Mr .N.K. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the trial Magistrate while passing order dated August 25, 2002 failed to appreciate the fact that the police officials were acting in the discharge of their official duties and were bound to maintain law and order situation at the given time and place. They had acted in accordance with the order passed by the Duty Magistrate posted at the spot to review the law and order situation as such they are protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Sanction of the competent authority was a condition precedent for their prosecution. They had acted in accordance with the order passed by the Duty Magistrate posted at the spot to review the law and order situation as such they are protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Sanction of the competent authority was a condition precedent for their prosecution. The respondent intentionally concealed the fact that on October 14, 2002, a prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. had been issued and that the respondent along with others had violated the said notification and committed an offence under Section 188 IPC vide conviction order dated November 28, 2002. The petitioners had acted under Sections 129, 130, and 131 of the Cr.P.C. for maintenance of public order and tranquility as such they are protected under Section 132 Cr.P.C. The respondent-complainant who has filed a complaint, after a gap of four and half months after the occurrence, has got a bad record of being an anti-social element having committed number of offences. A reference was made to his conviction in FIR No. 349 dated October 15, 2002 at Police Station Shahabad under Section 188 IPC. He was convicted in FIR No. 126 dated June 22, 1981, under Section 325 IPC pertaining to Police Station Shahbad. He was an accused in FIR No. 333 dated October 14, 1978 under Sections 307, 306, 324, 34 IPC of Police Station Shahbad. He was indicated in FIR No. 104 dated March 31, 2002 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Property Act, P.S. Shahbad. All the said cases were registered against the respondent-complainant prior to the postings of the petitioners in District Kurukshetra. Counsel for the petitioners has argued that petitioner No. 1 was posted as DSP HQ on October 15, 2002 but he had been sent for VIP Duty to Shahbad on October 15, 2002 after the arrest of persons forming unlawful assembly and bringing the situation under control. He had left the spot (Shahbad) and went to Ladwa in connection with verification of the investigation of a case FIR No. 195 dated October 15, 2002, registered under Section 302 IPC as such he had no occasion to go to CIA Staff, Kurukshetra on October 15, 2002. Permission was sought to refer to the log book and other Zimnies recorded in that context. Permission was sought to refer to the log book and other Zimnies recorded in that context. The falsity of the allegations in the complaint is reflected from the fact that the complainant did not make any complaint regarding the alleged happening as mentioned in the complaint. 7. Counsel for the respondent Ms. G.S. Turka, has vehemently urged that the petitioners are not protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C. as the act of illegally detaining a person and thereafter stripping him naked and assaulting in the illegal custody cannot be said to be the basis of official duties as such no sanction is required for prosecuting the petitioners. She vehemently urged that this Court should decline to consider the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. at this stage of taking of cognizance by the trial Court and in case the petitioners are able to establish by producing their defence that they had acted in the discharge of their official duties, they can subsequently derive the benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. She referred to K. Kalimathu v. State, 2005(2) RCR(Criminal) 463 : 2005(2) Apex Criminal 58 : 2005 Crl. L.J. 2190 and Raj Kishor Roy v. Kamleshwar Pandey and another, 2002(3) RCR(Criminal) 873 : 2002 Crl.L.J. 3780, wherein it was observed that the question of requirement of sanction can be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of trial. Relying upon the said judgments, she argued that the respondent must be given an opportunity to establish his case by evidence and opportunity can be given to the petitioners to produce their defence to establish that they had been acting in official course of their duties. 8. I have heard counsel for the petitioners as well as counsel for the respondent. So far as the judgments of K. Kalimuthus case (supra) and Raj Kishor Roys case (supra) cited by counsel for the respondent are concerned, I have carefully gone through the said judgments. There is no dispute regarding the proposition of law that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. Whether the said act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of duty can be appreciated during trial proceedings. There is no dispute regarding the proposition of law that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. Whether the said act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of duty can be appreciated during trial proceedings. In K. Kalimuthus case (supra) considering at what stage the Court is required to find out whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related to find out whether it was done by accused in performance of his official duty though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of situation. It was observed as follows :- "15. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned the effect of Section 19, dealing with question of prejudice has also to be noted." (emphasis supplied) 9. So far as the facts of Raj Kishor Roys case (supra) are concerned, in the said case, the complainant and his brother had been assaulted by the police officer in their house and thereafter at police station and had involved them in a false case of having been found in possession of weapon and cartridges and they were threatened that in case they protested they would be shot by showing encounter. The Honble Supreme Court in view of the facts of that case observed that the prosecution was required to be given an opportunity to establish its case by evidence and an opportunity could be subsequently given to the defence to establish that he had been acting in the official course of his duties. 10. Considering the judgments of K. Kalimuthus case (supra) and Raj Kishor Roys case (supra) the context in which the said judgments had been passed, it is apparent that the Honble Supreme Court has not laid down an absolute rule that in all the cases where the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is sought, the Courts should adopt evasive attitude to defer the consideration of said plea till the final completion of the trial. The judgments cited by counsel for the respondents are thus not applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. It is a settled principle of law that the judgments given by the Courts should not be considered as statutes. Before relying upon the ratio of a judgment, the facts and circumstances in which the decision has been given should be examined. In this context the observations of Honble Supreme Court in Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2004(3) RCR(Criminal) 343 : 2004(3) Apex Criminal 222 : (2004)2 SCC 362 are relevant regarding interpretation of judgments, laying down guiding principles. The apex Court ruled that a judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which are before the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows : "There is no such thing as a judicial precedent on facts though counsel, and even judges, are sometimes prone to argue and to act as if they were, said Bose, J., about half a century back in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P. (AIR 1956 SC 116). A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. A judgment should be understood in the light of facts of that case and no more should be read into it than what it actually says. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be complete law decided by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in te light of the questions which were before this Court. (See CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., (1992)4 SCC 363)". The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in te light of the questions which were before this Court. (See CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., (1992)4 SCC 363)". No absolute rule has been laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the above said two judgments referred to by counsel for the respondent that in all cases where the plea regarding sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. is raised, the official accused would have to wait for the final decision after a protracted trial to get a finding that the act attributed to them was an act during the course of performance of their official duties or it was in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. The facts and circumstances of each case are to be independently construed because the Honble Supreme Court in K. Kalimuthus case (supra) has observed that the question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. In the case of Abdul Wahid Ansari v. State of Bihar, 2004(2) RCR(Crl.) 215 (Patna), it was held that previous sanction of the competent authority being a pre-condition for the Court taking cognizance of the offence if the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused can be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty, the question touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and, therefore, there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges are framed. The principles laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1991(1) RCR(Crl.) 383 (SC) laying down the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction for quashing of criminal complaint or the FIR are always relevant to arrive at a conclusion whether the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing of the criminal proceedings are warranted in peculiar circumstances of a case or not. In M/s Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, 1997(4) RCR(Criminal) 761 : AIR 1998 SC 128, the Honble Supreme Court referring to the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 227of the Constitution of India held that no doubt Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of trial if he considers the charge to be groundless but that does not mean that an accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. A careful perusal of the circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that in case the powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. are not exercised this will result in manifest injustice to the petitioners and permit the respondent to abuse the process of the Court. 12. The petitioners have been summoned in the present case under Sections 341 and 323 IPC. The petitioners had intentionally concealed the fact that on October 15, 2002, respondent was taken in custody, the prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. were operative in the area and that he was arrested in FIR No. 349 dated October 15, 2002, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 199, 283, 332, 353, 341, 427, 436, 506 and 120-IPC read with Sections 3/4 PDP Act and had been convicted by the Court vide order annexure P-5 dated November 28, 2002 under Section 188 IPC. The summoning Court has summoned the petitioners only Sections 341 and 323 IPC. The question of respondent having been wrongfully restrained in the police station is absolutely wrong and misconceived because it is not a case where the complainant had been illegally detained but it is a case where the complainant-respondent had been arrested along with others in a criminal case for having violated prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. and for having committee an offence under Section 188 IPC. The said case was ultimately decided against the complainant-respondent. Had this fact been disclosed in the complaint, the trial Court could have arrived at a conclusion that the respondent had not been wrongfully restrained and that offence under Section 341 IPC was not made out. When a person is arrested by a police officer exercising powers under Section 41 Cr.P.C., the detention cannot be said to be illegal. Had this fact been disclosed in the complaint, the trial Court could have arrived at a conclusion that the respondent had not been wrongfully restrained and that offence under Section 341 IPC was not made out. When a person is arrested by a police officer exercising powers under Section 41 Cr.P.C., the detention cannot be said to be illegal. The petitioners have been able to establish from the official notification and the judicial order dated November 28, 2002 of the CJM that the detention of respondent-complainant was neither illegal nor could be said to warrant provision of Section 341 IPC. Applying the parameters laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lals case (supra), this Court is of the opinion that the complaint of respondent suffers from the vice of mala fide and the complaint is a counter-blast to the act of the petitioners in arresting him in a case which has ultimately resulted in his conviction. The previous record of the respondent having an accused in number of cases shows that the complainant-respondent nurses a grouse against the police. With an oblique motive and with a vindictive mind present complaint annexure P-4 has been filed. It is, therefore, a fit case warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against the petitioners. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan, 1998(1) RCR(Criminal) 165 : 1998 SCC(Crl.) 1, it was observed that "the question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary material which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority". In this context, a reference can also be made to Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia, 1990 SCC(Crl). In this context, a reference can also be made to Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia, 1990 SCC(Crl). 611, wherein it was held that want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a prohibition against institution of the proceedings, and the applicability of the section must be judged at the earliest stage of the proceedings. In the said case, this Court had directed the Magistrate to consider the question of sanction before framing a charge. 13. Mr. Sanghi has placed reliance on S.K. Zutshi and another v. Bimal Debnath and another, 2004(3) RCR(Criminal) 813 : 2004(3) Apex Criminal 362 : AIR 2004 SC 4174 to contend that when an act is done by a public servant in discharge of official duty, but acted in excess of duty, the public servant is entitled to protection of section 197 Cr.P.C. 14. I have considered the said contention carefully in context to the allegation levelled in the complaint and am of the opinion that the allegations of the complainant-respondent that petitioners had illegally arrested and detained him has been patently found to be false indicating that the petitioners are not at all liable to be prosecuted for the act of arrest of the complainant-respondent and others as the said act had been committed by them in discharge of their official duties. As per S.K. Zutshis case (supra), if they had to act in excess of their duty, the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be available to the petitioners because the legislative mandate of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. is a prohibition imposed by statute for taking cognizance. The offence alleged to have been committed by an official must have some thing to do or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty. The sole point to be determined in each case is whether the act was committed in discharge of official duty and that there is a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. Once the initial step has been found to be in consonance with law the next question which arises for determination is whether the Government official had acted in excess of duty debarring him for the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. 15. In the present case, the allegations of assault have not been established by proving that any injury was caused by the petitioners accused specifically to any of the petitioners. In the present case, the allegations of assault have not been established by proving that any injury was caused by the petitioners accused specifically to any of the petitioners. Respondent was got medically examined after he was arrested leading the mob. It is apparent that the police had a hard task to control the violent mob. The existence of abrasion in this manner cannot be attributed specifically to any of the petitioners. The allegations of stripping the complainant-respondent do not seem to have been established on the basis of the preliminary evidence as the petitioners have been summoned only under Sections 323, 341 IPC. It is important to mention that maintenance of public order and tranquility has been covered under Chapter X of Cr.P.C. Section 129 Cr.P.C., empowers an Executive Magistrate or Police in charge of a Police Station to order dispersal of any unlawful assembly by use of civil force. Section 130 Cr.P.C. gives statutory authority to the Executive Magistrate to use armed forces to disperse assembly. In the circumstances where public security is manifestly endangered by any unlawful assembly, armed force officers are entitled to disperse said assembly. Section 132 Cr.P.C. gives a statutory protection against prosecution for the acts done by the Executive Magistrate or the police officer under Sections 129, 130 and 131 Cr.P.C., without the sanction of the Central Government or State Government as the case may be. Relevant part of Section 132 Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under:- "132. Protection against prosecution for acts done under preceding sections(1) No prosecution against any person for any act purporting to be done under section 129, Section 130 or Section 131 shall be instituted by any Criminal Court, except- (a) with the sanction of the Central Government where such person is an officer or member of the armed forces; (b) with the sanction of the State Government in any other case. 2. (a) No Executive Magistrate or police officer acting under any of the said sections in good faith; (b) No person doing any act in good faith in compliance with a requisition under section 129 or Section 130; (c) No officer of the armed forces acting under Section 13 in good faith; (d) No member of the armed forces doing any act in obedience to an order which he was bound to obey; shall be deemed to have thereby committed an offence. (3) In this section and in the proceeding section of this Chapter, - (a) the expression "armed forces" means the military, naval and air force, operating as land forces and includes any other armed forces of the Union so operating; (b) "officer", in relation to the armed forces, means a person commissioned, gazetted, in pay as an officer of the armed forces and includes a Junior Commissioned Officer, a warrant officer, a petty officer, a non- commissioned officer and a non-gazatted officer, (c ) "member", in relation to the armed forces, means a person in the armed forces other than an officer". 16. A persual of the above section clearly indicates that neither Executive Magistrate nor a police officer or member of armed force, acting in good faith shall be deemed to have committed an offence if they had exercised the powers of disbursal of an unlawful assembly by use of civil force or armed force. 17. The action of the petitioners was pursuant to the passed by the Duty Magistrate on October 15, 2002 (annexure P-7) to disperse the unruly mob who was pelting stones on the police and damaging the vehicles on the national highway. The respondent being the leader was apprehended on the spot and thereafter he was tried and convicted under Section 188 IPC. 18. It will not be out of place to mention here that the complainant had levelled a serious allegation against the petitioners and while issuing process, Sh Rajinder Goel, CJM, Kurukshetra adopting a casual approach neither referred to the facts of the complaint in brief nor even the names of the witnesses examined at preliminary stage. What to say for applying judicious mind, the CJM without even finding out as to what part has been attributed to the accused ordered the summoning by passing a non-speaking cryptic order of less than a half page observing that no detailed reasons are required to be given for summoning the accused in view of the laid down in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., 2000(2) RCR(Crl.) 421. The said cryptic order does not even disclose that the Magistrate had formed an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceedings against the petitioners on judicious application of mind. Although he was required to express reasons for coming to the conclusion that prima facie some offence had been committed by the petitioners. The said cryptic order does not even disclose that the Magistrate had formed an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceedings against the petitioners on judicious application of mind. Although he was required to express reasons for coming to the conclusion that prima facie some offence had been committed by the petitioners. The Magistrate has neither specified any reason nor he has even formed an opinion of there being sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioners. The said action of CJM has not saved the time of the Court but has rather resulted in the wastage of time of the revisional Court which had to again refer to the statements of the witness and consider the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The CJM seems to have again misinterpreted the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Mohan Meakins case (supra) by just picking up few convenient words from the judgment. In view of Mehboob Dawood Shaikhs case (supra), it cannot be said that Mohan Meakinss case (supra) is a decision available as a precedent laying down a question of law that all the Courts of Magistrate are neither to consider the allegations in the complaint nor to touch the statement of the witnesses to find out prima facie case against the accused or stop applying judicious mind before issuing summoning order. 19. In the present case, before taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate had examined on oath the complainant and other witnesses and substance of the examination had been reduced to writing under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The language of Section 204 Cr.P.C. makes it mandatory for the Magistrate to form an opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused by issuing summons or warrants as per the requirement of the case. Instead of recording the sufficient grounds for proceedings against the petitioners, the Magistrate had very conveniently referred to Mohan Meakinss case (supra) observing that no detailed reasons are required to be given for summoning the accused. What to say of detailed reasons. The trial Court had even not touched the allegations in the complaint. Such an approach is not permissible and this had never been the ratio of the judgment of Mohan Meakinss case (supra) relied upon by the Magistrate. What to say of detailed reasons. The trial Court had even not touched the allegations in the complaint. Such an approach is not permissible and this had never been the ratio of the judgment of Mohan Meakinss case (supra) relied upon by the Magistrate. In view of the above said circumstances, the complaint annexure P-4, summoning order dated August 25, 2005, under Sections 323, 341 IPC and the order dated January 16, 2007 (annexure P-1) and all consequential proceedings are hereby quashed to meet the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.