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2008 DIGILAW 616 (GAU)

Bharati Das v. Ranjit Kumar Das

2008-08-22

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2008
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant revision petition has been filed challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 20.3.2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Agartala, West Tripura in Case No. TS (P) 27 of 2007 whereby and whereunder the learned trial court allowed the prayer for amendment of the plaint. 2. Considering the nature of the dispute and as agreed to by the learned Counsel for both the parties, this revision petition is taken up for final disposal at the admission stage. 3. The revision Petitioners are the Defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 in the aforesaid Title Suit. 4. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows: The Plaintiff-Respondents (hereinafter referred to as 'the Respondents') instituted a suit for partition of the immovable joint property, which both the Respondents as well as the Defendant-Petitioners (herein after referred to as 'the Petitioners') inherited after the death of their predecessor-in-interest, late Jogendra Chandra Das. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are the sons of late Jogendra Chandra Das while the Respondent No. 3 is the daughter and Respondents No. 4 and 5 are the maternal grandson and daughter respectively of the said predecessor-in-interest. Respondents No. 4 and 5 are the legal heirs of deceased Surabala Das, daughter of the predecessor-in-interest and the husband of Petitioner No. 1 and father of Petitioners No. 2 and 3 namely, Pradip Chandra Das was the Anr. son of the predecessor-in-interest, who died on 2.12.2006. The Respondents filed the suit in question for partition of the immovable property jointly owned by the Respondents and the Petitioners being the legal heirs of their predecessor-in-interest. In the said Title Suit, the Respondents claimed the following reliefs: i) Pass a preliminary decree for partition of the suit land described in Schedule-A, B and C below amongst the Plaintiffs and the Defendants as per their entitlement in the said property; ii) Appoint a Commissioner for effecting the partition in terms of the preliminary decree; iii) Pass a final decree embodying the report of the Commissioner so appointed in terms of prayer No. - II above; iv) Pass an order of injunction, Receiver and cost ; v) Pass any other appropriate order or orders to effect the partition by metes and bounds amongst the Plaintiffs and Defendants. 5. 5. On receipt of the notice, the Petitioners filed written statement objecting the prayers for partition, inter alia, that the predecessor-in-interest during his lifetime executed a registered will in respect of the suit land and bequeathed a part of the suit land, measuring 6.58 satak to his deceased son Pradip Chandra Das. It was also averred in the said written statement that because of execution of the said registered will on 14.6.1993, said Pradip Chandra Das became the absolute owner of the said land and after his death the Petitioners, by inheritance, have become the absolute owner of the said property and were/are in the peaceful possession of the same and on the strength of the said will, Pradip Chandra Das during his lifetime had sold some portion of land measuring about 6 Kanies out of the said bequeathed property and at that time the Respondents did not raise any objection. After presentation of the said written statement by the Petitioners herein, the Respondents made an application with a prayer for amending the plaint and sought for incorporating certain subsequent developments and prayers. In the said amendment petition, the Respondents also challenged the authenticity of the said purported registered will dated 14.6.1993 and prayed for a declaration of the will to be void with a further prayer for cancellation of the same. On receipt of the notice of amendment petition, the Petitioners by way of filing written objection questioned the maintainability of the amendment petition on the ground, inter alia, that the proposed amendment would change/alter the nature and character of the suit as by the said amendment sought to incorporate certain facts, which were already within the province of the knowledge of the Respondents at the time of institution of the suit. In that stage, the learned trial court upon hearing the parties has passed the impugned order dated 20.3.2008 allowing the amendment prayer of the Respondents. The operative part of the impugned order reads as follows: In view of what has been said above, I am at this stage constrained to hold that proper adjudication of the suit would not be possible unless the amendment as prayed for is allowed. Both the parties are at liberty to come up with their testimony etc. for a just decision after amendment of the plaint as desired by Plaintiff. The application seeking amendment is accordingly allowed. 6. Heard Mr. Both the parties are at liberty to come up with their testimony etc. for a just decision after amendment of the plaint as desired by Plaintiff. The application seeking amendment is accordingly allowed. 6. Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners as well as Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 7. Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners would contend that the prayer for amendment was allowed by the learned trial court in violation of the provisions contained in Order II, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as the Respondents without leave of the court tried to conjoin the separate cause of action with the earlier cause of action for which the suit was filed. According to him, no joinder of separate cause of action is permissible in a suit without leave of the court, which is absent in the instant case. For better appreciation, Order II, Rule 4 is quoted herein under: 4. Only certain claims to be joined for recovery of immovable property. No cause of action shall, unless with the leave of the court, be joined with a suit for the recovery of immovable property, except-- (a) claims for mesne profits or arrears of rent in respect of the property claimed or any part thereof; (b) claims for damages for breach of any contract under which the property or any part thereof is held; and (c) claims in which the relief sought is based on the same cause of action: PROVIDED that nothing in this rule shall be deemed to prevent any party in a suit for foreclosure or redemption from asking to be put into possession of the mortgaged property. 8. Mr. Deb further contended that due to the impugned order allowing the amendment as sought for, the nature and character of the suit has been changed, which is not permissible under the law as the said amendment would be prejudicial to the Petitioners. He finally contended that introduction of the new pleadings by way of amendment would certainly change the suit from a suit for partition to a suit for declaration. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Deb relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. v. S.K. Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Deb relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. v. S.K. Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4007, particularly para 7 of the said judgment, which is reproduced below: 7. The other relevant fact to be noted is the plea taken in the written statement filed by D-1 wherein, it is specifically stated that the suit schedule lands are classified as poramboke lands in survey and settlement operations and that the Government issued GO. Ms. No. 459 (Industries and Commerce) Department, dated 28.11.1998 leasing out an extent of 18.35 hectares of land covered under Survey Nos. 106 and 107 of Ayitham Valasa Village in favour of A.P. Mineral Development Corporation for mining purpose for twenty years. It is further averred that the Government in G.O. Ms. No. 102 (Industries and Commerce) Department, dated 20.2.2001 issued Orders transferring the mining lease held by A.P. Mineral Development Corporation in favour of M/s. Sarwagi and Co. Pvt. Ltd. for the unexpired period of lease, i.e. upto 1.6.2019. As rightly observed by the High Court, it is explicit from the written statement filed by D-1 that the Plaintiff was made known of the fact that the Government issued order transferring mining lease held by A.P. Mineral Development Corporation in favour of M/s Sarwagi and Co. Pvt. Ltd. (D-2) and the leased lands are in possession and enjoyment of M/s Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondent, in spite of the Plaintiff being put in knowledge of the act of the person in possession of the suit property did not chose to implead the said M/s Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (D-2) which came on record on its own application as D-2 in the suit. It is clear that in spite of reply notice and specific plea taken in the written statement of D-1, the Plaintiff did not chose to take steps to get the plaint amended suitably and instead allowed the suit to go on and examined the witnesses on his behalf and cross-examined the witnesses produced by the Defendants. Only during the stage of arguments, the Plaintiff came up with an application under Order VI, Rule 17 seeking amendment of the pleadings. Only during the stage of arguments, the Plaintiff came up with an application under Order VI, Rule 17 seeking amendment of the pleadings. We have already explained the implication of provisio to Rule 17. Though even after commencement of the trial, parties to the proceeding are entitled to seek amendment, in the light of the factual details such as clear information in the reply notice prior to the filing of the suit and specific plea in the written statement of D-1 which contained details of Government Orders leasing out the suit property in favour of D-2, the action of the Plaintiff at the stage of argument can not be permitted. Admittedly, the Plaintiff failed to adhere to the said recourse at the appropriate time. Further it is relevant to point out that in the original suit, the Plaintiff prayed for declaration of his exclusive right to do mining operations and to use and sell the suit schedule property and in the petition filed during the course of the arguments, he prayed for recovery of possession and damages from the second Defendant. It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be Subject to certain conditions, namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The Plaintiff not only failed to satisfy the conditions prescribed in proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 but even on merits his claim is liable to be rejected. All these relevant aspects have been duly considered by the High Court and rightly set aside the order dated 10.3.2004 of the Additional District Judge. He also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Co. and Ors. reported in 2008 AIR SCW 3192. 9. Per contra, Mr. All these relevant aspects have been duly considered by the High Court and rightly set aside the order dated 10.3.2004 of the Additional District Judge. He also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Co. and Ors. reported in 2008 AIR SCW 3192. 9. Per contra, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents would contend that the present revision petition filed under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable as the impugned order is an interlocutory order and after the last amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, no revision petition lies against an order passed in the course of a suit or other proceeding except where the order, if it has been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. Placing reliance on para 32 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and Ors. reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 , Mr. Chakraborty submits that if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision petition will not be maintainable and in the instant case, it is the admitted position that the impugned order is interim in nature and such order would not finally decide the lis between the parties. He further submits that amendment relates to procedure and the legislative intent is crystal clear so far Order VI, Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure is concerned. He further submits that amendment relates to procedure and the legislative intent is crystal clear so far Order VI, Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure is concerned. Order VI, Rule 17 vests the jurisdiction on a court to allow the parties of the lis for incorporation of the subsequent development and for deciding all the disputes between the parties effectively to avoid multiplicity of litigation He also contended that the Petitioners have grossly failed to show any jurisdictional error in the order impugned in the revision petition and also failed to show as to how they have been prejudiced by the impugned order and as to how there was failure of justice and grave injustice has been caused to the Petitioners by the said order and in absence of the said material in the revision petition, the Petitioners cannot get any relief from this Court in view of the decision contained in para 24 of the Apex Court judgment in Surya Dev Rai v. Ramcharder Rai and Ors. reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 Para 24 of the aforesaid decision is reproduced herein below: 24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai. Proceedings under Article226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Chakraborty clearly stated that before the filing of the written statement by the Petitioners, the Respondents had/have no opportunity to know about the execution of the alleged registered will and as such they could not go through the said will. Hence, question of filing of separate suit challenging the said will did not arise at all. Only option remains to the Respondents to challenge the said will relating to the land in question by way of amending the plaint for real adjudication of the partition suit as the land in question in the partition suit and the land mentioned in the alleged will are same. He also contended that the suit was basically a suit for partition of the ancestral property and the amendment did not change the nature and character of the said partition suit. Even after amendment also the suit remains as a partition suit and except challenging the will there was/is no other option to the Respondents to get the partition of the suit property. 11. In response to the contention raised by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the prayer for amendment was allowed by the learned trial court in violation of the provisions contained in Order II, Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel for the Respondents submits that the said provision of Order 2, Rule IV Code of Civil Procedure has no application in the present lis as the said provision has application only in a suit for recovery of immovable property. In this case it is an admitted position that the suit is not for recovery of immovable property but for partition of the ancestral property and the point relating to limitation raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is also devoid of merit in view of the fact that the Respondents made no delay in filing the amendment petition before the learned court below and it is also not the case of the Petitioners that after amendment they have been deprived of from filing their written statement controverting the pleadings in the amendment petition. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the cause of action for cancellation of the will would run from the date of knowledge of the Respondents and not from the date of execution of the alleged will. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the cause of action for cancellation of the will would run from the date of knowledge of the Respondents and not from the date of execution of the alleged will. He contended that in view of the amendment of the code there is no bar to allow application for amendment within the pretrial stage and the court can even allow the amendment in the trial stage subject to the said amendment would shorten the litigation between the parties. He finally submits that even after the amendment is allowed by the learned trial court, the Petitioners are at liberty to file their additional written statement against the amended part of the plaint and contest the suit before the learned court below raising their voice. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the decision of the Apex Court in Rajkumar Gurawara (supra), particularly in para 7, relied on by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, has no application in the present case as the fact of that case is totally different from the present one, rather, according to him, para 5 of the aforesaid judgment squarely covers the case of the present Respondents. 12. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submission made by the learned Counsel of both the parties as well as to the materials available on record. On perusal of the impugned order dated 20.3.2008, it appears that the learned trial court has passed the order by way of applying judicious mind as the amendment has been allowed considering the same to be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. On going through the decisions of the Apex Court as stated (supra), there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code gives a wide discretion to the court to allow amendment necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. But undoubtedly the discretion is to be a judicious one not an arbitrary action of the power. Only by way of proviso, the legislature has put a restriction on the court to the effect that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to a conclusion that inspite of due diligence, the party could have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. Only by way of proviso, the legislature has put a restriction on the court to the effect that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to a conclusion that inspite of due diligence, the party could have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that the learned trial court did not frame issues for deciding the suit and the Respondents have not yet filed their amended plaint. Before filing of such amended plaint the Petitioners have challenged the impugned order by way of filing the instant revision petition though as per law they are entitled to file their additional written statement against the amended plaint. The learned trial court at the time of allowing the prayer for amendment of the plaint stated, inter alia, in the impugned order "Both the parties are at liberty to come up with their testimony etc. for a just decision after amendment of the plaint as desired by Plaintiff", meaning thereby the Petitioners were given ample opportunity to meet up their case before the learned trial court by filing additional written statement etc. In the case of Baldev Singh and Ors. v. Manohar Singh and Anr. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 498 , the Apex Court in para 17 of the said judgment stated as follows: 17. Before we part with this order, we may also notice that proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure provides that amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed when the trial of the suit has already commenced. For this reason, we have examined the records and find that, in fact, the trial has not yet commenced. It appears from the records that the parties have yet to file their documentary evidence in the suit. From the record, it also appears that the suit was not on the verge of conclusion as found by the High Court and the trial court. That apart, commencement of trial as used in proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of documents and addressing of arguments. That apart, commencement of trial as used in proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of documents and addressing of arguments. As noted hereinbefore, parties are yet to file their documents, we do not find any reason to reject the application for amendment of the written statement in view of proviso to Order 6, Rule 17Code of Civil Procedure which confers wide power and unfettered discretion to the court to allow an amendment of the written statement at any stage of the proceedings. 13. This Court has also gone though the provisions contained in Order II, Rule 4 of the Code. According to this Court, the submission of Mr. Chakraborty has some force as the case in hand is not relating to a case of recovery of any immovable property. It is a settled position of law that the said rule has no application unless the suit is for the recovery of immovable property. Therefore, in the instant case question of leave of the court for filing a petition for amendment of the plaint does not arise at all. 14. Reply to the other questions raised by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners is available in the decision of the Apex Court in Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayapran and Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 472 , particularly in paras 4, 5 and 6 of the said judgment, which are reproduced herein below: 4. In view of the subsequent developments, the Appellant filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 for the amendment of the plaint for adding paras 8(a) to 8(f) in his plaint. The trial court rejected his prayer and the revision petition filed against that order was dismissed by the High Court vide order impugned in this appeal, mainly on the ground that the amendment, if allowed, would result in introducing a new case and cause of action. It was further, held that as the Appellant was seeking recovery of damages, the amendment could not be allowed as it would allegedly change the nature of the suit. It was also observed that the amendment sought was barred by limitation. 5. After referring to the judgments in Charan Das v. Amir Khan, L.J. Leach & Co. It was further, held that as the Appellant was seeking recovery of damages, the amendment could not be allowed as it would allegedly change the nature of the suit. It was also observed that the amendment sought was barred by limitation. 5. After referring to the judgments in Charan Das v. Amir Khan, L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram and various other authorities, this Court in B.K. Narayan Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai held: 3. The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in suh manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hyper technical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. 6. If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case, as is evident from the perusal of averments made in paras 8(a) to 8(f) of the plaint which were sought to be incorporated by way of amendment. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. 15. This Court is of further opinion that para 7 of Rajkumar Gurawara (supra) as referred to by Mr. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. 15. This Court is of further opinion that para 7 of Rajkumar Gurawara (supra) as referred to by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has no application in the instant case as the fact of that case is totally different than the case in hand. In that case, the Plaintiff originally filed a suit for declaration of his exclusive light to do mining operation and to use and sell the suit schedule property while in the amendment petition during the course of argument he prayed for recovery of possession and damages from the second Defendant. In the instant case, no argument, rather trial has yet started and the nature of the suit is also different. In para 5 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court while discussed regarding Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code, observed as follows: The first part of the rule makes it abundantly clear that at any stage of the proceedings, parties are free to alter or amend their pleadings as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy. However, this rule is subject to proviso appended therein. The said rule with proviso again substituted by Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 01.07.2002 makes it clear that after the commencement of the trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if the parties to the proceedings able to satisfy the court that in spite of due diligence could not raise the issue before the commencement of trial and the court satisfies their explanation, amendment can be allowed even after commencement of the trial. To put it clear, Order VI, Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings on such terms as may be just. Such amendments seeking determination of the real question of the controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. Pre-trial amendments are to be allowed liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial. Such amendments seeking determination of the real question of the controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. Pre-trial amendments are to be allowed liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial. As rightly pointed out by the High Court in the former case, the opposite party is not prejudiced because he will have an opportunity of meeting the amendment sought to be made. In the latter case, namely, after the commencement of trial particularly, after completion of the evidence, the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and in such event, it is incumbent on the part of the Court to satisfy the conditions prescribed in the proviso. 16. In the instant case, there was no other alternative to the Respondents except to file application for amendment of the plaint to meet the plea of the Petitioners. In similar situation, the Delhi High Court in the case of Mrs. Suneel Sodhi and Ors. v. M.L. Sodhi and Ors. reported in AIR 2004 Delhi 99 allowed the prayer for amendment. In that case, the suit was filed for partition and mesne profit and the Plaintiffs prayed for amendment seeking to profound wills by Defendant and the said application for amendment was filed before commencement of the trial. The Delhi High Court, in the aforesaid case, held that as the wills in question were claimed to have been discovered upon death of testator and the onus of proving said wills rested on Defendants and the Plaintiffs had the opportunity of questioning wills and raising objection as to their genuineness, as effect of wills was that it sought to deprive the Plaintiffs of their share and the said plea was not inconsistent with the plea of property being self acquired property of testators. In the instant case also the suit land sought to be partitioned is the land belonged to the predecessor-in-interest of the parties in the lis and the information regarding the execution of the registered will in favour of the husband of the Petitioners No. 1 and father of the Petitioners No. 2 and 3 had/has come to the notice of the Respondents only after filing of the written statement in the suit by the Petitioners herein. Therefore, the same cannot be overlooked by the Respondents, rather they have the right to question the genuineness of the will as the land involved in both the will and the partition suit are same and it is also a settled law that development subsequent to filing of the suit can be raised in the amendment petition. In the instant case, the Respondents wanted to include the subsequent development only in the plaint by way of amending the plaint and mere challenge of the will for declaring the same as void would not change the nature and character of the partition suit. Applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Ragu Thilak D. John (supra), particularly in para 6, it can easily be held that the amendment sought for in the instant case, could not be declined. The Petitioners nowhere in the instant petition have alleged how they have been prejudiced by the proposed amendment. 17. Regarding the question of limitation raised by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, this Court is of the considered view that the Petitioners herein can raise the said question in their additional written statement, if any, filed by them and also in the subsequent stage as the plea of limitation is a question of law. 18. In the case of Shiv Shakti (supra), the Apex Court took note of the opinion of the Law Commission relating to the provisions of Section 115 of the Code as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant para No. 12 is re-produced herein below: 12. It is interesting to note that the Law Commission of India had recommended deletion of Section 115. In the Law Commission's opinion, provisions of Section 115 are analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") and the litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire section is deleted. The Joint Committee of Parliament discussed these recommendations and only thought it proper to make certain modifications in the section. That led to amendment of Section 115 by the Old Amendment Act. The deliberations of the Committee are reflected in the following words: The Committee, however, feel that, in addition to the restrictions contained in Section 115, an overall restriction on the scope of applications for revision against interlocutory orders should be imposed. That led to amendment of Section 115 by the Old Amendment Act. The deliberations of the Committee are reflected in the following words: The Committee, however, feel that, in addition to the restrictions contained in Section 115, an overall restriction on the scope of applications for revision against interlocutory orders should be imposed. Having regard to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its 14th and 27th Reports, the Committee recommended that Section 115 of the Code should be retained subject to the modification that no revision application shall lie against an interlocutory order unless either of the following conditions is satisfied, namely; (i) that if the orders were made in favour of the applicant, it would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) that the order, if allowed to stand, is likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury. 19. In Para 14 of the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court also discussed regarding the scope of Section 115 of the Code. For better appreciation, Para 14 is reproduced herein under: 14. Section 115 is essentially a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not in any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court to approach the High Court for relief. The scope for making a revision under Section 115 is not linked with a substantive right. Ultimately, on the recommendation of the Law Commission, the legislature felt it not to delete the entire provision of Section 115 from the Code but imposed certain restrictions by way of incorporating the proviso. In view of the incorporation of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section115 of the Code, the revision petition can only be entertained when the lis would be finally decided, not against any interlocutory order. Therefore, according to this Court, the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel for the Respondents so far maintainability of revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code is concerned has some force, but the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, inter alia, that an application under Section 115 of the Code vis-a-vis Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable, is not the proper proposition of law. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel for the Respondents so far maintainability of revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code is concerned has some force, but the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, inter alia, that an application under Section 115 of the Code vis-a-vis Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable, is not the proper proposition of law. According to this Court, a petition under Section 115 of the Code vis-a-vis Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable but whether the court will exercise its power or not, that is within the discretion of the court. But in a proper case when the order of the subordinate court is either perverse or beyond the jurisdiction then the court should exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the amendment as allowed by the learned trial court vide impugned order was for the interest of justice and also to avoid multiplicity of suit between the parties and warrants no interference from this Court. 21. In view of what has been stated above, this revision petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.