JUDGMENT S. Ravindra Bhat, J.:- The petitioners invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, questioning the validity of the conditions being imposed by the ITOC (hereafter called "ITOC"), an instrumentality of State, not renewing licences (of premises), which are characterized as onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to the guidelines issued by the Central Government. They also seek orders to prevent the use of powers by the ITDC to evict genuine tenants from public premises under its control. Although the pleadings present some variants, essentially the reliefs claimed are twofold; one, to enjoin the ITOC from invoking its powers under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereafter called lithe Act") and, two, to direct it to renew the licence arrangement hitherto enjoyed by the petitioners. 2. It is averred by the petitioners that the ITDC has a policy of renewing the licence with an enhanced licence fee @ 15-20%. When they applied to the ITOC to renew their licence, the latter, allegedly arbitrarily and unreasonably agreed to renew the licence of the petitioner but at an enhanced licence fee which is @ 200- 458% times more than existing fee. The petitioners allege that ITDC has no basis for renewing the licence at such an unreasonable enhancement, and also aver that this is not the first time that the ITDC has acted discriminately and arbitrarily. 3. The petitioners are occupants/ licensees of spaces in Hotel Ashok, Hotel Janpath and Hotel Samrat, which are owned by the ITDC. They were inducted on licence basis, at different points in time. The licence arrangements were expressed in writing; those documents fixed the periods of occupation, the licence fee agreed to be paid, and the amenities which the licensees were entitled to enjoy. The spaces provided were commercial, in the form of shops, and in some cases, for office purposes. The IIDC also provided air-conditioning facility in most instances. 4. The details of the licences, periodicity, etc, as disclosed by the petitioners (in many cases they have not revealed the exact dates of occupancy, periods of renewal, etc.) are extracted in the form of a common concerning the three different hotels, with relative writ petition numbers, name of the concern, etc. 5. 4. The details of the licences, periodicity, etc, as disclosed by the petitioners (in many cases they have not revealed the exact dates of occupancy, periods of renewal, etc.) are extracted in the form of a common concerning the three different hotels, with relative writ petition numbers, name of the concern, etc. 5. The petitioners refer to a Resolution dated 30.5.2002 (hereafter called “guidelines") by.1he Central Government, Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty alleviation which indicated guidance to prevent arbitrary use of power to evict tenants from the public premises and to limit the use of powers of the Estate Officer. These guidelines were notified in the Gazette on 8.6.2002. It is alleged by the petitioners that the ITDC wrote to them, stating that it did not wish to renew the licence and that the status of the petitioners as occupiers would cease with effect from specified dates. The petitioners protested, highlighting that in most instances they were in lawful and peaceful occupation of the licensed spaces for long periods, and in a few cases for over three decades. The petitioners also informed that the space licensed were their source of livelihood and they had their business established in those places. ITDC was therefore requested to act fairly in respect of the petitioners and reconsider the matter. 6. It is alleged that in the end of August, and September 2006, ITDC while agreeing to renew the licence, however, imposed terms and conditions of renewal which were onerous, arbitrary, and such that the petitioners did not have an option to renew the licence. It is contended that the ITDC agreed to renew the licence on payment of astronomical licence fee, which amounted to an increase of over 200 to 400% as compared with the existing licence fee. The petitioners again represented to the ITDC for fair treatment, and reduction of the increase in licence fee. Instead of considering these requests reasonably, the ITDC issued notices under Sections 4 and 7 of the Act directing the petitioners to appear before the Estate Officer. It is submitted that the said notice is not in accordance with the mandate issued by Section 4 of the PP Act in that Section 4 mandates that the notice should specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. It is submitted that the said notice is not in accordance with the mandate issued by Section 4 of the PP Act in that Section 4 mandates that the notice should specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The petitioners attack the action of ITDC in agreeing to renew the / licence but at a vastly increased licence fee as unreasonable, arbitrary and unfair and violative of their right to livelihood. 7. The petitioners allege that in Hotel Ashok which is five-star hotel, the ITDC had recently renewed the licence(s) in respect of the shops in the same shopping arcade, Shop No.2, Shop No. 21 admeasruing about 160 sq. ft. the licence being renewed on March 25, 2006 @ Rs.75 per sq. ft. for the period from 1.11.2005 to 30.10.2007. They also allude to renewal of licence of another being shop Nos. 11 and 29 totally admeasuring about 529 sq. ft. the licence; the licence being renewed on March IS, 2006 for a period from 1.7.2005 to 30.6.2007, at an enhanced licence fee. of 10%. Likewise, another shop being No. 32, admeasuring 457 sq. ft is mentioned; its licence was renewed on April 20,2006 at a fee of Rs. 4,00,340/-@ 73 per sq. ft. The licence has been renewed @ 15%. Other cases of Shop Nos. 6, 9, 14 and 27 are also adverted for which licences were renewed in March 2006 @ 10-15%. It is further alleged that even in respect of fresh allotment of shop being shop No. 36 admeasuring approx. 500 sq. ft., was allotted to one HKD Laboratories on July 5,2006, at the rate of Rs. 62 per sq. ft. The licence for the said shop was granted for 3 years commencing from September I, 2006 and ending on August 31; 2009. Another shop being shop No.3 admeasuring about 345 sq. ft. was allegedly allotted on January 12,2006. The licence deed executed on November 1, 2004 was at the rate of Rs. 66/- per sq. ft. This shows that in a five star hotel, the ITDC had made fresh allotment @ Rs. 62/ - per sq. ft. The petitioners, therefore, allege that ITDC has deliberately and mala fide imposed astronomical rates as a condition for grant of fresh licence, to the petitioners. 66/- per sq. ft. This shows that in a five star hotel, the ITDC had made fresh allotment @ Rs. 62/ - per sq. ft. The petitioners, therefore, allege that ITDC has deliberately and mala fide imposed astronomical rates as a condition for grant of fresh licence, to the petitioners. They also allege that ITDC has failed to justify any reason for enhancement of the fee by 200-400% times, in the absence of any fresh improvement or renovation, or extension of new amenities or facilities. 8. It is settled law, contend the petitioners, that every action of the State or an instrumentality of State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. Actions uninformed by reason may questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The State acts in executive power in entering or not entering in contracts with individual parties. If a Government action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable. It is further submitted that if an act/ action is found to be unreasonable or unfair or irrational, this Court can look into relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. In present case there is no occasion for the Petitioners being the in an equal position to bargain, with ITDC. The petitioners should, in the existing state of affairs, either I accept the onerous, arbitrary and unreasonable terms of the IIDC or leave. Such unfair, untenable and irrational action of the ITDC is amenable to judicial review. 9. The ITDC, in its return broadly contends that the petitioners are seeking the performance of a contract under writ jurisdiction, which is not permissible under law. The relationship between the parties i.e. petitioner and respondent is governed by a licence. As such the present petition filed by the petitioner, it is contended, is not maintainable. It also contends that the petitioners approached the Court under Article 226 on the ground that they are entitled to remain in the premises as they are in occupation since last many years. They are public premises are governed by provisions of the Act. The ITDC has invoked the jurisdiction under the Act and its claims under Sections 5 and 7 of PP Act is pending before the Estate Officer. They are public premises are governed by provisions of the Act. The ITDC has invoked the jurisdiction under the Act and its claims under Sections 5 and 7 of PP Act is pending before the Estate Officer. The petitioners questioning the legality of those proceedings, it is contended is without any just and proper reason. 10. ITDC defends the offer to renew the licence at higher rates indicated to the petitioners, and states that it is demanding the market prevailing rate in the area, for which it is legitimately entitled. ITDC avers that it is a commercial establishment and duty-bound to utilize the commercial opportunities to make profits. Its hotels are at par with other private hotels. It adverts to the real estate boom and spiralling of rentals of properties multifold all around the country including the Connaught Place area, the commercial hub of Delhi. The ITDC, being a commercial establishment is also asking for the same rates. The petitioners are, it is alleged, trying to represent before this Court that the ITDC is trying to evict them from the premises during the currency of a subsisting agreement. ITDC submits that the agreements of the petitioners ended by efflux of time and they are in illegal occupation of the premises in question. Hence they are not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 11. The ITDC asserts that its decision to ask for enhanced license fee is in consonance with the guidelines. It also avers that guidelines cannot supersede the statute, i.e. the Act and does not apply, as it is applicable for tenants only. ITDC submits that the without holding a licence to remain m the premises, the petitioners do not possess the right to continue there. The initiation of proceedings under the Act, is therefore, justified. 12. ITDC denies that absence of reasons or basis for enhancing the licence fee. It claims to have, on 25.10.2006 published an advertisement in the national newspaper "The Times of India" to fill the shops and office places. In response to that the ITDC got bid offers for ranging between Rs. 225/- and Rs. 255/- sq; ft on monthly basis and it granted licences for a period of 2 years. It also denies that the increase in the licence fee is against the guidelines of Govt. of India. 13. In response to that the ITDC got bid offers for ranging between Rs. 225/- and Rs. 255/- sq; ft on monthly basis and it granted licences for a period of 2 years. It also denies that the increase in the licence fee is against the guidelines of Govt. of India. 13. As far as the contention regarding discrimination in regard to renewal of licences, and fresh licences at lower rates are concerned, the allegations have been denied by the ITDC, which states that a uniform rate of Rs. @ 220/- per sq. ft. Per month has been fixed. However utility purpose shops were given some rebate due to their nature of business. ITDC denies that it meted out unequal and discriminatory treatment to the petitioners. It alleges that mere acceptance of the licence fee during the period unauthorized possession cannot be construed as consent to remain in the premises. Contention of Counsel 14. Mr. H.L. Tikoo, learned Senior Counsel contended that it is settled law that the State and its authorities including instrumentalities of States have to be just, fair and reasonable in all their activities including those in the field of contracts. Even while playing the role of a landlord or a tenant, the State and its authorities remain so and cannot be heard or seen causing displeasure or discomfort to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that specifically in regard to the use of the Act the law is well settled; the State cannot act blindly and disregard the interests of tenants and other occupiers who are in peaceful occupation of the premises for a long period of time. He relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court, reported as Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 212 , and Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board Of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, II (2004) SLT 904= AIR 2004 SC 1815 , where the Supreme Court held that while acting in the field of contractual rights the personality of the State does not undergo such a radical change as not to require regulation of its conduct by Article 14. 15. Mr. 15. Mr. Tikoo relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1989 SC 1642 , where, the Court, while holding that the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 did not apply to local bodies or public authorities (which is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India) held that statutory power conferred for public purposes is in the nature of a trust, to be used only in the right and proper way, intended by Parliament. He submitted that the Court held that public authorities which enjoy the benefit of a different procedure for evicting licensees and tenants, without being hidebound by requirements of the Rent Control enactments and laws, must act for public benefit. In the absence of the element of fairness, recourse to provisions of the Act would be arbitrary. Therefore, the denial of licence renewal in these cases cannot be supported; it is unfair and arbitrary. 16. It was next contended that the long user of the premises by the petitioners had transformed the nature of occupation or interest in the property, into a lease. This placed a greater obligation upon the ITDC to act in a fair, just and reasonable manner, as it involved the petitioners right to carryon business and trade, a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The sudden and abrupt decision not to permit the petitioners and other similarly situated occupiers to continue in the premises (except on terms that were palpably unsupportable), constituted unreasonable inroads into their rights. The ITDC had never sought to enhance the licence fee to levels indicated in this case; it constituted anything between 200 and 450% of the existing licence fee levels. 17. Learned Counsel attacked the impugned notices as illegal and arbitrary, as they were opposed to guidelines of the Central Government, Ministry of Urban Development, dated 30th May, 2002. The ITDC had never sought to enhance the licence fee to levels indicated in this case; it constituted anything between 200 and 450% of the existing licence fee levels. 17. Learned Counsel attacked the impugned notices as illegal and arbitrary, as they were opposed to guidelines of the Central Government, Ministry of Urban Development, dated 30th May, 2002. Counsel relied on a part of the guidelines extracted below: “...2(ii) The provisions of the P.P.(E) Act, 1971 should not be resorted to either with a commercial motive or to secure vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate their own employees, where the premises were in occupation of the original tenants to whom the premises were let either by the public authorities or the persons from whom the premises were acquired. (iii) A person in occupation of any premises should not be treated or declared to be an unauthorized occupant merely on service of notice of termination of tenancy, but the fact of unauthorized occupation shall be decided by following the due procedure of law. Further, the contractual agreement shall not be wound up by taking advantage of the provisions of the P.P. (E) Act, 1971. At the same time, it will be open to the public authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provisions of the Rent Control Act in each state or to move under genuine grounds under the Rent Control Act for resuming possession. In other words, the public authorities would have rights similar to private landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with genuine legal tenants. (iv) ... The provisions under the PP (E) Act, 1971 should be used henceforth only in accordance with these guidelines. 3. These orders take immediate effect.” 18. It was submitted that in judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court can scrutinize the actions of the Government or its agencies, like ITDC, in exercise of its powers to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. It was contended that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It was contended that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. Counsel relied on the judgment reported as Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, 1995 (4) SCC 482, where the Supreme Court, after reviewing in detail several previous decisions held that actions of the State, its instrumentalities and public authorities or of persons whose actions bear insignia of public law element or public character are amenable to judicial review and that legality of such actions would be tested upon the anvil Article 14. The Court ruled that the content of public law remedy is intervention in exercise of judicial review power whereby the actions of State or its instrumentalities bearing the imprint of public interest element, can be examined. Every action, policy or even change of policy in the realm of State activity, therefore, has to be informed, fair and non-arbitrary. Counsel also relied on the judgment reported as Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 1031 . 19. It was submitted that the ITDC did not furnish any reason or rationale for its decision asking the petitioners to vacate the premises, and refusing to renew the licences. The offer made to renew it, subject to payment of astronomical amounts was unreasoned, irrational and arbitrary. Having allowed the petitioners to use the premises for considerable periods of time, and benefited from the relationship, ITDC could not transform itself into a grasping landlord, bent upon demanding unreasonable amounts from the petitioners as a condition for their using the premises. Being an instrumentality of the State, ITDC had a primary obligation to account its action to the Court, as well as the public at large. No reason was forthcoming as to why huge and unreasonable amounts were being demanded from existing licensees as pre-condition to their continuing in the premises. The action of the ITDC in purporting to take action under the Act was, for similar reasons, unjustified in law. The petitioners could not be called unauthorized occupants, at the caprice of the ITDC. No reason was forthcoming as to why huge and unreasonable amounts were being demanded from existing licensees as pre-condition to their continuing in the premises. The action of the ITDC in purporting to take action under the Act was, for similar reasons, unjustified in law. The petitioners could not be called unauthorized occupants, at the caprice of the ITDC. Counsel relied on the decision in Style Dress Land v. Union Territdty of Chandigarh, VII (1999) SLT 48=1999 (7) SCC 90. 20. Mr. Lalit Bhasin, learned Counsel appearing in WP 4903/2007 and WP 4904/2007, submitted that these petitioners had been in peaceful and lawful occupation of the premises for more than 45 years. The writ petitioner in WP 4903/2007 had rendered valuable assistance to the unit of the ITDC, i.e. Hotel Ashok, and continued in the premises through thick and thin, despite the fluctuating fortunes of the ITDC. Moreover, the petitioners had built up a reputation for credibility and reliable services, which bore association with the locale. They had always complied with the terms of the licence arrangement, and had never given any cause for complaint. In these circumstances, the ITDCs sudden action in deciding not to renew their licences, and do so on exorbitant terms, which had no bearing with existing terms was whimsical, capricious and unreasonable. 21. Learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court, reported as A.H. Wheeler & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2005 (3) ESC 1576 in support of the argument that in such a case, where the existing licensee is sought to be displaced due to ostensible policy change, the executive agency has to be alive to the background of the services rendered by such trader or licensee, and not disturb the arrangement, without exploring whether he can be accommodated. He also relied on the judgments reported as Delhi Outdoor Advertisers Association v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 63 (1996) DLT 4 and Raj Restaurant v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1982 (3) SCC 338 . It was also urged that the Court should take note of the relative unequal bargaining position between the parties, which would directly and substantially affect the petitioners livelihood. 22. Mr. Jagdeep Kishore, learned Counsel, appearing in WP 7273 and WP 7279 of 2007 adopted the submissions of Mr. Tikoo and Mr. Bhasin. It was also urged that the Court should take note of the relative unequal bargaining position between the parties, which would directly and substantially affect the petitioners livelihood. 22. Mr. Jagdeep Kishore, learned Counsel, appearing in WP 7273 and WP 7279 of 2007 adopted the submissions of Mr. Tikoo and Mr. Bhasin. He urged that the policy and guidelines of 2002 are a continuation of the previous policies of 1992 that genuine tenants should not be evicted through provisions of the Act. In addition, Counsel urged that the ITDC appeared to be dictated only by profit motive, regardless of the nature of the space occupied by the licensees. In some cases, the trades plied were small compared to the magnitude of turnover of the shops and commercial establishments. For instance, the licensees now sought to be evicted from spaces in Hotel Ashok and Janpath included florists, tobacconist, pharmacist, jewellers; the spaces in question were air-conditioned as well as non-air conditioned. In the absence of a thought out policy to treat and respect these differences, the ITDC was adamantly pursuing profit, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 23. Mr. Dheeraj Malhotra, Counsel appearing in WP 16582/2006 submitted that the licensee-petitioner had occupied the premises since 1980; it was being renewed from time-to-time. He submitted that as in past instances, when the question of renewal cropped up in 2006, meetings were held with the committee empowered in that regard. He relied on the 1 minutes of the meeting dated 30.6.2006 and 1.7.2006 to say that the committee was favourable and recommended renewal. Under the circumstances, the ITDC could not have gone back, without any reason; in any case the petitioner was not communicated formally that renewal was denied. Counsel submitted that in these circumstances, the decision not to permit the petitioner to continue, and initiate proceedings under the Act were arbitrary and unreasonable. 24. Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel urged that the guide-lines relied upon are inapplicable in cases where the corporation or PSU owning the premises, like the ITDC is in the business of hospitality where a significant part of the activity includes renting out commercial premises. He submitted that the nature of relief sought in this case cannot be obtained by the petitioners in civil law, as no direction or decree to specifically enforce a contract or agreement which is determinable in character can be issued. He submitted that the nature of relief sought in this case cannot be obtained by the petitioners in civil law, as no direction or decree to specifically enforce a contract or agreement which is determinable in character can be issued. He relied on the decisions reported as Indian Oil Corporation v. Amritsar Gas, 1991 (1) SCC 533 and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Srinam Narain, IV (2002) SLT 334= AIR 2002 SC 2598 . 25. Learned Counsel submitted that the argument that the petitioners licences enlarged into something more is untenable and has to be rejected. All the petitioners were allowed to occupy the premises as licensees; their status did not change in any manner whatsoever. The arrangement was one whereby the occupant was placed in permissive possession. The licensor could terminate the arrangement at any point of time. Counsel submitted that no rule, regulation or guideline supports the theory of enlargement of such restricted right (of a licensee into a lessee). ITDC is a state agency, and bound to operate within the confines of its mandate. It could not, without any policy formulation have granted larger than licence rights to the petitioners; they cannot support such pleadings, because setting up of an oral understanding is not only unfeasible, but cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. 26. Learned Counsel submitted that the ITDC took a conscious decision not to renew the licences which had ended, or were about to end. Instead, it was of the view that since commercial space, in Hotel Janpath, which is in the heart of the city, and in Hotel Ashok, one of the premier locales in Delhi, should be henceforth given out on licence basis at market rates, after following due procedure by advertising. Though most of the petitioners licences had ended, and they were allowed to continue on existing licences, or payment of enhanced licence fees according to mutual arrangement, the ITDC, having regard to their past occupation, decided to offer them the choice of continuing in the premises, without applying through tender provided they paid the market rates. It was contended that there was nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or objectionable in such proposal. The petitioners, having enjoyed the premises; in many cases, for decades together, and prospered in their business, should be willing to pay such market rates, for continuing in such premium locations. It was contended that there was nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or objectionable in such proposal. The petitioners, having enjoyed the premises; in many cases, for decades together, and prospered in their business, should be willing to pay such market rates, for continuing in such premium locations. In most cases, the spaces occupied by them were air-conditioned and the licence fee paid by them, fractional compared to what is paid by similar establishments in other nearby hotels. 27. Learned Counsel relied upon the file and nothings of ITDC to say that the decision not to allow existing occupants to continue on the same terms, was taken consciously and with due deliberation. Copies of the file and nothings were produced before the Court. It was submitted that the existing policy was reviewed at ITDCs highest quarters, in the end of June, 2006, when it was decided to evict the occupiers whose licences had ended, and were about to expire. This was based on preparation and examination of all the existing occupants, with their tenures, and terms and conditions. The Managing Director, who required compilation of all material, after considering it, on 20th July, 2006, directed notices to be issued to such licensees, and later approved the draft notice issued to the occupiers. Later, in respect of Hotel Janpath, 25 occupiers, including the petitioners were identified; they were served eviction notices. Thereafter, the office spaces were advertised; out of five, four offers were received, in regard to Janpath the highest was for Rs. 198/- per square foot per month. 28. Learned Counsel submitted that the offers made to occupiers, including the petitioners, to continue in the premises, in Hotel Janpath, provided they paid Rs. 220/- per month per square foot. In the event of their failure to vacate the premises, the ITDC proposed to recover damages with effect from 1st August, 2006. 29. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court, reported as Ashoka Marketing v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 and Kaiser-i-Hind v. National Textile Corporation, V (2002) SLT 555= 2002 (8) SCC 182 , and submitted that the powers under the Act are of wide amplitude and should not be artificially curtailed. He submitted that the definition of public premises is wide in import; it advisedly does not refer to any form of arrangement; the occupier may be a lessee or a licensee. He submitted that the definition of public premises is wide in import; it advisedly does not refer to any form of arrangement; the occupier may be a lessee or a licensee. The object of the enactment is to enable the public agency, i.e. the lessor or licensor to get back the premises, it owns, with expedition. Counsel submitted that the guidelines of 2002 cannot be construed as fettering the power of IIDC, having regard to the nature of its activities. The advertence to "genuine tenants" has, in any case, to be strictly confined to those who are tenants within the meaning of that expression as is commonly understood. It cannot be stretched to include licensees who wish to continue indefinitely in the premises, to the disadvantage of the public agency. Counsel submitted that allowing the petitioners relief in these proceedings would necessarily mean that they would enjoy profits and acquire wealth by using public property. 30. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions reported as Uttam Prakash Bansal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 100 (2002) DLT 497, for the submission that these guidelines cannot restrict bona fide invocation of powers under the Act. He further submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1994 (Suppl 3) SCC 694, where the Court ruled that the scope and amplitude of the definition "public premises" under Section 2(g) could not be cut down by reading into it conditions spelt out in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court, Counsel contended, held that the owner of premises, including a public authority like the ITDC was entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. Therefore, the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation, as in this case. 31. Learned Counsel submitted that though the scope of judicial review is wide, it does not include the right to review executive policy, as an appellate body. The ITDC in its wisdom decided that licence arrangements which had ended, and which were about to end, could not be continued; later it offered such licensees the choice of continuing on higher licence fees, which had co-relation with the market rates. The decision was bona fide, non-arbitrary and did not conflict with any statutory provision or regulation. It was, therefore, neither discriminatory nor unfair. The decision was bona fide, non-arbitrary and did not conflict with any statutory provision or regulation. It was, therefore, neither discriminatory nor unfair. The Court, Counsel contended, should desist from interfering in these circumstances. 32. Mr. Ajay Kapur, learned Counsel appeared on behalf of ITDC so far as its decision in relation to licences in Hotel Ashok, were concerned. He too, urged that there was no arbitrariness or unfairness in the decision to not renew the licence arrangements, some of which had ended long ago. Learned Counsel relied on the noting of the Managing Director, dated 30th June, 2006 requiring a fact sheet about each licensed premises, for which the arrangement had ended, and the analysis of area, rate paid, etc. A copy of the chart so made and submitted was also disclosed to the Court. On the basis of this analysis, the Managing Director said that wherever the licence had ended, and wherever the arrangement was to end that year, the licences were not to be renewed. Based on these directions, a list was prepared on 22.7.2006, containing a list of 18 licensees - 10 shops and 8 rooms, where the agreements had ended mostly by 30th September, 2006, or earlier. The instructions given were clear; wherever the licences had ended, the occupier had to leave; where the licences subsisted, notice to quit was given. The licensees, i.e. the petitioners were given notice that ITDC did not wish to renew the licences, and asked to quit the premises within 30 days of receipt of notice. The notices were issued in first week of October, 2006. It was submitted that later letters were addressed to the occupiers, offering to grant fresh licence, if they were willing to pay Rs. 250/- per square foot per month. It was submitted that this was not a fanciful or whimsical rate, but based on the offers received pursuant to advertisement. ITDC contended that this was a realistic valuation of the licence fee realizable for the premises, based on what other hotels were charging as well as the offers received and acted on by ITDC itself. Reliance was placed on the licence deeds entered into with M/s. Hyundai and M/s. Posco, for Rs. 255/- per month in respect of premises in Hotel Samrat, which is adjacent to Hotel Ashok, and has the same locational advantages. 33. Mr. Reliance was placed on the licence deeds entered into with M/s. Hyundai and M/s. Posco, for Rs. 255/- per month in respect of premises in Hotel Samrat, which is adjacent to Hotel Ashok, and has the same locational advantages. 33. Mr. Kapoor submitted that the ITDC has to act to achieve its objectives. Although many occupiers had been in possession of the premises for long, yet, their occupation could not fructify into anything more than a mere licensee; the ITDC never held out any promise that such would be the case. Further, the duty to act fairly, it was submitted, did not mean that ITDC as a public body, engaged in hospitality business, had to place itself under onerous disadvantage as compared with its competitors. It could validly claim market rates for commercial premises, meant to be given primarily on hire. 34. The sequence of events traced above shows that the petitioners occupied commercial premises, owned by the ITDC in its hotels, i.e. Ashok Samrat and Janpath. Some of these premises are not air-conditioned; others are. Many petitioners continued to occupy the premises, where their businesses thrived, for long periods - more than three decades, in a few instances. The original terms yielded to new terms, whenever the licence period ended; the increase in licence fee was by all accounts, not steep; it had some co-relation -usually 10% to 20% to the existing monthly license fee. Yet, other conditions remained the same; the arrangement continued to be a licence, whereby the ITDC retained to itself the right to renew the licence or discontinue it. There is no dispute that the petitioners arrangement either ended or were about to end, in 2006. In many cases, the petitioners were allowed to occupy the premises, despite no formal renewal of the licence. 35. In the end of June, 2006, the Managing Director of ITDC noted that several shop and commercial premises owned by the corporation were fetching low returns; he desired detailed information. The copies of official files made available to Court show that after his initial observation, detailed tables showing the licensees, areas, amounts being paid, duration of licence, etc. were made available. In respect of all hotels, the Managing Director decided that licensees should be asked to vacate, wherever the licences had ended, or given notices, wherever the licences were to end. that year. were made available. In respect of all hotels, the Managing Director decided that licensees should be asked to vacate, wherever the licences had ended, or given notices, wherever the licences were to end. that year. This was acted upon; notices were given to all classes of occupiers, in Hotel Ashok, Hotel Samrat and Hotel Janpath. The petitioners represented, against the notices protesting that they would be gravely affected since they had occupied the premises for such long periods. Later, ITDC offered to allow the petitioners to stay on provided they agreed to pay much higher licence fee. This, it is contended by the petitioners, is utterly arbitrary; the ITDC counters by saying that the rates demanded are based on its realistic estimate of the market rents for similar premises. 36. The preceding discussion, in the opinion of the Court, raises the following questions for decision: (1) Applicability of the guidelines of 2002; (2) Is the decision to not renew the petitioners licences arbitrary; (3) Are the fresh terms offered to the petitioners for grant of licence, unreasonable and arbitrary. Question No. 1 37. The definition of public premises in Section 2(e) of the Act is cast in the widest terms; it includes premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a company, as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one percent of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government as well as premises belonging to or taken• on lease by or on behalf of any corporation (not being a company, as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act in 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned and controlled by the Central Government. IIDC clearly falls within the description of such a company; the premises in question therefore are public premises. The Act contains provisions to evict occupants who have overstayed their period of licence or lease, and have become unlawful occupants. IIDC clearly falls within the description of such a company; the premises in question therefore are public premises. The Act contains provisions to evict occupants who have overstayed their period of licence or lease, and have become unlawful occupants. Unauthorized occupation is defined by Section 2(g) as follows: "(g) unauthorised occupation, relation to any public premises, means the occupant on by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." Certain additional provisions, providing for offences and penalties (Section 11), recovery of rent, etc. as arrears of land revenue (Section 14) and bar of jurisdiction of Courts (Section 15) have been enacted. 38. Now, if the statute clothes an authority with wide powers, as in this case, to take action under the Act, upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions, requisite for exercise of its functions, can this Court, exercising judicial review, prevent it from doing so, on application of the guidelines issued by the Government. Undeniably, all power has to be exercised to further goals for which they are conferred, in a non-arbitrary, bona fide, and non-discriminatory manner. Judicial review is available as a corrective remedy for all state action, even in the contractual field. The question, therefore, is whether the guidelines relied upon by the petitioner can restrict application of the Act and whether further proceedings before the Estate Officer are barred in law or arbitrary. 39. Right from 1971, the Supreme Court has examined, through three Constitution and Larger Bench rulings (Hari Singh & Others v. The Military Estate Officer, 1973 (001) SCR 515; Ashoka Marketing (supra) and Kaiser-i-Hind (supra», the Constitutional validity of provisions of the Act. In each decision, the challenge to the procedure prescribed under the Act, the legislative competence of Parliament, coverage of the Act to premises by virtue of an amendment, etc were turned down. Other incidental questions raising challenge to the procedure, like the Estate Officer being a judge of his own cause (since he is usually an employee or official of the public sector corporation), repugnancy with local statutes, etc. too have been negatived [Ref. Other incidental questions raising challenge to the procedure, like the Estate Officer being a judge of his own cause (since he is usually an employee or official of the public sector corporation), repugnancy with local statutes, etc. too have been negatived [Ref. Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India & Ors., 1988 (4) SCC 324 ; Delhi Financial Corpn. and Another v. Rajiv Anand and Ors., VI (2005) SLT 290= 2004 (11) SCC 625 ]. 40. The applicability of provisions of the Act to all premises, especially commercial premises was underlined in Ashoka Marketing; the Court also negatived the argument that an occupant or tenant, lawfully brought into possession, but even continuing after expiry of his lease or licence, was not an "unauthorized occupant". It held as follows: "28. We are also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of public premises would render the Public Premises Act as violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution or right to freedom to carryon any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. As indicated in the statement of Objects and Reasons the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz. making available, for use, public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The need to provide speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot be confined to premises used of residential purposes. There is no reason to assume that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorized occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises. No distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorized occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit. 29. Shri A. K. Ganguli, has urged that a person who was put in occupation of the premises as a tenant and who has continued in such occupation after the expiry or the termination of his tenancy cannot be regarded as a person in unauthorised occupation tmder Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. The submission of Shri Ganguli is that, the occupation of a person who was put in possession as a tenant is juridical possession and such an occupation cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation. In support of this submission, Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier K. K. Verma v. Union of India, ( AIR 1954 Bom 358 : 56 Bom LR 308) which has been approved by this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, ( (1968) 2 SCR 203 : AIR 1968 SC 620 ). 30. The definition of the expression unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In the first part the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupation which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. The second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The words "whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law." 41. The Supreme Court has ruled in some decisions that guidelines and administrative instructions can supplement, not supplant the law and statutory provisions State of U.P. & Ors. v. Daulat Ram Gupta, II (2002) SLT 743= 2002 (4) SCC 98 ; Dr. S.K. Kacker v. All India Institute Of Medical Sciences, 1996 (10) SCC 734 ; and the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, 1993 (4) SCC 727 ). In Daulat Ram Gupta (supra) the Supreme Court held that the power to issue guidelines cannot control the manner of use of statutory power, or its discretion. This view has been adopted by a Division Bench of this Court, in Uttam Parkash Bansal & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors., 100 (2002) DLT 497. The Court dealt with applicability of the same, 2002 guidelines to eviction proceedings, under the Act, and ruled that such guidelines or instructions could be issued only if there is no statute or statutory rules. The Court relied on Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. v. R.D. Degaonkar & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 166 . The Court dealt with applicability of the same, 2002 guidelines to eviction proceedings, under the Act, and ruled that such guidelines or instructions could be issued only if there is no statute or statutory rules. The Court relied on Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. v. R.D. Degaonkar & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 166 . One well known principle of administrative law also is that guidelines can only assist in the exercise of statutory power, but cannot fetter discretion lawfully vested with the authority [Ref. Indian Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1975 (2) SCC 414 ]. 42. In this case, though the petitioners had suggested that the long occupation of premises enlarged their rights, no attempt was made to prove it through reference to any law, rule or regulation. Therefore, the Court concludes that their status continued as licensees, entitled to occupy the premises so long as the arrangement was mutually acceptable. This meant that once the tenure or period ended, unless renewed, the licensees could not lay claim over the property; the licences do not say so. 43. The guidelines of 2002 no doubt are meant to channelize use of provisions of the Act. They were issued by the Ministry of Urban Development. No doubt, they generally deal with the procedure to be adopted to evict tenants. Yet, it would not be possible for this Court to conclude, as the petitioners suggest, that such general guidelines are applicable to all situations. So read, the purpose of enacting special provisions to deal with public premises would be rendered redundant and virtually the Court would be decreeing its repeal. The guidelines cannot be read as undermining the powers enacted by Parliament, and the consequences enjoined by the definition of "unauthorized occupant" under the Act. In this case, the ITDC had undeniably given the spaces for commercial use which clearly fall within the sweep of the Act, according to the holding in Ashoka Marketing (supra). The licensing of such commercial space is an integral and essential part of the hospitality and hotel business which the ITDC engages itself in. Therefore, it is not as if the letting was an incidental or isolated activity; it is and continues to be a part of the business of ITDC. Inferring that the guidelines bind the ITDC to not evict its licensees, would be to undermine its activities and perhaps even existence. Therefore, it is not as if the letting was an incidental or isolated activity; it is and continues to be a part of the business of ITDC. Inferring that the guidelines bind the ITDC to not evict its licensees, would be to undermine its activities and perhaps even existence. Being in the hotel and hospitality business, the ITDC can be placed under no additional burden them any other organization or entity carrying on its activity. Any other conclusion would erode the viability of ITDC. 44. In these circumstances, it is held that the guidelines of 2002 do not apply to the.ITDC in cases like the present one, where letting or licensing premises is an essential part of its activity. This finding is in line with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jiwan Dass (supra) and Ashoka Marketing. The Court cannot read into the statute any additional fetter, by the interpretive process suggested on behalf of the petitioners. Question No.2 45. Unguided discretion is perceived as potentially capable of abuse. The attempt of judicial review, therefore, is to evolve standards of accountability which act as corrective to administrative excesses. Non-arbitrariness and fairness have, therefore been highlighted as unalterable principles of absolute application, in public governance of this country, by the State and its instrumentalities. Yet, whenever a challenge to state action is mounted, the facts usually determine whether the complaint is legitimate. If the rights involved are fundamental personal liberties, the standard of scrutiny is high. However, if economic and commercial functioning of the State or its agency is involved, the Courts, while exercising judicial review powers, tread with caution. Thus, from Tata Cellular v. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 651 , onwards till the recent decisions in Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, I (2007) CLT 251 (SC)=II (2007) SLT 341= (2007) 2 SCC 588 , have emphasized that judicial review is scrutiny of the decision making process, its fairness, appreciation of relevant factors and eschewing of the irrelevant, conformity to binding statutory provisions and absence of mala fides. The Court also does not possess the discretion, power and wherewithal to make a choice of the appropriate policy to be pursued by the executive; equally it cannot second guess the merits of the policy decision. 46. The state, like any other organization possesses a degree of flexibility while functioning in its administrative and commercial activities. The Court also does not possess the discretion, power and wherewithal to make a choice of the appropriate policy to be pursued by the executive; equally it cannot second guess the merits of the policy decision. 46. The state, like any other organization possesses a degree of flexibility while functioning in its administrative and commercial activities. This was expressed in Directorate of Education & Ors., Petitioner v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd., 110 (2004) DLT 311 (SC)=II (2004) BC 386 (SC)=II (2004) SLT 540= 2004 (4) SCC 19 in the following terms: "It has clearly been held in these decisions that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny the same being in the realm of contract. That the government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The Courts would interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory mala fide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The Courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The Courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide." Similarly, in an earlier decision, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, held in Life Insurance Corporation Ltd. v. Escorts Ltd., 1986 (1) SCC 264 that when the State or its instrumentality ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. The Court also held that there is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder. 47. Here, the petitioners had been in occupation of public premises, licensed to them, undoubtedly for a long time. Also, the original licences had been extended, with some variation in the licence fee; in most instances, the increase had been 10-20% over the previously agreed fee. 47. Here, the petitioners had been in occupation of public premises, licensed to them, undoubtedly for a long time. Also, the original licences had been extended, with some variation in the licence fee; in most instances, the increase had been 10-20% over the previously agreed fee. In end June, 2006, the ITDC reviewed the position of licences which had expired, and were to expire later that year. Having regard to the licence fee and location of the units, in the two hotels, initially a decision not to allow the licensees to continue, since the amounts paid were low, was taken. Later, the licensees were given the offer to continue, provided they paid the market rates. 48. As this Court sees, the Constitution does not expect the State or its agencies to enter into trading ventures, or commercial relationships with their hands tied behind their back; so long as the decisions are apparently bona fide, within the bounds of law, backed by reason and taken for relevant considerations, the Court cannot impose some onerous and additional obligations which would defeat the object of their entering into commerce. Owning commercial space, as the ITDC undoubtedly does, the Court cannot expect it to continue the licensing arrangements so as to subsidise private venture whose purpose is the pursuit of private profit, by allowing low cost licensed public accommodation. Even if such objective did manifest at some point of time, the law does not oblige the ITDC to continue conferring such largesse indefinitely to the same set of licensees or allottees. In famshed Hormusji Wadia (supra) the Supreme Court held that: "18. In our opinion, in the field of contracts the State and its instrumentalities ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. They can augment their resources but the object should be to serve the public cause and to do public good by resorting to fair and reasonable methods. The State and its instrumentalities, as the landlords, have .the liberty of revising the rates of rent so as to compensate themselves against loss caused by inflationary tendencies. They can and rather must also save themselves from negative balances caused by the cost of maintenance, and payment of taxes and costs of administration. The State, as landlord, need not necessarily be a benevolent and good charitable Samaritan. They can and rather must also save themselves from negative balances caused by the cost of maintenance, and payment of taxes and costs of administration. The State, as landlord, need not necessarily be a benevolent and good charitable Samaritan. The felt need for expanding or stimulating its own activities or other activities in the public interest having once arisen the State need not hold its hands from seeking eviction of its lessees. However, the State cannot be seen to be indulging in rack-renting, profiteering and indulging in whimsical or unreasonable evictions or bargains." The decision cannot, therefore, in the Courts opinion be characterized as arbitrary; the ITDC was within its rights to expect higher returns. 49. One of the arguments made on behalf of the petitioners was that the impugned action was discriminatory since the ITDC had entered into licence arrangements with other specified units, and agreed to accept much lower amounts. The petitioners primarily pointed at such instances in Hotel Ashok. The ITDC has countered the allegation and contended that these arrangements were finalized, before the impugned decision was taken in July 2006. This Court is of the opinion that the record supports its contention. The decision to evict the existing occupants whose licence arrangements had ended, took place in July, 2006. The instances pointed out are of those where licences had just been granted before the decision, in March and even in June, 2006. The policy of the ITDC was apparently to not renew the licences which were to end in 2006; later it was altered and occupants were given the choice of fresh licence terms upon their paying market rates, which were unacceptable. Circumstantially, the two sets of occupants were different. Those in whose favout ITDC is accused to have discriminated, clearly entered into agreed relationships before the impugned policy decision. They could not be compared with the cases of the petitioners, whose licences had ended, or wherever existing, were about to expire in 2006. A policy change cannot be faulted on the ground that it accounts for such differences; had it not done so, perhaps the ITDC would have been accused of treating unequals equally, which too is an actionable vice. A policy change cannot be faulted on the ground that it accounts for such differences; had it not done so, perhaps the ITDC would have been accused of treating unequals equally, which too is an actionable vice. The argument of the petitioners about the unequal bargaining position of parties, can at best regarded as rhetorical; all the petitioners are occupying spaces in premier locales, including a five star hotel; the premises include air conditioned spaces. They willingly entered into licence relationships with the ITDC; they are also using the premises for profit. Nothing in these facts suggests that the parties were of unequal bargaining position. If the petitioners were allowed to use these premises at less than market rates for long periods, and are now asked to pay that, they cannot compel the owner of these premises, i.e. ITDC to continue there, on the same terms. No public law right, or civil law obligation can be pressed into service, in support of this submission. 50. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the answer to Question No.2 too must be in favour of the impugned order; it cannot be declared as arbitrary. Question No.3 51. There is a body of case law that though every aspect of administrative decision making is open to judicial scrutiny for enforcement of standards of fairplay and non-arbitrariness, in matters of rate, cost or price fixation, the agency is allowed greater leeway; its judgments, as long as they conform to the basic rules of fairplay and do not show mala fides, will not be minutely examined. In fiscal and financial matters, similarly, the States legislative and policy judgments are attached greater weight; the Constitution permits a liberal classification of goods, services and objects of taxation and matters to be dealt with. This was explained as follows in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Chairman, Bihar State Electricity Board, 1984 Supp SCC 16: "Some of the appellants have endeavoured to persuade us to go into the minutest details of the mechanism of the tariff fixation effected by the Board in an endeavour to demonstrate in relation thereto that a factor here or a factor there which ought to have been taken into account has been ignored. We have declined to go into those factors which are really in the nature of matters of price fixation policy and the Court will be exceeding its jurisdiction if it is to embark upon a scrutiny of matters of this kind which are essentially in the domain of the executive to determine, subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations." Though stated broadly, the above formulation holds good even today; it was echoed in a later, larger five-Judge decision of the Supreme Court in a slightly different context of statutory zoning and price fixation mechanism for sugar, in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 in the following terms: "57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The Court does not supplant the "feel of the expert" by its own views. When the Legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works: (SCC p. 479, para 4)" ... the Court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an income tax officer. The Court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The Court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination. 58. Price fixation is not within the province of the Courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by the concerned authority. As stated by Justice Cardozo in Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company v. United States of America: The structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment which the Commission by training and experience is qualified to form.... It is not the province of a Court to absorb this function to itself.... As stated by Justice Cardozo in Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company v. United States of America: The structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment which the Commission by training and experience is qualified to form.... It is not the province of a Court to absorb this function to itself.... The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body." 52. The declaration of law in the above cases was no doubt in the context of statutory price determination. Yet, the principles set out are no less applicable in other kinds of price or tariff fixation; it would also apply to instances where the state agency wishes to let out property. The factors required to determine what constitutes a fair market return may include the locational advantages of the premises, the amenities offered and available; the peculiar use to which they can be put; and the rate payable by a willing licen.see. There can be no "general" rate; yet, market driven considerations, such as rates prevailing at the time in the vicinity for similar premises, of like advantages would inevitably dictate the rent or fee. ITDC in this case appears to have been influenced by the offers received by it on its advertisement to the general public, as well as the prevailing rate in another star hotel, Hotel Nikoo, at the relevant time (in relation to rates determined at Ashok). The fact that such rates were acceptable to at least three other parties, is evidenced by licence deeds entered into subsequently concerning premises in Hotel Samrat. Even otherwise, the Court cannot delve into the matter, on the merits. On an overall conspectus of the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the procedure adopted in fixing the licence fee, offered to the petitioners cannot be faulted with; it is neither arbitrary nor unfair. This question is answered accordingly. 53. In view of the above findings, the reliefs claimed in these petitions cannot be granted. The petitioners were granted interim relief, subject to their paying Rs. 140/- per square foot as damages/licence fee, without prejudice to the parties contentions. Since the petitioners are disentitled to any relief, those orders too cannot be continued. All writ petitions and pending applications are consequently dismissed. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their costs. The petitioners were granted interim relief, subject to their paying Rs. 140/- per square foot as damages/licence fee, without prejudice to the parties contentions. Since the petitioners are disentitled to any relief, those orders too cannot be continued. All writ petitions and pending applications are consequently dismissed. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their costs. Writ Petition dismissed.