JUDGMENT S. Ravindra Bhat, J. 1. The Petitioner seeks direction to modify terms and conditions of a provisional letter of allotment issued on 16.10.2000 by the Delhi Development Authority, Respondent (hereafter called ``DDA`) with a consequential direction to the DDA to allot it 3 acres of land and charge rates prevailing as on 15.9.1997 with a further direction for quashing of the letter dated 22.8.2003. 2. The facts necessary for deciding this case are that the writ petitioner a Registered Society applied for allotment of land for the purpose of a Technical College to the DDA on 23.6.1994. The Petitioner avers about excellence of its institutions and of having established the Agra Institute of Technology at Jia Sarai in 1992 in rented premises. It claims that the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) informed the DDA on 4.7.1995 about approval to the Petitioner?s, in regard to the Aditya Institute of Technology (as the Agra Institute of Technology was re-named later); the letter also requested confirmation about allotment of land. The Petitioner contends that on 16.8.1996 the Directorate of Training and Technical Institution, Govt. of NCT of Delhi (hereafter called ?the Directorate?) granted sponsorship and requested DDA to allot it three acres of land. It alleges that the DDA delayed the issue and informed more than a year later that the land of its choice was unavailable and that the land in rural area with semi-public facility could be considered for allotment. The Petitioner further states that through letters dated 3.2.1997 and 8.3.1997 it requested the DDA to allot land in the Dwarka Institutional Area. It brought to the notice of the DDA that AICTE provisional recognition was conditional upon the Petitioner using permanent infrastructure within three years. The DDAs Institutional Allotment Committee, through a Resolution dated 15.9.1997 recommended that land in Dwarka should be allotted to the Petitioner according to the prevailing Master Plan norms. The Petitioner alleges that in spite of the recommendation and intervention of the Union Urban Development Minister an allotment letter was not issued by the DDA. It thereforee sought directions through a writ petition preferred on the file of this Court i.e CW No. 4020/2000. That writ petition was disposed of on 9.8.2000 with a direction to the DDA to issue the allotment-cum-demand letter within two months. It thereforee sought directions through a writ petition preferred on the file of this Court i.e CW No. 4020/2000. That writ petition was disposed of on 9.8.2000 with a direction to the DDA to issue the allotment-cum-demand letter within two months. On 16.10.2000 the DDA issued a provisional letter informing it that plot of 8016.135 sq.mtrs was allotted in Sector-3, Dwarka for the purposes of a Technical College @ of Rs. 50 lakhs plus 120 % enhance per acre with annual ground rent @ 2.5% per annum of the total premium. The Petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 2.24 Crores within 60 days. On receipt of the letter the Petitioner wrote to the DDA on 22.10.2000 pointing out that the land was insufficient for establishing a technical college as minimum 3 acres of land was necessary. 3. In tune with the request, the Petitioner about having written to the DDA for allotment of 3 acres of land on several occasions, by letters dated 5.12.2000, 29.1.2001, 7.4.2001, 2.8.2001, 1.11.2001, 25.1.2002, 27.2.2002 and 4.7.2002. The Petitioner also requested that the land rates prevailing as in 1971 when its case was recommended should be applied. The Petitioner alleges that the DDA did not respond at all. Consequently left with no option, it filed another writ petition i.e. WP No. 4236/2002. It is alleged that on 4.8.2003 a statement was made on behalf of the DDA that a decision had been taken in regard to the petitioners representations some time back though it was not communicated to it. The Writ petition was thereforee disposed of on an assurance by the DDA that its decision would be made known to the Petitioner within two weeks. This Court accordingly dismissed the writ Petition No. 4236/2002; yet reserving liberty to the Petitioner to challenge the decision on such grounds as may be permissible in law. 4. In tune with the DDA statement, communicated its decision regarding allotment of one more acre and on 22.8.2003 declined the request in the following terms: Sir, With reference to your letter dated 9.10.2000 on the subject noted above, I am directed to inform you that your request for allotment of land for 1 acre has been examined but it is regretted to say that the same cannot be acceded to. 5. 5. After the Petitioner preferred the present proceeding in 2003, inter alia, questioning the allotment letter and its terms, it moved applications for disclosure of facts and also brining on record additional facts and grounds pertaining to allotments based on land rates prevailing at the time of recommendation to other Institutions. Later , in CM No. 2497/2006 it also relied upon internal documents and nothings of the DDA that the original proposal was to allot 3.5 hactres of land to the Petitioner which was deliberately reduced to less than two acres. These facts were consolidated in the form of an amended petition. It is averred that the initial recommendation for allotment of a larger area and imposition of rates prevailing in the year 2000 as opposed to the land rates which ought to have been recovered, prevailing in the year 1997 rendered the DDAs decision arbitrary and unsustainable in law. It alludes to allotments made by DDA to other Institutions such as Gagan Education Society which was allotted 4 acres in Geeta Colony on 5.4.1999; Lord Krishna Education Society being allotted 4 acres in Sector-23, Rohini and one Shishu Nav Nirman Education Society being allotted 4 acres of land in Dwarka. On these grounds it is urged that the DDAs refusal to allot any more land is discriminatory. .6. In its return, DDA relies upon the terms of the allotment letter dated 16.10.2000 which required the Petitioner to pay Rs. 2.24 crores within 60 days. The relevant part of the said allotment letter reads as follows: 1. That the allottee Aditya Institute of Technology will be required to pay provisional premium of land measuring 8061.135 sq.mtr. @ 50 lacs +120% enhance per acre with annual ground rent @2.5% per annum of the total premium. The revision of rates of land is under consideration of Central Govt. The allottee shall have to pay premium for the land as per determined by the Central Government under Rule 5 of DDA (Developed Nazul Land) Rules 1981, and with the time demanded by the DDA. The rates of land determined by Central Government shall be binding upon the allottee shall not be called in question by it in any proceedings. 2. If the above terms and conditions are acceptable the acceptance thereof with attested undertaking be sent to the undersigned along with the demand draft for Rs. 2,24,58,482/- documental charges Rs. 45.00 (Premium Rs. The rates of land determined by Central Government shall be binding upon the allottee shall not be called in question by it in any proceedings. 2. If the above terms and conditions are acceptable the acceptance thereof with attested undertaking be sent to the undersigned along with the demand draft for Rs. 2,24,58,482/- documental charges Rs. 45.00 (Premium Rs. 2,19,10,670.00, Ground Rent Rs. 5,47,767.00 in favor of DDA within 60 days from the date of issue of demand-cum-allotment letter. The said amount can also be deposited in the bank counter situated in IN a office complex land copy of the same may be sent to this office for having deposited the same and along with the acceptance letter, undertaking within 60 days from the date of issue of demand-cum- allotment letter dated 16.10.2000. 3. The payment and the acceptance letter with the required document must be sent within 60 days. Interest at the rate of 18% shall be chargeable for the delay period up to 6 months of issue of this letter. After completion of 6 months from the date of issue of demand letter, allotment shall be automatically cancelled. If the society has made the partial payment, after 6 months from issue of demand letter, the Society have to re- apply for allotment. 7. The DDA alleges that the Petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the allotment and did not deposit any amount; accordingly the allotment was automatically cancelled. It also contends that the DDA (Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981 have been amended in the meantime in 2005. In terms of the amendment lands can be only purchased through auction or tender notice and are not subject to allotment. The DDA contends that the Petitioner cannot claim allotment of 3 acres merely on the strength of its application. According to it, recommendations and file nothings do not confer any right. Refuting the contention of discrimination the DDA argues that the allotment to those societies were based on the peculiar facts of each case. It further avers that some of those allotments have been since cancelled. 8. Mr. Aseem Mehrotra submitted that the Petitioner has been thwarted in its just attempt to secure allotment of adequate land by delay in action and distortion of facts by DDA. He contended that even though the Institutional Allotment Committee recommended its case, the DDA did not act upon it. 8. Mr. Aseem Mehrotra submitted that the Petitioner has been thwarted in its just attempt to secure allotment of adequate land by delay in action and distortion of facts by DDA. He contended that even though the Institutional Allotment Committee recommended its case, the DDA did not act upon it. Moreover, the DDA also in a malafide manner circumvented the recommendation as implemented in the subsequent inspection and earmarking of a specific plot of 3.5 hectares in Sector-9, which finds support in the noting of the Joint Director dated 10.6.1999. It was contended that the final proposal submitted was for allotment of such an area of 3.5 hectares; yet when the allotment was actually made it was only for 8061.135 sq.mtrs. This reduction of area cannot be explained except on the malafides of the DDAs and its officials. He, thereforee, contended that the Court should intervene and direct allotment of land. 9. Learned Counsel submitted that the Delhi Master Plan 2001 which was in vogue at the relevant time permitted allotment of up to 4 hactares of land for technical educational institutions. In the circumstances the Explanationn given now for reducing the extent of land ultimately allotted cannot stand scrutiny and are arbitrarily. .10. Learned Counsel contended that the DDA has not explained why it took a period of six years to consider the petitioners case and eventually issued the allotment letter after directions of this Court in the first writ petition. That the Petitioner was eligible for the allotment of land is not in dispute. Being a public agency no doubt the DDA had to consider the proposals in all its ramifications and ensure that allotment was made in accordance with policies and regulations prevailing at the time. Yet that did not mean that delay in the decision making process should have been at the expense of the petitioner. It was under tremendous time constraint and obliged to ensure availability of permanent infrastructure within three years of provisional recommendation by the AICTE. The Explanationn given now by the DDA after the petitioners ineligibility for land rates in 1997 cannot be countenanced. 11. Learned Counsel further contended that when the second writ petition was filed in 2002 and a statement was made on 4.8.2003 the DDA never revealed that allotment had been cancelled. The Explanationn given now by the DDA after the petitioners ineligibility for land rates in 1997 cannot be countenanced. 11. Learned Counsel further contended that when the second writ petition was filed in 2002 and a statement was made on 4.8.2003 the DDA never revealed that allotment had been cancelled. In the absence of any stand in that regard, it is not open to the DDA now to allege that the allotment was cancelled automatically for non-compliance with the terms of the letter dated 16.10.2000. Moreover the Petitioner was in continuous correspondence with the DDA both regarding the extent of the land as well as the prevailing land rates and thereforee it could not be said to have lost its right to seek recourse to legal remedies on that score. 12. Mr. J.M. Sabharwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA contended that the Petitioner was obliged to conform to the terms of allotment which has granted a time limit for payment. If the sum of Rs. 2.24 acres and odd was not paid within 60 days, interest of 18% had to be deposited;. The outer limit of the offer was six months; if payment were not made in that period, the allotment stood canceled. The Petitioner cannot maintain the present proceeding since no amount was paid in terms of the letter. It was contended that this question can be validly urged in these proceedings since the previous writ petition, WP No. 4236/2002 was disposed of not on its merits but merely with a direction to the DDA to communicate its decision. It did so on 22.8.2003, declining the request of allotment of additional amounts. Learned Counsel contended that the nonpayment of any amount and non-compliance with the terms and conditions results in withdrawal of offer and cancellation of allotment. He relied upon the decision reported as Bhupinder Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority: 71 (1998)DLT461 . .13. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioner cannot maintain these proceedings as it is belated and hit by laches. Besides its conduct in not even attempting to comply with terms and conditions of the allotment letter but waiting more than two years before approaching this Court in 2002 and much later after the request for additional land was declined, by filing the present writ petition disentitles it any discretionary relief. Besides its conduct in not even attempting to comply with terms and conditions of the allotment letter but waiting more than two years before approaching this Court in 2002 and much later after the request for additional land was declined, by filing the present writ petition disentitles it any discretionary relief. It was further contended that there is neither any legal principle or statutory provision, rule or regulation which obliged the DDA to offer institutional lands at the rates existing on the date of recommendation. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpinder Kumars case MANU/SC/0001/1995 : AIR1995SC1 as well as the decision of this Court reported as Smt. Sheelawanti and Anr. v. DDA and Anr.: AIR1995Delhi212 and J.B. Gupta v. DDA: AIR 1996 Delhi 195 to say that the offer so far as it is based on the land rates prevailing at the time of allotment, cannot .be dubbed arbitrarily. 14. Learned Counsel contended that so far as the area of land is concerned it was never the Petitioners contention that it required 4 hactares or 3.5 hactares. Its application for allotment of 3 acres of land. The reliance placed by the Petitioner by amendments brought about in 2006, upon communications in the file were of no avail. Learned Counsel contended that file nothings do not constitute decisions of the Government or the executive agency. It is only the official communication to the person concerned or likely to be effected which constitutes the decision. All steps leading to it are part of the decision making process and do not under any circumstance confer or create rights. He relied upon the judgment reported as State of Bihar v. Kirpalu Shankar: 1987CriLJ1860 in that regard. 15. The first question is whether the Petitioner can claim a direction to the Respondent-DDA to allot an additional one acre for its technical college. Two contentions have been made in support of this claim. The first is in regard to its need for such land and that the DDA had in its decision making process recommended a larger area of 3.5 hectares but willfully reduced it to less than two acres at the time of actual allotment. The second contention is discrimination. 16. Two contentions have been made in support of this claim. The first is in regard to its need for such land and that the DDA had in its decision making process recommended a larger area of 3.5 hectares but willfully reduced it to less than two acres at the time of actual allotment. The second contention is discrimination. 16. The preceding narrative undoubtedly reveals a sorry state of affairs whereby the Petitioners application had to languish for more than three years before the Allotment Committee formally approved the case. Eventually, however, allotment was made in 2000 after intervention by the Court. Besides relying on the Master Plan-2001 and the file notings, the Petitioner has not shown how the DDA is under a compulsion to allot three acres or for that matter any area of land demanded by an applicant. .17. In the opinion of the Court the argument about unsustainability of claims based on file nothings is well-founded. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab 1962 Supp 3 SCR 713 the Supreme Court held that merely wiring something on the file would not amount to an order; it may at best mean a viewpoint. Later in Kripalu Shankar it was held that nothings on a noting file even of Ministers would not constitute orders affecting others rights, in the absence of a communication. This has since prevailed and has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in C.J. International Hotels Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee: AIR2001Delhi435 and by the Supreme Court in its later decisions namely Laxmi Narayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra : [2003]3SCR409 and Bahadur Singh Lakhu Bai Gohil v. Jagdish Bhai M. Kamalia : (2004) 2SCC65 . In view of these considerations it is not possible to uphold the petitioners contention that it was arbitrarily dealt with in regard to the extent or area of the plot allotted. The DDA as a public agency can evolve standards for allotment of land. In its capacity as statutorily entrusted Town Planning Agency, it also draws the Master Plan. The mere indication that 4 hectares of land could be used for a technical institute would not necessarily oblige it to spare such land, undeniably developed with public funds, at pre- determined or concessional rates to every applicant. In its capacity as statutorily entrusted Town Planning Agency, it also draws the Master Plan. The mere indication that 4 hectares of land could be used for a technical institute would not necessarily oblige it to spare such land, undeniably developed with public funds, at pre- determined or concessional rates to every applicant. It has an over arching public duty to organize its available resources including the land at its disposal for optimal use. It accordingly chose to offer approximately two acres to the Petitioner. If the land is not to the Petitioners liking or that it wishes to acquire additional land it is always free to do so but sans an established obligation the DDA cannot be compelled to part with such additional land. 18. As far as the question of discrimination is concerned, the mere circumstance that four other societies were offered four hectares by itself does not amount to discrimination. The facts and surrounding circumstances in relation to every such allotment including when applications were made by such societies, the considerations which prevailed the peculiar facts of such societies have not been pleaded. The Petitioner has also not voiced a grievance with regard to those allotments in the sense that it does not challenge them. They are not parties before the court. The concept of discrimination thereforee has an abstract dimension and cannot be factored into the petitioners peculiar circumstances. It is not every allotment of four hectares or a larger plot which can amount to a cause of action without the necessary factual details. In these circumstances the mere advertence to allotments made to other societies, of larger plots itself cannot amount to discrimination of the Petitioner. 19. The second question concerns the cost of the plot. The Petitioners complaint is that having been made to wait for more than 7 years the DDA acted arbitrarily in seeking to recover costs on the basis of the prevailing rates in 2000; instead it should have recovered the cost prevailing as in 1997 at the time of recommendation by the Institutional Allotment Committee. Facially this argument appears attractive. Yet one cannot lose sight of the established legal position in this regard. In the area of costing the Court cannot engage itself into a deep scrutiny of the elements that have been taken into account by the executive agency or also the methodology. Facially this argument appears attractive. Yet one cannot lose sight of the established legal position in this regard. In the area of costing the Court cannot engage itself into a deep scrutiny of the elements that have been taken into account by the executive agency or also the methodology. The area of admissible concern is highly restrictive and pertains to illegality and patent unreasonableness. The Court cannot substitute and place itself in the position of a cost accountant or an expert. Thus even the methodology and use of accounting or costing concept cannot be the area of ordinary judicial concern. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Sheelawanti and Ors. v. DDA as approved by the decision of the Supreme Court in DDA v. Ashok Behl: 2002(80)ECC3 has said as much. 20. As regards the relevant date for determination of cost, the position of DDA is correct in law. In Ramanand v. Union of India 1993 (29) DRJ 594 a Full Bench of this Court held that the premium/cost calculated at the time prevailing when a firm offer of allotment is made would be the cost for concluding a valid contract. Similarly in DDA v. Pushpinder Kumar Jain: AIR1995SC1 the Supreme Court ruled that the cost of land prevailing at the time of allotment ? as opposed to earmarking or selection through a draw of lots ? would be the rate payable by the allottee. In view of this established legal position the relief claimed by the Petitioner as regards costing cannot be granted. 21. The DDA had urged that the Petitioners conduct in not complying with the terms of allotment and depositing any amount and instead waiting for more than 3 years to approach this Court disentitles it to any discretionary relief. An argument made was that the allotment letter issued in 2000 constituted an offer and had to be accepted in its terms and that a challenge to costing and the extent of land more than two years later is not maintainable. The findings on the first two questions are in the opinion of the Court dispositive of this petition. Nevertheless it has to be observed that the DDAs contentions on this score are also substantial. The allotment though made in 2000 was just an offer. It required the Petitioner to deposit the amount demanded within 60 days. The findings on the first two questions are in the opinion of the Court dispositive of this petition. Nevertheless it has to be observed that the DDAs contentions on this score are also substantial. The allotment though made in 2000 was just an offer. It required the Petitioner to deposit the amount demanded within 60 days. The outer limit for payment was six months with interest. Thereafter the offer lapsed. The Division Bench judgment in K Bhattacharji v. DDA: 63(1996)DLT467 somewhat supports this position. This of course does not mean that if a fanciful price or cost is indicated, a litigant or allottee is precluded from challenging it. But his right to so do and invoke judicial review in its restricted application cannot, however, be confused with when he moves the Court. In this case the Petitioner society having waited for a considerable time after obtaining the allotment letter chose not to agitate issue of costing within the six months period. In that sense its approaching the Court has to be viewed as belated and exhibiting conduct disentitling it to discretionary relief under Article 226. 22. For the above reasons, the petition cannot succeed. It is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed