ORDER 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 31.12.2001 (Annexure P-1), present writ petition was filed for directions to respondent to pay additional increments to petitioner for having acquired professional qualifications of LL.B. and M.B.A. Subsequently, petition was amended and the order dated 24.11.1989 was also simply mentioned in paragraph 3 of the prescribed format of the writ petition as one of the impugned order. 2. Undisputed facts are as under. Petitioner was working with the respondent Corporation in managerial capacity. He retired from service while holding the post of General Manager. During the course of employment first he did LL.B. and later on M.B.A. Degrees. Respondents as per order dated 4.10.1988 (Annexure P-4) introduced scheme for payment of different additional increment on acquiring specified professional qualifications. For LL.B. one additional increment was payable and for M.B.A. two additional increments was payable to the employee acquiring such qualification during service. Petitioner was sanctioned and paid w.e.f. 1.4.1988 one increment for obtaining LL.B. degree. He subsequently applied for grant of two additional increments on obtaining M.B.A. degree. Although, a sanction was accorded for additional increments w.e.f. 21.5.1993 but said increments were never released/paid to the petitioner on the ground that he had already reached the maximum of the sanctioned pay-scale. Said order was passed on 29.9.1993. Against said order, petitioner preferred representations after representation reiterating his demand for release of three additional increments for obtaining professional qualification of LL.B. and M.B.A. When he was communicated the order impugned taking clue from the order dated 29.9.1994, he filed the present writ petition. 3. Respondents have denied the claim of the petitioner and in their reply they have submitted that so far as additional increment for obtaining professional qualification of LL.B. they pointed out that same was released and paid to the petitioner from April 1988 to March 1990. It was also pointed out that when petitioner obtained MBA degree in 1993 petitioner was getting basic salary at the maximum of the scale from 1.4.1990 in the pay scale prescribed for post held by him. As such no additional increments could be paid to the petitioner either for obtaining LL.B. or MBA Degrees. They also contended that the petition suffers from laches and gross delay and therefore is not entitled for any relief. 4. As such no additional increments could be paid to the petitioner either for obtaining LL.B. or MBA Degrees. They also contended that the petition suffers from laches and gross delay and therefore is not entitled for any relief. 4. After having heard rival submissions and going through the material available on record, we do not find any merit and substance in this writ petition. We may point out that respondents have introduced scheme of one time cash award in place of the earlier scheme for grant of additional increments. From the documents filed along with the writ petition, it is clear that all along the case of the petitioner before the respondents was that he was not covered by scheme of one time cash award but he was entitled for three additional increments for obtaining LL.B. and MBA degrees. 5. In the service jurisprudence, 'Time Scale of Pay' has a definite connotation. In a Time Scale of Pay, increments are provided so that upon successful completion of specified period of service, an increment is added and the basic is enhanced by that amount in the same scale of pay. Thus, it is gradual rise of the basic salary by way of release of increments. In order to elaborate, let us take an example that A was appointed to a post carrying the Time Scale of Pay of Rs. 150-25-300. The basic is Rs. 150 and the maximum is Rs. 300/-. Once A after availing benefits of all increments sanctioned in scale of pay and starts drawing pay at the maximum of the scale Rs. 300/- then he will continue to draw the pay @ Rs. 300/- because beyond that stage a scale could not be enhanced by adding or releasing increment. This gradual increase in the pay will continue till the person has not reached or touched the maximum of the scale of pay prescribed. This exactly has happened in the present case. In Annexure P-8, there is categorical admission of the petitioner that in the pay scale of Rs. 3700-125-4700-150-5000, he had reached the maximum of pay in March 1990 and an additional increment on account of the LL.B. degree which petitioner was getting earlier was stopped. Thus petitioner was aware even prior to Annexure P-8 (dated 10.10.1993) that he was not entitled to get the benefit of additional increment once he had reached the maximum of the scale. 3700-125-4700-150-5000, he had reached the maximum of pay in March 1990 and an additional increment on account of the LL.B. degree which petitioner was getting earlier was stopped. Thus petitioner was aware even prior to Annexure P-8 (dated 10.10.1993) that he was not entitled to get the benefit of additional increment once he had reached the maximum of the scale. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct in contending that reaching of the maximum of the scale is neither relevant nor a decisive factor for release of additional increment as it would be against, the established principles of service jurisprudence. Similarly, we do not find any force in the submission that the petitioner was denied additional increments because he had reached the maximum of the scale would, result in discrimination between him and a person who has not reached the maximum of pay in the same scale. petitioner and persons like him, who were drawing maximum pay, formed a class by themselves vis-a-vis persons who had not reached the maximum of the pay scale. Thus, the plea of discrimination also fails. 6. Next contention that upon revision of pay scale, petitioner is entitled to get the benefit is neither here or there. Any subsequent change in the pay scale would not be material for the simple reason that his claim has to be decided on the date of application/of acquiring additional qualifications and not on the basis of subsequent revision of pay. Moreover before revision of pay scales was introduced, the Board of Directors of respondent No.1 in its meeting held on 24.12.1993 approved one time cash award in place of additional increment to such employees who had reached the maximum of their pay scales and had acquired prescribed professional qualification (See Annexure P-25 filed alongwith rejoinder). Petitioner could have availed of this benefit, but his own case has been that he was entitled only for additional increments and not the one time cash award. 7. Perhaps there may be another reason which disentitles petitioner to any relief on ground of inordinate delay. Petitioner was informed in no uncertain terms vide communication dated 29.9.1993 (Annexure P-7) that he was not entitled to get the benefit of additional increments as he had already reached the maximum of the scale. Thereafter any subsequent communication, like Annexure P-1 dated 31.12.2001 would not come to his rescue. Petitioner was informed in no uncertain terms vide communication dated 29.9.1993 (Annexure P-7) that he was not entitled to get the benefit of additional increments as he had already reached the maximum of the scale. Thereafter any subsequent communication, like Annexure P-1 dated 31.12.2001 would not come to his rescue. It seems that petitioner while he was in service, might have had his own reasons not to rub salt on the wrong side of the management by initiating legal proceedings in a Court of Law therefore he entangled the management with repetitive representations. No doubt, no period of limitation is prescribed for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, but as a self restriction, we would not like to entertain a stale cause of action. It is now well established principle of law that repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law, would not come to rescue of the petitioner. 8. Before parting with case, we must say a word about impugned Annexure P-30. Except to make a mention of it in paragraph 3 of the prescribed format, there is not even a whisper in the entire petition for what reasons and ground, said order is bad. There is not even amendment in relief clause qua Annexure P-30 and no arguments were advanced on invalidity of the said document. In view of this, we are not examining the validity of said order which apparently seems to in order. 9. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit and substance in the writ petition. Accordingly, it is hereby dismissed but without any orders as to costs.