JUDGMENT M. JEYAPAUL, J. The suit is filed seeking delivery of possession of the property bearing S. No. 2364/1 and S. No. 2364/2 measuring 22 grounds and 282 sq.ft or thereabout in Pidariyar Koil Street, Gopathy Narayanaswamy Chetty Street, Valeeswarar Koil Street,Mylapore,Chennai after removing the superstructure put up by the defendants. 2. The brief averments found in the complaint is as follows: a) The plaintiff Arulmigu Kolavizhi- amman Temple situated at G.N. Chetty Street, Mylapore,Chennai600 004 is an ancient village temple. It was formerly known as Kolamoli Amman Temple. It is treated as “Ellai” Pidari for Arulmigu Kabaleeswarar Temple, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004. b) The land bearing S. No. 2364 Pidariar Koil Street, Gopathy Narayanaswamy Chetty Street, Mylapore, Chennai measuring 1 cawnie 7 grounds 2306 sq.ft. belongs to the plaintiff temple. It was endowed to the Temple several years ago for conducting poojas and ceremonies and for the upkeep of the temple. In the Madras Town Resurvey Register 1895-97, the plaintiff has been shown as the owner of the said land. c) Subsequently, the said land in S. No. 2364 was subdivided into S. No. 2634/1 measuring 1 cawnie 7 grounds and 1334 sq.ft. and S. No. 2634/2 measuring 972 sq.ft. One Senji Archagar, the grandfather of the fourth defendant was the Poojari (Archagar) and de facto trustee of the Temple. He was in charge and management of the temple and its properties. He put up superstructure in a portion of the land and‘ was residing therein. He inducted several tenants into the rest of the portion of the land and was collecting rents from them. After his death in 1928, one Rajoo Archagar, the father of defendants 1 to 3, his sons Doraisamy Archagar and Shanmugam Archagar and their cousins were the poojaris and de facto Trustees of the temple and were in management of the temple and its properties as his legal representatives. d) Rajoo Archagar and others started acting against the interest of the temple. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai passed an order in D.Dis.6940/57 dated 4.8.1958 and appointed one C.P. Munuswami Naicker as the Trustee of the temple and directed him to take charge of the temple and its properties. C.P. Munuswami Naicker filed M.P. No. 651 of 1958 on the file of the VI Presidency Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai passed an order in D.Dis.6940/57 dated 4.8.1958 and appointed one C.P. Munuswami Naicker as the Trustee of the temple and directed him to take charge of the temple and its properties. C.P. Munuswami Naicker filed M.P. No. 651 of 1958 on the file of the VI Presidency Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. He took possession of the temple as per the order passed by the said Magistrate dated 23.10.1958. He took steps to recover possession of the immovable properties of the temple from the ex-poojaris and de facto Trustees of the Temple. e) Rajoo Archagar and others filed O.A. No. 9 of 1958 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai invoking the provision under Section 57 of the H.R. & C.E. Act, 1951 for a declaration that they were the hereditary trustees of the plaintiff temple. Their claim was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 30.4.1963. The appeal in A.P. No. 27 of 1963 filed by them on the file of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai was dismissed on 21.3.1964. They also filed O.A. No. 95 of 1958 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai under Section 57 of the said Act for a declaration that the temple and the properties attached to it were their private properties. By order dated 26.4.1960, the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai rejected their claim and the said order will operate as res judicata as it has reached finality. f) C.P. Munuswami Naicker or his successors in office did not succeed in their attempt to recover possession of the temple properties. Rajoo Archagar and others filed O.S. No. 27 of 1959 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai for a declaration that they were the absolute owners of the temple and its properties and also for permanent injunction. The said suit was not pressed on 9.8.1961. The plaintiff, represented by the then trustees, filed O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai against Rajoo Archagar and others for possession of a portion of the land bearing S. No. 2364/1. The said suit was withdrawn on 19.12.1973 with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The plaintiff, represented by the then trustees, filed O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai against Rajoo Archagar and others for possession of a portion of the land bearing S. No. 2364/1. The said suit was withdrawn on 19.12.1973 with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. g) In July 1959, the management of the plaintiff temple was amalgamated with the management of Arulmigu Kapaleeswarar Temple, Mylapore,Chennai600 004. h) S. No. 2364/1 measuring 1 cawnie 7 grounds and 1334 sgft was further sub-divided into S. No. 2364/1 measuring 21.1710 grounds, S. No. 2364/3 measuring 6.1920 grounds and S. No. 2364/4 measuring 2.1532 grounds. The temple is situated in a portion of S. No. 2364/3. The land in S. No. 2364/4 has been alienated unauthorisedly. Urban Land Tax authorities issued notices to defendants 1 to 4 asking them to pay Urban Land Tax in respect of the lands in S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2. Those lands belong to the plaintiff temple. An order of rectification was passed by the Urban Land Tax authorities. Taking advantage of their possession, defendants 1 to 4 managed to obtain patta in their individual names. i) Even after they ceased to be poojaris and de facto trustees of the temple in 1958, they continued to be in unlawful possession and management of the said lands and are collecting rents from the tenants in the property. Defendants 5 to 38 are the present tenants in respect of the said lands. 39th defendant has been added as a formal party to the suit. j) Defendants 40 and 41 were impleaded as per the orders passed by this Court in Application Nos. 5957 and 5958 of 1995. Defendants 42 to 45 are the legal representatives of the deceased first defendant. Defendants 46 to 49 are the legal representatives of the deceased second defendant. k) The suit is not barred by limitation since the property is a religious - endowment and as such vested in trust for specific performance. Therefore, the plaintiff temple prays that the suit may be decreed as prayed for. 3. The text of the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 4 in brief is as follows: a) Senji Archagar and his predecessors in title owned and possessed the suit property for more than 200 years. Therefore, the plaintiff temple prays that the suit may be decreed as prayed for. 3. The text of the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 4 in brief is as follows: a) Senji Archagar and his predecessors in title owned and possessed the suit property for more than 200 years. They have been in absolute and successive possession and enjoyment of the said lands without any interruption from any person and put up constructions of their own in their capacity as absolute owners. Defendants 1 to 4 also are in possession of the suit property in their own right and title and not in the capacity of trustees of the temple. b) The Urban Land Tax authorities have correctly sent notice to defendants 1 to 4 for payment of Urban land Tax in respect of the properties in S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2. The patta originally stood in the name of Senji Archagar as he was the true owner of the said lands. The defendants deny the allegation of the plaintiff temple that it is the absolute owner of the lands bearing S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2. The property is not an original endowment nor was it vested in the plaintiff temple. The plaintiff is not entitled to follow the suit property maintaining the same as trust property invoking the provision under Section 10 of the Limitation Act. c) The plaintiff filed a similar suit in O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 against Rajoo Archagar and others in respect of the very same property praying for similar relief and the same was withdrawn on 19.12.1973. After a lapse of more than 16 years, the plaintiff has come forward with the present suit. Curiously, there is no prayer for a declaration. d) The plaintiff has simply asked for possession of the suit property. Therefore, the suit for mere possession without a prayer for declaration in the present circumstances is not maintainable. Since the defendants and their predecessors in title have been and are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in their own right for more than the statutory period of limitation, they have prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession. Since the defendants and their predecessors in title have been and are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in their own right for more than the statutory period of limitation, they have prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession. e) Being an institution managed by public funds, the plaintiff can have a luxury of multiplicity of legal proceedings on speculative and imaginary claims, but, it should not be at the cost and peril of bona fide owners of the properties like the present defendants. The suit is totally devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed as the same is speculative and vexatious. It may be dismissed with costs. 4. The following issues were framed for determination: “ 1. Whether the plaintiff temple is the absolute owner of the suit property. 2. Whether defendants 1 to 4 and their predecessors in title have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property not as poojaris and Trustees of the plaintiff temple but in their own right as owners. 3. Whether the order in O.A. No. 9 of 1958 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner H.R. & C.E.Madras would operate as res judicata and binding on defendants 1 to 4 and whether defendants 1 to 4 are estopped from questioning the findings of the said application. 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Whether the suit is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title. 6. Whether the plaintiff temple is entitled to a decree for possession. 7. To what reliefe” The following additional issue was framed on 4.10.2002: “Whether defendants 2, 3, 4 and 42 to 45 have prescribed title to the suit property‘ by adverse possession.” During the course of arguments/ as it was found necessary, the following additional issue was also framed: “Whether the suit filed by the Executive Officer of the plaintiff temple is maintainable in law.” 5. On the side of the plaintiff, a Clerk of the plaintiff temple has been examined as P.W.1 and Exhibits P-1 to P-22 have been marked. On the side of the defendants, one Koothandan, power of attorney of defendants 1 to 4 has been examined as D.W.1 and Exhibits D-1 to D-46 have been marked. 6. On the side of the plaintiff, a Clerk of the plaintiff temple has been examined as P.W.1 and Exhibits P-1 to P-22 have been marked. On the side of the defendants, one Koothandan, power of attorney of defendants 1 to 4 has been examined as D.W.1 and Exhibits D-1 to D-46 have been marked. 6. Issue No. 1:- The plaintiff temple would contend that the suit property was originally endowed by the Government to the temple for the purpose of conducting poojas and for the upkeep of the temple. Senji Archagar, the grandfather of the fourth defendant was the poojari and de facto trustee of the temple. Thereafter, Rajoo Archagar, father of defendants 1 to 3 and his sons were poojaris and de f£cto trustees of the temple. As far as defendants 1 to 4 are concerned, the plaintiff has set up a stand that they have been in unlawful possession and enjoyment of the suit lands without any right or title or interest therein. 7. Defendants 1 to 4 and 42 to 49 would contend that Senji Archagar and his predecessors owned and possessed the suit property for more than 200 years. They are the absolute owners of the suit property. They have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property not in their capacity as poojaris of the plaintiff temple and trustees and managers of the temple properties. They are in possession of the suit property in their capacity as absolute owners. The plaintiff temple has no right over the suit property. 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that Exhibit P-2, an extract of the Resurvey Register of Town of Madras, Mylapore Division No. I relating to the year 1895-97 would demonstrate that the plaintiff temple is the owner of the suit property comprised in old Survey No.2672, 2673, 2674 and 2716 which merged into Survey No.2364 as per the Resurvey conducted in 1895-97. Exhibit P-3, an extract taken from “the register of land exempted from assessment, Madras Taluk (South), Madras District for the Resurvey No. 2364/1 would go to show that the suit property consisting of temple, coconut garden and a hut was granted by the Government to the plaintiff temple at the time when Senji Archagar was incharge thereof. There was no personal grant to Senji Archagar as per Ex-P3. There was no personal grant to Senji Archagar as per Ex-P3. D.W.1 has categorically admitted that Senji Archagar and thereafter, defendants 1 to 4 managed ‘the affairs of the temple and also the property owned by the temple. The claim made by Rajoo Archagar and others seeking to declare the temple as a private one was rejected by the H.R. & C.E. Department as per the proceedings in Exhibit P-5a and P-6a. Exhibit D-39, an extract of new land register has been created for the purpose of this case after the suit was laid by the plaintiff. There was no record to connect Kumaran Archagar to the suit property except the document, Exhibit D-39. Therefore, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff temple is the absolute owner of the suit property. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants would vehemently submit that the plaintiff has come out with an inconsistent stand as to the title they claim over the suit property. At one stage, they have claimed that the suit property was endowed to the temple. At a later stage, they have come out with a case that the suit property was granted by the Government to the temple. Neither an endowment deed nor a deed of grant was produced before the Court to establish the case of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff claims ownership over the property, the plea that the Government granted the property to the temple does not survive. No document was produced to establish the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property. Exhibit D-39 shall be preferred as it reflects entries both in the revenue account and the settlement account. The defendants could produce Exhibit D-31 to establish that Senji Archagar paid quit rent for the suit property for the fasli 1338 corresponding to the year 1928. Exhibits D-27 to 29 would go to show that defendants 1 to 4 have also got patta for the suit property. Therefore, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff miserably failed to establish the ownership over the suit property to seek recovery of possession. 10. Exhibit P-2 is the extract taken from Resurvey Register of the Town of Madras, Mylapore Division. It speaks to the fact that as per the old survey conducted in 1854-64, the suit property comprised in old Survey Nos. 10. Exhibit P-2 is the extract taken from Resurvey Register of the Town of Madras, Mylapore Division. It speaks to the fact that as per the old survey conducted in 1854-64, the suit property comprised in old Survey Nos. 2672, 2673, 2674 and 2716 got merged into Survey No. 2364 as registered in the Collector's Office. The plaintiff temple was shown therein as the owner of the suit property. It further discloses that the holding was utilised as temple and guardian and therefore, no quit rent was collected by the Government. The ancestors of defendants 1 to 4 did not figure in the above detailed earliest document produced by the plaintiff. There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the aforesaid document, Exhibit P-2 which has its antique flavour. 11. The next document is Exhibit P-3 which is an extract taken from the Register of Lands exempted from assessment. The nature of the suit property and the title thereto have been unambiguously referred to therein. The resurvey No. 2364 as found in Exhibit P-2 seems to have been sub-divided into S. No. 2364/1 measuring 1 cawnie 7 grounds and 1334 sq.ft. and S. No. 2364/2 measuring 972 sq.ft. In the quit rent notice, Exhibit D-31 issued to Senji Archagar, the grandfather of the fourth defendant, the sub-divided survey No. 2364/1 is found. Therefore, it seems that resurvey No.2364 seems to have been sub-divided into S. No. 2364/1 and 2364/2 during the period from 1895 to 1930. In Exhibit P-3, it has been categorically referred to that Senji Archagar was in charge of the plaintiff temple which was granted with the property in S. No. 2364/1 consisting of 1 cawnie 7 grounds 1334 sq.ft. for the purpose of using it as a temple premises and a coconut garden with a hut. There was a condition adumbrated in the grant of the said land. So long as the land forms the site of the temple and the income from the garden is appropriated for the purpose of the temple, the collection of quit rent is exempted. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the Government has not granted the said property to Senji Archagar, grandfather of the fourth defendant in his personal capacity. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the Government has not granted the said property to Senji Archagar, grandfather of the fourth defendant in his personal capacity. It appears that he was in charge of the plaintiff and therefore, it has been mentioned therein without any ambiguity that the grant is made by the Government to Senji Archagar who was in charge of the plaintiff temple. 12. Exhibit P-3 is the extract prepared on 27.6.1958 from the Register of lands exempted from assessment maintained much earlier. D.W.1 has categorically deposed even during the course of chief examination that Senji Archagar has been managing the suit temple till he died in the year 1928. During the course of cross examination, D.W.1 reiterates his stand that Senji Archagar has been managing not only the affairs of the temple but also its properties. There was no personal grant to Senji Archagar as per the unassailable document Exhibit P-3. The admission of D.W.1 would also go to show that Senji Archagar was in the management of the temple and its properties. Therefore, it is held that the grant was made by the Government to Senji Archagar not in his individual capacity but, in his representative capacity of the plaintiff temple. 13. Invoking the provision under Section 63(b) of H.R. & C.E. Act, 1959, the first defendant and others filed O.A. No. 95 of 1958 seeking a declaration that the plaintiff temple was a private one. Exhibit P-3 referred to above was the subject matter of discussion before the Deputy Commissioner who took up the above case for disposal. Exhibit P-5a which is a fair order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department in the above application would go to establish that the defendants claim over the temple was rejected on 26.4.1960. It has been declared therein that the plaintiff temple is a public temple. 14. Rajoo Archagar and the first defendant and others filed O.A. No. 93 of 1958 before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department seeking hereditary trusteeship to the plaintiff temple. Under the orders, Exhibit P-6a, it has been held by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department that they had managed the temple only as poojaris and had not served in their capacity as Trustees. Therefore, the claim for hereditary trusteeship made by them also stood rejected. 15. Under the orders, Exhibit P-6a, it has been held by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department that they had managed the temple only as poojaris and had not served in their capacity as Trustees. Therefore, the claim for hereditary trusteeship made by them also stood rejected. 15. On the side of the defendants, the Corporation Tax Receipts in respect of door Nos. 1 and 2, Pagoda Street and Pidariar Koil Street right from the year 1946 to 2001 were produced as Exhibits D-9 series to D-12 series. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff that there was a hut in the suit property which was in possession of the ancestors of defendants 1 to 4. It is the further ease of the plaintiff that the superstructures were put up by the ancestors of defendants 1 to 4 and they also let out some premises to the third parties. It is but natural that the persons who were in possession of the superstructure put up by them were required to pay Corporation Tax. Exhibits D-9 to D-12 would not establish the title of defendants 1 to 4 to the suit property. Likewise, the demand notice and Urban land Tax assessment order and other notices emanated from the Urban land Tax authorities marked as Exhibits D-15 to D-25 and D-32 to D-35 right from the year 1972 to 1994 and the payments made to the Urban Land Tax authorities under Exhibit D26 in the year 1995 will not clothe defendants 1 to 4 with any semblance of title: 16. On the side of defendants 1 to 4, extracts from the permanent land register in respect of S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2 were filed as Exhibits D-27 and D-28. Of course, the names of defendants 1 to 4 are found therein. But, from the remarks column found in the said extracts, it is seen that the entries in the said permanent register have been updated only as per the proceedings in B2/TR.913/84-85 dated 20.3.1985. These permanent land register entries have been made only on 20.3.1985 after the parties took out efforts to assert their respective rights over the said property. But, from the remarks column found in the said extracts, it is seen that the entries in the said permanent register have been updated only as per the proceedings in B2/TR.913/84-85 dated 20.3.1985. These permanent land register entries have been made only on 20.3.1985 after the parties took out efforts to assert their respective rights over the said property. O.S. No. 27 of 1995 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai filed by Rajoo Archagar and others seeking the relief of declaration that they were the owners of the temple property and also for permanent injunction was dismissed as not pressed on 9.8.1961. The plaintiff, on their part also, through their then Trustees, filed a suit in O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 on the file of the City Civil Court, Chennai against Rajoo Archagar and others for recovery of possession of the property in S. No. 2364/1. The said suit also was withdrawn by the plaintiff on 19.12.1973 with liberty to lay a fresh lis on the very same cause of action. Therefore, it is found that there had been some scramble to establish the rival claim of the parties over the suit property. Therefore, much credence cannot be attached to the aforesaid permanent land register extract which came into existence after 1985. 17. The patta, Exhibit D-9 series obtained by defendants 1 to 4 from the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk in respect of S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2 subsequent to the controversy arisen between the parties in respect of the right over the property cannot also be taken serious note of, Exhibit D34 is a similar extract from the permanent land register relating to S. No. 2364/3. There is no dispute to the fact that the temple is situated therein. In fact, the right claimed over the temple was rejected by the competent authority viz., H.R. & C.E. Department. That apart, Exhibit D-34 would disclose that Senji Archagar was shown as the person in charge of the plaintiff temple situated in S. No. 2364/3. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot make a claim over the suit property bearing S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2 based on Exhibit D-34. 18. That apart, Exhibit D-34 would disclose that Senji Archagar was shown as the person in charge of the plaintiff temple situated in S. No. 2364/3. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot make a claim over the suit property bearing S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2 based on Exhibit D-34. 18. Just prior to the filing of the present suit and long after the earlier suits filed by the rival parties, the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax Authority has chosen to pass a revised order of assessment in the name of the plaintiff temple in respect of the suit property in S. Nos. 2364/1 and 2364/2, cancelling the Urban Land Tax levied on defendants 1 to 4 earlier, of course, after conducting some enquiry. Such document has originated very recently after the parties started litigating over the title thereto. But, at any rate, it is found that an attempt has been made by defendants 1 to 4 to introduce themselves as owners of the plaint schedule property against the spirit of Exhibits P-1 and P-2, the source documents in this case projected by the plaintiff. 19. The sheet anchor of the defence of the defendants centers around the quit rent demand notices issued by the Tahsildar, Mylapore dated 1.3.1930 marked as Exhibit D-31 and the extract of land settlement register issued by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvaniiamalai dated 23.7.2000 marked as Exhibit D-39. The quit rent has been demanded under Exhibit D-31 from Senji Archagar under Section 4 of the Madras Act VI of 1867, for the fasli 1338 during the year 1930. It is found therein that the Tahsildar concerned has not demanded quit rent from the said Senji Archagar solely on the ground that he was the owner of the property bearing S. No. 2364/2. The quit rent has been demanded from Senji Archagar in his capacity either as owner or as occupier of the said property. Admittedly, Senji Archagar was in charge of not only the temple but also of the properties of the temple during the relevant point of time. Little wonder, such a quit rent demand notice was issued to Senji Archagar who was representing the temple and its properties. There is also no dispute to the fact that the superstructures also were put up by the ancestors of defendants 1 to 4 and they resided therein. Little wonder, such a quit rent demand notice was issued to Senji Archagar who was representing the temple and its properties. There is also no dispute to the fact that the superstructures also were put up by the ancestors of defendants 1 to 4 and they resided therein. Further, the demand notice seeking quit rent cannot be a document of title. 20. Coming to yet another document, Exhibit D-39 filed on the side of the defendant, it is found that the name of Kumaran Archagar has been introduced as the owner of old Survey Nos. 2673, 2674 and 2716, major part of resurvey No.2364 corresponding to the latest new S. Nos. 2364/1, 2364/2 and 2364/4. On a close scrutiny, of the said document, it is found that old Survey No. 2672 where the temple is admittedly situated was merged with new Survey No. 2364. Firstly, it is found that Kumaran Archagar has been introduced for the first time through the said document. Secondly, if Kumaran Archagar had independent title over the properties bearing S. Nos. 2364/1, 2364/2 and 2364/4, he would not have permitted the revenue authorities to merge those survey numbers along with the survey number over which the temple has exclusive right. Exhibit P-3 would categorically demonstrate that the grant was given to the plaintiff temple when Senji Archagar was in charge of the said temple. When grant by the Government was made only when Senji Archagar was at the helms of affairs of the temple administration/the introduction of Kumaran Archagar in Exhibit D-39 raises doubt in the mind of this Court. The plaintiff mounts attack on Exhibit D-39 that it was a document created by the defendants only in the year 2000 long after the filing of the present suit to suit their version. At any rate, it is found that no other document was produced to show that Kumaran Archagar originally owned the suit property. Further, when Exhibits P-2 and P-3 would demonstrate that the plaintiff temple, who had got the suit property through grant made by the Government, had been managing the same through Senji Archagar, the document, Exhibit D-39 incorporating the name of Kumaran Archagar without any rhyme or reason, loses its credibility. 21. It is contended on the side of the defendants that no document was filed to show that the defendants were appointed as poojaris of the temple. 21. It is contended on the side of the defendants that no document was filed to show that the defendants were appointed as poojaris of the temple. Further, P.W.1 also has not deposed the effect that the defendants were the managers of the suit property. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has not supported its pleading with proof as required under law. 22. D.W.1 has categorically admitted during the course of chief examination and cross examination that Senji Archagar has been managing not only the affairs of the temple but also the administration of the suit property. It is the consistent case of the plaintiff that Senji Archagar has been serving not only as Poojari but also as manager of the properties of the temple. The engagement of Senji Archagar had taken place about a century ago. Therefore, we cannot expect a document to establish the appointment of Senji Archagar as Poojari and also manager of the properties of the temple. Exhibit P-3 clearly demonstrates that Senji Archagar was in charge of the temple. Admittedly, the suit property has been managed by the said Senji Archagar. Therefore, the Court finds that Exhibits P-2 and P-3, the telling testimony available in this case establish the case of the plaintiff that it is the owner of the suit property. 23. It has been held in Gopal Krishnaji v. Mohd. Haji Latif AIR 1968 SC 1413 that the Court shall draw adverse inference against a party who withholds the best evidence which would throw light on the issue in controversy notwithstanding the fact that the onus of proof does not lie on him. A party cannot rely on the extract doctrine of onus of proof on the ground that he was not called upon to produce it. 24. A party cannot rely on the extract doctrine of onus of proof on the ground that he was not called upon to produce it. 24. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted an authority in Rani v. Santa Bala AIR 1971 SC 1028 : (1970) 3 SCC 722 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held, “Where the evidence which could be brought before the Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale is withheld, such evidence being normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force and the Court may be justified in appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially, when he withholds evidence in his possession.” 25. In this case, it is not as if the plaintiff temple had burked important documents which would throw light on the issue in controversy. The documents relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the issues arisen in this case have been produced by the plaintiff temple. 26. The Honourable Supreme Court has held in Vinod Kumar v. Surjit Kaur AIR 1987 SC 2179 : (1987) 3 SCC 711 : “However, when the appellant entered the witness box, he gave up the case set out in the written statement and propounded a different case that the hall had been taken on lease only for non-residential purposes. The perceptible manner in which the appellant had shifted his defence has escaped the notice and consideration of the Statutory Authorities. Both the Authorities have failed to bear in mind that the pleadings of the parties form the foundation of their case and It is not open to them to give up the case set out in the pleadings and propound a new and different case.” 27. Of course, in this case, the plaintiff has claimed ownership over the suit property based on the grant made by the Government. The grant made by the Government to the temple clothes the temple with the right of ownership. The grant to the temple is one of the sources of title acquired by the temple. Exhibit P-3 would establish that endowment was created by the Government by way of grant of land to the temple. The grant made by the Government to the temple clothes the temple with the right of ownership. The grant to the temple is one of the sources of title acquired by the temple. Exhibit P-3 would establish that endowment was created by the Government by way of grant of land to the temple. In the above facts and circumstances, the Court does not find shifting of any material stand taken by the plaintiff from one stage to another stage during the course of trial. 28. In view of the above, it is held that the plaintiff temple is the absolute owner of the suit property. Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly. 29. Issue No. 2:- The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that D.W.1 has categorically admitted the fact that Senji Archagar, the grandfather of the fourth defendant was in charge of not only the temple but also the properties of the temple. The application filed before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department to declare- that the temple is a private temple was also rejected. Exhibit P-3 would also demonstrate that Senji Archagar was only in charge of the temple. The Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Chennai appointed one C.P. Munuswami Naicker as the Trustee of the temple unseating Rajoo Archagar. Defendants 1 to 4 have been in possession of the suit property admittedly, but, not in their own right as owners thereof. Therefore, he would submit that that defendants 1 to 4 and their predecessors have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property only as managers of the plaintiff temple. 30. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants would contend that in the pre-suit notice issued by the plaintiff temple, defendants 1 to 4 have been described as encroachers. Therefore, they cannot now come and say that the suit property was in the management of defendants 1 to 4. He would further contend that the suit property had already vested on the predecessors of the‘ defendants way back in the year 1903 as per Exhibit D-39. He would further submit that defendants 1 to 4 have demonstrated before the Court that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in their own right as owners. 31. He would further contend that the suit property had already vested on the predecessors of the‘ defendants way back in the year 1903 as per Exhibit D-39. He would further submit that defendants 1 to 4 have demonstrated before the Court that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in their own right as owners. 31. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, D.W.1, during the course of cross examination, unambiguously admits that Senji Archagar managed the affairs of the temple and its properties. He has also admitted that Senji Archagar performed poojas in the temple. Admittedly, Senji Archagar died in the year 1928 as per the death extract, Exhibit D-5 and therefore, defendants 1 to 4 have been in possession of the temple and its properties. 32. The H.R. & C.E. Department had appointed C.P. Munusami Naicker as the trustee of the plaintiff temple and directed to take possession of the temple and its properties as per the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Exhibit P-4 dated 4.8.1958. Rajoo Archagar, the first defendant R. Shanmugam and others have been described as de facto trustees of the temple in the aforesaid proceedings. After the temple was taken possession by the aforesaid new trustee appointed by the H.R. & C.E. Department. The defendants filed O.A. No. 95 of 1958 to declare that the plaintiff temple was a private one. But, the said application stood dismissed under Exhibit P-5a. The claim of hereditary trusteeship made by the first defendant and Rajoo Archagar and others in O.A. No. 93 of 1958 also stood dismissed as per the order, Exhibit P-6a. Now, there is no dispute to the fact that defendants 1 to 4 have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and the suit temple. This Court has already held that the plaintiff temple is the owner of the suit property. It is true that Exhibit P-19 has been given by the plaintiff temple as though defendants have become encroachers. The fact remains that defendants 1 to 4 are not encroachers, but, they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property which was administered by their predecessors in their capacity as poojaris and manager thereof. It is true that Exhibit P-19 has been given by the plaintiff temple as though defendants have become encroachers. The fact remains that defendants 1 to 4 are not encroachers, but, they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property which was administered by their predecessors in their capacity as poojaris and manager thereof. Therefore, mere reference as encroachers in the pre-suit notice, Exhibit P-19 does not deal a deathknell to the otherwise consistent case of the plaintiff. 33. While dealing with the word “Manager” under the Wakf Board constituted under the Wakf Act, this Court in State Wakf Board v. Subramanyam AIR 1977 Mad 79 : (1976) 2 MLJ 263 has held as follows: “The word ‘Manager‘ in relation to a religious or charitable endowment is not a term of art. The said word denotes the person who is in charge of the administration of the endowment or manages the property or supervises the performance of the charity and the word is one of very wide and general import.” A person in charge of administration of the temple and its properties as per the above ratio can be termed as a manager.” 34. Considering the above facts and circumstances of this case, the Court holds without any hesitation that defendants 1 to 4 and their predecessors have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as poojaris and de facto trustees of the plaintiff temple, but, they have not been in possession of the suit property in their own rights as owners. Issue No. 2 is answered accordingly. 35. Issue No. 3:- Under Exhibits P-5a and P-6a, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department en the applications filed by the fourth defendant, Rajoo Archagar and others, the authorities have decided the issue as to whether the temple was a private temple or a public temple and whether the predecessors of defendants 1 to 4 were poojaris and de facto trustees of the temple. It is only the Civil Court which can decide the title to a property. The title to the suit property was not the main issue in those two proceedings. But, those important and pertinent issues decided in those two proceedings in O.A. Nos. It is only the Civil Court which can decide the title to a property. The title to the suit property was not the main issue in those two proceedings. But, those important and pertinent issues decided in those two proceedings in O.A. Nos. 95 of 1958 and 93 of 1958 have reached finality and therefore, those decisions rendered as per law would definitely bind defendants 1 to 4 with respect to the issues decided therein and they cannot question the findings rendered in those two applications, but, it will not operate as res judicata as regards the issues relating to the title to the suit property. Issue No.3 is answered accordingly. 36. Issue No. 4 and additional issue relating to adverse possession framed on 4. 10. 2002:- The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that as per Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit property which vested in trust for specific purpose can be recovered at any point of time and there is no limitation for laying a suit for recovery of such- properties. He would further contend that Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act substituted by Act 28 of 2003 is retrospective in operation. Further, the law of limitation is a procedural one and therefore, the substitution of a new provision would be deemed to have come into effect from the date when originally the litigation was commenced. 37. The learned counsel for the defendants would vehemently contend that Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act as substituted by Act 28 of 2003 which gives blanket right for recovery of possession of immovable property belonging to any religious institution will not apply to the suit which was laid way back in the year 1989. As per the original provision under Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act, the plaintiff temple cannot file a suit for recovery of the temple properties which had vested in the defendants‘ predecessors much prior to 30.9.1951. The plaintiff temple also cannot invoke the provision under Section 10 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as the property was not vested in the predecessors of defendants 1 to 4 for specific purpose. 38. The earlier suit filed by the plaintiff temple in O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 was dismissed as withdrawn on 19.12.1973 with liberty to file a fresh suit on the very same cause of action. 38. The earlier suit filed by the plaintiff temple in O.S. No. 2191 of 1971 was dismissed as withdrawn on 19.12.1973 with liberty to file a fresh suit on the very same cause of action. The cause of action for the present suit which was laid in the year 1989 is found to be materially the same, though certain inconsequential cause of actions also have been added with the main cause of action which had arisen long before the institution of the previous suit in O.S. No. 2191 of 1971. When the plaintiff temple has been given a liberty to file a fresh suit on the very same cause of action, the suit filed in the year 1989 cannot be considered as a suit laid beyond the period of limitation. 39. As per the original provision under Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act, 1959, a party cannot set up a plea as against the religious institution on the ground of prescription and adverse possession when the properties had vested in him after 30.9.1951. If the property had vested in such a person or his predecessor before the 30.9.1951, the person vested with the property of any religious institution can validly set up a plea of prescription and adverse possession. But, as per the newly substituted provision under Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act through the Tamil Nadu Act 28 of 2003 which came into effect on 1.9.2003, the entire provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply to any suit for possession of immovable property belonging to any religious institution. 40. The intention of the legislature for substitution of Section 109 of the Act is to protect the property of the religious institutions from being lost by adverse possession on account of the limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. Let us visualize a situation where the plaintiff temple withdrew this suit and laid a fresh suit after the year 2003. Can the defendants still contend that the suit laid for recovery of possession by the plaintiff temple is barred by limitation in the face of the substitution of Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Acte The defendants cannot definitely set up such a plea. Denying the plaintiff temple to take advantage of the benevolent substitution of Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act will multiply the civil proceedings between the parties. Denying the plaintiff temple to take advantage of the benevolent substitution of Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act will multiply the civil proceedings between the parties. Therefore, the Court finds that even for the pending suits, the provision under the substituted Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act will apply. Such being the case, the Court finds that the suit is not barred by limitation in view of the fact that there is limitation for the religious institutions to lay a suit for possession of immovable property belonging to it. 41. Section 10 of the Limitation Act is a special provision which protects the properties entrusted to a person in trust. As per Section 10 of the Limitation Act, there is no limitation for laying a suit for recovery of the property from the person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose. The old Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act, 1959 debars a person from claiming the property of a religious institution not vested in him before the 30.9.1951. That is to say, a person vested with the property of a religious institution prior to the 30.9.1951 can very well set up a plea of prescription and adverse possession available under the law of Limitation. The old Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act, 1959 does not put any spoke to the independent operation of Section 10 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as the subject and domain of Section 10 of the Limitation Act is totally different. The operation of old Section 109 of the H.R. & C.E. Act is religious institution specific. But, Section 10 of the Limitation Act has wide implication to deal with the properties vested in a person in trust for some specific purpose. 42. D.W.1 has categorically admitted that his predecessors had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as poojaris of the temple. Exhibit P-3 also buttresses the plea of the plaintiff that the property was in the management of Senji Archagar, the grandfather of the fourth defendant. There is no dispute to the fact that the property is now in the management of defendants 1 to 4. It is found therefore that the suit property was vested in the predecessors of defendants 1 to 4 in trust. There is no dispute to the fact that the property is now in the management of defendants 1 to 4. It is found therefore that the suit property was vested in the predecessors of defendants 1 to 4 in trust. Under the above facts and circumstances, applying the principles adumbrated under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, the Court holds without any hesitation that the suit as per Section 10 of the Limitation Act is not barred by any length of time. 43. It has been held by a Bench of this Court in Padmanabha v. Ramachandra Rao AIR 1953 Mad 842 : (1953) 2 MLJ 382 that: “Archakas cannot acquire proprietary rights in the lands as against the temple to which the properties had been granted, because they should be deemed to have been in possession in a fiduciary capacity and as such, could not claim adverse possession.” 44. It has also been held by a Bench of this Court in yet another decision in Venkatanarasimha v. Gangamma AIR 1954 Mad 258 : (1953) 2 MLJ 31 that inasmuch as the Archakas were in enjoyment of the lands in a fiduciary capacity as trustees, they could not acquire title by adverse possession against the deity. No person who has accepted the position of a trustee and has acquired property in that capacity can be permitted to assert adverse title on his own behalf until he has obtained a proper discharge from the trust with which he has clothed himself. The principle stated above that a trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property applies equally to the managers of the Hindu religious endowments also. 45. In the light of the aforesaid authorities, the Court holds that the predecessors of defendants 1 to 4 who were in charge of the property of the temple and defendants 1 to 4 who have continued to be in possession of the property inspite of the resistance flowed from the plaintiff temple cannot set up a plea of adverse possession as against the plaintiff temple. Further, it is found that the defendants have not clearly stated as to when the adverse possession actually commenced as against the plaintiff temple. Further, it is found that the defendants have not clearly stated as to when the adverse possession actually commenced as against the plaintiff temple. In view of the above, the Court holds that the suit is not barred by limitation and defendants 2 to 4 and 42 to 45 have also not prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession. The aforesaid issues are answered accordingly. 46. Issue No. 5: The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that no law prescribes that a suit simpliciter for recovery of possession without a prayer for title is not sustainable. 47. The learned counsel for the defendants would contend that in the cause of action paragraph of the plaint, the plaintiffs have unambiguously stated that the defendants in their reply notice dated 12.6.1989 denied the right of the plaintiff to recover possession. Further, he would submit that in the reply notice, Exhibit P-16, defendants 1 to 4 have chosen to deny the title claimed by the plaintiff over the suit property. In view of the above, the learned counsel for the defendants would contend that the suit for mere recovery of possession without a prayer for declaration of title is not maintainable in law. 48. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives discretion to the person entitled to some property to institute a suit for declaration as against the person who denies his title. The Court also has been given some discretion to make a declaration that such a person is so entitled to as per Section 34 of the said Act. If the person who seeks a mere declaration omitted to seek further relief which can be sought for by him, then the Court has been mandated to deny such declaration. There is no provision under the Specific Relief Act that a party who seeks recovery of possession shall mandatorily seek for declaration of title in case where there is denial of title. Therefore, the Court finds that the plea of the defendants is totally unsustainable. The suit filed for bare recovery of possession without seeking declaration of title is maintainable in law. The issue is answered accordingly. 49. Additional Issue regarding maintainability of the suit;- The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that there is no such plea in the written statement that the suit filed by the Executive Officer is not maintainable. The suit filed for bare recovery of possession without seeking declaration of title is maintainable in law. The issue is answered accordingly. 49. Additional Issue regarding maintainability of the suit;- The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that there is no such plea in the written statement that the suit filed by the Executive Officer is not maintainable. No evidence also was let in by the defendants touching upon such issue. Further, the plaintiff has produced documents to establish that the plaintiff temple got amalgamated with Kapaleeswarar Temple. The scheme decree framed for the Kapaleeswarar Temple gives authority to the Executive Officer to-lay a suit, of course, with the sanction of the trustees. As there was no trustee at the time when the suit was filed, the Executive Officer, who has been authorised by his superior officer viz., Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, has laid the suit, it is further contended. 50. The learned counsel for the defendants would submit that the issue as to the maintainability of the suit is a legal issue. If at all the plaintiff temple got merged with Kapaleeswarar Temple, Kapaleeswarar Temple should have figured as plaintiff and not the plaintiff temple in its independent entity. Further, the scheme framed for Kapaleeswarar Temple will not apply to the constituent temple of Kapaleeswarar Temple. No document has been produced to show that necessary sanction was accorded to the Executive Officer even as per the spirit of the scheme decree, he contends further. 51. A Bench of this Court in Sri Arthanareeswarar of Tiruchengode v. T. M. Muthuswamy Padayachi and Others Sri Arthanareeswarar of Tiruchengode v. T. M. Muthuswamy Padayachi and Others Sri Arthanareeswarar of Tiruchengode v. T. M. Muthuswamy Padayachi and Others 2003-1-LW 386 has categorically held that the plea of maintainability of a suit is essentially a legal plea if the suit on the face of it is not maintainable. The fact that no specific plea was taken or no issue was framed is of little consequence. It has been further held that the Executive Officer of the temple is not the authority competent to initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the temple. It is only the Board of Trustees in existence was competent to initiate the legal proceedings on behalf of the temple. 52. It has been further held that the Executive Officer of the temple is not the authority competent to initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the temple. It is only the Board of Trustees in existence was competent to initiate the legal proceedings on behalf of the temple. 52. In the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Court holds that even though the defendants have not set up such a plea in the written statement and no issue also was framed, the defendants have every right to rake up such an issue as it is only a legal issue. Further, it is found that the Board of Trustees alone has right to file the suit on behalf of the temple and not the Executive Officer. 53. In the instant case, the plaintiff has filed Exhibit P-21 which is a certified copy of a gazette containing the scheme framed in O.A. No. 125 of 1968 dated 8.5.1970 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Chennai in respect of Kapaleeswarar Temple, Mylapore, Chennai. P.W.1 has stated that there is no separate Executive Officer or no separate Trust Board for the temple. Exhibit P-18 is the proceedings dated 17.7.1979 passed by the Commissioner of H.R. & C.E. Department. As per the aforesaid proceedings, the plaintiff temple was amalgamated with Kapaleswarar Temple as on 17.7.1979. As per clause 7(c) of the scheme decree, Exhibit P-20, the Executive Officer, Kabaleeswarar Temple has been empowered to lay a suit on behalf of Kabaleeswarar Temple. inasmuch as the plaintiff temple has got amalgamated with Kabaleeswarar Temple, the scheme decree passed for Kabaleeswarar Temple will definitely apply to the plaintiff temple also. As per the scheme, Exhibit P-20, the Executive Officer is bound to seek prior permission from the Trustees prior to filing of the suit. It has been demonstrated before this Court by the plaintiff temple that there was no trustee during the year 1989, when the suit was laid by the plaintiff temple. Exhibit P-21, resolution of the fit person and Exhibit P-22, permission granted to the Executive Officer by the Joint Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. would establish that the fit person who is the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., having passed a resolution, granted permission to the Executive Officer of Kabaleeswarar Temple, who is incharge of the plaintiff temple to institute the suit for recovery of the suit property. 54. 54. There can be no merger of two temples inasmuch as the deities in those temples cannot take a shape of single deity. The management of the plaintiff, on account of amalgamation, is being done by Kapaleeswarar Temple which is guided by the scheme framed under Exhibit P-20. The aforesaid judgment of the Bench of our High Court will not apply to a case where administration of the temple is guided by the scheme framed by the competent authority and the Executive Officer has been empowered under the scheme with the permission of the Board of Trustees to lay a suit. In view of the above, the Court holds that the present suit filed by the Executive Officer representing the plaintiff temple is maintainable. The issue is answered accordingly. 55. Issue Nos. 6 and 7:- The plaintiff temple has established that it has got title to the suit property on account of grant made by the Government. The defendants, who are now managing the property after the same was left behind by their predecessors, who were in charge of the temple in their capacity as poojaris and managers of the temple and its properties, do not have legal right to be in possession of the suit property. They cannot set up any title as against the religious institution which has established its title to the suit property or resist their claim for recovery of possession. Therefore, it is held that the plaintiff temple is entitled to a decree for recovery of possession. 56. In view of the above, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs. The defendants shall vacate and hand over possession of the suit property within three months. Suit decreed.