Judgment Samarendra Pratap Singh, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. In the instant Writ Petition, the Petitioner has prayed for conviction/amalgamation of two cases, namely, Raxaul PS Case No. 14 of 1989 (in short as the Bihar case) and Vivek Vihar PS Case No. 20 of 1989 (in short as the Delhi case) in which he has been convicted on 2nd July, 1993 and 18th December, 1993 respectively. He has further prayed to treat his custody in Bihar case with effect from 4th October, 1989 on which date production warrant was issued to him for being produced in the said case. Petitioner has also prayed for other consequential relief for his release from jail custody. 3. The facts of the case have not been mentioned in detail in the petition and as such same gathered from the Writ Petition with aid of affidavits of the Respondents appear as follows: (a) For heinous murder of his family members, namely, four children and his wife and their unethical burial, two cases were instituted against the Petitioner, one being Delhi case and other being Bihar case. (b) The Petitioner was taken into custody on 18,hl August, 1989 in Delhi case, whereas he has been taken into custody on 18th December, 1994 in Bihar case. (c) The Petitioner was awarded death sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, Sahadra Court, Delhi on 2nd July, 1993 which on appeal was reduced to life imprisonment on 30th August, 20Q4. (d) Admitted case of the Petitioner in para 9 of the Writ Petition is that he is in custody in Bihar case from 18th December, 1994 and was convicted under Section 302 and sentenced to imprisonment of life on 20th March, 1999. (e) It would further appear that Raxaul Court on 4th October, 1989 issued production warrant favouring Metropolitan Mgistrate, Sahadra, Delhi for facilitating production of Petitioner in Bihar case. However, he was produced in Raxaul Court only on 19th September, 1994, on which date he was taken into custody and remanded to judicial custody in Bihar case. 4. (a) Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, Home (General) Department also provides remission under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short the Code) and a life convict is generally released after completion of fourteen years of imprisonment. 4. (a) Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, Home (General) Department also provides remission under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short the Code) and a life convict is generally released after completion of fourteen years of imprisonment. He submits that as he was admittedly in custody in Delhi case on 18th August, 1989 he would serve out life imprisonment which is generally taken to be twenty years on 18th August, 2009. He submits that as per general admissible remission provided for in Order dated, 16th July, 2004, Annexure A1 of the Government of NCT, Delhi he ought to have been let off on 18th August, 2003 after completing fourteen years of actual imprisonment. (b) So far as Bihar case is concerned he submits that though he was taken into custody on 18th December, 1994, he should be deemed to have been taken into custody on 4th October, 1989, when production warrant was issued to Sahadra Court, Delhi for his production from Tihar jail to Raxaul Court. (c) Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that if 4th October, 1989 is shifted as the date of his custody in Bihar case he would be entitled to be released on 4th October, 2003 after serving in actual custody for fourteen years as life convicts are generally released in view of remission provided by the State Government. 5. Learned Counsel for the State submits that so far as release of the Petitioner in Delhi case is concerned, the Delhi High Court or the Delhi Government would be the appropriate Authority to issue necessary direction. So far as Bihar Court is concerned, learned Counsel submits that the period of custody can only be considered from 18th December, 1994, on which date Petitioner was taken into custody He submits that it would be evident from Order of Principal Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Bihar Government, Annexure B to the counter affidavit dated, 12th February, 2008 that 14 years of actual imprisonment in lieu of life imprisonment would be 18th December, 2008 after admissible remission the Petitioners possible date of release would be 12th February, 2008. In view of this Order, learned Counsel for the State submits that the Petitioner may represent before the State Remission Board which would finally decide his date of release as per permissible remission under relevant law in jail manual and Government circulars. 6. As far as Delhi case is concerned, this Court is in agreement with the submissions of learned State Counsel that Government of NCT of Delhi would be the appropriate Authority for passing direction in respect of plea of permissible remission and release of the Petitioner, on recommendation of Sentence Review Board. It appears from Order dated, 16th July, 2004 of Government of NCT Delhi, Home (General) Department, that a life convict becomes eligible for release after completing 14 years of actual imprisonment, though the same is not automatic. It appears that the Petitioner has remained in custody for almost 19 years in Delhi case from 18th August, 1989 to 18th April, 2008 date of passing this Order. In my view, it would be appropriate for the Petitioner, if so advised, to move the Government NCT of Delhi or the Delhi Courts for his release. 7. Now the core issue is whether Petitioner would be deemed to be in custody in Bihar case from 4th October, 1989 when the production warrant was issued by Raxaul Court on 18th December, 1994 or the date 18th December, 1994 when he was taken into custody and remanded in the Bihar case on production from Tihar jail. A person is deemed to be in custody in a particular case when he is specifically remanded in judicial custody in that case. A person is remanded to the custody in a particular case generally only on his physical appearance either being brought before the Court on arrest or on suo motto surrendering. In exceptional case a Mgistrate by issuance of custody warrant can take a person in judicial custody if one is convalescing in hospital and despite best efforts he/she cannot be brought before Court on account of physical infirmity/disability. In such cases, he has to be brought to the Court at the earliest even on stretcher etc. A person who is accused in more than one case would be deemed to be in custody in those cases only when is taken into custody in each of the cases specifically by speaking Order. 8. In such cases, he has to be brought to the Court at the earliest even on stretcher etc. A person who is accused in more than one case would be deemed to be in custody in those cases only when is taken into custody in each of the cases specifically by speaking Order. 8. Section 267 of the Code provides for making an Order for production of a person for answering to the charge or for purpose of appearing in a proceeding for giving evidence. Such Order requiring a person to be produced in the Court concerned from custody consequent to detention in another case is ordinarily referred to as issuance of production warrant. The aforesaid provision does not refer to taking a person in custody in the required case. As such a person against whom the production warrant is issued cannot be deemed to be in custody in the case merely by issuance of such warrant. Section 167(2) of the Code speaks about authorizing detention of prisoner in custody during course of investigation. Sections 209 and 309 authorize the remand of accused to custody during enquiry and trial subject to provision of bail. From reading of aforesaid provisions it would be clear that issuance of mere production warrant would not amount to taking a person in custody in that case. As such, the custody of the Petitioner would be reckoned only from 18th December, 1994 when he was formally arrested and remanded to jail. 9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has prayed for amalgamation of conviction of both cases. The criminal law does not conceive of any such feature like amalgamation of conviction. Section 427 of the Code deals with the sentence inflicted on subsequent conviction on an offender who is already undergoing sentence in another offence. Section 427(1) speaks that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is further sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such sentence would commence at the expiration of imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with previous sentence. Section 427(2) of the Code is relevant here which is quoted herein: When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Section 427(2) of the Code is relevant here which is quoted herein: When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. 10. This provision of law mandates that if a person is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in two different cases, then both the sentences would run concurrently. In this respect no formal Order of the Court is needed or required and the subsequent sentence of imprisonment would run concurrently with the earlier sentence. In other words, Section 427 of the Code indicates that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the same person in two different convictions would converge into one from the date of latter imprisonment and thereafter, it would flow through one stream alone. Section 427 of the Code intended to provide amelioration to the Petitioner. Thus, Section 427 of the Code provides for convergence of sentence of convictions and there is nothing like amalgamation of conviction. As such, the prayer of the Petitioner is misconceived. 11. It would appear from the State affidavit that the Government provides set off against the sentence of imprisonment under Section 428 and as well as remission of sentence as provided under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code and Bihar jail manual. The period of detention undergone during investigation, enquiry or trial by an accused in each of the cases by mandate of law requires to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment. Detention of a person would be reckoned from the date he or she has been taken into custody in that particular case and would also run concurrently with detention in other cases as has been propounded by Honorable Apex Court in case of State of Maharastra and Am. V/s. Najakat Ali Mubarak Ali, 2001 6 SC 311. 12. Analysing the law in this respect as detailed above, this Court now proceeds to examine the possible date of release of the Petitioner after allowing permissible remission provided for by the State Government Annexure A is a copy of a chart prepared by the IG, Prison, Bihar from which it would appear that the Petitioner was convicted on 20th March, 1999, as such, he completes period of imprisonment for life taking the same to be 20 years on 20th March, 2019. The Petitioner has remained in detention from 18th December, 1994 to 20th March, 1999 the date of conviction which comes to four years three months one day. In view of Section 428 of the Code after deducting this period from his sentence, the possible date of release would come to 20th March, 2019-4 years three months one day = 18th December, 2014. However, in view of Sections 432, 433 of the Code and provisions of Jail Manual State Government Provides remissions treating 14 years of actual imprisonment as one akin to life imprisonment. This brings down the possible date of release of Petitioner to 18th December, 2008 (18th December, 1994 + 14 years). 13. It would also appear from Annexure B of the State affidavit dated, 12th February, 2008 that Petitioner in Bihar case would be completing 14 years of actual conviction on 18th December, 2008 as he is in life imprisonment in this case from 18th December, 1994. 14. I agree with the view of the State Government that though the Petitioner was in imprisonment since 18th August, 1989 he would not be entitled to set off in this case prior to 18th December, 1994 as he was never taken into custody in this case. The set off under Section 428 of the Code is deductable only when one is actually comes under detention in that particular case. If one is detained in several cases then he can be entitled to set off in as many cases from the date he is detained in particular cases and not prior to it. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions and also in view of the own affidavit of the State Government that Petitioner would be completing fourteen years of actual imprisonment on 18th December, 2008 I direct the State Remission Board/Authorities concerned to examine the case of the Petitioner in respect of his release prior to 18th December, 2008 and pass appropriate Order in this regard. With the aforesaid observations and directions the Writ Petition is disposed of.