JUDGMENT By the Court.—Aggrieved by the order dated 15.2.1997 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) passed by the District Consumer Protection Forum, Allahabad (hereinafter called as ‘Forum’), the respondent No. 1 in Proceedings No. 986/656, arising out of the complaint No. 1074 of 1995, the petitioners have moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the prayer to issue writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the same and staying the further proceedings of complaint No. 1074 of 1995. 2. We have heard Shri B.B. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.A. Khan and Sri Kamleshwar Singh for the respondents. 3. It appears from the record that the respondent No. 2 namely Manoj Kumar Singh was allotted plot No. 9 by the petitioner No. 1 in Deoghat-Jhalwa Scheme, but in spite of the payment of price of the plot the possession was not given to him. He filed complaint No. 1074 of 1995 before the Forum, which was decided on 5.7.1996 and the petitioners were ordered to refund the amount paid by the respondent No. 2 alongwith interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum within the specified period and after that 18 per cent per annum, copy of order is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Aggrieved by the said order of the forum the petitioners preferred appeal before the State Commission under Section 15 of the Act, which is pending. In the meantime, the respondent No. 2 moved application under Section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act’) for execution of the order passed by the Forum and the Forum passed order under Section 27 of the Act, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition. By the impugned order, the Secretary of the Allahabad Development Authority was sentenced to undergo three months imprisonment in addition to the fine of Rs. 5,000/- only and for execution of the penalty, it was directed that the proceedings under Section 25 of the Act be started. 4. As regards the merits of the order dated 5.7.1996 passed by the Forum in complaint No. 1074 of 1995 is concerned that has not to be looked into by this Court in writ petition because the appeal preferred under the Act is pending before the competent Court. 5. 4. As regards the merits of the order dated 5.7.1996 passed by the Forum in complaint No. 1074 of 1995 is concerned that has not to be looked into by this Court in writ petition because the appeal preferred under the Act is pending before the competent Court. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised a very short question in this writ petition for consideration, whether the order of the District Consumer Forum becomes non-executable merely because an appeal has been filed. In this connection he has referred the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, which reads as under : “Finality of orders.—Every order of a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of the Act, be final.” 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners have contended that as soon as the appeal is preferred to the State Commission against the order passed by the District Consumer Forum, the order becomes non-executable whether any stay has been granted or not by the Appellate Authority. But we are not convinced by this argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. No doubt under Section 24 of the Act, there is no mention of any stay order but this is a general principle of law that unless and until the Appellate Court stays the operation of the order of the Trial Authority, the order remains executable and the limitation also runs from the date of passing the order and in computing the period of limitation the stay period is excluded. Where no limitation is given in Special Act, the provisions of Limitation Act will apply. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also contended that since this Act is Special Act, hence, the provisions of the Act shall prevail over any procedural law. But we are not convinced with this argument also. Section 3 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The Apex Court has laid down the law regarding executability of any order or decree. But we are not convinced with this argument also. Section 3 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The Apex Court has laid down the law regarding executability of any order or decree. In the case of Ratan Singh v. Vijay Singh and others, 2001 (1) All CJ 752, the Apex Court has made following observations which is quoted below : “Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the Appellate Court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court then it is the Appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower Court decree continues to be enforceable.” 8. Moreover, when the order under Section 27 of the Act was passed by the Forum, it was desirable for the petitioners to file appeal against that order under Section 27-A of the Act, which was not done by them. There was no occasion for the petitioner to come up in the writ petition before this Court, when the alternative and effective remedy was already provided under the Act. Admittedly, no stay order was passed by the State Commission in the appeal preferred by the petitioners under Section 15 of the Act, therefore, the Forum was free to executre its order under Section 25 of the Act and impose penalty under Section 27 of the Act. Instead of preferring appeal under Section 27-A of the Act, the petitioners have chosen wrong forum before this Court. 9. As regards the merits of the order dated 15.2.1997 in Misc. Proceedings No. 986/656, arising out of the complaint No. 1074 of 1995 is concerned that has also not to be looked into by this Court in this writ petition. The merits of the order should have been challenged by the petitioners before the State Commission under Section 27-A of the Act or if the law permitted so, should have applied before the Forum itself to recall or modified that order. 10. In view of our above discussions, this writ petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed with cost. ————