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2008 DIGILAW 627 (GAU)

North East Plains People Traders and Youth Federation v. Union and India

2008-08-27

BROJENDRA PRASAD KATAKEY, RANJAN GOGOI

body2008
JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. The writ petitioner is an Association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 having its registered office at Silchar within the State of Assam. The petitioner Association claims to represent the non-Mizo/non-tribal traders of Assam having business in Mizoram, particularly, in the districts of Aizawl and Lunglei. Most of the members of the petitioner Association, it is claimed, are permanent residents of the three districts in the Barak Valley of the State of Assam i.e. Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi. In the present writ application, the petitioner Association seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of the Eastern Bengal Frontier Regulation, 1873, hereinafter referred to as the Inner Line Regulation. The guidelines for the enforcement of the said Inner Line Regulation framed by the State of Mizoram in exercise of powers conferred by Section 2 of the aforesaid Regulation and published on 1.9.2006 has also been challenged in the present writ application. 2. The Inner Line Regulation had been initially introduced by the then Secretary of State for India in the eastern most frontier areas of the province of Bengal, of which Assam had then been a part. It was made applicable to the districts of Kamrup, Darrang, Nagaon, Sivasagar, Lakhimpur and subsequently extended to other areas of the then province of Assam which today comprises the States of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. Specifically the Regulation was extended to the then Lusai Hills district of the State of Assam (presently the State of Mizoram) on and from 28.8.1930. The detailed objects for introduction of the aforesaid Regulation to the areas in question need not detain the Court, save and except that such introduction was designed to protect the tribal people inhabiting the areas in question from increasing social and economic exploitation and prevent the prospect of incessant invasion into their independent domain. The said Regulation, it must be noticed, was adapted under the Government of India Act, 1935 and, thereafter, under the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. The said Regulation was again adapted under the North-Eastern Areas (Re-organization) Act, 1971 and has continued to hold the field in the absence of any decision of the State Legislature of Mizoram either to repeal or amend the enactment. 3. The said Regulation was again adapted under the North-Eastern Areas (Re-organization) Act, 1971 and has continued to hold the field in the absence of any decision of the State Legislature of Mizoram either to repeal or amend the enactment. 3. To give effect to the provisions of the Regulation and for due enforcement thereof, the Government of Mizoram from time to time, has framed guidelines in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2 of the Regulation. In so far as the present case is concerned, the guidelines published by the Notification dated 1.9.2006 which are presently holding the field and under challenge in the present writ petition, will be required to be noticed. In view of the issues that have arisen in the present writ petition, the relevant provisions of the guidelines with a brief analysis of the same may be set out below : 1. Authorities for issue of Inner Line Pass (hereinafter referred to as ILP) : (1) Regular ILP: The Deputy Commissioner of Aizawl District, Lunglei District, Kolasib District, Mamit District, Serchhip District, Champai District, Lawngtlai District and Saiha District or any other concerned subordinate officer authorized by them on their behalf shall be competent to issue regular ILP for a period not exceeding 6(six) months, subject to the availability of a sponsor who is a bonafide indigenous resident. (2) Temporary ILP: The Resident Commissioner, Government of Mizoram at New Delhi, the Liaison Officer, Silchar, Shillong, Guwahati, Kolkata, the Deputy Superintendent of Police in-charge of Airport Security at Lengpui, Officer-in-charge of Kanhmun Police Station, Administrative Officer, Bairabi and Sub Divisional Officer (C), Ngopa are authorized to issue Temporary ILP in Form E for a period not exceeding 159fifteenO days, to bonafide visitors/tourists or business representatives with intimation to the concerned Deputy Commissioner. (2)(a) The Officers, authorized to issue temporary ILPs, should also ensure that the temporary ILPs are issued only on Government working days i.e. no temporary ILPs will be issued on Saturdays, Sundays and Government Holidays. (3) Renewal or extension of ILP: The Deputy Commissioner of Aizawl District, Kolasib District, Mamit District, Serchhip District, Champai District, Lunglei District, Lawngtlai District and Saiha District or any other concerned subordinate officer authorized by them on their behalf may on application renew or extend the validity of the ILP of the holder residing in their respective districts for not more than two times. Renewal of ILP shall be subject to the good conduct of the ILP holder that he/she is not involved in any criminal activity. (3)(a).................. (3)(b).................. 2. Categories of Persons to be exempted (1) In partial modification of the Notification No. PLA.393/70-Pt/I dt. 7.9.1970 which prohibits all person other then officers on Government duty and indigenous inhabitants of the then Mizo District (now the State of Mizoram), from crossing the Inner Line, it is prescribed that in addition to the persons exempted under the said notification, members of the Security Forces and the families of such non-indigenous and regular or permanent Government servants, and employees of the Government Undertakings and Corporations shall also remain exempted : Provided that the expression 'family' shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under the FR & SR or the CCS Pension Rules; Provided further that a retired government employee settled in Mizoram by virtue of his or her marriage to an indigenous tribal of Mizoram, and Government Advocates as well as the advocates on Defence Panels of Government shall also remain exempted from requiring to have an ILP. (2) Entry of foreigners into Mizoram is regulated under the provisions of Foreigners (Protected Areas) Order, 1958 made under the provision of Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950. (3) The system of issuing Identity Cards with photographs may be adopted for regular Government servants for easy identification at the check gates. Although the Government servants on duty visiting Mizoram and staying temporarily are not required to carry Inner Line Pass but due to ignorance about their identity, the men posted in the check gate may refuse their entry. Identity Cards will be useful in such situations. In the absence of Identity Card, Government servant should carry a movement order or even an Inner Line Pass to avoid any risk of being refused entry due to ignorance of his order identity. (4) Students of Educational Institutions of the State possessing genuine Identity Cards issued by the Institutions shall be exempted from requiring to have ILP during the period of their studies. The Heads of the Institutions may clearly state the year/period of study in the Identity Cards. 5. Verification of Character and Antecedents. (4) Students of Educational Institutions of the State possessing genuine Identity Cards issued by the Institutions shall be exempted from requiring to have ILP during the period of their studies. The Heads of the Institutions may clearly state the year/period of study in the Identity Cards. 5. Verification of Character and Antecedents. (1) A simple yet effective system of verifying the character and antecedents of the intending visitors or tourists may be adopted by the Pass issuing authorities so that the procedure is not made too cumbersome for the administrative machinery and also for the intending visitors or tourists in normal cases. While in doubtful cases, it may become necessary to go deeper by even referring to the home districts of the intending visitors or tourists. In normal cases, it should be enough to verify from the applicant himself by the Pass issuing authority. The pass-issuing authority, however, has the right to grant the pass or reject the application without assigning any reason. (2) The influx of Bangladeshi nationals into the districts of Karimganj, Hailakandi and Cachar of Assam has to be taken into consideration while issuing ILPs to persons claiming to be from these districts. The ILP issuing authorities should insist on the production of EPI Card of relevant extract of Electoral Roll countersigned by concerned ERO or genuine reliable document to prove the bonafide identity as Indian citizen of the applicant from applicants above the age of 18 years and residential or birth certificate or bonafide document from applicants below 18 years. This is required to ensure that only bonafide Indian citizens of these districts avail the ILP and that the security of the State is not jeopardized. 8. Passes for non-indigenous businessmen/Traders holding Trade Licenses. There are a few non-indigenous persons who are running shops/businesses by virtue of Trade Licenses, either Permanent or Temporary, granted to them by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the Autonomous District Councils (Lai, Chakma and Lakher). 8. Passes for non-indigenous businessmen/Traders holding Trade Licenses. There are a few non-indigenous persons who are running shops/businesses by virtue of Trade Licenses, either Permanent or Temporary, granted to them by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the Autonomous District Councils (Lai, Chakma and Lakher). Special arrangements have to be made for them, and regular ILP may be issued to them in the following manner : (1) Permanent Trade License holders: Inner Line Passes with validity exceeding 1(one) year but not exceeding 3(three) years, renewable by 1(one) year at a time may be issued to persons who are in possession of Permanent Trade License issued by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the Autonomous District Councils (Lai, Chakma and Lakher) and to the members of their family. Such Permanent Trade License holders are also allowed to sponsor non-indigenous employees numbering not more than 3(three) for the purpose of carrying their business as manager, attendant etc. (2) Temporary Trade License holders: Inner Line Passes with validity exceeding 1(one) but not exceeding 3(three) years, renewable by 1(one) year at a time 'may be issued to persons, who are in possession of Temporary Trade License issued by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the Autonomous District Councils (Lai, Chakma and Lakher) and to the members of their family subject to prior approval of the Government. 9. Passes for non-indigenous employees of the Private or Public Sector Companies, Corporations and Firms : There are Private or Public Sector Companies, Corporations and Firms whose services are required for execution of work contract in the State. If such Companies, Corporations and Firms require ILP for registration under Mizoram Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and the Rules made thereunder, the Government shall have the right to issue Inner Line Passes of 2(two) years validity to one representative (CEO/Managing Director/Manager etc.) of the companies/firms to enable them to register under MVAT Act, 2005. Other non-indigenous employees my be issued Regular ILP by the Deputy Commissioner upon sponsorship by the Government Department under which the Companies, Corporations and Firms are executing work contract. In case of casual traders or dealers whose services are required for execution of Development Projects and Schemes inside the State of Mizoram, the Government shall have the right to issue ILP with validity of 2 years on case to case basis to make them eligible for registration under MVAT Act, 2005. 10. In case of casual traders or dealers whose services are required for execution of Development Projects and Schemes inside the State of Mizoram, the Government shall have the right to issue ILP with validity of 2 years on case to case basis to make them eligible for registration under MVAT Act, 2005. 10. Passes for non-indigenous proprietors of non-CSD canteens (unit canteens) of Central Forces. State Police : The Central Forces like BRTF, BSF, Assam Rifles etc stationed in various places in the State have non-CSD canteens(unit canteens) run by non-indigenous persons. Similarly, the State Police have canteens in several places like Battalion Headquarters, District Headquarters, Police Stations etc. The Government shall have the right to issue ILP with 2(two) years validity to the non-indigenous proprietors of these canteens subject to certain conditions as may be laid down for this purpose. Such proprietors once issued ILP with 2(two) years validity are allowed to sponsor non-indigenous employees numbering not more than 3(three) for the purpose of carrying their business as manager, attendant etc. 11. Issue of Provisional Inner Line Pass to import Labourers in bulk. A large number of Inner Line Passes are often issued to labourers of Border Roads Task Force, Public Works Department, Public Health Engineering, Power and Electricity Department and their Contractors, Environment and Forest Department and to its Mahaldars/Contractors, Government Undertakings and Corporations. Such labourers can be the clandestine source of infiltration of a large number of anti-social and anti-national elements or spread of various communicable diseases. Therefore, special care has to be taken to screen them and regulate it properly. A too rigid system of screening would lead to non-availability of skilled/semi-skilled/unskilled labourers for development works. Therefore, a simple yet effective system of verifying their characters and antecedents will have to be adopted. The following procedure maybe followed : (1) The Deputy Commissioner of Aizawl District, Lunglei District, Kolasib District, Mamit District, Serchhip District, Champai District, Lawngtlai District and Saiha District or any Officer authorized by them may issue provisional passes for labourers wife validity of 15(fifteen) days, on the recommendation of the Chief Engineer, Pushpak, Engineer-in-Chief, Public Works Department and the Zonal Chief Engineers below him, as the case may be. Before submission of such recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl the sponsoring Departments/authorities shall obtain 'No Objection Certificate' from the Labour & Employment Department. 4. Before submission of such recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl the sponsoring Departments/authorities shall obtain 'No Objection Certificate' from the Labour & Employment Department. 4. A reading of the provisions of the guidelines quoted above would go to show that under Clause 1(1) Regular Inner Line Pass (hereinafter referred to as 'ILP') can be granted for a period not exceeding six months subject to a sponsorship being made by a bonafide indigenous resident of Mizoram. Temporary ILPs can be granted for a period not exceeding fifteen days to the bonafide visitors/tourists or businessmen. Under Clause 1(3) of the Regulation renewal or extension of ILPs granted can be made, but not more than two times. Under Clause 2 of the Regulation, the members of the Security Forces and their families; non-indigenous persons who are regular or permanent Government servants and employees of Government Undertakings and Corporations are exempted from the requirement of obtaining an ILP. Students undergoing studies in educational institutions in the State of Mizoram are also exempted for the period of their study subject to such period being clearly mentioned in their identity cards. Under Clause 8, non-indigenous persons who are running their business by virtue of Trade Licenses, permanent or temporary, granted by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the Autonomous District Councils of Lai, Chakma and Lakher form a special class for whom regular ILPs are to be granted. In case of Permanent Trade License Holders, ILPs are to be granted for any period between one to three years, renewable by one year at a time. The members of the family of such Permanent Trade License Holders are also entitled to regular ILPs for the periods noted above. Besides, such Permanent Trade License Holders are also allowed to sponsor non-indigenous employees, not exceeding three in number, for the purpose of carrying on their business. In so far as the Temporary Trade License Holders are concerned, regular ILPs are to be issued for a similar period as in the case of Permanent Trade License Holders along with their families subject to prior approval of the Government. However, such Temporary Trade License Holders are not allowed to sponsor any non-indigenous employee for the purpose of their business. However, such Temporary Trade License Holders are not allowed to sponsor any non-indigenous employee for the purpose of their business. Clauses 9, 10 and 11 of the Regulation quoted above deal with grant of ILPs to employees of the private or public sector companies, Corporations or Firms executing works in Mizoram; permits for non-indigenous proprietors of non-CSD canteens of Central Forces and ILPs for import of labourers in bulk for execution of works in Mizoram. The aforesaid provisions of the Regulation being self contained and the same not being very relevant for the purpose of the present case, for the sake of brevity, a detailed consideration of the said provisions is not being attempted in the present order. 5. The pleaded case of the petitioner Association is broadly to the following effect : It is stated that all the members of the petitioner Association were holding valid ILPs at one point of time or the other. Such ILPs have not be renewed, which action was sought to be justified by the authorities of the State of Mizoram by relying on the provisions of Clause 1(3) of the Regulation. According to the petitioner, the applications for fresh ILPs by the members of the petitioner Association have been answered by the State by contending that fresh ILPs cannot be granted in view of a Court order passed in a proceeding registered as Civil Suit No. 19/2000 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Aizawl. According to the petitioner, enquiries have revealed that there is no such case in the file of the learned Civil Judge, as contended. According to the writ petitioner, the consequence of the stand taken by the State of Mizoram is that, in the absence of any renewal or grant of fresh ILPs, there is a legal bar on the entry or stay of the members of the petitioner Association in Mizoram. The petitioner Association in the writ petition filed has also alleged that almost all its members have subsisting business interests in Mizoram for generations particularly, in the districts of Aizawl and Lunglei stations. Trade Licenses had been granted to the members of the petitioner Association and, in some cases, to their predecessors under the provisions of the erstwhile Lusai Hills District (Trading by Non-Tribals) Rules, 1964. Trade Licenses had been granted to the members of the petitioner Association and, in some cases, to their predecessors under the provisions of the erstwhile Lusai Hills District (Trading by Non-Tribals) Rules, 1964. According to the petitioner Association, in the year 1975, a new law i.e. Mizoram (Trading by Non-Tribals Regulation) Act, 1974 was framed which came into force with effect from 7.5.1977. The aforesaid Act was to remain in force for a period of ten years and has lapsed in the meantime. While the Act was in operation, under Section 14 thereof, an order dated 7.5.1977 was issued by the Governor of the then Union Territory of Mizoram to the effect that all non-tribals who had been the residents of the Union Territory for the last ten years or more stand exempted from the requirement of obtaining Trade License under the provisions of the-aforesaid Act. It is the case of the petitioner Association that the members of the Association accordingly submitted their existing Trade Licenses to the authorities against valid receipts. However, till date neither any formal exemption order has been issued to any of the members of the petitioner Association, nor any Trade License has been renewed or fresh license has been issued. In such circumstances, the members of the petitioner Association are constrained to carry on their business without any Trade License and in an environment of utter uncertainty or apprehension. It is contended by the petitioner that the Act of 1975 having ceased to have any effect after expiry often years from the date of its coming into force, the Government has not been issuing any Trade License to the members of the petitioner Association. It is the further case of the petitioner that under the provisions of the Mizoram Value Added Tax Act, 2005 as well as under the provisions of the erstwhile Mizoram Sales Tax Act, 1989, registration as a dealer under the provisions of the Act is contingent on the applicant possessing a valid ILP. As no ELP is being issued or the existing ILPs are not being renewed, the members of the petitioner Association cannot be registered under the Act to legitimately carry on their business. As no ELP is being issued or the existing ILPs are not being renewed, the members of the petitioner Association cannot be registered under the Act to legitimately carry on their business. In such a situation, according to the petitioner, various unscrupulous tribal bodies have been taking the law into their own hands and have been threatening and intimidating the non-tribal traders including the members of the petitioner Association, to leave Mizoram and refrain from doing any business. The petitioner further complains of the failure of the law-enforcing agency to take timely and appropriate remedial measures to protect the rights and interests of the members of the petitioner Association. The aforesaid circumstances having given rise to a situation where the members of the petitioner Association, who are non-Mizo/non-tribal/non-indigenous residents, have been totally prohibited from carrying on their business, the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation and the guidelines dated 1.9.2006 framed thereunder as well as the impugned actions of the respondent State have been challenged as ultra vires the provisions of Article 19(i)(e) & (g) of the Constitution, not being saved by the provisions contained in Article 19(5) and (6) of the Constitution. The infringement of the rights guaranteed by Article 19(i)(e) & (g) of the Constitution, according to the petitioner Association being virtually in respect of all non-Mizo/non-tribal traders and businessmen having business interest in Mizoram or intending to carry on such business, the present writ petition has been filed as a Public Interest Litigation on the basis that the issues raised concern violation of the fundamental rights of a class of determinate citizens, the number of which is fairly large. In the writ petition filed, averments have been made to the effect that the names and particulars of the members of the petitioner Association on whose behalf this writ petition has been filed have not been incorporated in the documents enclosed to the writ petition in order to prevent unnecessary harassment or intimidation to such members and furthermore that in the event such particulars are required, the petitioner Association will submit the same to the Court at a later stage. 6. 6. The respondent State has filed an affidavit in the case wherein it has been contended that the present writ petition should not be admitted as a Public Interest Litigation, inasmuch as, the petitioner Association claims to represent persons whose individual rights are alleged to have been violated by the provisions of the impugned Regulation/guidelines and the actions taken on that basis by the State. Furthermore, it is contended that the petitioner Association has not submitted to the Court the list of its members along with the relevant papers and particulars of the members who were granted ILPs or Trade Licenses. No particulars of the submission of the Trade Licenses to the authorities of the State against valid receipts, as claimed, have also been disclosed by the petitioner along with other relevant facts. It is the contention of the respondent State that in the absence of the aforesaid particulars, this writ petition cannot be construed to be a bonafide attempt at espousing the cause or causes of the citizens on whose behalf it is professed to be filed. The respondent State has, therefore, prayed that this writ petition should be dismissed at the threshold without entering into any adjudication of the issues raised therein. 7. In the affidavit filed, the respondent State has further stated that a Civil Suit being Civil Suit No. 19/2000 has been instituted and is presently pending in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Aizawl. The said Suit has been filed by an Association of Mizo Traders seeking a direction to the State not to grant ILPs to the persons holding powers of attorney issued by holders of Trade Licenses granted by the erstwhile Mizo District Council or under the provisions of the Act of 1975. According to the State, in the said Civil Suit it has been averred that most of the holders of such Trade Licenses are not running their business by themselves and have issued powers of attorney to certain individuals whose identity and nationality is suspect. In the said Civil Suit an interim order has been passed by the learned Court directing the State not to issue any illegal ILP. Consequently, directions have been issued by the State to grant ILPs of two years duration to Temporary Trade License Holders whereas Permanent Trade License Holders are being granted ILPs after due verification. 8. In the said Civil Suit an interim order has been passed by the learned Court directing the State not to issue any illegal ILP. Consequently, directions have been issued by the State to grant ILPs of two years duration to Temporary Trade License Holders whereas Permanent Trade License Holders are being granted ILPs after due verification. 8. In the affidavit filed, the respondent State has traced the history of the Regulation as in force in the State of Mizoram after extension of the same to the erstwhile Lusai Hills District in the year 1930. According to the State, the Inner Line Regulation 'aims at maintaining or restoration of peace by protection of indigenous tribes from the encroachment of their areas by their neighbouring people as such encroachments led to countless bloodshed in those bygone days'. It is the further case of the State of Mizoram that 'if such protective regulations are to be taken away and if their territories are to be freely opened to all, the majority non-tribal populace of the country would surely enjoy their rights to its full, but for the tribals, it would usher in the end of the beginning of their life with their distinctive identity, which would eventually lead to their total disappearance from the face of the earth'. It is, therefore, contended that the provisions of the Regulation are within the scope and ambit of reasonable restrictions permitted by Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The respondents have further contended that the grievances expressed by the petitioner Association with regard to Clause 8 of the guidelines are absolutely unfounded. Under the said Clause 8, a Permanent Trade License Holder or even a Temporary Trade License Holder is entitled to year renewals of special ELPs covered by Clause 8. That apart, it has been contended that the provisions of Clause 8 enabling a Permanent Trade License Holder to sponsor three non-indigenous persons for running his business is considered to be adequate and reasonable and not prohibitive, inasmuch as, there is no dearth of local/indigenous workers in the State of Mizoram. Refuting the contention of the petitioner that no ILPs have been granted, the respondent State, in the affidavit filed, has placed before the Court the precise number of Temporary ILPs granted by the authorities competent to issue such permits during the period May, 2007 to April, 2008. Refuting the contention of the petitioner that no ILPs have been granted, the respondent State, in the affidavit filed, has placed before the Court the precise number of Temporary ILPs granted by the authorities competent to issue such permits during the period May, 2007 to April, 2008. In the affidavit filed, the number of non-tribal traders who are presently registered under the Mizoram Value Added Tax Act, 2005 has also been mentioned. Above all, it is contended that the tribal population of Mizoram as per 2001 census is 8,91,058, which constitutes 0.08% of the total population of the country. The tribal people of Mizoram have their own distinct identity and culture which has been possible to be maintained only account of the enforcement of the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation of 1873. In the affidavit filed the respondent State has specifically denied the allegation of the petitioner with regard to the unlawful actions of different tribal groups in seeking to evict the non-Mizo/non-tribal businessmen from the State as well as the complaints of Police inaction in the matter. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, as noticed above, the first question that arises in the present case is whether this writ petition filed as a Public Interest Litigation should be entertained by the Court as such. The aforesaid question has to be answered in the context of the fact that the petitioner Association, representing certain members has complained of violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(i)(g) in respect of its members. In addition, violation of such rights of other non-Mizo/non-tribal traders who are not members of the petitioner Association has also been sought to be raised. Naturally, if the aforesaid question is to be answered in favour of the petitioner and this writ petition should be treated by the Court as a Public Interest Litigation, the issues arising will have to be answered. However, in the event the said question is answered in the negative, the further question that will require an answer from the Court is whether even though the writ petition ought not to be treated as a Public Interest Litigation, the same can be considered in the light of the grievances expressed with regard to the members of the petitioner Association. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel for the petitioner Association in the course of his elaborate argument has taken the Court through the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation and the administrative guidelines framed thereunder including the statutory forms prescribed under the said guidelines for submission of application for ILPs and the forms in which such ILPs are required to be granted. At the very outset Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that though the constitutional validity of the inner Line Regulation of 1873 has been questioned in the present writ petition, the petitioner Association would not press the said issue. The learned Counsel, therefore, has submitted that he would confine his argument to the validity of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 and the actions taken by the authorities of the respondent State while implementing the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation. Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that apart from the individual grievances of the members of the petitioner Association as raised in the writ petition, other questions involving violation of the fundamental rights of a large number of citizens have also been raised which should be gone into and adjudicated by the Court by treating the writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation, According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, the Court should avoid a narrow or technical approach when the issue of invasion of fundamental rights of the citizens are involved, particularly, when the writ petition has been admitted to regular hearing by the Court. In this regard the following observation of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Aslant alias Bhure v. Union of India and Ors. reported in [2003] 3 SCR 143 has been relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharyya. 10. On several occasions this Court has treated letters, telegrams or postcards or news reports as writ petitions. In such petitions, on the basis of pleadings that emerge in the case after notice to different parties, relief has been given or refused. Therefore, this Court would not approach matters where public interest is involved in a technical or a narrow manner. Particularly, when this Court has entertained this petition, issued notice to different parties, new parties have been impleaded and interim order has also been granted, it would not be appropriate for this Court to dispose of the petition on that ground. 11. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Particularly, when this Court has entertained this petition, issued notice to different parties, new parties have been impleaded and interim order has also been granted, it would not be appropriate for this Court to dispose of the petition on that ground. 11. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Bhattacharyya on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Gupta, V.M. Tarkunde, J.L. Kalra and Ors. Iqbal M. Chagla and Ors. Rajappa, P. Subramaniam, D.N. Pandey and Ors. v. President of India and Ors. reported in [1982] 2 SCR 365. Elaborately placing the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, Mr. Bhattacharyya has drawn the pointed attention of the Court to the view expressed by the Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment. Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that on the same analogy as contained in paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner Association must be understood to be vitally interested in the conduct of business by all non-Mizo/non-tribal citizens which would clothe the petitioner Association with sufficient locus to maintain the writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation. The views expressed by the Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment having been relied upon, the relevant part of it may be usefully extracted below: 25. If we apply these principles to determine the question of locus standi in the writ petition of Iqbal Chagla and Ors. in which alone this question has been sharply raised, it will be obvious that the petitioners had clearly and indisputably locus standi to maintain their writ petition. The petitioners are lawyers practising in the High Court of Bombay. The first petitioner is a member of the Bombay Bar Association, petitioners, Nos. 2 and 3 are members of the Advocates Association of Western India and petitioner No.4 is the President of the Incorporated Law Society. There can be no doubt that the petitioners have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if an unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary, the petitioners would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such action. The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They assist the court in dispensing justice and it can hardly be disputed that without their help, it would be well nigh impossible for the Court to administer justice. Thee are really and truly officers of the Court in which they daily sit and practice. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of the judicial system and if the integrity or independence of the judiciary is threatened by any act of the State or any public authority, they would naturally be concerned about it, because they are equal partners with the Judges in the administration of justice, Iqbal Chagla and others cannot be regarded as mere bystanders or meddlesome interlopers in filing the writ petition. 12. Furthermore, by relying on the observations of the Apex Court in paragraph 61 of the judgment in the case of Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in [1987] 2 SCR 223, Mr. Bhattacharyya has appealed to the Court to shed the procedural shackles and hear the present writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation as the issue(s) raised pertains to gross violation of fundamental rights of a group/class of citizens. 13. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further submitted that there being nothing to doubt the bonafides of the petitioner Association in seeking to espouse a larger cause, this writ petition would be maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation on the authority of the views of the Apex Court contained in paragraph 109 of the judgment in the case of Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. reported in 1993 CriLJ 600. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors. reported in [1984] 2 SCR 67 has also been relied upon. Pointed attention of the Court has been drawn to the views of the Apex Court contained in para 10 of the judgment in the case of Chaitanya Kumar v. The State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in [1986] 2 SCR 409. reported in [1984] 2 SCR 67 has also been relied upon. Pointed attention of the Court has been drawn to the views of the Apex Court contained in para 10 of the judgment in the case of Chaitanya Kumar v. The State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in [1986] 2 SCR 409. Relying on the said judgment, it has been contended that in the present case arbitrariness being ex-facie apparent in State action and large scale invasion of fundamental rights having occurred, the Court should not shirk its duty to entertain the writ petition. On the point of maintainability of the writ petition, lastly Mr. Bhattacharyya has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bar Council of Maharashstra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc. etc. reported in [1976] 1 SCR 306. Relying on the aforesaid decision wherein the Apex Court held a Bar Council to be a 'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted relying on the observations contained in paragraph 27 of the aforesaid judgment, that in the present case also a broader meaning must be attributed to the expression 'person aggrieved' to include within its fold the petitioner Association. 14. Continuing, Mr. Bhattacharyya has argued that in the present case the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 are ex-facie ultra vires the provisions contained in Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution, inasmuch as, the effect of the provisions contained in the guidelines impose a virtual prohibition, as distinguished from reasonable restrictions, on the entry of non-Mizo/non-tribal persons into Mizoram particularly, those connected with trade or business. Mr. Bhattacharyya has argued that what is permissible under Article 19(5) and (6) are reasonable restrictions having an acceptable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Specifically, according to Mr. Bhattacharyya, the provisions of Clause 1(1) and 1(3) of the guidelines have imposed a prohibition on grant and renewal of a regular ILP beyond a period of eighteen months. No non-Mizo trader or businessman can, therefore, stay in Mizoram beyond eighteen months even to carry on his legitimate business. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further submitted that the requirement of an indigenous sponsor for the purpose of submitting an application for a regular ILP has in effect also imposed a virtual prohibition on the non-Mizo citizens from obtaining a regular ILP. No non-Mizo trader or businessman can, therefore, stay in Mizoram beyond eighteen months even to carry on his legitimate business. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further submitted that the requirement of an indigenous sponsor for the purpose of submitting an application for a regular ILP has in effect also imposed a virtual prohibition on the non-Mizo citizens from obtaining a regular ILP. This is because of the local conditions in Mizoram i.e. threat, intimidation and violence against non-tribals, no indigenous person is willing to sponsor a non-tribal for issuance of an ILP. Mr. Bhattacharyya has also pointed out that as per the conditions enclosed to the ILP to be issued in the prescribed form (Form AA) the indigenous citizen sponsoring a non-tribal has to submit an undertaking, the terms of which would act as a virtual inhibition for any indigenous person from coming forward to sponsor a non-tribal. Pointing out to the provisions of Clause 5 of the Regulation, Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that the authority competent to issue an ILP has been vested with an unfettered discretion to reject an application without assigning any reason. The situation is worst compounded in the absence of any remedy against such an order under the provisions of the guidelines. In so far as Clause 8 of the guidelines dated 1.9.2006 is concerned, Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that the limitation on the number of non-indigenous persons who can be sponsored by a Permanent Trade License Holder being fixed at three, the same constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(i)(g), inasmuch as, in the context of larger business operations three employees who can be sponsored may not be adequate for running the business. 15. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the reasonableness of the restriction sought to be imposed has to be judged by testing the validity of the substantive law as well as the procedural requirements prescribed under such law. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The State of Madras v. V.G Row reported in 1952 CriLJ 966 Mr. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The State of Madras v. V.G Row reported in 1952 CriLJ 966 Mr. Bhattacharyya has submitted that the test for determination of reasonableness of the restrictions laid down by Apex Court in the said case has withstood the test of time and, therefore, has to be applied to the present case to determine the constitutional validity of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 and the actions of the respondent State. Paragraph 15 of the aforesaid judgment having been relied upon and being relevant, may be usefully extracted hereinbelow: 15. This Court had occasion in Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi (1950) SCP 519 to define the scope of the judicial review under Clause (5) of Article 19where the phrase "imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right" also occurs and four out of the five Judges participating in the decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorized. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.". Reliance in this regard has also been placed on another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Anr. reported in [1958] 1 SCR 308. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further argued that in determining the reasonableness of a restriction imposed the Courts have always sought to strike a just balance between the deprivation of the right and the evil that is sought to be avoided. Of the several decisions cited to bring home the above point, reference may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and Ann, reported in [1967] 1 SCR 1012 by which judgment the Apex Court, by a majority view, held Section 3 of the Lushai Hills District (Trading by Non-Tribal) Rules, 1954 to be constitutionally invalid. The views of the Apex Court expressed in para 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment may usefully be extracted below : 7. The views of the Apex Court expressed in para 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment may usefully be extracted below : 7. These authorities clearly demonstrate that the fundamental rights of a citizen to carry on trade can be restricted only by making a law imposing the interest of the general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such a right, that such restrictions should not be arbitrary or excessive or beyond what is required in the interest of the general public and that an uncontrolled and uncanalized power conferred on the authority would be an unreasonable restriction or such right. Though a legislative policy may be expressed in a statute it must provide a suitable machinery for implementing that policy in such a manner that such implementation does not result in undue to excessive hardship and arbitrariness. The question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is clearly a justiciable concept and it is for the court to come to one conclusion or the other having regard to the considerations laid down in (supra). It is also well established that where a provisions restricts any one of the fundamental rights it is for the State to establish the reasonableness of such restriction and for the Court to decide in the light of the circumstances in each case, the policy and the object of the impugned legislation and the mischief it seeks to prevent. 8. With this background I now proceed to examine the provisions of the Regulation and consider whether the power granted under S. 3 amounts to a reasonable restriction so as to save it under Article 19(6). As already stated, under para 10 of the Sixth Schedule the District Council has the power to enact regulations for regulating and controlling moneylending or trading by non-tribals in the District. Clause 1 empowers the Council in general terms to make regulations and Clause 2 empowers it in particular to make regulations prescribing that a non-tribal after the enactment of such a regulation shall not carry on trade except under a licence. Reading para 10 fairly and as a whole it would seem that the Constitution-makers were anxious that the tribals should be safeguarded from unfair exploitation by non-tribals entering the District and carrying on moneylending and other activities. Reading para 10 fairly and as a whole it would seem that the Constitution-makers were anxious that the tribals should be safeguarded from unfair exploitation by non-tribals entering the District and carrying on moneylending and other activities. It appears that Regulation 2 of 1953 was passed for the avowed object set out in para 10 of the Sixth Schedule though its preamble merely states that it was expedient to regulate and control trade by non-tribals. Section 3 of the Regulation lays down a prohibition against any one carrying on trade without a licence and except in accordance with the terms of such licence. The effect of this section is that if a non-tribal wishes to carry on trade in the District but is refused the licence, such refusal would result in a total prohibition against him from carrying on any trade. Even if a licence is issued it can only be a temporary licence for one year only. If the Executive Committee to which this power is delegated by the Rules were to refuse to renew it such refusal would mean that he has to stop the trade which he was until then carrying on. In the first case it is a prohibition and in the other a total extinction of his trade. It is clear from the Regulation and the Rules made thereunder that there is no right of appeal to any superior authority against a refusal to grant or renew a licence. There is also no provision either in the Regulation or in the Rules empowering any civil court to adjudicate against any such order of the Executive Committee. A non-tribal trader therefore has no remedy whatsoever against such an order though the refusal to grant or renew a licence amounts to his being totally barred from trading in one case and his business or trade being destroyed in the other. Even if a non-tribal obtains a licence and starts a trade investing therein a large, capital, there would be no security for such trade as the licence would be for one year only. The Executive Committee can refuse to renew his licence and such refusal would as aforesaid result in the total extinction of his trade. Even if a non-tribal obtains a licence and starts a trade investing therein a large, capital, there would be no security for such trade as the licence would be for one year only. The Executive Committee can refuse to renew his licence and such refusal would as aforesaid result in the total extinction of his trade. Under the second proviso to Section 3the Committee no doubt has to record the grounds for refusal but that is hardly a safeguard against an arbitrary refusal, for, the Regulation does not constitute any superior authority with power to revise such an order or to examine whether the grounds are legal or proper. Though the Regulation provides that no non-tribal can carry on any trade without a licence issued by the Council it is the Executive Committee under the Rules to which an application has to be made for such a licence or for a renewal thereof and in the event of the Committee refusing to grant such a licence or refusing to renew it the applicant is left without any remedy whatsoever. A perusal of the Regulation shows that it nowhere provides any principles or standards on which the Executive Committee has to act in granting or refusing to grant the licence. The non-tribal trader either wishing to start a trade or continue his trade started on a grant of licence is entirely at the mercy of the Executive Committee for the grant or the renewal of a licence. There being no principles or standards laid down in the Regulation there are obviously no restraints or limits within which the power of the Executive Committee to refuse to grant or renew a licence is to be exercised. This situation is clearly seen from the fact that though Section 9 of the Regulation authorises the Executive Committee to cancel a licence--presumably both permanent and temporary--if the licensee is convicted of contravention of any of the provisions of the Regulation, the power of refusal under Section 3 is not limited or circumscribed by any such provision or any other criterion. The power of refusal is thus left entirely unguided and untrammelled. The power of refusal is thus left entirely unguided and untrammelled. How arbitrary the exercise of such unguided power can be is seen from the fact that the Executive Committee not only refused to renew the appellant's licence but also directed him to remove his property by the end of July 1960 and imposed a fine if he failed to do so. 16. Of the several other judgments cited by Mr. Bhattacharyya on the point at issue, useful assistance can be derived from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Khandsari etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in [1981] 3 SCR 92 of the aforesaid judgment being relevant to the present case, the views expressed in the said paragraphs may be noticed : 16. It is abundantly clear that fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor unlimited but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may he imposed by the State in public interest under Clause 2 to 6 of Article 19. As to what are reasonable restrictions would naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it seeks to serve, the existing circumstances, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of restraint or restriction placed on the rights of the citizen. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule of universal application but this Court has consistently held that in imposing such restrictions the State must adopt an objective standard amounting to a social control by restricting the rights of the citizens where the necessities of the situation demand. It is manifest that in adopting the social control one of the primary considerations which should weigh with the court is that as the directive principles contained in the Constitution aim at the establishment of an egalitarian society so as to bring about a welfare State within the framework of the Constitution, these principles also should be kept in mind in judging the question as to whether or not the restrictions are reasonable. If the restrictions imposed appear to be consistent with the directive principles of State policy they would have to be upheld as the same would be in public interest and manifestly reasonable. 17. If the restrictions imposed appear to be consistent with the directive principles of State policy they would have to be upheld as the same would be in public interest and manifestly reasonable. 17. Further, restrictions may be partial, complete, permanent or temporary but they must bear a close nexus with the object in the interest of which they are imposed. Sometimes even a complete prohibition of the fundamental right to trade may be upheld if the commodity in which the trade is carried on is essential to the life of the community and the said restriction has been imposed for a limited period in order to achieve the desired goal. 18. Another important consideration is that the restrictions must be in public interest and are imposed by striking a just balance between the deprivation of right and the danger or evil sought to be avoided. Thus freezing of stocks of food grains in order to secure equitable distribution and availability on fair prices have been held to be a reasonable restriction in the cases of Narendra Kumar v. Union of India [1960] 2 SCR 375 ; Diwan Sugar & General Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1959 SC 626 and State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal and Mitha Mal [1954] 1 SCR 982. 19. These are some of the general principles on the basis of which the quality of reasonableness of a particular restriction can be judged and have been lucidly adumbrated in State of Madras v. V.G Row's case 1952 CriLJ 966. Another important test that has been laid down by this Court is that restrictions should not be excessive or arbitrary and the court must examine the direct and immediate impact of the restrictions on the rights of the citizens and determine if the restrictions are in larger public interest while deciding the question that they contain the quality of reasonableness. 20. In such cases a doctrinaire approach should not be made but care should be taken to see that the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by restricting the rights of the citizens is subserved. 20. In such cases a doctrinaire approach should not be made but care should be taken to see that the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by restricting the rights of the citizens is subserved. This can be done only by examining the nature of the social control, the interest of the general public which is subserved by the restrictions, the existing circumstances which necessitated the imposition of the restrictions, the degree and urgency of the evil sought to be mitigated by the restrictions and the period during which the restrictions are to remain in force. At the same time the possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been enforced would not expose the restrictions to challenge on the ground that they are not reasonable. 17. On the aforesaid basis, it is the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 framed for the purpose of enforcement of the Inner Line Regulation has prescribed a procedure for obtaining a regular ILP which is virtually impossible to comply with. A non-Mizo/non-tribal citizen has to be sponsored by an indigenous person for grant of an ILP which sponsorship is impossible to obtain. Even if an ILP is to be granted, the maximum duration of the same can be eighteen months beyond which renewal of the ILP is not contemplated. In reality, no ILP has been issued of late and the existing ILPs have also not been renewed; Trade Licenses have not been granted or renewed and the exemptions therefrom have also not been granted. Restrictions have been imposed on the number of non-local employees that a non-indigenous businessman can have in his establishment in Mizoram. Registration under the Value Added Tax Act, 2005 cannot be obtained in the absence of any ILP being granted. All these, according to Mr. Bhattacharyya, are the result of the provisions contained in the administrative guidelines and the consequential action taken by the State. All such actions impose a complete prohibition on the entry of a non-Mizo trader or businessman into Mizoram for the purpose of business. Even if such a non-Mizo trader enters Mizoram by obtaining an IPL, the maximum duration of his stay can be eighteen months beyond which any further stay may invite penal action. Such a situation, Mr. All such actions impose a complete prohibition on the entry of a non-Mizo trader or businessman into Mizoram for the purpose of business. Even if such a non-Mizo trader enters Mizoram by obtaining an IPL, the maximum duration of his stay can be eighteen months beyond which any further stay may invite penal action. Such a situation, Mr. Bhattacharyya has argued, is inconsistent with the valuable rights of the citizens of the country as guaranteed by Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution. 18. Controverting the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. AK Goswami, learned senior counsel representing the respondent State has submitted that as stated in the affidavit filed by the State, the Mizo tribal population constitutes 0.08% of the country's population. The Inner Line Regulation and its enforcement has withstood the test of time and had helped Mizoram to maintain its distinct cultural and tribal identity. Enforcement of the said Regulation on the basis of the guidelines issued from time to time by the State Government have saved the local populace from exploitation which would be a natural result if such restrictions are to be removed. Mr. Goswami has further submitted that in the present case, the petitioner Association has highlighted certain specific grievances concerning its members. Mr. Goswami has further pointed out the specific averments made in the writ petition in this regard. The learned Counsel has pointed out that Clause 8 of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 specifically deals with grant of special ILPs to Permanent/Temporary Trade License Holders to which class the members of the petitioner Association claim to belong. If that be so, it is individual Us which should be have been projected by the petitioner Association. According to Mr. Goswami, such grievances have been raised. However, in addition certain other grievances of persons who are not members of the petitioner Association have also been sought to be highlighted by giving the present writ petition the label of a Public Interest Litigation. The petitioner Association has espoused the personal/individual interest of its members in the writ petition in addition to those of certain unknown persons who are not even members of the petitioner Association. The petitioner Association has espoused the personal/individual interest of its members in the writ petition in addition to those of certain unknown persons who are not even members of the petitioner Association. The interest of the petitioner Association is directly involved in the present litigation, inasmuch as, it is contended that the rights of such members to do business in Mizoram have been effected by the impugned guidelines and the actions taken thereunder. In such a situation, according to Mr. Goswami, the present writ petition will not be maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation. Mr. Goswami has further pointed out that a Public Interest Litigation is a judicial innovation which has in mind attainment of social justice for the deprived masses. A Public Interest Litigation has to be founded on such a basis. The petitioner Association having sought to espouse the individual grievances of its members and, thereafter, the grievances of certain other unknown persons who are not even its members, cannot be construed to have acted bonafide in bringing the present action. Mr. Goswami, therefore, has submitted that the present Public Interest Litigation will not be maintainable in law and should be discouraged by the Court. To fortify the contentions advanced Mr. Goswami has relied on the views of the Apex Court expressed in paragraph 2 of its judgment in the case of Employee s Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1982) IILLJ 454 SC. Reliance has also been placed on the observation of the Apex Court contained in para 4, 12 and 14 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. reported in AIR 2004 SC 280 . 19. Mr. Goswami has submitted that in the aforesaid decisions the Apex Court has clearly laid down the law that the person who seeks to move the Court by means of a Public Interest Litigation must have no individual interest in the subject matter of the writ petition and the exercise must be justified on the touchstone of rendering social justice to a large number of citizens who are unable to come to the Court on their own. The above test which is cardinal to the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation is not satisfied in the present case, inasmuch as, clearly and evidently the members of the petitioner Association have a distinct interest in the subject matter of the writ petition. To espouse such grievance, the petitioner Association should have instituted a 'regular' writ petition instead of a Public Interest Litigation. Beyond the interest of its individual members which has been espoused, the petitioner Association seeks to raise the grievance of some unknown persons who are not even its members. Who are these persons? How is the petitioner Association interested in their alleged rights? Why the aforesaid persons have come and such other incidental questions have not been answered. Mr. Goswami, therefore, has argued that the very approach of the petitioner Association by means of the present writ application is questionable and apparently lacks in bonafide. The writ petition, therefore, should be frowned upon and the Court should not even attempt to severe or salvage the specific grievance of the members of the petitioner Association and enter into any adjudication even of the aforesaid restrictive parameters of the writ petition.