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2008 DIGILAW 630 (GAU)

Hmingdailova v. Union of India

2008-08-27

H.BARUAH

body2008
JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. This appeal under Section 100 has been preferred for setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 30.3.2004 passed by Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, Aizawl in connection with Civil Suit No. 3 of 1997 and the appellate judgment and order dated 22.5.2006 passed by Addl. District Magistrate (J), Aizawl in RFA No. 9 of 2004. For the purpose of this present appeal, after scrutiny of the materials available in the record and submissions of the counsel of both the parties, the following substantial questions and additional substantial question of law have been formulated: Substantial Questions of Law: 1. Whether the Appellant being stepped into the shoes of the lessor (the previous owner) by right of purchase of the suit land, recover possession of the same from the Respondents (No. 1 to 6), the lessees, the lease being in perpetuity; 2. Whether the courts below are right and logical in dismissing the suit of the Appellant on the ground of limitation when adverse possession is not set up; and 3. Whether the suit of the Appellant in respect of recovery of rental compensation at least for 3 years preceding the date of filing, even if Limitation Act is applicable would be sustainable. Addl. Substantial Question of Law: 1. Whether the lease agreements dated 20.1.1977 and 27.6.1980 made between the original owner Shri Khawvelthanga and Respondents No. 1 to 6 are violative of the provisions of Section 3 of the Mizo District (Transfer of land) Act, 1963. For the decisions of the above substantial questions of law it would be appropriate for this Court to put in brief the case of the Appellant. Appellant-Plaintiff purchased a plot of land measuring 48.58 Bighas pertaining to periodic Patta No. 316 of 1997 from one Khawvelthanga on 8.5.1982. After the purchase, he (Appellant-Plaintiff) applied to the Respondent No. 10, herein, for transfer of the said patta in his name. After following all formalities required therefor, the said periodic patta was transferred in the name of the Appellant-Plaintiff on 31.3.83 and thereafter, he (Appellant-Plaintiff) approached the revenue authorities for converting the said patta into a land settlement certificate. After the purchase, he (Appellant-Plaintiff) applied to the Respondent No. 10, herein, for transfer of the said patta in his name. After following all formalities required therefor, the said periodic patta was transferred in the name of the Appellant-Plaintiff on 31.3.83 and thereafter, he (Appellant-Plaintiff) approached the revenue authorities for converting the said patta into a land settlement certificate. After due demarcation and verification as required under the provisions of Mizo District (Agricultural Land) Act and Rules made thereunder, the said periodic patta was converted into land settlement certificate vide No. G-91 of 1985 in respect of lands measuring 40.73 Bighas only, the remaining portion of the land was given to Shri Malsawma by Shri Khawvelthanga which was later converted into Agricultural Land Settlement Certificate in the year 1986 and subsequently converted into LSC No. AZL 1688 of 1986. 2. In respect of the land covering an area of 40.73 Bighas under land settlement certificate No. G-91 of 1985, the Directorate of land revenue and settlement issued a Non-encumbrance Certificate No. 188 of 1985 dated 17.12.1985, which goes to show that the land is/was free from all encumbrances. The land under LSC No. G-91 of 1985, land measuring an area of 15.15 Bighas being in the occupation of Respondent No. 1 to 6, who do not have valid permit issued by the Revenue Department, the Appellant-Plaintiff approached the Respondent No. 2 and 4 herein on many occasions and requested them to pay the rent with effect from the date on which he purchased the said land from Shri Khawvelthanga. The Appellant-Plaintiff had been paying tax for entire land covered under LSC No. G-91 of 1985 including the portion of the land being under the occupation of Respondent Nos. 1 to 6. Appellant-Plaintiff sent letters and notices to the Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 requesting them to pay the rent with effect from 8.5.1982 at the rate fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl. Rent was fixed by Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl at Rs. 1296/- per month for the portion of the land occupied by the Respondent No. 2 to 4. Although such request was made on several occasions but Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 did not pay any heed for which he had to take resort to Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure. 3. 1296/- per month for the portion of the land occupied by the Respondent No. 2 to 4. Although such request was made on several occasions but Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 did not pay any heed for which he had to take resort to Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure. 3. In reply to the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure Respondent No. 3 contended that Border Road Organization entered into a lease agreement with the previous owner Shri Khawvelthanga in respect of land measuring 5.50 Bighas and 9, 16 Bighas on 20.1.1997 and 27.6.1980 for one time payment of rent amounting to Rs. 6600/- and Rs. 10,992/- respectively and thereby declined to make payment of rent to the Appellant-Plaintiff though the rent had been assessed at Rs. 1296/- per month by the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl with effect from 8.5.1982. Being denied the Appellant-Plaintiff's claim he filed the civil suit No. 3 of 1997 asking for a decree in his favour in respect of the rent at the rate of Rs. 1296/- per month with effect from 8.5.1982 with interest at the rate of 25% per annum for the arrear rent and for vacant possession of the land purchased by him. The Respondent submitted written statement wherein they claimed possession of the land under lease agreement as stated herein before which entered in between them and the original owner Shri Khawvelthanga. The Respondents also disputed the sale of the land by Shri Khawvelthanga to the Appellant-Plaintiff, the land being in their possession under lease agreement without their knowledge and consent. It was further contended in the written statement by the Respondent/Defendants that the Appellant/Plaintiff purchased the suit land from Shri Khawvelthanga with full knowledge that the land in question was/is in the occupation of the Defendants on the strength of the lease agreements. 4. The learned trial court, on the pleadings of both the parties, framed the following issues: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? 2. Whether a portion of the land covered under P. Patta No. 316 of 1977 was sliced out and given to Mr. Malsawma by Pu Khawvelthanga? 3. Whether the relief claimed in the notice is different from that of relief claimed in the plaint? 4. Whether there is any cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants? 5. Malsawma by Pu Khawvelthanga? 3. Whether the relief claimed in the notice is different from that of relief claimed in the plaint? 4. Whether there is any cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants? 5. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of Limitation, Estoppel and Acquiescence? 6. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to reliefs claimed? And after recording evidence both oral and documentary, the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 5. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the Appellant-Plaintiff filed an appeal before the Addl. District Magistrate (J), Aizawl challenging the legality of the judgment and decree of the trial court. Vide judgment and order dated 22.5.2006, ADM (J), Aizawl dismissed the appeal (RFA No. 9 of 2004) and affirmed and decree the judgment passed by the learned trial court. 6. The Appellant, thereafter, approached this Court against the judgment and order dated 1.4.2005 passed by the first appellate court. The said appeal was registered as RSA No. 3 of 2005. This Court vide order dated 13.7.2005 set aside the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court dated 1.4.2005 in RFA No. 9 of 2004 remitted back to the learned lower appellate court for fresh hearing and disposal. Parties were also directed to appear before the lower appellate court accordingly. 7. The first appellate court after remand again heard the appeal and disposed of the same vide its judgment and order dated 22.5.2006. The first appellate court this time also dismissed the appeal. 8. Felling aggrieved thereby this present RSA No. 15 of 2006 has been preferred by the Appellant. 9. We heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned CGC for Respondent No. 1 to 6 and Mr. N. Sai1o, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State Respondent Nos. 7 to 10 at length. 10. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant at the very out set of his argument submitted that both the courts below committed error and illegality in deciding the suit/appeal as against the Appellant-Plaintiff on the point of limitation. The issue of limitation was considered by the learned trial court while deciding the issue No. 1 and 5 conjointly. 10. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant at the very out set of his argument submitted that both the courts below committed error and illegality in deciding the suit/appeal as against the Appellant-Plaintiff on the point of limitation. The issue of limitation was considered by the learned trial court while deciding the issue No. 1 and 5 conjointly. While discussing the issues, it was held that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not approach the court within the period limited/prescribed by/in the Article 64 of the Limitation Act i.e. within 12 years. While deciding the issues, the learned trial court relied on the decision in the case between Lalchawimawia and Ors. v. State of Mizoram and Ors. reported in 1999 (2) GLT 410in respect of application of Limitation Act in Mizoram. According to the learned trial court the Plaintiff-Appellant ought to have instituted the suit within a period of 12 years from the date of arising out of cause of action. The Plaintiff-Appellant purchased the plot of land pertaining to Patta No. 316 of 1977 from Shri Khawvelthanga on 8.5.1982 and the ownership of the same was transferred on 31.1.1983. The suit was filed on 21.4.1977 after a lapse of 15 years that to without filing any application for condonation of delay. The learned trial court decided both the issues as against the Plaintiff-Appellant and dismissed the suit. The learned appellate court did also offer the same view in respect of limitation. The first appellate court while taking the issues into consideration, was, also of the opinion that since the Respondents by virtue of the lease agreement are/were in the possession, despite having knowledge of such possession, the Appellant-Plaintiff purchased the land from Shri Khawvelthanga. Thus, for possession of the land which was under occupation of the Respondents, the Plaintiff-Appellant ought to have brought the suit within 12 years from the date of purchase of the land and or on and from the date when the ownership was transferred. The learned first appellate court also held that the suit being filed after lapse of 15 years the suit cannot survive, accordingly up held the judgment of the trial court. 11. This issue of limitation in this second appeal is taken as the 2nd substantial question of law to be decided. The learned first appellate court also held that the suit being filed after lapse of 15 years the suit cannot survive, accordingly up held the judgment of the trial court. 11. This issue of limitation in this second appeal is taken as the 2nd substantial question of law to be decided. From the reading of the plaint as well as the written statement we have come across that one Khawvelthanga sold the plot of land measuring 48.58 Bighas to the Plaintiff-Appellant pertaining Patta No. 316 of 1977 on 8.5.1982. From the written statement of the Respondents it is noticed that on 20.1.1977 said Khawvelthanga and the Respondent No. 1 to 6 herein entered into a lease agreement in respect of a plot of land measuring 5.50 Bighas covered by Periodic Patta No. 316 of 1977 subject to payment of one time rent amounting to Rs. 6600/-. Again on 27.6.1980 Anr. lease agreement was entered into between Khawvelthanga and Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 for a plot of land measuring 9.16 Bighas under the same periodic patta subject to payment of one time rent amounting to Rs. 10,992/-. Apparently, the Respondents by virtue of the lease agreements have been possessing the lands on and from the dates of execution of the lease deed. The Appellant-Plaintiff admittedly purchased the land after execution of both the lease deeds. But in the written statement the Defendant, Respondents herein did never plead the right of adverse possession as against the Plaintiff-Appellant. Therefore, question arises whether a dismissal of a suit is right and logical when on the ground of limitation when adverse possession is not set up. 12. Article 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act provide 12 years period of limitation for bringing a suit for possession based on previous possession and also on title respectively. Period to be computed for the purpose of filing a suit, the date of possession, in respect of possession of immovable property based on previous possession when the possession of the Defendants becomes adverse to the Plaintiff in respect of suit for possession of immovable property and for any interest therein based on title. Period to be computed for the purpose of filing a suit, the date of possession, in respect of possession of immovable property based on previous possession when the possession of the Defendants becomes adverse to the Plaintiff in respect of suit for possession of immovable property and for any interest therein based on title. From the facts averred by the Plaintiff-Appellant herein that he purchased the land on 8.5.1982 and the periodic patta was transferred in his name on 31.1.1983, apparently the Plaintiff-Appellant by virtue of purchase of the land become the owner and possessor of the land from the date of purchase and transfer. If during his possession and ownership if dispossessed therefrom the owner can bring a suit within 12 years. But the Respondents were in the possession of the land by virtue of the lease deeds entered into between the Respondents and Khawvelthanga prior to the date of purchase of the land by Plaintiff-Appellant. The Plaintiff-Appellant having had the knowledge of such lease agreement entered, between, Khawvelthanga and the Defendants-Respondents, purchased the land from Khawvelthanga. Admittedly the Respondents have not raised plea of adverse possession on the ground that they are/were in possession of the lands since 1977-1980. At no point of time the Plaintiff-Appellant after the purchase of the land could have taken the possession of the portion of lands which were/are in the occupation of the Respondents by virtue of the lease deeds, so in that situation it cannot be expected that the Respondents would plead adverse possession as against the Appellant. When adverse possession is set up by the adversary party (herein Respondents-Defendants) under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, the Plaintiff is required to prove that he has been dispossessed while in possession of the property and for that a suit must be brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Where there is no evidence on record to show who was in possession whether the owner of some third party or no one at all, the presumption would be that the owner is in the possession. Adverse possession means a hostile possession, which disapproves the true owner's title and constitutes an invasion there to. Where there is no evidence on record to show who was in possession whether the owner of some third party or no one at all, the presumption would be that the owner is in the possession. Adverse possession means a hostile possession, which disapproves the true owner's title and constitutes an invasion there to. Here, in our present case from a careful scrutiny of the pleadings and the evidence on record it is nowhere found that the Plaintiff-Appellant is/was in the possession of the land admittedly occupied by the Defendants-Respondents by virtue of the lease deeds. For a party to succeed in establishing title on the basis of adverse possession, a plea to that effect must be specifically raised. In other words, a person who claims adverse possession must plead to that effect and must show on what date he came into possession and also the nature of his possession, whether the fact of adverse possession was known to the owner. Once it is established that the Defendants are in a adverse possession for over 12 years before the date of institution of the suit the suit must fail. It is apparent from the face of the records and the evidence that the Plaintiff-Appellant was never in possession of the land either before purchase or after purchase. The portion of the lands under the lease deeds was is/was always in the possession of the Defendants-Respondents when neither party pleads adverse possession, the dismissal of the suit on the ground of limitation is not permissible, appreciable and legally acceptable. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 also provides 12 years limitation for bringing a suit for possession or any interest therein based on title. The Appellant-Plaintiff claimed that he purchased the land from Khawvelthanga and by virtue of purchase he became the owner. For invention of his possession, right, title and interest it would be open for him to bring a suit within the 12 years when the possession of the Defendants (Respondents herein) becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. 13. The suit of the Plaintiff-Appellant does not fall within the purview of Article 64 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as there is no evidence on record of dispossession of the Plaintiff-Appellant by the Respondents. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are/were in possession of this land since the date of execution of the lease deeds. 13. The suit of the Plaintiff-Appellant does not fall within the purview of Article 64 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as there is no evidence on record of dispossession of the Plaintiff-Appellant by the Respondents. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are/were in possession of this land since the date of execution of the lease deeds. Appellant-Plaintiff purchased the land after execution of the lease deeds and hence there cannot be any question of dispossession of the Plaintiff by the Respondents. Though the Plaintiff-Appellant purchased the land, for possession of the same or any interest therein based on title the suit must be brought within 12 years when the possession becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. In either case, the Defendants must be in possession of the suit thus the findings of the courts' below that the suit is barred by limitation are not correct findings and the learned trial court ought not to have dismissed the suit on ground of limitation. 14. In this instant appeal Anr. pertinent question has cropped up for decision whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable in the State of Mizoram in absence of specific notification issued by the Government of Mizoram regarding non-application of law of limitation in a suit? In the case between Lalchawimawia and Ors. v. State of Mizoram and Ors. reported in 1999 (2) GLT 410, this Court held that in absence of any specific notification issued by the Govt. of Mizoram regarding the non-application of law of limitation in a suit, the law of limitation shall be applicable. But in the case between the State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong reported in 1987 (2) GLR 221, Sh. H. Sapliankunga v. State of Mizoram and Ors. decided on 19.8.2005 and Sh. Ramthlengliana v. Secretary, Revenue Department and Ors.; decided on 7.4.2005, this Court held that law of limitation will not be applicable in the tribal areas specified in the 6th Schedule of the Constitution. But decisions rendered in the cases decided on 19.8.2005 and 7.4.2005, the ratio of the case between State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong reported in 1987 (2) GLR 221 has been followed. The present suit was filed by a tribal against the Union of India represented by Respondent No. 1 to 6 for passing of a decree against the Respondent/Defendant Nos. The present suit was filed by a tribal against the Union of India represented by Respondent No. 1 to 6 for passing of a decree against the Respondent/Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 for rental compensation together with interest and also for recovery of possession of land covered by LSC No. G-91 of 1985. The learned courts below after due trial and hearing dismissed the suit and the appeal on the ground of limitation holding that the suit was not brought within 12 years from the date of purchase of the suit land by the Plaintiff/Appellant from Khawvelthanga. 15. While deciding the substantial question No. 2, reasons for non-application either Article 64 or 65of the Limitation Act, 1963 have been rendered, on the ground that the Plaintiff-Appellant did never came into possession of the land after purchase from Khawvelthanga. 16. In the case between L. Biakchhunga v. State of Mizoram and Ors. reported in 2006 (3) GLT 785this Court held that the Notification dated 14.3.1996 issued by the Governor of Assam barring applicability of the Limitation Act to the erstwhile Mizo District of Assam would not be applicable to the State of Mizoram and while deciding as such, this Court dissented from the judgment delivered by this Court in the case between State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong reported in 1987 (2) GLR 221 and concurred with the decision reported in 1999 (2) GLT 410(Lalchawimawia and Ors. v. State of Mizoram and Ors.). 17. In regard to the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 in the State of Mizoram there appears conflicting judgments rendered by this Court. Having considered the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases (supra) I subscribe the view of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy on the ground that the Notification dated 14.3.1966 of the Governor of Assam would have no application after the reorganization of the Union territories of Mizoram/State of Mizoram from the erstwhile Assam. 18. By virtue of purchase of the land from Khawvelthanga, the lessor on 8.5.1982, the Plaintiff-Appellant stepped into the shoes of the lessor by right of purchase. But the pertinent issue to be decided is whether by such right of purchase, he (Plaintiff-Appellant) can recover the possession of the lands from the Respondents. 18. By virtue of purchase of the land from Khawvelthanga, the lessor on 8.5.1982, the Plaintiff-Appellant stepped into the shoes of the lessor by right of purchase. But the pertinent issue to be decided is whether by such right of purchase, he (Plaintiff-Appellant) can recover the possession of the lands from the Respondents. We have already come across about the execution of lease deeds by Khawvelthanga in favour of the Respondents on payment of one time rent at different times. Annexure-A and Annexure-B are those lease deeds executed by him (Khawvelthanga) in favour of the Respondent No. 1 to 6. Annexure-A was executed on 20th January 1977 by Khawvelthanga in respect of the land described in the schedule measuring 5.5 Bighas on one time payment of Rs. 6600/-as rent. While Annexure-B was executed on 27th June 1980 in respect of land measuring 9.16 Bighas for payment of one time rent at Rs. 10,992/- at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per Bigha described in the schedule of the deed. After execution of these lease agreements, the Defendants No. 1 to 6 came into possession of the lands described in the lease agreements (Annexures-A and B) from the date of execution, but subsequently while Defendants are/were enjoying the properties/lands, the lessor pu Khawvelthanga transferred in other words sold the land measuring 48.58 Bighas including the lands leased out in favour of the Respondents. Thus by virtue of transfer, the Plaintiff/Appellant became the lessor of the lands leased out in favour of the Respondents. 19. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines lease as under: 105. Lease defined--A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined--The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. While Section 106 of the Act provides duration of leases in absence of written contract or local usage. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined--The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. While Section 106 of the Act provides duration of leases in absence of written contract or local usage. Section 107 of the Act provides the creation of lease. By right of purchase, the Plaintiff-Appellant stands at the footing of lessor. Section 109 of the Act speaks for interest of the transferee when the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein in such a situation, the transferee, in absence of a contract to the contrary shall possess all the rights if lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long he is the owner of it. But the lessor shall not, by raising only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him. So the provision of the section vests some interest in the property sold which has already been leased out after transfer by the original lessor. The proviso to the section also provides that the transferee is not entitled to arrear rent due before the transfer and that if the lessee not having the reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee. The Plaintiff-Appellant by right of purchase of the land from Khawvelthanga, the original lessor of the land already leased out the lands to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 stepped into the shoes of the lessor and for that he possesses all rights in the land so transferred to him by the original lessor Pu Khawvelthanga. 20. The Plaintiff-Appellant by right of purchase of the land from Khawvelthanga, the original lessor of the land already leased out the lands to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 stepped into the shoes of the lessor and for that he possesses all rights in the land so transferred to him by the original lessor Pu Khawvelthanga. 20. A lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. The lands leased out by Pu Khawvelthanga in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 by virtue of agreements (Annexures-A & B) were/are not admittedly for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, therefore, the leases so executed in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 shall denote and mean a lease from month to month. 21. In paragraph 2 of the Annexures-A & B provide the option to the Respondents in the context of determination of the lease. In paragraph 2 of Annexure-A, it has been specifically incorporated as under: 2. The lease shall commence on the 1st day of September 1968 shall subject to the terms hereof continues from this date of occupation until Border Roads Organization vacate it. While in paragraph 2 of Annexure-B, it reads as under: 2. The lease shall commence on the day of occupation and shall subject to the terms hereof continues from this date of occupation until Border Roads Organization vacate it. Therefore, when by virtue of the lease, the option is given/offered to the Respondents to determine the lease, unless the Respondents determine so, it shall be in perpetuity. The lease shall commence on the day of occupation and shall subject to the terms hereof continues from this date of occupation until Border Roads Organization vacate it. Therefore, when by virtue of the lease, the option is given/offered to the Respondents to determine the lease, unless the Respondents determine so, it shall be in perpetuity. The definition as provided in Section 105 of the Act provides that a lease of immovable property is a transfer of right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Pu Khawvelthanga, the lessor gave option in other words authority to the Respondents to determine the leases. The Plaintiff-Appellant being the transferee of the lessor Pu Khawvelthanga though by virtue of such purchase/transfer can possess all such rights in the land transferred to him already leased out, would be bound by the terms and conditions of the lease executed in between Pu Khawvelthanga and the Respondents. By right of purchase though the Plaintiff Appellant stepped into shoes of the lessor, he would not be entitled to determine the lease from his own when by virtue of the conditions, the authority is/was given to the Respondents for such determination. Unless the leases are determined by the Respondents themselves it would not be open for the Plaintiff-Appellant to go for recovery of the lands transferred to him by Pu Khawvelthanga, the original lessor by virtue of sale deeds in his favour nor any rental compensation from the Respondents preceding the date of filing of the suit and thereafter, although, he possesses all rights over the land transferred to him since Pu Khawvelthanga, the transferor had already accepted one time rent from the Respondents for the lands leased out. Thus the substantial question Nos. 1 and 3 also can be answered in negative as against the Appellant if otherwise affected by any other law time being in force. Thus the substantial question Nos. 1 and 3 also can be answered in negative as against the Appellant if otherwise affected by any other law time being in force. By obtaining/accepting one time rent from the Respondents for the leased out lands, the leases became the leases in perpetuity, but the question/issue of legality of the leases would be subject to the out come of the decision of the Additional substantial question of law determinable by the Respondents themselves. Appellant-Plaintiff being the transferee cannot claim any apportionment of the rent already paid or any rental compensation from the Respondents by virtue of the Annexures-A & B. 22. On 13.5.2008, having been heard the counsel of the either party and relying a decision in the case between Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Paramount Polymers (P) Ltd. reported in (2006) 13 SCC 101an additional substantial question of law was framed for determination which can be described as under: Whether the lease agreements dated 20.1.1977 and 27.6.1980 made between the original owner Shri Khawvelthanga and Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are violative of the provisions of Section 3 of the Mizo District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1963. 23. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant taking aid of the provision of Section 3 of Mizo District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as Mizo Act, 1963) submitted that the lease agreements Annexure-A and Annexure-B entered into between Pu Khawvelthanga and the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are violative of the provisions of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963 which deals with the provisions for control of transfer of lands under the district council, since, no previous permission of the executive committee of the district council was obtained by Pu Khawvelthanga for the purpose of leasing out the lands described in the annexures in favour of the Respondents. It was submitted by him that sale, mortgage, lease, barter, gift or otherwise transfer is permissible in respect of a land in district council by a tribal to a non-tribal or by a non-tribal to Anr. non-tribal except with the previous permission of the Executive Committee. While refusing such permission reasons must be recorded by the Executive Committee. According to Mr. non-tribal except with the previous permission of the Executive Committee. While refusing such permission reasons must be recorded by the Executive Committee. According to Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant before leasing out lands described in the annexures Pu Khawvelthanga did not apply for such permission for leasing out the land in favour of the Respondents since such permission according to Mr. C. Lalramzauva is mandatory inasmuch as Pu Khawvelthanga being a tribal leased out his land to non tribal. Therefore, the Annexures-A & B cannot be said to have been executed within the purview of provision of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963. 24. Now, for the purpose of decision of the Addl. Issue, raised by Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant, it would be appropriate for the court to see who is a "tribal". Sub-section 4 of Section 2 of the Mizo Act, 1963 defines "tribal" as under: "Tribal" means a person who belongs to one of the Scheduled Tribes in Assam and specified as such by order made by the President of India under Article342(1) of the Constitution of India in so far as the specification pertains to the Autonomous District of Assam. Article 342(1) of the Constitution of India speaks for "Scheduled tribes" in respect of State or Union Territory. Such declaration can be made by President of India in consultation with the Governor where it is a State, by public notification. Therefore, tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups thereof may be notified as scheduled tribe by the President of India in consultation with the Governor where it is a State by virtue of Article 342(1) of the Constitution and by virtue of Clause 2, the President is also empowered to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled any tribes or tribal community or part thereof. The definition of "Tribal" under Sub-section 4 of Section 2 of the Mizo Act, 1963 is defined per Article 342 Clause 1 of the Constitution. There is no dispute that Pu Khawvelthanga is not a tribal within the meaning of Section 2 Sub-section 4 of the Mizo Act, 1963, but the issue before us is whether the Union of India, represented by Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 is a tribal within the definition of Section 2(4) of the Mizo Act, 1963. 25. Mr. There is no dispute that Pu Khawvelthanga is not a tribal within the meaning of Section 2 Sub-section 4 of the Mizo Act, 1963, but the issue before us is whether the Union of India, represented by Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 is a tribal within the definition of Section 2(4) of the Mizo Act, 1963. 25. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant while supporting his contention submitted that the tribals or tribal communities or part or groups there of specified in the public notification published under the authority of Article 342(1) of the Constitution can include and defined as tribal for the purpose of the Mizo Act, 1963. The tribal or tribal communities or part or groups thereof which do not fall under the purview of the public notification published under Article 342(1) of the Constitution cannot be treated as tribal. According to Mr. C. Lalramzauva, the Union of India represented by the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 in whose favour lease agreements were executed cannot be a tribal within the definition of Section 2(4) of the Mizo Act, 1963. Therefore, for transfer of land under a lease, a previous permission is mandatory from the executive committee of the district council and if no such permission is obtained, any transfer of land by way of sale, mortgage, lease, barter, gift or otherwise would be void. Since the Union of India represented by the Respondents is a "non-tribal" leasing of lands by Pu Khawvelthanga, a "tribal" without obtaining previous permission from the Executive Committee would be violative of provision of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963. Since the leases created in favour of the Respondents by Pu Khawvelthanga, a tribal are void within the meaning of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963, retention of the lands by the Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 by virtue of Annexures-A & B would be illegal and for that the suit brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant dismissed on the ground of limitation ought to have been decreed in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellant inasmuch as "plaintiff-Appellant" possessed/possesses all rights by virtue of transfer of the lands by Pu Khawvelthanga in his favour, Sri C. Lalramzauva, argued. 26. 26. The issue, whether the Union of India is a tribal within the meaning of Section 2(4) of Mizo Act, 1963 has been set at rest by this Court by a judgment in the case between State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong reported in 1987 (2) GLR 221. In paragraph-4 of the judgment it is held as under: 4. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya that the first question was not at all required to be referred by the learned revisional Court in view of the Constitutional provisions relating to the State Government. The State is not a natural person but a juristic person. In this context the learned Advocate General has referred to us a decision of this Court rendered in Union Territory of Mizoram v. C. Lalthanpara as reported in (1983) 2 GLR 269. In the said case it was held that the 'State' is a juristic person and it can sue or be sued. The State cannot be termed as a "person belonging to a non-scheduled or scheduled tribe". This point arose in the Criminal Revision No. 1(H)/80 when the State filed a revision application against the order of discharge of the opposite party in G.R. No. 6/80 under Section 392/ 506 of IPC. When the question of limitation for filing the revision petition arose, this reference is made for an answer as regards the status of the State of Meghalaya and also the applicability of the Limitation Act. The State Government is one of the organs of the State and since the State is a "juristic person" and not a "natural person" it cannot be classified in the category of the citizen of India. As regards whether a person is a member of the Scheduled tribe or not can be ascertained only in the case of a natural person who is a citizen of India. In view of the above, the State of Meghalaya is a legal entity known as juristic person which cannot be put in the group of Scheduled tribe community or in any community of India. We, therefore, need not dilate further on this point. This question is answered accordingly. 27. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General apeparing on behalf of the State Respondents submitted that "the State" is a non-tribal. We, therefore, need not dilate further on this point. This question is answered accordingly. 27. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General apeparing on behalf of the State Respondents submitted that "the State" is a non-tribal. Article 12 of the Constitution of India defines "the State" which speaks as under: Unless the context otherwise required, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. The lease agreements executed in between Pu Khawvelthanga and the Union of India represented by Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 make it palpably clear that the agreements were entered into between a private individual and "the State", the Union of India as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 28. Contrary to the submission advanced by Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 submitted that the lease deeds were executed in presence Director of Land Revenue and Settlement, which apparently fulfilled the requirements of the provision of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963 in respect of transfer of land under lease by a tribal to a non-tribal whose signature appear in the annexures, the lease agreements. Execution of the lease agreements in his presence, per submission of Mr. S.N. Meitei, is an implied permission although no express permission is available on record. The submission advanced by S.N. Meitei, learned counsel for the Respondents was not approved by Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant since the language employed in the Section 3 required previous permission for such transfer from the Executive Committee. According to Mr. Lalramzauva mere presence of Director, Land Revenue and Settlement at the time of execution of lease deeds and putting his signature thereon does not necessarily mean that permission was obtained from the Executive Committee. Signature of Director, Land Revenue and settlement is apparent on the face of the lease agreement but the intention of the Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963 thereby cannot over ride or brush aside. In this context submission of Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned CGC for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 is found not acceptable. Thus, the leases created in favour of the Respondent Nos. In this context submission of Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned CGC for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 is found not acceptable. Thus, the leases created in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are not inconformity with the provisions of Section 3 of the Mizo Act, 1963. 29. Though the leases Annexures-A & B were executed in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 by Pu Khawvelthanga and can be branded as leases in perpetuity, the same were of course not executed per provision of Section 3 of Mizo Act, 1963. 30. Having considered the facts appearing in the face of the records and the law laid down, this Court is of view that the judgments rendered by the trial and appellate court cannot stand in the eye of law. Accordingly, both the judgments of the court below are set aside and quashed. The suit is remanded back for a fresh decision. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court within a month from today. Registry is directed to send down all the records to the court below with a copy of the judgment. The trial court shall make an endeavour to dispose of the suit within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of receipt of the records and appearance of the parties. 31. Appeal stands allowed. No cost.