Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 631 (BOM)

Madanlal s/o Tukaram Pashine v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation

2008-04-29

A.M.KHANWILKAR

body2008
ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This petition takes exception to the judgment and order dated 31st July 1995 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, in Complaint (ULPN ) No. 338/ 1989. The said complaint was filed by the petitioner under section 28 read with Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 ( for short “ the Act, 1971”) for the following reliefs:- “(a) It may be declared that the respondent has engaged in/ has been engaging in unfair labour practice; (b) The complainant be granted relief by directing the respondent to treat the complainant as continued in the alternative employment in the post of Peon or Helper w.e.f. 25.4.1989 (AN) with consequential benefits; ( c)Any other relief which may be deemed fit.” 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner was working as Driver since 7th October 1963 in the establishment of the respondent. He was removed from service as he was found medically unfit, on 25th April,1989. The petitioner immediately thereafter applied to the Competent Authority for being appointed on compassionate ground on the post of Peon or Helper. That application was rejected as it was noticed that the petitioner did not possess minimum qualification. Inasmuch as, for the post of Peon, the qualification prescribed is VI standard passed and for Helper VII standard passed. Going by the said requirement, the petitioner was obviously not eligible for being considered for any of those posts. Nevertheless, the petitioner filed the present Complaint before the Industrial Court on 27th April,1989. Significantly, when the said Complaint was pending, one post of Cleaner was created on 13.12.1989. That post was offered to the petitioner by the respondent vide letter dated 24th February, 1990, followed by the letter dated 24th July 1990. However, the petitioner did not respond to the said communications. The Respondent eventually sent final communication to the petitioner on 29th August 1990. This position was placed on record before the Court and is reflected in the impugned judgment. Suffice it to observe that in so far as the merits of the claim of the petitioner, for being appointed on the post of Peon or Helper is concerned, that has been rightly negatived by the Industrial Court. For, the petitioner, admittedly, did not possess the minimum qualification and was not eligible to be considered for such appointment. Suffice it to observe that in so far as the merits of the claim of the petitioner, for being appointed on the post of Peon or Helper is concerned, that has been rightly negatived by the Industrial Court. For, the petitioner, admittedly, did not possess the minimum qualification and was not eligible to be considered for such appointment. The petitioner, however, could have availed of the offer of being appointed to the post of Cleaner which post became available after 13.12.1989. Counsel for petitioner who had appeared in the lower Court made a statement before the Court, as is recorded in the impugned order that he would have accepted that post provided his salary of the post of Driver is protected. The Respondent, on the other hand, referred to Circular dated 22nd June, 1990 to point out that the petitioner will have to accept that post as fresh appointment and his pay scale in the post of Driver cannot be protected. Consequently, the Industrial Court has dismissed the Complaint preferred by the petitioner. 4. The question that arises for my consideration is whether the view taken by the Industrial Court that the petitioner was ineligible for being considered to be appointed on the post of Peon or Helper can be doubted. The answer is an emphatic 'no'. The relevant orders and resolutions clearly envisage that the person to be appointed to the post of Peon should have minimum qualification of IV standard passed and that to the post of Helper as VII standard passed. As the petitioner was qualified only upto II standard, was not eligible for being considered for appointment to any of the the said posts. 5. The next question that arises for our consideration is whether the Industrial Court in the garb of moulding the relief could have considered issuing direction to the respondent to appoint the petitioner on the post of Cleaner which was created on 13.12. 1989. In fact, the respondent on its own, offered the said post to the petitioner. The petitioner did not avail of the said offer on the specious stand that the offer did not protect his salary as that of the Driver. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent has acted unreasonably in not providing that benefit to the petitioner in terms of Circular dated 19th August, 1975 which is pressed into service by the petitioner. The petitioner did not avail of the said offer on the specious stand that the offer did not protect his salary as that of the Driver. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent has acted unreasonably in not providing that benefit to the petitioner in terms of Circular dated 19th August, 1975 which is pressed into service by the petitioner. The said Corporation Resolution No. 8306 dated 19th August, 1975 , clearly provides that the petitioner could be absorbed in the post of Cleaner without any loss of pay and break in service and if there was any, the same be condoned. Going by the Circular, the petitioner would be justified in submitting that the petitioner was not bound to accept the conditional offer of the respondent for being appointed on the post of Cleaner on fresh basis. The argument though attractive clearly overlooks the efficacy of the subsequent circular issued by the Department, being Circular No. 31/1990 dated 22nd June 1990, which governs the field as of now. This Circular clearly stipulates that in respect of Drivers declared medically unfit in visual acquity test will not be provided the protection of pay as Drivers, in case of being considered for compassionate and alternate employment. It is not in dispute that the said Circular has not been challenged so far before the Court of law. The Circular is still operating and will be binding on the respondent. If this Circular dated 22nd June 1990 is to be given effect to, certainly the petitioner will not be entitled for protection of pay that of the Driver. 6. To get over this position, counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Circular dated 22nd June 1990 makes no reference to the Circular dated 19th August 1975 and for which reason the earlier circular still operates in the field. It is not possible to accede to this argument. If this argument is to be accepted, that would clearly render the Circular dated 22nd June 1990 redundant which explicitly provides to the contrary. The Circular dated 22nd June 1990 being the last in point of time, will have to prevail unless declared to be illegal or ultra vires by Court of competent jurisdiction. As aforesaid, going by this Circular, the petitioner will not be entitled for the relief of protection of his pay scale of the Driver. The Circular dated 22nd June 1990 being the last in point of time, will have to prevail unless declared to be illegal or ultra vires by Court of competent jurisdiction. As aforesaid, going by this Circular, the petitioner will not be entitled for the relief of protection of his pay scale of the Driver. The fact remains that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation. He was reportedly 53 years of age when the complaint was filed in the year 1989 and 58 years of age in 1995 when the Writ Petition is filed. The benefit available for alternate and compassionate appointment is up to the age of 58 years being the superannuation age. 7. The counsel for petitioner lastly relied on the decision of our High Court in the case of Divisional Controller MSRT Corporation Solapur vs. M N Vijapure reported in 2002 Vol III CLR 182. Counsel contends that similar contention was put in issue before this Court and this Court has upheld the decision of the lower Court while rejecting the Writ Petition preferred by the Respondent-Corporation. In the said decision in paragraph 12 reference is made to settlement Clause 1(A.) It is not clear when this settlement has been arrived at between the Corporation and its workmen or workmen union. In the said decision, the Court was not called upon to consider the efficacy of Circular dated 22nd June, 1990 which is the subject-matter of present petition. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, therefore, this Court finds that the grievance made in the present petition is devoid of merits. Hence the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.