JUDGMENT : 1. This Second Appeal is filed by original plaintiffs. Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1984 filed by present appellants for declaration and possession was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Biloli on 25.7.1991. As against said judgment and decree, Regular Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1993 (Old No. 192 of 1991) was filed by the respondents. The learned Additional District Judge, Biloli on 30.6.2001 allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence the appellants have preferred this Second Appeal. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, regarding which there is no dispute, may be stated below. . Baliram was the original owner of the suit property. He died somewhere in 1920. He was survived by his widow Shivbai and daughter Bhagubai. Bhagubai first married one Narsing and gave birth to original defendant no. 1 Venkatrao of whom present appellants are sons. Narsing expired and after his death, Bhagubai married one Bhaurao and gave birth to respondent no. 1 Ramrao. Respondent no. 2 is wife of respondent no. 1 Ramrao. Respondent no. 3 Venkatrao is purchaser of part of property from respondent no. 1 Ramrao. Bhagubai died somewhere in 1970. 3. The Trial Court held in para 12 of the judgment that the present appellants who were Putrika Putras (daughter’s sons) inherited property of Baliram. He held that after death of Baliram the interest derived by his widow and daughter was limited interest, like widow’s estate and on the death of widow the property devolved on Narsing and with such declaration he decreed the suit. 4. The First Appellate Court, however, held that Shivbai died prior to coming into operation of Hindu Women Right to Property Act, 1937, and in these circumstances, the property devolved on Bhagubai. However, he did not agree with the Trial Court that second marriage by Bhagubai excluded her from inheritence and property was inherited only by present appellants through Narsing. He discussed the position of Hindu Law and relied upon the case of Shamsunder Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar [ AIR 1981 SC 178 ] and ultimately dismissed the suit as appellants were not entitled to relief claimed. 5. This Appeal is admitted on following substantial question of law. He discussed the position of Hindu Law and relied upon the case of Shamsunder Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar [ AIR 1981 SC 178 ] and ultimately dismissed the suit as appellants were not entitled to relief claimed. 5. This Appeal is admitted on following substantial question of law. " Whether the conclusions arrived at by the First Appellate Court regarding rights of Bahgubai and her sons are legal and proper ? " 6. Learned advocate Shri Khandarkar relied upon Article 43(6)(iv) of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla, Volume 1, 20th Edition, which runs as follows : " The daughter’s son occupies a peculiar position in Hindu law. He is a bhinna gotra sapinda or bandhu, but he comes in before parents and other remote gotraja sapindas. The reason is that, according to the old practice, it was competent to a Hindu, who had no son, to appoint a daughter to raise up issue to him. Such a daughter, no doubt, was the lawful wife of her husband, but her son, called putrika putra, became the son of her father. Such a son was equal to an aurosa or legitimate son, and took his rank, according to several authorities, as the highest among the secondary sons. Although, the practice of appointing a daughter to raise up issue for her father became obsolete, the daughter’s son continued to occupy the place that was assigned to him in the order of inheritance and even now he takes a place practically next after the male issue, the widow and the daughters being simply interposed during their respective lives. In regard to the obsequies of ancestors, says Mitakshara, ’daughter’s sons are considered as son’s sons’. " 7. Shri Khandarkar, advocate argued that since after death of Narsing, Bhagubai was disqualified from property, property devolved on the appellants as sons of Narsing. 8. Mrs. Deshpande, advocate stated that there would not be any disqualification for Bhagubai as he had inherited property from her parental side and not as a widow. She relied upon a case of Appa Babaji Misal Patil vs Dagdu Chandru Misal [AIR 1995 BOMBAY 333]. Therein it is held that where a person was sole surviving coparcener, the property inherited by him after his father’s death becomes a separate property. The right of succession to males in Bombay state was in accordance with the Mitakshara School. She relied upon a case of Appa Babaji Misal Patil vs Dagdu Chandru Misal [AIR 1995 BOMBAY 333]. Therein it is held that where a person was sole surviving coparcener, the property inherited by him after his father’s death becomes a separate property. The right of succession to males in Bombay state was in accordance with the Mitakshara School. In absence of son, son’s son, daughter, daughter’s son, mother was entitled to succeed. In this case Baliram who died in 1920 was survived by his widow and daughter. 9. The commentary under Article 43 (5) of the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla lays down that daughters do not inherit until all widows are dead. So after death of Baliram it would be Shivbai who would initially succeed to the property. Article 43 (6)(i) also lays down that the daughter’s son is not entitled to succeed, if there be any daughter living and capable of inheriting and while laying down law regarding daughters, it is further laid down that Article 43(5) that in between daughters inheritence comes first to unmarried daughter next, to daughters who are married and ’unprovided for’ i.e. indigent and lastly on daughters who are married and are ’enriched’, i.e. possessed of means. Here there was only one daughter viz. Bhagubai. 10. So far as Bombay State is concerned, Article 43(5)(iv) lays down Rules regarding survivorship or limited estate do not apply in Bombay State. In Article 72 it is laid down that in the Bombay state, daughters do not take as joint tenants with benefits of survivorship, but they take as tenants-in-common. Further, a daughter in that state does not take a limited estate in her father’s property, but takes the property absolutely. Thus, if a Hindu governed by the Bombay school dies leaving two daughters, each daughter takes an absolute interest in a moiety of her father’s estate, and holds it as her separate property, and on her death her share will pass to her own heirs as her stridhana. 11. So abovesaid law laid down clearly shows that after death of Baliram the property had been inherited by his widow Shivbai and after her death in about 1936 the property had devolved on Bhagubai and Bhagubai took the property not as a limited estate but absolutely. 11. So abovesaid law laid down clearly shows that after death of Baliram the property had been inherited by his widow Shivbai and after her death in about 1936 the property had devolved on Bhagubai and Bhagubai took the property not as a limited estate but absolutely. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no question of Narsing inheriting the property of his father-in-law bypassing the widow or the daughter. The appellants do not inherit property directly from Baliram to the exclusion of respondent no. 1. So far as daughter’s son is concerned, it is discussed in Article 43 (6)(i) and it lays down that the daughter’s son is not entitled to succeed, if there be any daughter living and capable of inheritence. So there is no question of appellants or respondent no. 1 for that matter inheriting property during life time of Bhagubai. Since Bhagubai died in 1970 the property would devolve on all her sons whether born out of first marriage or second marriage. 12. The suit filed by appellants-plaintiffs is for declaration of the exclusive possession and ownership over the suit property and also alternatively for putting them into possession. So no such relief can be granted to the appellants/plaintiffs. So far as sale deed executed by defendant no. 3 in favour of defendant no. 4 is concerned, the same cannot be considered in this suit. The appellants are at liberty to file suit for partition and claim appropriate reliefs therein. 13. With the above observations, the Second Appeal is dismissed.