Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 635 (DEL)

INDIAN BANK v. DAYA RAM

2008-07-03

REKHA SHARMA

body2008
REKHA SHARMA, J. (ORAL) This appeal by Indian Bank is directed against the judgment of first appellate court, namely, Additional Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, dated March 19, 2008. It is not disputed by learned counsel for the appellant that the criminal proceedings against the respondent are pending and during the pendency of those criminal proceedings, the Bank chose to initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent. It is also not disputed that a Bipartite Agreement is in existence between the Bank and the respondent containing clause 19.4 which reads as under: “19.4 “ If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of “gross misconduct” of “minor misconduct”, as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or comes to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in Clause 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months” pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in Clause 19.3 supra. If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in Clause 19.3 above shall apply.” Feeling aggrieved by the action of the Bank proceeding to hold a departmental enquiry against the respondent, he preferred a civil suit before the Civil Judge for permanent injunction seeking a restraint order for not proceeding with the departmental proceedings. The said suit was decreed in his favour and consequently the Bank was restrained from continuing with the departmental proceedings till the final disposal/decision of the criminal case bearing FIR No. 76/97 pending against the respondent. It was then the turn of the Bank to feel aggrieved. The said suit was decreed in his favour and consequently the Bank was restrained from continuing with the departmental proceedings till the final disposal/decision of the criminal case bearing FIR No. 76/97 pending against the respondent. It was then the turn of the Bank to feel aggrieved. It preferred an appeal against the said order of the Civil Judge but with no success. The Additional District Judge maintained the order of the Civil Judge. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Apex Court vis a vis another employee, namely, Ashok Bhattacharya of the same Bank, who was also facing criminal prosecution and in whose case also departmental proceedings were initiated during the pendency of the criminal trial held that in case the criminal trial was not over within a period of one year, the Bank was at liberty to proceed with the departmental proceedings against the employee in accordance with law. Relying upon the said judgment, it is contended that a similar order ought to have been passed by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge in the present case as well. I have perused the order of the Apex Court passed in the case of Ashok Bhattacharya. The order does not make any reference to clause 19.4 of the Bipartite Agreement which prohibits proceeding with departmental action against a delinquent employee till the conclusion of the criminal trial. One does not know whether the Apex Court was apprised of clause 19.4 in the case of Ashok Bhattacharya. The mere fact that Ashok Bhattacharya was also an employee of the Indian Bank and some direction was passed by the Apex Court in his case, cannot be made binding in the case of the respondent specially when the order is silent with regard to clause 19.4 of the Bipartite Agreement. In the above view of the matter, I find no infirmity in the order either passed by the trial court or by the first appellate court. The appeal raises no question of law, much less, substantial question. The same is dismissed.