JUDGMENT I. MAHANTY, J. — The petitioner-Rabinarayan Sahu in this writ application has sought to challenge an order of confiscation dated 19.4.2007 passed by the Authorized Officer-cum-District Forest Officer, Southern Division, Ghumusar, Bhanjanagar (O.P.3) as well as the judgment dated 24.9.2007 delivered by the learned District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur in F.A.O. No.18 of 2007 confirming the aforesaid order of confiscation of the peti¬tioner’s Tractor bearing Registration No.OR-07-K 9335 along with a trolley bearing Registration No.OR-07-K 9336. 2. The main contention advanced by Mr. Das, learned coun¬sel appearing for the petitioner is that the confiscation pro¬ceeding as well as the appellate order stand vitiated since the statutory enquiry contemplated under Rule-4 of the Orissa Forest (Detection, Enquiry and Disposal of Forest Offence) Rules, 1980 (in short “1980 Rules”) has not been complied with. Rule 4 of Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980 reads as follows : “4. Enquiry - (1) When a forest offence is detected, a preliminary enquiry, may be held by a Forester in charge of the section who shall forward his enquiry report along with the report in Form No.1 to the Range Officer concerned, soon after his preliminary enquiry is completed. Provided that no enquiry may be held by any such Officer if the accused who has committed a forest offence other than an offence under Section 66 or Section 67 of the Act agrees, and files a petition to that effect in Form No.IV to get the offence compounded under Section 72 of the Act and to pay compensation therefor. Such application in Form No.IV shall also form a part of the case record. (2) An enquiry into the forest offence shall thereafter be held by an officer not below the rank of a Range Officer. (3) The enquiry report together with the case record shall be submitted to the divisional Forest Officer by the Range Officer in all cases in which the Divisional Forest Officer is not competent to compound under Rule 7 and where the accused persons do not opt to compound the offence.” 3. Mr. Das, contends that in the present case when the alleged forest offence was detected, the Forester claims to have carried out a “preliminary enquiry” in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980 and forwarded the enquiry report in Form No.1 to the Range Officer concerned. Mr. Das, contends that in the present case when the alleged forest offence was detected, the Forester claims to have carried out a “preliminary enquiry” in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980 and forwarded the enquiry report in Form No.1 to the Range Officer concerned. But the Range Officer concerned failed to carry out the statutory enquiry in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980. Consequently the action taken by the Authorized Officer-cum-D.F.O. on the prelimi¬nary enquiry conducted by the Forester without conducting the “statutory enquiry” by the Range Officer, being in violation to Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980 as noted hereinabove, renders the impugned orders both, in the confiscation proceedings as well as the subsequent appeal invalid in law. 4. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the tractor and trolley in question had been given on hire basis to a contractor namely, Rajendra Prasad Mohanty and it is the said contractor who had issued instructions to the driver of the vehicle to transport some wooden poles and other articles required for construction work in the said tractor by claiming that he possessed the necessary valid receipts show¬ing purchase of the poles by paying royalty to the Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that those re¬ceipts were shown to the petitioner’s driver and the driver be¬lieving such receipts indicating payment of royalty to the Gov¬ernment as valid in law, acted on such bona fide impression and permitted loading of said wooden poles on his vehicle for the purpose of transportation. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that neither the owner of the vehicle nor the driver had any role in the alleged offence and since the driver who was driving the vehicle on the date of seizure acted under a bona fide impression that the receipts indicating payment of royalty to the Government was adequate permission for the purpose of transportation of the same. It is further submitted that the contractor had taken up another construction work at a construction site, i.e., Hukuma and since the construction works had been completed, on the instruction of the contractor the wooden poles and other articles required for construction work were being transported to Jamata and during the said transporting the vehicle and the alleged forest produce came to be seized by the Forester. 5. Mr. C.A. Rao, learned counsel for the Forest Department supported the orders passed by the Authorized Officer-cum-DFO as well as by the learned District Judge in appeal and submitted that the enactment of stringent provisions in the Forest Act became necessary on account of rampant theft and loss of forest cover and that the petitioner was obliged in law not to transport any forest produce without necessary lawful permits. Since in this case the petitioner admits that no necessary permits had been issued by the forest department for the transportation of the forest produce in question, i.e., 2.82 Cft. of Sal Sizes, 27 Nos. of non-Sal poles, 18 Nos. of Sal poles and 20 Nos. of Bamboo Kusangi, was violative of the provisions of Orissa Timber and other Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1980 and in particular, Rule 4 of the 1980 Rules. Mr. Rao, further submitted that the forest offence was committed with the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle and its driver and showing a revenue receipt in favour of a contractor namely, Rajendra Prasad Mohanty is of no consequence and is an after thought. Mr. Rao further submitted that the claim of the petitioner is that the vehicle in question was carrying poles belonging to Mr. Rajendra Prasad Mohanty, contractor from his construction site at Hukuma to another construction site at Jamata should be out right rejected since the said contractor Mr. Rajendra Prasad Mohanty was never examined as a witness in the confiscation proceeding by the Defence. Section 56(2-c) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 reads as follows : “56. Seizure of property liable to confiscation- (1) ............ Rajendra Prasad Mohanty was never examined as a witness in the confiscation proceeding by the Defence. Section 56(2-c) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 reads as follows : “56. Seizure of property liable to confiscation- (1) ............ (2-c) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2-b) no order or confiscation under Section (2-a) of a any tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle shall be made if the owner thereof proves to the satisfaction of the authorized officer that it was used without his knowledge or connivance or the knowledge or connivance of his agent, if any, or the person in charge of the tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle, in committing the offence and that each of them had taken all reasonable and neces¬sary precautions against such use.” 6. In terms of the aforesaid provision it is clear that onus is cast upon the owner of the vehicle to prove that his vehicle had not been used for commission of the forest offence neither with his knowledge or connivance nor with the knowledge or connivance of the agent (driver). This principle has been laid down by numerous decisions of this Court and in the case of Malatilata Samal & others v. State of Orissa, 94 (2002) CLT 290. 7. In the light of the aforesaid contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties, in our considered view the first issue that needs to be adjudicated is as to wheth¬er the procedures laid down under Orissa Forest (D.E.D. of F.O.) Rules, 1980 have been complied with or not and the consequence thereof. The 1980 Rules was enacted by the State of Orissa in exer¬cise of powers conferred by Clause-(d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 82 of the Orissa Forest Act. 1972. In terms of the 1980 Rules whenever a forest offence is detected, the aforesaid rules mandates the procedure for conducting such enquiry. Rule 4 of the 1980 Rules which has been quoted hereinabove clearly requires that when a forest offence is detected a preliminary enquiry is required to be carried out by the Forester who thereafter is required to submit his enquiry report along with the report in Form No.1 before the Range Officer. Rule 4 of the 1980 Rules which has been quoted hereinabove clearly requires that when a forest offence is detected a preliminary enquiry is required to be carried out by the Forester who thereafter is required to submit his enquiry report along with the report in Form No.1 before the Range Officer. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 there¬of requires the Range Officer to “conduct an enquiry into the forest offence” and upon completion of his enquiry the Range Officer is required to furnish his enquiry report along with the case record before the Divisional Forest Officer (Authorized Officer). 8. In the present case and from the L.C.R. of O.R. Case No.46/2006-07 it appears that the Range Officer was examined as prosecution witness No.1 in the confiscation proceeding and the Range Officer’s statement, as noted in the cross-examination are quoted below : (a) “I have not enquired any thing in this case ...” (b) “After completion of enquiry by Forester, I took charge of the case on 31.3.2007. I have submitted my final enquiry report to day, i.e., 16.4.2007.” (c) “I have received letter from the office of D.F.O. to submit enquiry report but I have not submitted any reply for submission of case record. I have submitted the production report.” (d) “I have not interrogated or enquired personally to the owner or driver since I agreed with enquiry report of the Forester.” (e) “I have not issued any notice to the driver for production of Driving Licence as the Forester who is enquiring officer and suppose to do.” (f) “I have not ascertained any thing with regard to compound receipt submitted by party to Forester.” (g) “I have not enquired personally with regard to removal of seized produce from the spot, since the Forester is enquiry officer.” (h) “Practically I have not done any thing in this case the Forester has entirely enquired and investigated the case.” I have extracted the statement of the Range Officer made in the confiscation proceeding in order to highlight the extent of lack of knowledge on the part of statutory authorities of their statutory responsibilities. 9. On a perusal of the evidence of the Forester (P.W.2) in the confiscation proceeding it is found that the Forester has stated thus : “I know about 2 nos. compounding receipts. Those two re¬ceipts stands in the name of Jogi Patra and Kalu Panda of Badaga¬da. 9. On a perusal of the evidence of the Forester (P.W.2) in the confiscation proceeding it is found that the Forester has stated thus : “I know about 2 nos. compounding receipts. Those two re¬ceipts stands in the name of Jogi Patra and Kalu Panda of Badaga¬da. I have not enquired to those persons during my enquiry.” These statements of the Forester who alone carried out the enquiry of the alleged offence amount to an admission that he too has not enquired into about the compounding receipts produced by the driver of the vehicle. Once again we re-affirm our view that the statutory authorities have failed to discharge their statuto¬ry obligation in an effective and complete manner. Any person vested with statutory authority, is required in law to discharge that function by conducting an effective enquiry into all allegations as well as defence that may be advanced before him. In this case the Forester having clearly admits that the compounding receipts, which the driver of the vehicle claimed to be the lawful basis for carrying of forest produce has not at all been enquired into. In respect of these compounding receipts, the Range Officer accepts the facts that the owner of the vehicle Rabinarayan Sahu (petitioner) had submitted the receipts of the forest department to the Forester directly. Therefore, the non-enquiry into the receipts produced by the driver is another ground which vitiates the initiation of the confiscation proceeding. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts we have no hesitation in holding that the confiscation proceeding has not been proceeded in the manner as prescribed under 1980 Rules and apparent lack of knowledge on the part of the Range Officer for conducting an enquiry as is required under Rule 4 sub-rule (2) of the Rules, 1980 renders the entire prosecution violative of the said Rules. The next question arises is having come to a finding that 1980 Rules have not been complied with what would be the consequence of such finding. 11. It is well settled in law that when the legislature mandates that a statutory authority must discharge his duties in a particular manner, it is incumbent upon the said statutory authority to do so in the manner as stipulated in the statute or not at all. 11. It is well settled in law that when the legislature mandates that a statutory authority must discharge his duties in a particular manner, it is incumbent upon the said statutory authority to do so in the manner as stipulated in the statute or not at all. Where a power is given to do certain things in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, is the Rule laid down by the House of Lords in the case of Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch. 426. 12. This principle of law was for the first time adopted in India by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253. Whereas this principle, thereafter, has been reiterated in various judgments of the Supreme Court from time to time and the same has also been approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others, (2002) 1 SCC 633 . The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in paragraph-27 of the aforesaid judgment, while dealing with a matter arising out of Income Tax Act, came to hold that” ...... It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself.” This principle has also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, (2004) 2 SCC 759 , wherein the Supreme Court in a matter arising out of the Repre¬sentation of the People Act, 1951, similarly reiterated the same principle laid down in Taylor v. Taylor (supra). It is also relevant to note herein that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 2 SCC 56 , in a case arising out of the Narcotic Drugs and Psycho¬tropic Substances Act, 1985, after taking note of the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad (supra) came to reiterate the principle that if the thing is required to be done in a particular way, it should be done in that way by strictly complying with the requirement of law and failure to comply with such requirement was held to be fatal to the prosecution. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 , once again reiterated the principle of law that where an action taken is without jurisdiction, even an order which is conclusive may be subject to judicial review and jurisdictional errors are divided in two categories; one being an order passed which is wholly without jurisdiction and secondly, although the action is not ultra vires, the jurisdictional error has been committed while exercising jurisdiction. In this respect, the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of John v. Rees, (1969) 2 All ER 274. 13. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments and the discussions made hereinabove, we are of the considered view that in the present case at hand, since the inquiry as contemplated under Rule 4(2) of the 1980 Rules, has admittedly not been car¬ried out for which the impugned order resulted in depriving the petitioner of his property (assets) i.e. Tractor and Trolley and it was incumbent upon the authorities concerned to strictly comply with the requirement of law and failure to do so would fatal to the prosecution. We further hold that the impugned order of the Authorized Officer and the order in appeal suffer from jurisdictional error being committed while exercising jurisdic¬tion. 14. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that since admittedly the Range Officer did not conduct any enquiry as is required in terms of Rule-4 (2) of the 1980 Rules, the consequent confiscation proceeding and the confirmation of the same in appeal, is bad in law, unlawful, and invalid. 15. 14. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that since admittedly the Range Officer did not conduct any enquiry as is required in terms of Rule-4 (2) of the 1980 Rules, the consequent confiscation proceeding and the confirmation of the same in appeal, is bad in law, unlawful, and invalid. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the order dated 19.4.2007 passed by the Authorized Officer-cum-D.F.O., Soroda Range in the confiscation proceeding (O.R. Case No.46/2006-07) and the appellate order dated 24.9.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur in F.A.O. No.18 of 2007 are set aside and the Authorised Officer-cum-D.F.O. (O.P.3) is directed to release the Tractor bearing Registration No.OR-07-K 9335 along with a trolley bearing Registration No.OR-07-K 9336 in favour of the petitioner forthwith. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.