JUDGMENT A.S. NAIDU, J. — The judgment dated 19th April, 2004 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Rourkela in Civil Proceeding No.155 of 2001 dissolving the marriage solemnized between the parties by a decree of divorce is assailed by the appellant-wife. 2. The parties got married at Dhanbad according to Hindu rites and customs. The marriage was consummated at Rajgangpur in the district of Sundargarh. A proceeding was initiated by the husband under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act with a prayer for dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the wife. According to him, after fifteen days of the marriage the wife expressed her reluc¬tance to stay with the family of the husband and insisted on him to send her back to her parent’s house. Consequently he sent her with her father to Dhanbad. Five days after her departure, he went to his place of posting at Bhutan. In June, 1993 for avail¬ing summer vacation he came to Rajgangpur when his wife joined him and both of them lived together for about ten days where-after he went back to Bhutan to resume his duties leaving the wife at the matrimonial home. After arranging accommodation at Bhutan he came to Rajgangpur and took the wife to Bhutan where both of them led a blissful married life for some time. After a few days, it was alleged, the wife did not like to stay at Bhutan and insisted on him to send her back to her parents again. While the matter stood thus, one day on his return from duty he found that all the furniture and utensils of the house lying scattered on the floor being damaged. On being questioned the wife admitted to have done so. Then a few of his friends and other guests visited his house and when he directed the wife to serve them tea, she bluntly refused, thereby causing embarrassment to the husband. Such action, according to the husband, lowered his prestige and dignity before others amounting to cruelty to him. Thereafter he sent for the parents of the wife and her father took the wife to Dhanbad from Bhutan.. Then in the year 1995 the marriage of his brother took place at Rajgangpur. Such action, according to the husband, lowered his prestige and dignity before others amounting to cruelty to him. Thereafter he sent for the parents of the wife and her father took the wife to Dhanbad from Bhutan.. Then in the year 1995 the marriage of his brother took place at Rajgangpur. Though the wife attended the said marriage, she refused to accompany him to Bhutan and created problems in the house and even rebuked the family members for which he again sent her back to her parent’s house. To make the long story short, according to the husband, the behaviour of his wife was not proper. She used to exhibit furious anger and as such he always apprehended risk to his life. Thereafter the wife never returned to him to resume the conjugal life and he having no other option had to serve a lawyer’s notice on her and ultimately approached the Court. 3. The wife in her written statement filed before the Court below admitted the marriage but stoutly denied all the allegations made against her by the husband. According to her after the marriage he and his parents demanded a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 as dowry and threatened her that otherwise her matrimonial relationship with the husband would be at stake. He never tried to maintain a cordial relationship with her and always used to hatch plan with his family members to somehow or other defame her. As she was a simple lady coming of an orthodox family, she could not express all the atrocities meted out to her before her parents. She alleged that her husband left no stone un-turned to blame her although she was always cooperative and wanted to live with him. Though she was willing to live with her husband but she was thrown out of the matrimonial house and her in-laws not only insulted her but also insulted her father. With regard to the allegation made by the husband with regard to incident at Bhutan, she stated that one evening some of the friends of her husband had accompanied him to the house and the said friends showed indecent behaviour to her in the very presence of her husband. The allegation as to damaging the furniture and utensils was stoutly denied alleging the same to be a cock and bull story. The allegation as to damaging the furniture and utensils was stoutly denied alleging the same to be a cock and bull story. According to her, the husband was addicted to wine and women besides other bad habits. He used to coerce her to join parties at Bhutan and on her reluctance he not only used to insult her, but also her father. He also intimated her father to give Rs.1,00,000.00 or else to face the consequence. She took a positive stand that she was ready and willing to live with her husband but then the latter never made any endeavour to take her to him. 4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed the following issues for adjudicating the case :- (1) If the respondent-wife was guilty of cruelty and deser¬tion ? (2) If she had reasonable cause/excuse to leave her matrimo¬nial home ? (3) If her desire to continue conjugal relationship with the petitioner-husband was bona fide ? and (4) If the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed ? 5. To substantiate their respective cases, the husband got two witnesses examined and exhibited three documents. The wife also got two witnesses examined and exhibited a number of documents. The Court below after going through the materials available disbelieved the case of the wife that she had been tortured by her husband and his family members and observed that the wife from the very beginning did not co-operate with the husband and during stay of the couple at Bhutan she misbehaved with him in presence of his friends. He also refused to serve tea to the friends of her husband who had visited the house and, accordingly, came to the conclusion that the above behaviour on the part of the wife amounted to physical and mental cruelty to the husband. It was further held that the wife withdrew her company from her husband without any reasonable ground. It was held that there was irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and it was impossible for the parties to stay as husband and wife, the Court below passed a decree of divorce without awarding any alimony in favour of the wife. 6. It was further held that the wife withdrew her company from her husband without any reasonable ground. It was held that there was irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and it was impossible for the parties to stay as husband and wife, the Court below passed a decree of divorce without awarding any alimony in favour of the wife. 6. Miss Rath, learned counsel appearing for the wife strenuously urged that both the grounds of cruelty and desertion on the basis of which dissolution of the marriage has been or¬dered having not been established by the husband, the impugned judgment of the Court below cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 706 , Miss Rath submitted that on the basis of a solitary allegation a Court should not come to the conclusion that cruelty had been proved. She further submitted that the husband had not got any of his family members examined as witness in support of his allega¬tions. He had only got one of his neighbours at Bhutan who de¬posed that he had once seen the household articles of the parties lying on the floor of the house and the wife refusing to serve tea to the friends of the husband. The said witness did not breath a word as to who had scattered those household articles. He also did not state about any incident prior to that. Miss Rath accordingly submitted that in absence of any evidence, the Court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in coming to the conclusion that the behaviour of the wife amounted to physi¬cal or mental cruelty to the husband. Such finding, according to Miss Rath is unsustainable. 7. So far as the ground of desertion is concerned, Miss Rath submitted that the husband had totally failed to prove the said aspect, but then the Court below shifting the burden in that regard on the wife held that the wife had failed to establish that she was ready and willing to live with her husband. 8. Referring to the evidence of the wife-DW 2 and her father- DW 1, Miss Rath submitted that there were enough materi¬als to reveal that the husband and his family members drove the wife out of their home on 7th of June, 1995. 8. Referring to the evidence of the wife-DW 2 and her father- DW 1, Miss Rath submitted that there were enough materi¬als to reveal that the husband and his family members drove the wife out of their home on 7th of June, 1995. In short, according to Miss Rath, the conclusions arrived at by the Court below were based on no material and were perverse and as such cannot be sustained. Even otherwise, the decree of divorce passed by the Court below without awarding alimony to the wife was unjust and illegal and it is a fit case where this Court may direct suffi¬cient alimony to be paid to the wife so as to enable a young lady thrown out of her husband’s house to maintain herself and that too with dignity. 9. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the husband, repudiated all the submissions of Miss Rath and submitted that the Court below appreciated the materials available on record in correct perspective and arrived at just conclusions and the impugned judgment calls for no interference. 10. This Court patiently heard the learned counsel for the parties, meticulously perused the materials available on record and diligently considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. In the case at hand, a decree of divorce was passed under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. For ready reference the said Section is quoted hereunder :- “13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party- (i) has after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.” 11. Clause (ia) and (ib) quoted supra stipulated that if a spouse after solemnization of marriage treated the other spouse with cruelty or has deserted the other for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before presentation of the petition that may be a ground for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. Clause (ia) and (ib) quoted supra stipulated that if a spouse after solemnization of marriage treated the other spouse with cruelty or has deserted the other for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before presentation of the petition that may be a ground for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. The word ‘cruelty’ stipulated in clause (ia) connotes and includes both physical and mental. The Act is, however, silent with regard to the nature or degree of cruelty which needs to be proved in a matrimonial case. In absence of any comprehensive definition of the expression ‘cruelty’ any act that endangers the life of the other spouse or any act that may be an attempt to endanger the life of the other spouse should be considered as the ingredient to establish the allegation of cruelty. The acceptable legal meaning of the expression ‘cruelty’ though difficult to define would mean, conduct of such character as to have caused danger to life, limb(s) or health (bodily or mental) or has to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger (see Russel v. Russel, reported in 1897 AC 395). 12. The Supreme Court in the Parveen Mehta case (supra) held as follows :- “The provision in clause (ia) of Section 13(1) which was introduced by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 68 of 1976, simply states ‘treated the petitioner with cruelty’. The object, it would seem, was to give a definition exclusive or inclusive, which will amply meet every particular act or conduct and not fall in some circumstances. By the amendment the legislature must, therefore, be understood to have left to the Courts to determine on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the conduct amounts to cruelty. This is just as well since actions of men are so diverse and infinite that it is almost impossible to expect a general definition which could be exhaustive and not fail in some cases. It seems permissible, therefore, to enter a caveat against any judicial attempt in that direction (Mulla’s Hindu Law, 17th Edn., Vol.II, p.87).” In the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, re¬ported in (2002) 2 SCC 73 it has held : “Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordi¬narily wear and tear of family life. It seems permissible, therefore, to enter a caveat against any judicial attempt in that direction (Mulla’s Hindu Law, 17th Edn., Vol.II, p.87).” In the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, re¬ported in (2002) 2 SCC 73 it has held : “Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordi¬narily wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for the spouse to live with the other.” In the case of G.V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. Jabilli, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 296 , it has been held : “The Court has to come to a conclusion whether the acts committed by the counter-petitioner amount to cruelty, and it is to be assessed having regard to the status of the parties in social life, their customs, traditions and other similar circum¬stances. Having regard to the sanctity and importance of mar¬riages in a community life, the Court should consider whether the conduct of the counter-petitioner is such that it has become intolerable for the petitioner to suffer any longer and to live together is impossible, and then only the Court can find that there is cruelty on the part of the counter-petitioner. This is to be judged not from a solitary incident, but on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances.” 13. In the case at hand, the only circumstance from which the Court below arrived at the conclusion that the wife's acts amounted to cruelty is that when her husband returned from office with his friends, he found the household articles lying scattered on the floor of the house and when he asked the wife to serve tea she refused to do so. The said allegation was countered by the wife stating that the friends of her husband exhibited indecent behaviour and as such she refused to serve them tea. Though one witness was examined to prove such allegation of the husband, it appears that the said witness did not breathe a word as to who had thrown the articles scattered on the floor of the house of the parties and what happened at that juncture. His statements revealed that he was not a witness to the incident. Though one witness was examined to prove such allegation of the husband, it appears that the said witness did not breathe a word as to who had thrown the articles scattered on the floor of the house of the parties and what happened at that juncture. His statements revealed that he was not a witness to the incident. Be that as it may, on the basis of only this solitary allegation, the Court below ought not to have come to the conclusion that there was cruelty to the husband by his wife, or that there was any danger to the life of the husband by staying with his wife together. 14. The other ground on which the Court below passed the decree of divorce was desertion by the wife. Admittedly the marriage was held on 19th November, 1992. After the marriage the couple stayed for ten days at the parent's house of the husband and thereafter the husband left for his working place at Bhutan sending back his young bride to her parents' house. Of course there are some allegation that the husband coerced the wife to bring a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 (one lakh) from her father towards dowry, but the same is irrelevant for the purpose of this case. In June, 1993 the husband came from Bhutan to Rajgangpur to avail summer vacation and immediately the wife joined him at her matrimonial house. They led a blissful married life for about fifteen days whereafter they together left for Bhutan. It was alleged by the husband that after staying at Bhutan for fifteen days the wife behaved unnaturally, damaged the furniture and utensils, misbehaved with him and also with his friends for which he sent for her father by telegram and on his arrival he sent the wife with her father to her paternal house. According to the husband, though thereafter he had sent letters to the wife asking her to return to him, she did not respond and the said action of the wife amounted to desertion. But then no cogent evidence has been adduced to that effect. There is also no discussion in the impugned judgment with regard to the intention of the wife to end her marital relationship with the husband, which is the most important ingredient to establish desertion. 15. But then no cogent evidence has been adduced to that effect. There is also no discussion in the impugned judgment with regard to the intention of the wife to end her marital relationship with the husband, which is the most important ingredient to establish desertion. 15. In the case of Bipin Chandra v. Prabhabati, reported in AIR 1957 SC 176 , the Supreme Court after posing the question what was desertion, observed that the legal position had been admira¬bly summarized in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol.12, Paras-353 and 354 as follows : “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. xx xx Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the mar¬ried state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated.” The same view was followed in the case of Lachhman v. Meena, reported in AIR 1964 SC 40 . In the case at hand, as would appear from the evidence, both oral and documentary, the basic ingredient that the intention to bring cohabitation to an end and/or total repudiation of marital obligations has not been proved at all. On the other hand, the case of the wife all through is that she was ready and willing to stay with her husband. 16. The Court below, it appears, shifted the burden on the wife to establish that she was ready and willing to live with the husband, though law requires that a person who seeks divorce on a particular ground has to establish the said ground by proving the allegation to the hilt. The Court below has not analysed the evidence of DW 1 and DW 2 in proper perspective. The wife in her deposition expressed her willingness to live with the husband. The said fact gets corroborated from the evidence of DW 2. After perusal of the entire evidence and other materials this Court finds that the Court below has not arrived at a correct conclu¬sion. 17. The wife in her deposition expressed her willingness to live with the husband. The said fact gets corroborated from the evidence of DW 2. After perusal of the entire evidence and other materials this Court finds that the Court below has not arrived at a correct conclu¬sion. 17. In course of hearing it was submitted by the Bar that the husband in the meanwhile has married again during pendency of the appeal. 18. In the case of Tejinder Kaur v. Gurmit Singh, AIR 1988 SC 839 , referring to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Supreme Court observed that where a decree for dissolution is passed and the appeal is preferred, it is incumbent upon a spouse to apprise himself as to whether the appeal is still pending before getting married. 19. This Court after hearing learned counsel for the par¬ties though at one stage felt that the Judge, Family Court having not appreciated the materials in proper perspective, the decree of divorce should be set aside and in view of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act the second marriage should be held to be in¬valid, but then according to Miss Rath, the appellant-wife is no longer interested to resume her marital tie with the respondent-husband as he has brought another woman into his life and this Court feels that rightly such decision has been taken, inasmuch as no dignified lady will relish to stay with a person who has another lady in his life. Under such circumstances, this Court concludes that the decree for divorce and dissolution of marriage needs no interference. 20. The only other ground that needs consideration is whether the wife is entitled to permanent alimony. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates as follows :- “25. Permanent alimony and maintenance. Under such circumstances, this Court concludes that the decree for divorce and dissolution of marriage needs no interference. 20. The only other ground that needs consideration is whether the wife is entitled to permanent alimony. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates as follows :- “25. Permanent alimony and maintenance. - (1) Any Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not ex¬ceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the re¬spondent’s own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the Court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. (2) If the Court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under Sub-section (1), it may at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem just. (3) If the Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this Section has re-married or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such party is the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it may at the instance of the other party vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem just.” 21. It is submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband having ditched the wife, she has to depend on others for her day to day life and her parents are not that affluent to take care of her. On the other hand the husband having been gainfully employed with handsome salary, a reasonable sum may be awarded as perma¬nent alimony of the wife. On the other hand the husband having been gainfully employed with handsome salary, a reasonable sum may be awarded as perma¬nent alimony of the wife. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the income of the husband, status of the parties and the fact that the appellant-wife has the right to live with dignity vis-a-vis the status of the husband, this Court feels that a sum of Rs.2,50,000.00 (two lakhs fifty thousand) as perma¬nent alimony to the wife would be just and proper and directs accordingly. The said sum shall be paid by the respondent-husband to the appellant-wife within a period of ninety days, failing which the appellant-wife will be at liberty to realise the same in consonance with law, with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of this judgment. Appeal disposed of.