Judgment 1. The office has raised objection that the appeal is barred by two days. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has a caveat to the office objection. He has pointed out that appeal is against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 27.11.2007 and the appeal has been undisputedly presented in court on 17.12.2007 that is to say within 21 days of the order under appeal. The limitation for filing the L.P.A. is 30 days. Therefore, when the appeal was filed in the registry of this Court the appeal was within limitation. He further submits that because of some other defects, other than limitation, after presentation of the appeal the same was returned to the appellant as per practice prevalent for removing those defects and presenting it again. Thereafter, appeal was re-submitted on 7.1.2008 after removing those defects. It is by considering the date of re-submission, of memo of appeal on second submission to be date of filing appeal that the stamp reporter has computed the period lapsing between the judgment under appeal and date of filing. As on 7.1.2008 the appeal has been treated time barred by the stamp reporter. 3. We are of the opinion that the office objection must be over-ruled. When the memo of appeal was first presented in court on 21.12.2007 the terminal point of filing appeal had arrived. It is with reference to that date of presentation of memo of appeal alone that the time taken in filing the appeal can be computed, which is the only relevant date of presentation of the appeal inasmuch as the other defects can only be brought out after accepting the presentation of appeal and examining the memo filed by the appellant. The fact that according to practice of the court memo of appeal is not kept in the office of registry requesting the counsel to remove the defects in the Court itself, but is returned to appellant for removing those defects outside court, to save further burden on office time, cannot alter the date of presentation or filing of memo of appeal in court, and allow the limitation to expire. To illustrate if the memo of appeal is filed in Court on the last date of expiry of limitation with some technical or other curable defects and instead of keeping the papers in court the same are returned to the counsel to resubmit after removing such other defects the appeal will become barred by the time and is resubmitted. But if it is kept in Court the same will be within limitation, such a result is not envisaged under law nor it can be countenanced. 4. It can be viewed from yet another angle if 17.12.2007 is accepted the date of presentation of appeal to the court, then the stamp reporter would also not have jurisdiction to examine the memo and find the defects pointed to the counsel and require the same to be removed. The memo was presented on 17.12.2007 but was not kept in the court but returned to the counsel is reflected in court proceedings. Presentation of the appeal on 17.12.2007 was complete. The other part of the transaction namely returning the memo of appeal to the learned counsel for removing the other defects is based on procedure of the court in dealing with a file after presentation and would not affect the date of filing of appeal so as to alter the computation of period of limitation. The period for the purpose of limitation has to be counted from the date of judgment up to first presentation. On such consideration there is no denial that the presentation of the appeal was within the limitation. 5. Accordingly, the office objection is over-ruled and the appeal is held to have been filed within limitation. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that there is no merit in this appeal. 7. The petitioner was posted vide the impugned order dated 15.6.2007 at M.M. Manila College, Ara captioned as, on deputation. The petitioner has challenged the order on the ground that this being a posting on deputation without the consent of incumbent concerned, it cannot be given effect to and, therefore, she must not be compelled to go to the place of deputation at M.M. Mahila College, Ara. 8. Learned Single Judge has considered the impugned order of the University to be an order of transfer only and has dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal. 9. 8. Learned Single Judge has considered the impugned order of the University to be an order of transfer only and has dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal. 9. There is no dispute about the facts that M.M. Mahila College, Ara is a College of the University itself and the posting by transfer from one College to another College of the University is permissible. Deputation in legal sense envisages posting from one department or establishment to another, both of which are under different discipline of employer. But under the same employer within his own establishment under same discipline no deputation can be envisaged. If under education department, here it is a University, it has authority to transfer teacher from one College or faculty to another College or faculty which is not affiliated but its own College for such posting the term deputation is inappropriate. The learned counsel for the petitioner is of course right in his submission to the extent that expression deputation means sending from one department to another department, which is under different discipline and in a way it results in change in employers identity, which effect cannot be brought about without employees consent. 10. But if an employee is transferred under the same employer for discharging his duties at different place in ordinary course, no question of deputation arises. Therefore, merely because the expression deputation has been used but which in fact is only with regard to power to transfer, its employee from one College to another, in our opinion, would not make difference in the nature of the order of transfer of the petitioner from Shershah College, Sasaram to M.M. Mahila College, Ara as one on deputation. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has further urged about certain difficulties which the petitioner is likely to encounter if she is posted at Ara including the fact that she will be separated from the husband who is serving at her present place of posting and will disrupt her family life. If that is so she can make appropriate representation before the competent authority for redressal that husband and wife be posted as far as possible at same place. If such a representation is made, the same shall be considered by the respondents unaffected by this litigation.