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2008 DIGILAW 641 (GAU)

Chanjit Singh v. Union of India

2008-08-29

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2008
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner has prayed for quashing/setting aside the impugned order of dismissal dated 31.8.2001 passed by the Commandant, 118 Bn. CRPF, Jirania, West Tripura in exercise of powers under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 imposing penalty of dismissal of the Petitioner from service and Office Order dated 18.5.2001 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 20,361.00 being the cost of carbine butt No. 46 with one magazine and 14 live rounds as well as the appellate order dated 26.11.2001 passed by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Jamshedpur rejecting the appeal of the Petitioner dated 19.9.2001 and upholding the dismissal order dated 31.8.2001. 2. The case of the Petitioner in brief is that he being Head Constable of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was on duty on 11.02.2001 along with six jawans to keep watch on the Assam-Agartala Highway between Mile points 56 & 57. But, according to the Petitioner, in such security deployment in terrorist infested areas 11 force personnel are deployed in the following formation, namely, 3 Riflemen with rifles at 3 defined spots, 2 GF riflemen at 2 other specified spots, 2 two inch mortar gun rifle men at 2 other spots and similarly 2 LMG rifleman on 2 other selected spots and the Head Constable remains as In-charge patrols along with section. But on that day, the formation was deficient because only six persons were deployed instead of eleven and the Petitioner as In-charge was patrolling alone and at that time his carbine (gun) was snatched away by three terrorists. 3. Accordingly the Petitioner was charge-sheeted on 31.3.2001 with the following Articles of Charges: ARTICLE-I That the said No. 751170586 HC/GD Chanjit Singh (under suspension) of E/118 Bn. CRPF while functioning as HC/GD on 11.02.2001 at about 1100 hrs to 1400 hrs committed disobedience of orders/neglect of duty in his capacity as a member of the Force Under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that HC/GD Chanjit Singh (under suspension) while performing an active operational duties in an extremists prone area, has behaved in a very irresponsible manner in that officiating Coy Commander Insp M.C. Kakoty found him along standing near KM Stone-56, at his own isolated from his Section No. 5 at about 1100 hrs. The OC Insp. M.C. Kakoty directed him to go immediately and join his section. The special convoy towards Agartala crossed his Section (No. 5) along at his own and straying away went to a tea shop, run by a girl named Shila Deb Barma with the Carbine and Arms and there mingled with unknown civilian/tribals in the tea shop, thereby utterly disregarding his personal safety and without any heed to security instructions which lead to violation of security Standing Orders issued from time to time thereby committing an offences Under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 which is prejudicial to good orders and discipline of the Force. ARTICLE-II That during the aforesaid period while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said No. 751170586 Chanjit Singh (under suspension) of E/118 Bn. CRPF was guilty of neglect of duty/remissness in the discharge of his duty and failed in proper safe custody of his personal weapons and Arms in his capacity as member of the Force under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he left his Section (No. 5) on 11.2.2001 at 1320 hrs at his own and straying away went to tea stall, run by a girl named Shila Deb Barma, with his Carbine Butt No. 46, Body No. 15404399, one Magazine and 14 rounds and mingled with unknown civilian/tribals in the said tea stall utterly disregarding his personal safety in extremist prone area of Tripura State without any heed to security instructions and safety of his personal arms/amns which ultimately resulted in snatching away of his Carbine, Magazine and 14 rounds by unknown miscreants. He also failed to timely raise any alarm or contact his section personnel through wireless set available with him. Thus he committed an offence of unbecoming of a member of Force and not expected from a responsible Head Constable of the force while performing most sensitive operational duties in extremist infested area of Tripura. Thereby tarnishing the good image of the Force in the eyes of the Public and media. Thus he committed an offence Under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act which is prejudicial to good orders and discipline of the Force. 4. Thereby tarnishing the good image of the Force in the eyes of the Public and media. Thus he committed an offence Under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act which is prejudicial to good orders and discipline of the Force. 4. A Departmental Enquiry (for short D. E) was initiated and a Court of Inquiry (for short COI) was also ordered to enquire into the circumstances under which Carbine Butt No. 46 Body No. 15404399 with one magazine and 14 rounds of E/118 Bn. CRPF was snatched away by miscreants from No. 751170586 HC/GD Chanjit Singh of E/118 Bn. on 11.2.2001 while he was on active duty and the findings of the COI given on 19.3.2001 areas follows: Considering the pros and cons of the case, the Court is of the opinion that HC Chanjit Singh himself is solely and entirely responsible for the loss of his weapon, i.e. one Carbine Butt No. 46, Body No. 15404399 IAI SAF 1990 along with one Magazine and 14 rounds as he did not bother to ensure safety of his personal Arms/amns and kept it out of his shoulder that too in unchained and unattended. The Court also recommends that the cost of the Carbine, one Magzine and 14 rounds amounting to Rs. 20,361/- 12 R/off to Rs. 20,361/- (Rupees twenty thousand three hundred sixty one) only ordered to be recovered from H.C. Chanjit Singh followed by contemplating departmental enquiry to probe into the matter in discreet. 5. The E.O. has submitted his report on 18.6.2001 finding the Petitioner guilty of both the Articles of Charge. Thereafter, the Commandant 118 Bn. CRPF passed the dismissal order of the Petitioner dated 31.8.2001 with the following observation: * * * Considering all the aspects of the case, evidence on record, report of the E.O. and after applying my mind judiciously, I am convinced that No. 751170586 HC/GD. Chanjit Singh of E/118 Bn. is not a fit person to be kept in service as his continuance is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the force. Chanjit Singh of E/118 Bn. is not a fit person to be kept in service as his continuance is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the force. Keeping in view the gravity of offence committed by the delinquent and in exercise of powers conferred/vested in me under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF rules, 1955, I impose upon him the penalty of "dismissal" from service from the date of issue of this order and accordingly to struck off him from the strength of this unit from the same date. * * * 6. It is to be noted here that in the course of departmental enquiry proceeding, the Office Order dated 18.5.2001 was also issued to the effect that a sum of Rs. 20,361.00 being the cost of carbine butt No. 46 with one magazine and 14 live rounds to be recovered in lump sum from No. 751170586 HC/GD Chanjit Singh of E/118 Bn. CRPF for his serious misconduct, slackness, indiscipline while on active operation duty in sensitive area in contemplating that further disciplinary action as deemed fit will be taken against him on finalization of Departmental Enquiry vide Annexure 6 A to the writ petition. 7. On receipt of the dismissal order, the Petitioner submitted an appeal on 26.11.2001 to the appellate authority, namely Dy. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Jamshedpur, which was also dismissed by Office Order dated 26.11.2001 with the following views: The fact that one carbine and' magazine fully loaded with arms has been lost from the hands of the Ex-HC Chanjit Singh is undeniable. Snatching of a semi-automatic fire arm from a trained soldier that also a Commander of a section need to be same more intently. As Commander of the section, Ex-HC Chanjit Singh was responsible for tactical deployment of the men under his command. In spite of deploying the persons under his command, he failed to locate himself in a tactical position. The fact that after deploying the personnel under his command, he had gone astray and went to some shop or a mandir forgetting the purpose of his duty and the prevailing situation. The very fact that he was away from his men and went away in an shop proves its negligence and dereliction of duty. The fact that after deploying the personnel under his command, he had gone astray and went to some shop or a mandir forgetting the purpose of his duty and the prevailing situation. The very fact that he was away from his men and went away in an shop proves its negligence and dereliction of duty. While moving for R.O.P. duty in the tortuous jungle road of Tripura, the Ex-HC Chanjit Singh have not taken due precautions and case for performing the duties. The loss of carbine in the hands of untrained persons amply proves the charges levelled against the Ex-HC Chanjit Singh. In consideration of the undeniable facts. I reject the appeal dated 19.9.2001 submitted by No. 751170586 Ex-HC Chanjit Singh and up-hold the orders dated 31.8.2001 passed by the Commandant, 118 Bn, CRPF." (Annexure-9 to the writ petition). 8. Before proceeding with the detailed discussion on submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be proper for this Court to examine the scheme of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (in short the 'Act') and the scope and ambit of the relevant provisions of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (in short 'Rules'). From the scheme of the Act, it appears that Section 3 deals with the constitution of the Force and according to this section, there shall continue to be an armed force maintained by the Central Government and called the Central Reserve Police Force and the Force shall be constituted in such manner, and the members of the Force shall receive such pay, pension and other remuneration, as may be prescribed. 9. Section 4 is important as because the same lays down that the Central Government may appoint to the Force a Commandant and such other persons as it thinks fit to be assistant commandants and company officers. The Commandant and every other officer so appointed shall have, and may exercise, such powers and authority as may be provided by or under this Act. 10. Now let us see the provisions of Section 9 as well as well as Section 10 and 11. The Commandant and every other officer so appointed shall have, and may exercise, such powers and authority as may be provided by or under this Act. 10. Now let us see the provisions of Section 9 as well as well as Section 10 and 11. Section 9 deals with more heinous offences which have been categorized in Clause (a) to (i) and these offences shall be punishable with transportation for life for a term of not less than seven years or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with fine which may extend to three months' pay etc. Section 10 deals with less heinous offences categorized in Clause (a) to (p) and the offences enumerated therein shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to three months' pay etc. 11. From the aforesaid provisions of two Sections, namely, Sections 9 and 10, it is clear that offences stated thereunder are triable by a competent Court of law i.e. a judicial court. Section 11 is relating to minor punishment as stated supra and authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to or in lieu thereof minor punishment mentioned in Clause (a) to (e) may also be awarded. Therefore, there are differences between the purpose of Sections 9 and 10 on the one hand and Section 11on the other hand. Sections 9 and 10 are for the purpose of prosecution and Section 11 is for the purpose of disciplinary action. Even when a person is prosecuted under Sections 9 and 10 and convicted, then also the authority can exercise its power under Section 11 of the Act as well as in absence of any prosecution, only for the negligence and misconduct of the member of the Force, the power vested with the authority under Section 11 can be exercised for awarding punishment as mentioned thereunder and Rule 27 of Rules has prescribed the procedure for award of punishment. 12. Now let us reproduce the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules as that would be profitable for giving proper conclusion. 11. 12. Now let us reproduce the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules as that would be profitable for giving proper conclusion. 11. Minor Punishments--(1) The commandant or any other authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the force whom he considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force, that is to say-- (a) reduction in rank; (b) fine of any amount not exceeding one month's pay and allowances; (c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for a term not exceeding one month; (d) confinement in the quarter guard for not more than twenty-eight days, with or without punishment drill or extra-guard, fatigue or other duty; and (e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force. 27. Procedure for the award of punishments--(a) [The punishments shown as in items 1 to 11 in column 2] of the Table below may be inflicted on non-gazetted officers and men of the various ranks shown in each of the headings of columns 3 to 6, by the authorities named below such headings under the conditions mentioned in column 7. 13. The writ Petitioner though challenged 6the impugned order of punishment on various grounds, Mr. Biswas learned Counsel for the Petitioner virtually pressed on two counts which are as follows: (1) When the charges are framed under Section 11(1) of C.R.P.F. Act i.e. for minor punishment prescribed thereunder, can the disciplinary authority pass any major punishment like the punishment of dismissal outside the punishment enumerated in Section 11(1)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the CRPF Act. (2) where there is negligence on the part of the Commanding authority, can the consequential burden of those negligence be shifted on the subordinate officer like the present Petitioner-delinquent officer. 14. He also urges that the Charge under Article No. 1 has not been proved as the Petitioner had not gone outside the range of his duty/patrolling area between post Nos. 14. He also urges that the Charge under Article No. 1 has not been proved as the Petitioner had not gone outside the range of his duty/patrolling area between post Nos. 56 and 57 and the area of duty of the Petitioner was not less than a K.M. having curved road, a temple and a shop where people do assemble and the place was vulnerable. 15. As regards the charge under Article No. 2, he further submits that the same has also not been proved inasmuch as the Petitioner remained in the area of his responsibility where the arms and ammunition of the Petitioner were snatched away by the extremists and there is no evidence that he failed to raise alarm or contact his section personnel. The girl whom the prosecution has relied upon was a minor and made contradictory statements, he submits. According to him, had the adequate strength of personnel for patrolling been given, the unfortunate incident would not have taken place. So, it can be easily said that for such non-providing of adequate strength, the alleged incident was happened. Therefore, for such incident, the Petitioner is not responsible, rather the authority who did not provide adequate strength is responsible and as the Commanding Officer was negligent to discharge his duty, for such negligence, the Petitioner should not be charged and punished. 16. According to him, the E.O. did not consider the said aspect for which itself, the findings of the E.O. is liable to be set aside. Calling in question the report of the Enquiry Officer, he again contended that E.O. is the Adjutant who fixes the duties and varies the strength of persons for duties and as such he is incompetent for holding enquiry as he cannot judge his own case as well as he has not been able to apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and in a stereo type manner, he gave his findings. 17. Mr. Biswas argues that the order of dismissal of the Petitioner is not proportionate to the degree of misconduct of the Petitioner if at all proved. He further argues that the order directing to the Petitioner to deposit Rs. 17. Mr. Biswas argues that the order of dismissal of the Petitioner is not proportionate to the degree of misconduct of the Petitioner if at all proved. He further argues that the order directing to the Petitioner to deposit Rs. 20,361/- being the cost of carbine snatched away by the extremists was passed before the order of dismissal which should not have been passed before the actual findings of the enquiry proceedings that means the authorities had in their mind to pass order of dismissal of the Petitioner before completion of actual departmental inquiry and as such the order of dismissal of the Petitioner was preconceived by the Respondents authorities and the mode of recovery of the money was also not permissible in law because the recovery has been made from the provident fund dues of the Petitioner which cannot be used for recovery of the loan/debts or other dues inasmuch as the withdrawal of money from the provident fund was not the desire of the Petitioner but the Petitioner was asked to sign on the dotted lines so that the cost of the carbine is realized by the Respondents authorities in anyway/manner and as such, the order of recovery is also liable to be set aside and the money recovered from the Petitioner should be refunded to the Petitioner. 18. Assailing the appellate order, he finally contends that none of the grounds taken in appeal with additional grounds was considered by the appellate authority and the appellate authority has passed the order on extraneous consideration and without application of mind to the greatest prejudice of the Petitioner and his dependants. He further contends that there is gross violation of Rule 27(b) of the Rules. According to him, the officer conducting the enquiry shall only forward his report together with the proceedings, but in the instant proceedings, the E.O. has given his findings of guilty of the Articles of charges of the delinquent/Petitioner whereas the findings have to be given by the Commandant on the basis of the proceedings of the Enquiry Officer. Appellate authority is to arrive at the conclusion independently, but in the instant case, he acted on the findings of the E.O., he submits. 19. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Appellate authority is to arrive at the conclusion independently, but in the instant case, he acted on the findings of the E.O., he submits. 19. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in J.K. Misra Head Constable, CRPF v. Director General of Police of CRPF and Ors. reported in (1981) 2 SLR 182, particularly, paragraph-2 of the said report. Relying on para-11 of the judgment in the case of Bank of India and Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana reported in (1999) 5 SCC 762 he contended that High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion of the disciplinary authority and if it is found that there is no evidence in support of the findings of the E.O. accepted by the disciplinary authority, then the Court can easily interfere with the impugned order. 20. Mr. R.K. Biswas, learned Assistant SG for the Respondents submits that there had been no violation of Rule 27(b) of the Rules in any way. The E.O. submitted his report along with DE file to the Commandant and the Commandant after going through the same and considering all aspects gave 15 days time to the Petitioner to reply/refute point brought out in the report of the E.O. The Petitioner misinterpreted the provision of Rule 27(c)(4) of the CRPF Rules. The standing order/circular order of the Force clarified that after closing of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused shall be recorded by the E.O. in the form of simple question and answer related to the charges and the evidence and documents duly provided as exhibits. The E.O. acted as a quasi judicial authority and was absolutely free to regulate the proceeding. There was no illegality whatsoever on the part of the E.O. in conducting the proceeding in view of the standing order/circular order. He further argues that the Petitioner deposited the cost of carbine rightly to make good loss suffered by the Government and order in this regard was issued by the competent authority. There was no illegality whatsoever on the part of the E.O. in conducting the proceeding in view of the standing order/circular order. He further argues that the Petitioner deposited the cost of carbine rightly to make good loss suffered by the Government and order in this regard was issued by the competent authority. The D. E. was conducted to enquire into the offence/gross misconduct of the Petitioner, inter alia, to enquire into the charges framed against him in Articles-1 and 2 of the Memorandum of Charges and since the charges were proved beyond doubt, he was awarded punishment of dismissal which was commensurated with the gravity of the offence and therefore, the order to deposit the cost of carbine and the award after the D. E. should not be mixed together while the Petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to face the COI and DE separately. 21. In support of his contention, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Assistant SG relied on the decision in Union of India v. Gulam Mohd. Bhat reported in AIR 2005 SC 4289 particularly referred to Paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the judgment and also referred to paras 11 and 12 of the judgment in Deen Dayal v. D.I.G. of Police, CRPF reported in (1974) LABIC 929. 22. On going through the decision of the Calcutta High Court in J.K. Misra, Head Constable, CRPF (supra), as relied by Mr. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, this Court is of the opinion that the fact of that case is totally different from the case in hand. In that case, the writ Petitioner-Appellant was admittedly a teaching Havildar and he was not paid the travelling expenses and trained constables, handcuff and rope which were essentially required to bring the prisoner to the place he was ordered to. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Respondents of that case, it was admitted that the handcuff was not supplied to the Petitioner as he did not ask for it. Considering the aforesaid fact, the Calcutta High Court was of the opinion that it was not the duty of the Petitioner to ask for them, but under the rules as framed, it is for the Department to provide the Petitioner and Ors. Considering the aforesaid fact, the Calcutta High Court was of the opinion that it was not the duty of the Petitioner to ask for them, but under the rules as framed, it is for the Department to provide the Petitioner and Ors. with the aforesaid materials for the purpose of escorting the prisoner and in view of that fact, the Division Bench held that finding of the Enquiry Officer that handcuff was not given to him, he should have asked for it, does not stand scrutiny at all and the Enquiry Officer in his report stated that handcuff was given, which was contra to the stand taken by the Respondent authority in their affidavit, wherein it was clearly stated that handcuff was not given to the person who was to escort the prisoner and keeping in view the said fact, the charge-sheet issued against the said Petitioner was set aside and liberty was granted for proceeding in accordance with law. Therefore, such decision is a distinguishable one and not applicable in the case in hand. 23. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bank of India and Anr. (supra). It is a settled position of law that a Court has the power to enquire into whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion of the disciplinary authority and if it is found that there is no evidence in support of the findings of the Enquiry Officer accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, then the Court can surely interfere with the impugned order. 24. This Court has also gone through the decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Deen Dayal Yadav (supra), as relied by Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Assistant SG appearing for the Respondents. Particularly he referred to Paras 11 & 12 of the said decision, which are reproduced below: 11. Now I may also turn here in this connection to Rule 27 which deals with the procedure for award of punishment and there is a table given under this rule which has different columns and it is clear from the table which has to be read with Rule 27 that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police has the power to impose a punishment such as dismissal or removal from the Force but this punishment has to be inflicted after a formal departmental enquiry. This enquiry has already been held in the present case. 12. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that no punishment such as removal or dismissal from service could be passed, does not seem to be correct. I have already quoted the section above and it is significant to note that in this section the important words are "in lieu of or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers...." may be passed. The words 'in lieu of or in addition to' in my opinion clearly indicate that in addition to the punishment of dismissal from service the punishments prescribed in Section 11 could be passed or in lieu of a punishment for dismissal. It has also been urged that the punishment such as removal or dismissal from the Force could be passed only under Section 12 which I have quoted above but I think this contention also does not seem to be correct because this section clearly lays down that if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment under the Act, then he can be dismissed and shall also be liable to forfeiture of pay etc. The heading of the section also shows that it deals with 'place of imprisonment and liability to dismissal or imprisonment'. In my opinion it cannot be said that a punishment of removal or dismissal from Force can only be passed under Section 12 of the Act i.e. to say only when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment I am strengthened in my view because a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shyam Singh v. Dy. Inspector-General of Police, Central Reserve Police, Ajmer reported in AIR 1965 Raj 140 where also it was held that from a perusal of Section 12 it is clear that the punishment of dismissal under the section may be given to a delinquent in addition to the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him under the law. If the authorities mean to proceed under the section, it will not be necessary to observe the formalities of a regular disciplinary inquiry and action may be taken up after a person's conviction and punishment of imprisonment under the Act. If the authorities mean to proceed under the section, it will not be necessary to observe the formalities of a regular disciplinary inquiry and action may be taken up after a person's conviction and punishment of imprisonment under the Act. It has also been further held that Section 12 does not lay down that a person could not be liable to dismissal if he is not convicted or sentenced under the Act. Similarly with regard to Section 11 it was held that the words 'in lieu of' or 'in addition to suspension or dismissal' appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 before Clauses (a) to (e) show that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the minor punishments mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded. It was also held that a perusal of Sections 9, 10 and 11 would clearly show that a delinquent can be punished with dismissal even if he has not been prosecuted for an offence under Sections 9 or 10 of the Act. I am therefore, of opinion that the Dy. Inspector General of Police under Section 11 of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules could impose a punishment of dismissal or removal from service. 25. On going through the aforesaid judgment, it appears that Jammu & Kashmir High Court discussed about the scope of Sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and Section 18 of the Act i.e. rule making provisions under which provision, the Rules namely Central Reserve Police Rules was framed and in the said judgment, it is specifically held that words 'in lieu of' or 'in addition to' clearly indicate that in addition to punishment of dismissal from service, the punishment prescribed in Section 11 could be passed or in lieu of a punishment for dismissal. It has also been urged that the punishment such as removal or dismissal from Force could be passed only under Section 12. It was further held that this contention also does not seem to be correct because this section clearly lays down that if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment under the Act, then he can be dismissed and shall also be liable to forfeiture of pay etc. It was further held that this contention also does not seem to be correct because this section clearly lays down that if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment under the Act, then he can be dismissed and shall also be liable to forfeiture of pay etc. The heading of the section also shows that it deals with 'place of imprisonment and liability to dismissal or imprisonment'. It cannot be said that the punishment of removal or dismissal from Force can only be passed under Section 12 of the Act i.e. to say only when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment. His Lordship Justice Syed Wasi-Ud-din of J & K High Court, as he then was, in that judgment also stated that His Lordship was strengthen in his view because a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shyam Singh v. Dy. Inspector-General of Police, Central Reserve Police, Ajmer reported in AIR 1965 Raj. 140 . 26. In the case of Shyam Singh (supra), it was held that words 'in lieu of' or 'in addition to suspension or dismissal' appearing Sub-section (1) of Section 11 before Clauses (a) to (e) show that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the minor punishment mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded. It was also held that a perusal of Sections 9, 10 and 11 would clearly show that a delinquent can be punished with dismissal even if he has not been prosecuted for an offence under Sections 9 or 10 of the Act, which this Court has already observed in the foregoing paragraph of this judgment. 27. In the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Gulam Mohd. Bhat (supra), the Apex Court in Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8, discussed the scope of Section 11 and Sections 9 and 10 of the Act as well as Rule 27 of the Rules, which are reproduced hereunder: 5. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the proceeding section. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the proceeding section. It lays down that the Commandant or any other authority or officer, as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under the Act, award any one or more of the punishments to any member of the force who is found guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force. According to the High Court the only punishments which can be awarded under this section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force. In our opinion, the interpretation is not correct, because the section says that these punishments may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal. 6. The use of words 'in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal', appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 before Clauses (a) to (e) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the punishment mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded. 7. It may be noted that Section 9 of the Act mentions serious or heinous offences and also prescribes penalty which may be awarded for them. Section 10 deals with less heinous offences and Clause (m) thereof shows that absence of a member of the force without leave or without sufficient cause or overstay without sufficient cause, is also mentioned as less heinous offence and for that also a sentence of imprisonment is provided. It is, therefore, clear that Section 11deals with only those minor punishments which may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and a plain reading thereof makes it quite clear that a punishment of dismissal can certainly be awarded thereunder even if the delinquent is not prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 or Section 10. 8. It is fairly well settled position in law that removal is a form of dismissal. This Court in Dr. 8. It is fairly well settled position in law that removal is a form of dismissal. This Court in Dr. Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni (since deceased by his LRs.) v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1992 SC 786 explained that removal and dismissal from service stand on the same footing and both bring about termination of service though every termination of service does not amount to removal or dismissal. The only difference between the two is that in the case of removal he is not debarred from getting future employment. Therefore, dismissal has more serious consequences in comparison to removal. In any event, Section 11(1) refers to Rules made under the Act under which action can be taken. Rule 27 is part of Rules made under the Act. Rule 27 clearly permits removal by the competent authority. In the instant case the Commandant who had passed the order of removal was the competent authority to pass the order. 28. In the instant case, this Court has gone through the relevant record of the Court of Inquiry (COI) held for the purpose of enquiry into the circumstances under which carbine Butt No. 46 Body No. 15404399 IAI SAF 1990 with one Magazine and 14 rounds were snatched away by unknown extremists on 11.2.2001 from the Petitioner while he was on ROP duty at NH 44. On going through the relevant records and findings of the COI this Court finds that there are materials against the Petitioner for ordering recovery of the cost of the loss of property, namely, one carbine etc. as ordered by the COI. This Court has also gone through the relevant records relating to the departmental enquiry. 29. In view of the provisions of Rule 35 of the CRPF Rules, the Court shall enquire into the case, record evidence and submit findings in Form A.F. A2 to the Commandant and in the instant case also, it is admitted fact that a Court of Inquiry (COI) was held for deciding loss of property entrusted to the delinquent officer, and on enquiry, order of recovery was passed only relating to loss of property not for any other purpose, but the disciplinary proceeding was initiated for alleged negligence and misconduct. Therefore, there is no bar to initiate any disciplinary proceeding, even after recovery of the amount relating to the loss of property. 30. Therefore, there is no bar to initiate any disciplinary proceeding, even after recovery of the amount relating to the loss of property. 30. By this time, it is well settled that power of the writ court is very much limited so far the disciplinary proceeding is concerned and writ court does not have the power to reexamine or re-appreciate the evidence laid before the enquiring authority/officer for the simple reason that the writ court cannot convert itself as an appellate Court while exercising its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ Court can interfere with the departmental proceedings when there are some procedural defects in the departmental proceeding like when the proceeding is initiated by the authority without jurisdiction or the finding of the inquiry authority is perverse and without any evidence but the instant case is neither an ex-party one nor a case of no evidence and also there is no jurisdictional error. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority which was affirmed by the appellate authority. 31. Now the question remains is only whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is proportionate or not. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dharamraj Kumar Singh v. Union of India reported in 2007 LABI.C. 2680held that discipline in the force is the sine qua non and if the member of such disciplined force becomes indisciplined like the delinquent Petitioner, consequence will be nothing but nullification of the force, which is recognized by virtue of its discipline. In the case of Union of India v. Narain Singh reported in (2002) 5 SCC 11 , the Apex Court also observed that in so far as punishment imposed on the member of a disciplined force is concerned, power of writ court to interfere with such punishment is severely restricted and ought to be rightly exercised. In the case of Union of India v. Narain Singh reported in (2002) 5 SCC 11 , the Apex Court also observed that in so far as punishment imposed on the member of a disciplined force is concerned, power of writ court to interfere with such punishment is severely restricted and ought to be rightly exercised. By now it is well settled principle of law that judicial review is not against the decision, rather against the decision making process and it is also the duty of the charged employee to maintain the position of trust, honesty and integrity for which he was employed and when the said honesty, integrity and trust are in question in a disciplinary proceeding, he cannot expect that the disciplinary authority will not take any action against him. In the instant case, admittedly, the Petitioner went alone to the tea stall leaving his other colleagues away from where the extremist snatched away the carbine along with magazine and 14 rounds which proves that the Petitioner was negligent. Such negligence of the member of Force should not be looked into in a casual manner. This Court is of further opinion that whenever the disciplinary authority found any negligence and indiscipline of a member in the disciplinary force that has to be checked with iron hand so that for one person, the entire force should not be demoralized. The aforesaid views of this Court get support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Regional Manager, UPSRTC v. Hoti Lal reported in 2003 AIR SC 801 wherein the Apex Court held that if the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. This Court is of the considered opinion that the action taken by the authority against the Petitioner is permissible under law. 32. With the above observations and discussions, this writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.