JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - The original Appellant Kasinath Panda was the Defendant in Original Suit No. 127 of 1981-1 of the Court of the then Munsif, Bhubaneswar. He having expired during pendency of the present litigation, his L.Rs have been substituted in his place as the Appellants. Similarly, the original Plaintiff in the said suit, namely, Silla Satyabadi Patra having expired, his L.Rs have been substituted in his place who are the present Respondents. 2. The aforesaid Original Suit was filed by Silla Satyabadi Patra, the predecessor of the present Respondents, with a prayer for declaration that all right, title and interest of the Defendant who were Kasinath Panda (deceased Defendant No. 1) and his family members (Defendaints 2 to 5) in respect of the suit property had extinguished in his (Plaintiff) favour as also for eviction of the Defendants from the said property. 3. It was averred by the Plaintiff that the suit property consists of an area measuring 100' x 32' appertaining to SCR Plot Nos.30 and 30A of Bapuji Nagar, P.S. Capital, Bhubaneswar with an asbestos room standing on plot No. 30A more fully described in the schedule to the plaint. According to the Plaintiff, suit plot No. 30 belonged to Defendant No. 1 who was in possession thereof along with the adjoining plot No. 30A. Defendant No. 1 had constructed an asbestos room on plot No. 30A. The land appertaining to plot No. 30 belonged to Government and a lease in respect of that plot had been granted in favour of Defendant No. 1 by Government and there is no dispute that he was the absolute owner thereof. The adjoining plot No. 30A also belonged to Government, but that had not been leased out in favour of anybody. Defendant No. 1 on the basic of his possession and construction made on plot No. 30A claimed possessory title in respect of that plot. Admittedly after obtaining necessary permission and approval of the authorities. Defendant No. 1, to meet some of his legal necessities, proposed to transfer plot No. 30 in favour of the Plaintiff and on receipt of a part consideration had entered into an agreement to transfer the lease hold plot No. 30 along with adjoining plot No. 30A, a Government land, which was in his possession but not leased out in his favour. The said agreement had been duly registered and it was agreed that as soon as the land appertaining to plot No. 30A was leased out to him by Government he would execute the deed transferring the same in favour of the Plaintiff for the consideration as agreed upon. In consonance with that agreement Defendant No. 1 had delivered possession of plot Nos.30 and 30A with the existing structures except the asbestos room standing on plot No. 30A and had agreed to deliver possession of that room subsequently on receipt of the balance consideration. On 2-7-1976 Defendant No. 1 received a sum of Rs. 13,500.00 and had delivered vacant possession of the asbestos room to the Plaintiff, thereby delivering possession of the entire property, but could not execute any deed of transfer since permission had not been obtained from Government. After obtaining due permission from Government, Defendant No. 1 transferred his lease-hold plot No. 30 in favour of the Plaintiff by a registered instrument, but since plot No. 30A had not been leased out in his favour by Government, the same could not be transferred though possession thereof with the structure standing thereon was handed over to the Plaintiff. While matter stood thus, on 7-3-1979 Defendant No. 1 approached the Plaintiff to allow him to stay in the asbestos standing on plot No. 30A for a temporary period for the treatment of his wife at Bhubaneswar. The Plaintiff having permitted him he stayed in that room. Subsequently, instead of vacating the said asbestos room. Defendant claimed his right over the same and in spite of several requests and legal notices he did not vacate the same. Consequently the Plaintiff filed the aforesaid Original Suit. 4. Defendant No. 1, his wife and children though appeared in the suit, Defendant. No. 1 alone filed a written statement. The other Defendants having not contested the suit they were set ex parte. In his written statement Defendant No. 1 admitted transfer of plot No. 30 by him in favour of the Plaintiff, but took a stand that plot No. 30A with structure raised thereon was never transferred by him in favour of the Plaintiff. According to him, he and his family members were in continuous possession of that plot for more than thirty years and that there was never any talk regarding transfer of that plot in favour of the Plaintiff. According to him, he and his family members were in continuous possession of that plot for more than thirty years and that there was never any talk regarding transfer of that plot in favour of the Plaintiff. While executing the agreement for sale of plot No. 30, mischievously plot No. 30A was mentioned in the schedule of property without his knowledge and in good faith he had signed the agreement without going through the recitals of the agreement meticulously. In short, according to him, neither aforesaid plot No. 30A nor the structure raised, thereon was ever agreed to be transferred in favour of the Plaintiff and the same was all along in possession of him and his family member. In the year 1981 when the Plaintiff tried to forcibly raise construction on plot No. 30A, a proceeding was initiated u/s 144 CrPC which was subsequently converted to one u/s 145 CrPC. On the basis of such averments, Defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed eight issues for adjudication. To substantiate their respective cases, both sides adduced evidence, both oral and documentary. After discussing the evidence, the Trial Court held that plot No. 30A belonged to Government and the same had never been leased out in favour of Defendant No. 1. The lease deed dated 10'" November, 1976 (Ext.3) indicated that plot No. 30 only had been leased out by the State in favour of Defendant No. 1 and that Defendant No. 1 had delivered possession of both plot Nos.30 and 30A with structure standing on plot No. 30 A in favour of the Plaintiff on 2-7-1976, thereby relinquishing his right and interest in respect of those two plots in favour of the Plaintiff. Consequently, the right, title and interest of Defendant No. 1 in respect of aforesaid both the plots stood extinguished in favour of the Plaintiff, although Defendant No. 1 had title only in respect of plot No. 30. Consequently, the right, title and interest of Defendant No. 1 in respect of aforesaid both the plots stood extinguished in favour of the Plaintiff, although Defendant No. 1 had title only in respect of plot No. 30. So far as possession was concerned, the Trial Court held that possession was handed over on 2-7-1976 and the Plaintiff was in possession of both the plots and that Defendant No. 1 had failed to establish his continuous possession of plot No. 30A with the asbestos-room standing thereon and that Defendant No. 1 as also his family members were liable to be evicted from the asbestos room. On the basis of such conclusion the Trial Court decreed the suit. 6. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the Defendants preferred appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bhubaneswar which was registered as Title Appeal No. 7/17 of 1984/85. The Appellate Court held that as the agreement clearly indicated that Defendant No. 1 had agreed to alienate the lands appertaining to plot Nos. 30 and 30A, he not being an illiterate man the stand that he was not aware of inclusion of plot No. 30A in the agreement could not be accepted. It was held that the recitals of the agreement coupled with delivery of possession by Defendant No. 1 in favour of the Plaintiff conferred right, title and interest on the Plaintiff and, as such, the Plaintiff was entitled to the declaration prayed for, and accordingly declined to interfere with the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The said confirming Judgment and decree is assailed in this appeal. 7. The following substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission: (1) Whether contingent contract depending upon happening of some future events which did not happen is capable of being specifically enforceable, or void ab initio? and (2) Whether any advantage can be taken or derived from such void contract? 8. According to the Plaintiff he acquired right, title and interest in respect of plot No. 30A by virtue of the agreements dated 11-12-1974 (Ext. 1) and 2-7-1976 (Ext.2). The recitals of Ext.1 reveal that Defendant No. 1 had agreed to alienate plot No. 30A after obtaining due permission from Government. 8. According to the Plaintiff he acquired right, title and interest in respect of plot No. 30A by virtue of the agreements dated 11-12-1974 (Ext. 1) and 2-7-1976 (Ext.2). The recitals of Ext.1 reveal that Defendant No. 1 had agreed to alienate plot No. 30A after obtaining due permission from Government. Similarly the recitals of Ext.2 reveal that he had agreed and undertaken that after obtaining necessary lease from Government and permission to sell he would execute the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff and get the same registered. 9. Where a property is not transferable without permission of the authority, an agreement to transfer the property must be deemed to be subject to the implied condition that the transferor will obtain sanction of the authority. In other words, a contract to do or not to do something if some event collateral to such contract does or does not happen, is said to be a contingent contract. 10. In the case at hand, there is no dispute that the land appertaining to plot N0.30A was Government land and had not been leased out to Defendant No. 1 and under law it was not permissible to transfer the said land without a valid lease deed and also due permission to alienate. Thus, any agreement to transfer the property must be held to be subject to the implied condition that the transferor would obtain sanction of the authority concerned (see AIR 1930 287 (Privy Council) . 11. Thus a contingent contract is concluded only on the happening of the contingency in question. In the case of such a contract unless the contingency happened no suit was maintainable. In other words, contingent contract, which depend for its validity or enforceability on the happening of the contingency, cannot, in its nature be specifically enforced. The happening of the contingency is a vital condition in the agreement, intended not exclusively for the benefit of the promisee, but benefit of the promisor also. Thus where an agreement was for sale in respect of a property pending an application for lease and was subject to grant of permission of the paramount owner, the intending purchaser had no right to insist on specific performance. This being the settled legal position, the submission of the Learned Counsel for the parties has to be analysed in that line. 12. This being the settled legal position, the submission of the Learned Counsel for the parties has to be analysed in that line. 12. This Court heard Learned Counsel for the parties at length referring to the evidence, both oral and documentary, and the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below. Law is well settled that a concurrent finding of fact cannot be Interfered with by the second Appellate Court and its Judgment is to be confined, only to substantial question of law. 13. Mr. S.P. Misra, Learned Counsel for the Appellants, while assailing the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below, submitted rather forcefully that plot Nos.30 and 30A belonged to State and therefore the suit filed without impleading the State, the paramount owner, was not maintainable. He also contended that plot No. 30A was never leased out by the State in favour of Defendant No. 1. Thus he had no right, title or interest on the same. Consequently, no right, title or interest could pass in favour of the Plaintiff. That apart, only by virtue of a deed of agreement, title to the said land could not pass. The registered sale deed reveals that only land appertaining to plot No. 30 had been alienated. Thus by virtue of that sale deed, the Plaintiff cannot claim title to plot No. 30A with structure standing thereon. Referring to Exts. 1 and 2, the two agreements, Mr. Misra submitted that in both those agreements, it was admitted that no lease deed had been executed by the State in favour of Defendant No. 1 with regard to plot No. 30A and that only after such a lease deed would be executed, Defendant No. 1 would alienate the said plot through a sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff. Thus at best a suit for specific performance of contract only could be maintained and not a suit for declaration of right, title or interest. 14. Mr. P.K. Routray, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Madan Mohan Panigrahi v. Executive Officer, Berhampur Municipality reported in 1988(1) OLR 549, submitted that a person in possession without title has an interest in the property which is heritable and he has interest over the same against all the world except the true owner and the said interest is transferable unless the true owner interferes. 15. 15. There is no quarrel over the aforesaid legal position. In the case at hand, admittedly the true/paramount owner of plot No. 30A, i.e. the State, had not been impleaded as a party to the suit. Even if it is held that Defendant did acquire possessory title to the land appertaining to plot No. 30A, it appears that he has not alienated the same in favour of the Plaintiff, inasmuch as the registered sale deed executed by him in favour of the Plaintiff only confined to plot No. 30. Referring to the agreements said to have been entered into among the parties, both the Courts below held that Defendant No. 1 having delivered possession of the lands in favour of the Plaintiff, the latter had acquired title to the same. This proposition cannot be accepted by this Court, inasmuch as the lands did not belong to Defendant No. 1 and the true/paramount owner was not impleaded as a party to the suit. As is well settled in law, possession simpliciter without proof of hostile animus does not mature to possessory title. If according to the Plaintiff by virtue of his possession he had acquired any title to the disputed lands, he ought to have impleaded the State as a party to the suit which was the true/paramount owner and made specific pleading that he was possessing the said lands on his own right and his possession was adverse to the interest of the State. In absence of such pleadings, or issue or evidence, the conclusion of the Courts below that the Plaintiff had acquired possessory title on plot No. 30A cannot be accepted by this Court. 16. This Court finds some force in the submission of Mr. Misra that by virtue of an agreement no title to a property passes. Law is well settled that transfer of a property worth more than Rs. 100.00 has to be effected by a registered instrument. In the case at hand, admittedly Defendant No. 1 had not executed any sale deed alienating plot No. 30A in favour of the Plaintiff. Thus no title in respect of the said plot could pass to the Plaintiff. 17. The plaint averments reveal that on the date of filing of the suit the Defendants were occupying the asbestos room standing on plot No. 30A. Thus no title in respect of the said plot could pass to the Plaintiff. 17. The plaint averments reveal that on the date of filing of the suit the Defendants were occupying the asbestos room standing on plot No. 30A. Materials are also there to reveal that there was a proceeding u/s 144 CrPC in respect of plot No. 30A and there was a restraint order. The said proceeding was subsequently converted to one u/s 145 CrPC. Thus it is clear that on the date of filing of the suit the Defendants were in possession of plot No. 30A which belonged to State. Thus the person in possession was Defendant No. 1 and not the Plaintiff. 18. All the aspects discussed above having not been kept in mind by the Courts below while passing the Judgments and decrees, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the same so far as plot No. 30A is concerned and to confirm the same so far as plot No. 30A is concerned. Accordingly it is declared that all rights and interests which the Defendants had in respect of plot No. 30 have been extinguished in favour of the Plaintiff. The direction given to the Defendants to leave vacant possession of Plot No. 30A and the asbestos room standing thereon in favour of the Plaintiff is set aside. 19. The Second Appeal is thus disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs.