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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 651 (MP)

Ashok Kumar Dubey v. Parvati Bai

2008-05-05

PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA

body2008
ORDER 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 25.6.1992 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer under section 170-B of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (herein after referred to as the Code) directing reversion of land situated in Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres to its original owner i.e. the legal heirs of Sukhlal. The order dated 15.12.1995 passed by the Additional Collector in appeal and 7.1.2005 passed by the Additional Commissioner in revision declining to interfere in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 25.6.1992 have also been challenged. 2. The material facts are that one Sukhlal was the original owner of the land situated in Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres. There were certain outstanding dues against Sukhlal and for the recovery of which his land was being auctioned. The petitioner was intending to purchase the said land. Since the land belonged to tribal therefore an application under section 165 of the Code was made and the Collector passed the order dated 21.4.1969 (Annexure P-l) under section 165 of the Code granting permission to sell the land. There was some ambiguity in the order of Collector as regards land for which permission was granted. In the earlier part of the order of the Collector Khasra No.33 was mentioned whereas in the later part Khasra No. 252/2 was mentioned. Thereafter, sale deed dated 8.5.1969 was executed by Sukhlal in favour of the petitioner alienating Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres. 3. A dispute arose in respect of Khasra number for which the permission was granted by Annexure P-1. Sub-Divisional Officer on receiving the information from Patwari about the alleged illegal transfer of the land of the tribal, by order dated 17.1.1982, initiated proceedings under section 170-B for violating the provisions of section 165 (6) of the Code and issued notice to the petitioner. In these proceedings record of the Collector in Case No.95 (A-21) 68-69 was called for examination. The Sub-Divisional Officer dropped the proceedings under section 170-B of the Code by order dated 28.12.1983 by recording that in the first part of the order dated 21.4.1969 correction was done and Khasra No.33 area 5.93 was recorded in place of Khasra No.252/2 but in the tenth line of the order dated 21.4.1969 correction was not done and by the typographical error Khasra No. 252/2 area 5.92 remained, therefore, the sale made by Sukhlal was not an illegal sale. With these findings, the Sub-Divisional Officer closed the case under section 170-B of the Code. 4. Thereafter, sometime in 1991, the matter was taken up in suo motu review under section 51 of the Code by the Sub-Divisional Officer and enquiry was directed. In that enquiry, the petitioner appeared and produced the permission granted to him by the Collector on 21.4.1969. The Sub-Divisional Officer passed the order dated 25.6.1992 against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner did not inform about the sale within the stipulated time under section 170-B of the Code, which he was required to do since the sale was effected between the period 2.10.1959 to 23.10.1980. By this order, the Sub-Divisional Officer directed the petitioner to return the land to the legal heirs of vendor Sukhlal. Appeal against this order was dismissed by Additional Collector on the ground of limitation by order dated 15.12.1995 and the revision, was also dismissed by Additional Commissioner by order dated 7.1.2005. Present writ petition has been filed challenging the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 25.6.1992, order of the Additional Collector dated 15.12.1995 and order of Additional Commissioner dated 7.1.2005. 5. Shri D.N. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the sale deed dated 8.5.1969 was executed by Sukhlal in favour of the petitioner after obtaining due permission as required by section 165 of the Code therefore the sale cannot be held to be illegal. He further submitted that the typographical error, which had occurred in the order of the Collector dated 21.4.1969, was later corrected by order dated 28.12.1983 and thereafter there remains no doubt about the Khasra number for 'which permission was granted. The matter had attained finality by order dated 28.12.1983 and Sub-Divisional Officer could not have reopened the matter in suo motu exercise or revision after a long lapse of time in 1991. He further submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer while passing the order dated 25.6.1992 did not consider the permission dated 21.4.1969 which was granted in favour of the petitioner. The matter had attained finality by order dated 28.12.1983 and Sub-Divisional Officer could not have reopened the matter in suo motu exercise or revision after a long lapse of time in 1991. He further submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer while passing the order dated 25.6.1992 did not consider the permission dated 21.4.1969 which was granted in favour of the petitioner. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Dhirendra Nath Sharma v. State of M.P. and another, 1986 RN 106 = AIR 1986 MP 122 , Atmaram Rohulla and others v. State of M.P., 1995 RN 124 = 1995 MPLJ 633 and Ravi Narayan v. State of M.P. and others, 2000 RN 161. 6. Shri L.M. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 7, has submitted that the permission dated 21.4.1969 was in respect of Khasra No.252/2 area 5.92 acres and on the basis of this permission Khasra No.33 could not be sold by the original owner by the sale deed (Annexure P-2) in favour of the petitioner. He has also placed reliance upon the additional document (Annexure-I) in support of his submission that the respondents are still in possession of Khasra No.33. 7. Shri N.K. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 8 to 10, has placed reliance upon the order dated 21.7.1983 and 28.12.1983 of the Sub-Divisional Officer in support of his submission that the permission was only for Khasra No.252/2 area 5.93 acres and not for Khasra No.33 which was sold by the original owner to the petitioner. He has submitted that since the sale was effected in violation of provisions of section 165 of the Code and the requirement of section 170-B of the Code was not complied with therefore sale deed is void and the order dated 25.6.1992 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer does not suffer from any error. 8. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. This Court by order dated 31.7.2007 had directed the counsel for the State to produce the original record relating to the grant of permission (Annexure P-1). In pursuance to the said direction, the State has produced the original record. 8. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. This Court by order dated 31.7.2007 had directed the counsel for the State to produce the original record relating to the grant of permission (Annexure P-1). In pursuance to the said direction, the State has produced the original record. On perusal of the original record, it is found that while considering the application for grant of permission, a report was called by the Collector from the Patwari and Patwari had submitted the report dated 24.3.1969 stating that the applicant Sukhlal was intending to sell Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres. In that report, he had also mentioned that the average market value of said land is Rs.500/- per acre and Rs.3,000/-, which was offered as consideration for the said land was proper consideration keeping in view the market value of land. He had also calculated the area, which would remain with the original owner Sukhlal after sale of area 5.93 acres Khasra No.33. A map is also enclosed in the original record making Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres with red ink, for which permission was applied for. The Collector in these proceedings had passed the order dated 21.4.1969 granting permission to sale, a perusal of the original order sheet dated 21.4.1969 indicates that in the fourth and tenth line of this order Khasra No.252/2 area 5.92 acre was originally written but later on correction was done in the fourth line and Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres was written by scoring off Khasra No.252/2 area 5.92 acres but no such correction was carried out in the tenth line of the order, but the original record of the proceedings clearly indicates that the permission was sought for Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres and Patwari had submitted report for Khasra No.33 on the basis of which order dated 21.4.1969 was passed. 9. The sale deed which was executed on 8.5.1969 by Sukhlal in favour of the petitioner also mentions that the permission for the sale of the land was obtained by Sukhlal from Collector in Case No.95 (A-21) 68-69 on 21.4.1969 and on the basis of his permission Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres was sold. 9. The sale deed which was executed on 8.5.1969 by Sukhlal in favour of the petitioner also mentions that the permission for the sale of the land was obtained by Sukhlal from Collector in Case No.95 (A-21) 68-69 on 21.4.1969 and on the basis of his permission Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres was sold. The order sheet of the Naib Tahsildar dated 17.1.1982 indicates that some complaints were received by the Naib Tahsildarin respect of sale of Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres and Naib Tahsildar prima facie finding violation of section 170-B of the Code had sent the matter to the Court of Sub -Divisional Officer. The Sub-Divisional Officer had issued notice to the legal heirs of original owner Sukhlal since in the meanwhile Sukhlal had expired. Thereafter Sub-Divisional Officer had passed the final order dated 28.12.1983 recording that in the order dated 21.4.1969 granting permission to sale, Khasra number in the fourth line was corrected as Khasra No.33 area 5.93 acres but no correction was carried out in the tenth line of the order and in tenth line Khasra No.252/2 area 5.92 continued which apparently was a typographical error. The Sub-Divisional Officer on reaching the said conclusion had found that the sale and transfer was not invalid and he had closed the proceedings. This order of the SDO was not challenged any further. 10. Sometime in 1991 exercising suo motu review power under section 51 of the Code, the Sub-Divisional Officer reopened the proceedings and directed for fresh enquiry. Such a suo motu exercise of review power after a period of about 9 years is under challenge. Section 51 of the Code which deals with the power of review is as under: "51. Review of orders. Such a suo motu exercise of review power after a period of about 9 years is under challenge. Section 51 of the Code which deals with the power of review is as under: "51. Review of orders. -- (1) The Board and every Revenue Officer may, either on its/his own motion or on the application of any party interested review any order passed by itself/himself or by any of it/his predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit; (i) if the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Board, and if an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order, whether passed by himself or by any predecessor, he shall first obtain the sanction in writing of the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate; (i-a) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order; (ii) no order from which an appeal has been made, or which is the subject of any revision proceedings shall, so long as such appeal or proceedings are pending be reviewed; (iii) no order affecting any question of right between private persons shall be reviewed except on the application of a party to the proceedings and no application for the review of such order shall be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the passing of the order. (2) No order shall be reviewed except on the grounds provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). (3) For the purposes of this sanction the Collector shall be deemed to be the successor in office of any Revenue Officer who has left the district or who has ceased to exercise powers as a Revenue Officer and to whom there is no successor in the district. (4) An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed be any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority. 11. (4) An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed be any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority. 11. Similar issue as regards the exercise of the review power under section 51 of the Code in the proceedings under section 170-B after lapse of considerable time had come up before this Court in the matter of Ravi Narayan (supra) wherein this Court held that under sections 50 and 51 of the Code, no limitation has been prescribed but rule of prudence says that such power should be exercised within reasonable time and the Court is required to consider whether particular period is a reasonable period for suo motu exercise of review or revisional powers. This Court in that case had found that exercise of the review power after 9 years was not within the reasonable period by holding that: 22. The words "at any time" used either in section 50 or in section 51 for exercise of the suo motu powers would ordinarily mean that question of limitation would not arise. But the rule of prudence says that such power should be exercised within reasonable time. The principle of interpretation says that if the plain words are given their plain meaning and they lead to absurdity then such interpretation should be avoided. In all matters referred above, Supreme Court and this Court considering the totality of the circumstances and the facts before the said Courts, came to the conclusion that the words "at any time" would not mean an indefinite period. In some of the cases period of months and in some of the cases period of one year was considered to be belated. 23. When the Courts are required to consider whether particular period is a reasonable period for exercising the suo motu revisional powers or suo motu review powers then the Courts are guided not only by the provisions of law or rule of prudence but are also guided by the principles of equity, fair play and justice. The Courts cannot ignore the fact that public at large deposes confidence in the Judicial system and they wish to say that some end should be brought to the litigation. The Courts cannot ignore the fact that public at large deposes confidence in the Judicial system and they wish to say that some end should be brought to the litigation. Though from the plain language of section 51 it does not appear that length of time would curtail or curb the powers of the authority to review its order by the judicial dictum it has been circumscribed. The words "at any time" in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other Courts will have to mean "within reasonable time", The period in which powers can be exercised should be reasonable period. A man is entitled to feel that after a final order in his favour he is free and is entitled to use and enjoy his property and chattel. If it enters in his mind that some authority on some day may exercise suo motu review or revisional powers then it would be almost impossible for such person to enjoy the property which is in his possession. There must be some end to the litigation. If the things are kept in suspension and no finality is attached even to a final order it is going to shatter the public faith in the system. The law nowhere provides that the things may be kept in animated suspension so that someone or the other whenever wants transfusion of life into the suspended article may bring it back to life. The law is to be respected and justice is to be done by those who have authority to dispense justice. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deals to remain buried in their graves. 24. The resumption and initiation of the proceedings by the SDO prima facie shows non-application of mind. It simply records that effect of non submission of the information was not considered nor the authority had considered the payment of proper consideration, therefore present was a fit case for suo motu review. In the opinion of this Court the initiation of proceedings almost after nine years of the close of the first chapter is not in accordance with law nor can be approved under the provisions of law. In the opinion of this Court the initiation of proceedings almost after nine years of the close of the first chapter is not in accordance with law nor can be approved under the provisions of law. Even for the sake of repetition, it is again observed that in the first order the SDO had tacitly held that proper consideration was paid because the sale was effected after obtaining sanction from the Collector. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ushadevi, wd/o Shankarrao and others v. State of M.P. and others, 1990 RN 77 = 1990 MPLJ (FB) 353, Division Bench judgment in the case of Rammulal and others v. State of M.P., 1990 RN 407, judgment of this Court in the case of Pratap Singh and another v. State of M.P, 1997 RN 219 and in the case Sitaram S/o Bhagatram v. State of M.P. and others, 1999 RN 82 = 1999 (1) MPLJ 178 . 12. In the present case also, the sale was effected by the parties after getting permission by order dated 21.4.1969 as per the existing provisions 0 section 165 (6) of the Code. The proceedings for alleged violation of the provisions of section 170- B were initiated in 1982 and the final order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 28.12.1983 dropping the proceedings under section 170-B of the Code by holding that the permission dated 21.4.1969 was in respect of Khasra No. 33 area 5.93 acres and there was no illegal transfer. The Sub-Divisional Officer initiated the proceedings sometime in 1991 after a lapse of about 7 years under section 51 of the Code to suo motu review the order dated 28.12.1983. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer initiating suo motu review proceedings, filed by the petitioner as Annexure P-6, does not bear any date but the proceedings, filed by the petitioner as Annexure P-6, does not bear any date but the petitioner in paragraph 5(f) of the writ petition has specifically stated that the proceedings were reopened on 27.3.1991 and this statement of the petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents in their reply. The order reopening the proceedings in suo motu review does not contain any reason for taking the matter in review after more than 7 years. The reopening of the proceedings and exercising suo motu review power in the facts of the present case, after lapse of7 years, cannot be held to be within a reasonable time. 13. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 25.6.1992 cannot be sustained for yet another reason that the Sub-Divisional Officer had passed by order dated 5.6.1992 in exercise of the suo motu review power and held that the petitioner had not submitted the information in terms of section 170-B between the period 2.10.1959 to 23.10.1980 and the land of the tribal is in possession of non-tribal petitioner without any legal right and consequently; directed the petitioner to return the land to legal heirs of the tribal owner Sukhlal. While passing the order dated 25.6.1992 the Sub-Divisional Officer completely ignored the permission dated 21.4.1969 which was given to the tribal owner Sukhlal under section 165 (6) of the Code. He also failed to take note of the fact that the presumption under section 170-B sub-section (2) is only a rebuttable presumption and the object of section 170-B is to enable the Sub-Divisional Officer to enquire into the bona fide nature of transactions or transfers made of agricultural land belonging to the tribal between the period 2nd October, 1959 when the Code came into force and the date of amendment in 170-B in the year 1980. This Court while examining the question of constitutional validity of section 170-A and section 170-B of the Code in the matter of Dhirendra Nath Sharma (supra) has examined the object of the provisions and held that: 11. The substance of the meaning of sections 170-A and 170-B may be mentioned at this stage. Sub-section (1) of section 170-A lays down that the Sub-Divisional Officer, on his own motion or on an application oil or before 31st December, 1978 made by a transferor of agricultural land belonging to a tribal, shall enquire into the bona fide nature of such transfer effected in any manner including accrual of right of occupancy tenant at any time, during the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date on which the 1976 Amendment came into force. Subsection (2) then lays down that if the Sub-Divisional Officer is satisfied as a result of an enquiry that such transfer was not bona fide, he may notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other enactment set aside such transfer and restore the land to the transferor; or where such land has been diverted for non-agricultural purposes, he shall fix the price of such land and direct payment of the deficiency in the amount to be paid to the transferor within a period of six months. In short, section 170-A was enacted to enable the Sub-Divisional Officer to enquire into the bona fide nature of all transfers made of agricultural land belonging to a tribal during the period commencing on 2nd October, 1959 when the Code came into force and ending on the date on which the amendment of 1976 came into force, on his own motion or on an application made by the transferor up to 31st December, 1978. 12. Section 170-B was inserted later for the same purpose with a view to cover the remaining transfers of agricultural land belonging to tribals under which they had been exploited resulting from their unequal bargaining capacity at the time of the transaction. By enacting section 170-B, a duty was cast on every person in possession of agricultural land, which belonged to a tribal at any time between 2nd October, 1959 and the date of commencement of the Amendment Act of 1980 to notify the Sub-Divisional Officer within the period specified in the prescribed manner all the information as to how he had come in possession of such land. Obviously, the provisions enacted in section 170-A for initiation of the proceedings was not found sufficient and, therefore, such a provision became necessary to ensure that every such transaction of transfer of land belonging to a tribal at any time after 2nd October, 1959 when the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force was brought to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Officer to enable examination of its validity on the basis of information supplied by the person in possession. Sub-section (3) provides that on the receipt of such information, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the tribal transferor has been defrauded, the transaction shall be declared null and void and an order would be made revesting the agricultural land in the tribal transferor or his legal heirs, as the case may be. The order contemplated by sub-section (3) is to be passed only as a consequence of a finding reached after due enquiry that in the transaction of transfer, the tribal transferor had been defrauded of his legitimate right. Unless such a conclusion is reached, no question arises of declaring the transaction null and void and passing an order revesting the agricultural land in the tribal transferor or his legal heirs. In that matter this Court had also considered the scope of section 170-B sub-section (2) of the Code and held that: 13. Sub-section (2) of section 170-B merely lays down a rule of evidence. It says that where the person in possession fails to notify the information, as required by sub-section (1) within the specified period, it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural without any lawful authority and the land shall revert to the transferor or his legal heirs, as the case may be. Obviously, the presumption arising by virtue of sub-section (2) is based on the ground that if the person in possession has nothing to say nor show that his possession is under any lawful right and that the same is not derived as a result of a transaction defrauding the tribal transferor, the logical consequence must follow to presume that the transfer was void. Thus, the object of the provision is to examine if possession of non-tribal purchaser is lawful and to ensure that tribal transferor was not defrauded in the transaction. 14. Thus, the object of the provision is to examine if possession of non-tribal purchaser is lawful and to ensure that tribal transferor was not defrauded in the transaction. 14. This Court in the matter of Atmaram Rohulla and others (supra) while considering the scope of section 170-B (2) of the Code has held that the presumption under section 170-B, sub-section (2) is only a rebuttable presumption and once in reply to the show cause notice, the purchaser submits statement stating that the land was purchased by him under valid registered sale deed for adequate consideration and obtaining permission from the Collector then the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer directing reversal 0 land to the vendor would not be proper. This Court in the matter of Atmaram Rohulla (supra) while examining the nature of presumption under section 170B (2) held that: "8. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with three kinds of presumptions: The first deals with a case where the Court may presume a fact as proved it may regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. This is the meaning of the words "may presume". The second deals with the words "shall presume", i.e. where the Evidence Act has directed that the Court shall presume a fact unless and until it is disproved. The third variety is what is referred to as "conclusive proof". When one fact is declared to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof on one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purchase of disproving it. Sub-section (2) of section 170-B of the Code merely uses the words "shall be presumed" and does not indicate that it shall amount to conclusive proof and does not bar any evidence being adduced for the purpose of disproving it. The presumption under sub-section (2) must, therefore, be regarded as a rebuttable presumption." This Court while considering the similar issue in the matter of Ravi Narayan (supra) took the view that if proper consideration was paid and the case is not one of fraudulent transfer then the proceedings would be dropped and held: 11. The presumption under sub-section (2) must, therefore, be regarded as a rebuttable presumption." This Court while considering the similar issue in the matter of Ravi Narayan (supra) took the view that if proper consideration was paid and the case is not one of fraudulent transfer then the proceedings would be dropped and held: 11. In the matter of Atmaram v. State of M.P., 1995 RN 124 = AIR 1995 MP 225 , a Division Bench of this Court has held that even if the necessary information is not furnished by the present holder of the land, the SDO cannot straight way pass a declaratory order but he has to make an enquiry. 12. From perusal of the order of SDO dated 18.8.1988, it would clearly appear that he was satisfied that proper cosideration was paid and present was not a case of fraudulent transfer. If these two points were decided in favour of the present petitioner then it cannot be held that the SDO was unjustified in dropping or closing the original proceedings. 15. In the present case also, the report of Patwari, which was submitted prior to the grant of permission dated 21.4.1969 shows that the consideration was adequate. The permission under section 165 (6) of the Code was granted by the Collector on 21.4.1969 and on that basis the registered sale deed was executed therefore the presumption under section 170- B sub-section (2) is rebutted by the petitioner. 16. Coming to the question of dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by Additional Collector by order dated 15.12.1995 on the ground of limitation, a perusal of the order sheet of Sub-Divisional Officer filed as Annexure P-6 shows that on 23.1.1992 the case was adjourned for want of report by Patwari. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 27.1.1992 stating that the case was taken up and for orders. The order sheet dated 25.5.1992 states that the order passed, parties may be informed whereas the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Annexure P-5) is a subsequent order dated 25.6.1992. The petitioner had sufficient reason to allege that he was not aware of the order dated 25.6.1992. The order sheet dated 25.5.1992 states that the order passed, parties may be informed whereas the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Annexure P-5) is a subsequent order dated 25.6.1992. The petitioner had sufficient reason to allege that he was not aware of the order dated 25.6.1992. Since there is no order sheet of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 25.6.1992 which is the date of passing of the order therefore, if for that reason there was some delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the appeal against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Additional Collector while dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay ought to have considered the said aspect. Even otherwise this aspect is no longer relevant since both the parties have advanced arguments on merit before this Court and the issue is being decided finally with the consent of the parties. 17. Thus, the order dated 25.6.1992 cannot be sustained since it was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer without considering the permission dated 21.4.1969; which was granted by the Collector under existing provisions of section 165(6) of the Code and without considering the settled position of law as regards the scope of section 170-B (2) and without considering the fact that as per the settled position of law the presumption under section 170 B (2) is only a rebuttable presumption which was duly rebutted by the petitioner by producing the permission granted by the Collector under section 165(6) of the Code read with the order dated 28.12.1983 and SDO even otherwise could not exercise the suo motu power of review under section 51 of the Code after a lapse of 7 years. 18. Thus, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 25.6.1992 (Annexure P-5), order dated 15.12.1995 (Annexure P-8) and order dated 7.1.2005 (Annexure P-9) are set aside. No order as to costs.