JUDGMENT A. K. PARICHHA, J. — This is an appeal by the unsuccess¬ful plaintiff challenging the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S. No.450 of 2002. 2. Appellant, as plaintiff, filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction against the present respondent. The case of the plaintiff in essence, is that the defendant is the owner of the property described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint and he entered into an agreement with her (plaintiff) for sale of that property as he was in dire need of money for the treatment of his wife, who was suffering from cancer. The plaintiff pleaded that in that negotiation the sale price of the suit property was fixed at Rs. 6 lakhs out of which the defendant received an advance consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs on 15.1.2000. Agreeing that he would execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a period of two years after receiving the remaining consideration money of Rs.2 lakhs. The plaintiff claims that in support of this agreement and transac¬tion, the agreement was made and for advance amount of Rs.4 lakhs, money receipt was also given by the defendant. According to the plaintiff after this agreement, he remained in possession of the suit property and waited for two years. But the defendant did not execute the registered sale deed although she was all along ready to pay the remaining consideration to him. The plain¬tiff alleged that after passing of these two years, he approached the defendant for execution of the registered sale deed, but the defendant avoided to execute the sale deed and threatened to dispossess her from the suit property forcibly through antisocial elements, as a result of which she had to send a lawyer’s notice on 9.5.2002 asking the defendant to receive the balance consider¬ation money and execute the registered sale deed in her favour within one month of receipt of the notice. Since the defendant did not oblige and went on threatening to dispossess her from the suit property, finding no other way, she filed the suit for specific performance of contract. 3. Since the defendant did not oblige and went on threatening to dispossess her from the suit property, finding no other way, she filed the suit for specific performance of contract. 3. The defendant in his written statement denied the plaint averments regarding execution of the agreement for sale of the suit house, receipt of any advance money, grant of any money receipt or delivery of possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. He pleaded that the suit property belonged to his mother and on the death of his mother, he and his sisters came into joint possession of that property. He pleaded that the suit property comprises of six tenanted premises within a common com¬pound wall with common electricity and water supply and the plaintiff with her husband was residing as tenant in one of the tenanted premises on a monthly rent of Rs.1100/-. Defendant pleaded that on 15.1.2000 the husband of the plaintiff came to his house and induced him to take HUDCO loan of Rs.4,00,000/- to repair and reconstruct the house which had been damaged in Super Cyclone telling him that by availing such loan he can get subsidy of Rs.1,00,000/-, and told that for the purpose of getting that loan the defendant would have to give three affidavits basing on which the income certificate and other documents would be pro¬cured. Since the husband of the plaintiff always introduced himself as an advocate, the defendant believed him and on his advice purchased the required stamp papers, cartridge papers and vakalatnama, signed on those blank papers and vakalatnama and handed over the same along with Rs.1,000/- to the husband of the plaintiff. The defendant alleged that the husband of the plain¬tiff converted those stamp papers and cartridge papers into the alleged agreement and receipt. The defendant further pleaded that he never received the HUDCO loan, but sometimes in 2002 he came to know that the plaintiff has filed the suit for specific per¬formance contract. According to the defendant, the plaintiff and her husband are not entitled to any specific performance of contract as there was never any contract for sale of the suit premises and the documents relied by the plaintiff are all forged and fabricated documents. According to the defendant, the plaintiff and her husband are not entitled to any specific performance of contract as there was never any contract for sale of the suit premises and the documents relied by the plaintiff are all forged and fabricated documents. Defendant also challenged the maintain¬ability of the suit on the ground that there was no cause of action, that it is barred by limitation, it suffers from non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties and under valuation. From the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the follow¬ing ten issues : (i) Whether the suit in C.S. No.450 of 2002 and C.S. No.683 of 2002 as laid are maintainable in the eye of law ? (ii) Have the plaintiff any cause of action to bring the suit ? (iii) Whether the plaintiff in C.S. No.450 of 2002 is entitled for a decree of specific performance of contract as prayed for ? (iv) Whether the plaintiff in C.S. No.450 of 2002 is entitled for a decree of permanent injunction regarding alienation of ‘A’ Schedule property and evicting her out of the suit property as prayed for ? (v) Whether the plaintiff in C.S. No.683 of 2002 is entitled for a degree of eviction as prayed for ? (vi) Whether the plaintiff in C.S. No.683 of 2002 is entitled for a decree of damages ? (vii) Whether the suit in C.S. No.683 of 2002 is barred by law of limitation. (viii) Whether the suit in C.S. No.683 of 2002 is bad of non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties ? (ix) Whether the suit in C.S. No.683 of 2002 has been valued properly and proper Court fee has been paid thereon ? (x) To what relief if any the plaintiffs of either suit is entitled ? The suits were however tried separately and separate judg¬ments were pronounced. As has been indicated above, this appeal relates to C.S. No.450 of 2002. 4. Plaintiff examined seven witnesses and produced documents, which were marked as Exts. 1 to 5. Defendant also examined four witnesses and relied on documents, which were marked as Exts. The suits were however tried separately and separate judg¬ments were pronounced. As has been indicated above, this appeal relates to C.S. No.450 of 2002. 4. Plaintiff examined seven witnesses and produced documents, which were marked as Exts. 1 to 5. Defendant also examined four witnesses and relied on documents, which were marked as Exts. A to N. On consideration of these evidence the trial Court came to the conclusion that the agreement and the money receipt are forged documents, that there as no agreement between the plaintiff and defendant for sale of the suit house, that the mandatory provision of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was not complied with by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief of specific performance of contract or injunction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the suit. Challeng¬ing that judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed this ap¬peal. 5. Mr. P.K. Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court did not appreciate the evidence and circumstances properly and placed the burden of proof on the wrong party and in consequence arrived at wrong findings. He placed the relevant portion of the statements of the witnesses to show that there was enough evidence and circumstances to estab¬lish the alleged agreement, passing of advance consideration and delivery of possession, which are the essential ingredients in a matter of specific performance of contract. He argued that pre¬sumption of genuineness of the documents Ext. 1 and 2 was in favour of the plaintiff and there was also no credible evidence to hold that the documents were fabricated ones and for that reason the trial Court should have granted a decree of specific performance of contract, particularly, when the plaintiff had led evidence to show that she was willing to perform her part of the contract. In support of his stand Mr. Sahoo relied on the case of Ramesh Chandra Chandiok and another v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his legal representative and others; AIR 1971 SC 1238 , wherein it was said that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula and have to be determined from the en¬tirety of the facts and circumstances. He also relied on the cases of S.V.R. Mudaliar (dead) by Lrs and others v. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari (Dead) by LRs. He also relied on the cases of S.V.R. Mudaliar (dead) by Lrs and others v. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari (Dead) by LRs. and others, AIR 1995 SC 1607 and Surya Narain Upadhayaya v. Ram Roop Pandey and others, AIR 1994 SC 105 , which say that refusal of relief cannot merely be on the ground that price of the property in question has increased or failure to pay sufficient Court fees. 6. Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and stated that oral and documen¬tary evidence were available to show that the defendant was not in need of money from the plaintiff or her husband. He stated that the documents Exts.1 and 2 were not proved through the relevant witnesses and the manner of writing of these documents itself indicate that the contents were written subsequently adjusting the space available above the signature of the defend¬ant. He argued that there were letters and documents sent by the husband of the plaintiff which positively indicate that the plaintiff had taken papers and money from the defendant for obtaining the HUDCO loan and for effecting repair of the electric line in the suit house. According to him, a cumulative reading of all these evidence would show that there was never any agreement for sale of the suit house and that the documents are all fabri¬cated ones. Mr. Mishra also argued that grant of decree of spe¬cific performance of contract is the discretion of the Court and it has to be exercised on sound judicial principle and the Court should see that litigation is not used as an instrument to give unfair advantage to the plaintiff. In support of his contention, he relied on the cases of Parakunnan Veetill Jospeh’s Son Mathew v Nedumbara Kuruvila’s Son and others, AIR 1987 SC 2328 and M/s. Mirahul Enterprises and others v. Mrs. Vijaya Sirivastava, AIR 2003 Delhi 15. Mr. Mishra also argued that the plaintiff never proved that she was willing to pay the remaining consideration money or that she sent any lawyer’s notice demanding execution of the sale deed by the defendant or that she sent a draft copy of the sale deed for the purpose and therefore, her readiness and willingness as contemplated under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act was not there. On this score he relied on the case of Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa and others, AIR 2003 SC 1391 . 7. The main issues involved are issue Nos.2 and 3. The plaintiff-appellant bases his claim on the agreement, Ext.2 wherein it is stipulated that the defendant agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 6 lakhs, accepted part consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs and agreed to execute the registered sale deed within a period of two years after receiving the remaining consideration of Rs. 2 lakhs. In support of the transaction, the plaintiff also relied on the money receipt, Ext.1 allegedly executed by the defendant. The defendant denied that he ever entered into any agreement with the plaintiff, received any advance consideration or agreed to exe¬cute the registered sale deed in respect of the suit property. His specific case is that he never executed these documents, but the plaintiff’s husband, who is an advocate has created these false documents to grab the suit property. Defendant as D.W.4 took a specific plea that the plaintiff and her husband were residing as tenant in one of his houses and after the super cyclone which damaged the houses including the suit house the husband of the plaintiff P.W.7 induced him to avail a loan of Rs.4 lakhs from HUDCO for effecting necessary repair to the suit house and promised to undertake the official formalities and arrange the loan. D.W.4 stated that because P.W.7, the husband of the plaintiff was his tenant and an advocate and was known to him and because the HUDCO loan carried subsidy, he accepted the proposal and purchased stamp papers and gave his signature on those blank stamp papers and cartridge papers on the advice of P.W.7 with the understanding that those papers would be utilized for preparation of affidavits and loan application. He alleged in his evidence that P.W.7 converted those papers into Exts.1 and 2 and raised a false claim over the suit property. In view of the stand taken by the respective parties, the moot question for decision is whether Exts.1 and 2 are genuine documents or are fake/created documents. 8. P.W.1, the plaintiff in her affidavit evidence stated that Exts.1 and 2 are the agreement for sale of the suit house and money receipt for Rs.4 lakhs respectively. In view of the stand taken by the respective parties, the moot question for decision is whether Exts.1 and 2 are genuine documents or are fake/created documents. 8. P.W.1, the plaintiff in her affidavit evidence stated that Exts.1 and 2 are the agreement for sale of the suit house and money receipt for Rs.4 lakhs respectively. She, however, admitted that she is an illiterate lady and cannot read the contents of Exts.1 and 2. She also admitted that she never talked with the defendant about the transaction or directly entered into any agreement with him, but her husband actually negotiated with the defendant. She also stated that by the time she was brought to the Sub-Registrar’s office, the documents had already been written. So, her evidence does not help to prove execution or genuineness of Exts.1 and 2. P.W.7 stated that the agreement was entered into with the defendant and the defendant purchased the stamp papers, cartridge paper from the Court premises at Cuttack, but the documents were executed at Bhubaneswar Sub-Registry Office. He stated that after purchase of the stamp papers at Cuttack, the defendant and his son asked him to come with the plaintiff to Bhubaneswar Sub-Registrar’s office at 2.00 P.M. and accordingly, he went there and there in presence of the witness¬es, the document was written. He said that when the document was being written, he went home to bring the plaintiff and after coming back with the plaintiff at 3.30 P.M., the documents were signed and the advance amount of Rs.4 lakh was paid. While P.W.1 stated that at about 3.00 P.M. the documents were executed and she gave money to the defendant, P.W.7 stated that he came back to the Sub-Registrar’s office with the plaintiff at about 3.30 P.M. and thereafter the document was executed and payment was made. Exts.1 and 2 show that one Sarat Chandra Pattnaik, Moharir scribed both the Exts.1 and 2. The said person was not examined as a witness to prove that in fact on the instruction of the defendant, he wrote those documents and that the parties and witnesses voluntarily signed on those documents and the money was paid in his presence. P.W.7 offered an explanation that the scribe Sarat Chandra Pattnaik demanded one gunth of land for coming to the Court for giving evidence and for that reason, he could not examine the scribe. P.W.7 offered an explanation that the scribe Sarat Chandra Pattnaik demanded one gunth of land for coming to the Court for giving evidence and for that reason, he could not examine the scribe. If that was so, the plaintiff could have procured the attendance of the scribe in the Court by issuing summons through Court. No such step was taken and no sincere effort was made to bring the scribe as a witness. 9. P.Ws.3 and 4 are the alleged attesting witnesses to Exts.1 and 2. Although these witnesses stated that the documents, Exts.1 and 2 were executed in their presence, their evidence does not appear to be reliable. P.W.3 in his affidavit evidence men¬tioned that in January, 2000 one day he had come to the house of the plaintiff with some bags of rice and on the request of P.W.7 he remained in his house till 15.1.2000 and on that day he came to the Sub-Registrar’s office with P.W.7 and witnessed the execu¬tion of Exts.1 and 2. The evidence of these witnesses show that he is an interested person with P.W.7 and he is a partition wit¬ness. His statement that the contents of the documents were read over and explained to him by the scribe is unbelievable because no other witness corroborated this aspect and there is no en¬dorsement of Exts.1 and 2 that the contents were read over and explained to the parties and witnesses. In fact his statement raises a doubt about his presence at Bhubaneswar on 15.1.2000. The evidence of P.W.4 also appears improbable. He claims that he was running a tea stall by the side of the Civil Court, Bhubanes¬war and that P.W.7 and the defendant used to visit his stall regularly and that on the alleged date they called him to be a witness to the documents, Exts.1 and 2. First of all his address noted in the document is materially different from the address which he gave in the Court. He stated that on being called by the son of the defendant, he came to the Sub-Registrar’s office where he was introduced to the plaintiff at 3.00 P.M. although it is the evidence of P.W. 7 that he and the plaintiff came to the Sub-Registry Office at 3.30 P.M. His evidence was also some what contradictory to the evidence of P.W.7. While P.W.7 stated that he had a discussion with the defendant about the consideration amount at his shop at Lingaraj Market Complex, P.W.4 stated that the consideration amount was discussed and finalized at his tea stall near the Civil Court, Bhubaneswar. The oral evidence of the plaintiff’s side was, therefore, not very convincing regarding the execution of Exts.1 and 2 by the defendant. 10. There is no dispute that P.W.7 is an advocate of Bhuba¬neswar. The defendant, D.W.4 stated that P.W.7, and the plaintiff were residing in one of his houses as tenants and that on the persuasion of P.W. 7 he signed on the blank stamp papers, cartridge paper with the understanding that these papers would be used for the purpose of preparation of affidavit and the documents for obtaining HUDCO loan. P.W.7 denied that he was staying in the house of the defendant as a tenant, but the certified copy of the petition filed by the plaintiff in FAO No.123 of 2002 and the order marked as Ext.B indicate that the plaintiff was a tenant. Ext. C, which is a letter written by P.W.7 also gave a hint that he was living in the house of the defendant as a tenant. The defendant, D.W.4 claimed that along with the stamp papers and cartridge paper he had given some money to D.W.7 for meeting the expenses of prepa¬ration of the application, affidavit etc. for the loan. In this connection, the cash memo and account was filed as Ext.D wherein it is there in the handwriting of P.W.7 that the expenditure of Rs.435/ was made for three certificates with affidavits etc. and that Rs.1,000/- was spent for R.I. report. Along with this, the expenditure made for electric line repair of the house is also there. A letter written by P.W.7 is Ext. K. In this letter P.W.7 has informed D.W.4 that the papers given by him were utilized for the affidavits and not for any other purpose. These documents support the plea of the defendant that P.W.7 was a tenant and that the papers and money had been given to P.W.7 for the purpose of preparation of affidavit and meeting the expenditure for obtaining HUDCO loan. The documents, Exts.1 and 2 on the face of it also appear some what suspicious. The writings in Ext. These documents support the plea of the defendant that P.W.7 was a tenant and that the papers and money had been given to P.W.7 for the purpose of preparation of affidavit and meeting the expenditure for obtaining HUDCO loan. The documents, Exts.1 and 2 on the face of it also appear some what suspicious. The writings in Ext. 2 show that regular gap between the lines had not been maintained and it appears that the contents have been squeezed between the stamp heading and the signature of the defendant. There is also a mark on this document, which indicates that some adhesive stamp was there on the document, which has been removed. Normally for an affidavit adhesive Court fee of Re/1 is pasted on a 10 rupees non-judicial stamp paper. Ext.2 is a non-judicial stamp paper worth of Rs. 10/- and the adhesive Court fee has been removed from this paper. Ext.2 has not been laminated, but Ext.1 has been laminated. According to the defendant, the revenue stamps on Ext.1 has been pasted to cover the date, which was previously there on those papers and in order to conceal that aspect, the document has been laminated, so that the Court cannot examine this aspect. This plea appears reasonable one. In essence, Exts.1 and 2 are very suspicious and their execution was also not proved through the scribe or witnesses properly. Ext.K, a letter written by P.W.7, also shows that he had actually taken the papers from the defendant for the purpose of affidavit. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the documents, Exts.1 and 2 were marked without objection and there¬fore, its formal proof was not necessary. This submission does not contain any force because in the affidavit evidence of the plaintiff these documents were simply described as Exts.1 and 2 and the plaintiff herself admitted that she is illiterate and cannot read the contents of Exts.1 and 2 and also that those documents were not written in her presence. 12. Regarding payment of the consideration, it is canvassed by P.Ws.1 and 7 that they entered into an agreement for sale of their land and one shop room and with the advance money, which they got from those agreements, they paid Rs. 4 lakhs to the de¬fendant and obtained the receipt, Ext.1. In support of this plea, they proved Exts.4 and 5. 4 lakhs to the de¬fendant and obtained the receipt, Ext.1. In support of this plea, they proved Exts.4 and 5. The person with whom there was an agreement for sale of the shop was not examined. The other person, Krushna Chandra Panda was examined as P.W.4. As has been stated earlier, he is not a reliable witness. According to him, he had a thatched tea stall near the Civil Court, Bhubaneswar, which was no more there by 2002. It cannot be believed that such person could give Rs.3,70,000/- as advance to the plaintiff forthwith on the simple asking of the plaintiff. Further more, he admits that he has not insisted for execution of the sale deed in respect of that land as yet. This appears improbable. If a person has given so much of money, naturally he would be eager to close the deal and take over ownership of the land. The documents, Exts.4 and 5 thus appear to be got up documents created for the purpose of showing funds for payment of the alleged advance to the defendants. 13. There was another important aspect of the case. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was in dire need of money for the treatment of his wife who was suffering from cancer and for that reason he proposed to sell the suit house to the plaintiff and received an advance of Rs. 4 lakhs. No paper or document was produced by the plaintiff or was called for from any hospital to show that the wife of the defendant was undergoing treatment for her cancer disease at that point of time. On the other hand, the defendant produced the prescription. Ext. H dated 31.3.1984 and the report of the AIIMS, New Delhi dated 30.4.1984, which indicate that the wife of the defendant had undergone the cancer treatment in 1984 and was virtually cured. With such material, it cannot be believed that the defendant was in need of Rs.4 lakhs for the treatment of his wife in the year 2000. 14. The defendant stated that the suit land along with six nos. of houses was purchased by his mother in the year 1937 and on the death of his mother, he and his sisters inherited those properties and that they had given those houses on rent. 14. The defendant stated that the suit land along with six nos. of houses was purchased by his mother in the year 1937 and on the death of his mother, he and his sisters inherited those properties and that they had given those houses on rent. This plea is supported by Ext.G, the sale document showing purchase of the property by the mother. Furthermore, D.W.2, who is an educat¬ed lady and a tenant in one of the houses, stated that the plain¬tiff and her husband were tenants in one of the houses. Similar¬ly, D.Ws.3 and 4 also supported the plea that the plaintiff and her husband were tenants under the defendant and that the defendant had no legal necessity to sell the property. When the suit property did not exclusively belong to the defendant, the plaintiff and her hus¬band could not have entered into an agreement with the defendant for sale of the property. These are all circumstances, which also belie the plea of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court, therefore, rightly concluded that there was no agreement between the plain¬tiff and the defendant for sale of the suit property and that the Exts. 1 and 2 are not genuine documents. 15. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says that the plaintiff has to establish without shadow of doubt that there was a valid and legal contract and that he/she was willing to perform his/her part of the contract as contemplated under Sec¬tion 16 of the said Act. It is had been stated in the case of Ramesh Chandra Chandiok (supra), that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula and have to be determined from the facts and circumstances. It has, however, been made clear in several judicial pronouncements that burden of showing readiness and willingness cannot be discharged by simply giving oral evidence that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the remaining consideration. There must be specific evidence to show that the plaintiff took some concrete steps regarding performance of his/her part of the contract. There is no evidence in the present case that during the period of 2 years as contem¬plated in Ext.2, the plaintiff offered the remaining considera¬tion money of Rs.2 lakhs to the defendant either by tendering cash or sending Bank Draft/Cheque. There is no evidence in the present case that during the period of 2 years as contem¬plated in Ext.2, the plaintiff offered the remaining considera¬tion money of Rs.2 lakhs to the defendant either by tendering cash or sending Bank Draft/Cheque. There is also no evidence that he sent the draft copy of the sale deed to the defendant for his approval and execution of the same. The plaintiff also never moved any Court with the plea that she is ready and willing to deposit the balance consideration in the Court in the name of the defendant. She also did not prove any notice sent to the defend¬ant indicating that she is willing to pay the remaining consider¬ation and demanding execution of the sale deed. No doubt, P.W.7 claimed that he sent a notice, but DW. 4 explained that the plaintiff had sent one invitation, Ext.L for “Namakaran’ ceremony of the child and that he never received any notice from the plaintiff. Such being the situation, learned trial Judge commit¬ted no error in concluding that there was lack of evidence to establish that the plaintiff was all along willing to perform her part of the contract. 16. When the evidences on record do not establish a valid agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for sale of the suit house, payment of advance consideration and readiness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the alleged contract, there was no scope for allowing her prayer for specific performance of the contract. Similarly, when the plaintiff could not establish his right over the suit property, there was no scope of grant of permanent injunction against the defendant for the suit schedule properties because permanent injunction can only be granted in favour of a rightful owner/possessor of the property. Since Exts.1 and 2 are found to be fake documents and there was no contract or sale of the suit property, there was also no cause of action for the plaintiff to bring the suit. 17. For all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with cost. Appeal dismissed.