JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. Challenging the legality of the order dated 19.1.2006 (Annexure-18) issued by the Secretary, Managing Committee of Nonghali L.P. School (the respondent No. 4) terminating her services as an Assistant Teacher, the petitioner is seeking the intervention of this Court by this writ petition for appropriate order. Shorn of unnecessary details, the pleaded case of the petitioner is that she was appointed as a non-Government teacher on 6.5.1989 by the Administrator, Primary Education, Khasi Hills District, and was initially posted in that capacity at the Mawber DCLP School, which is a Government school. There is no dispute at the bar that her appointment was made on the recommendation of the District Selection Committee. By the order dated 14.6.1991, the petitioner was transferred to Smt. Junior Basic School, but she was again transferred to Nonglait DCLP School on 21.4.1993. She was, however, transferred to Ummir DCLP School vide the order dated 23.3.1995, but before she could join the post, her transfer order was cancelled and replaced by another order dated 7.4.1996 re-transferring her to Nonghali DCLP School. At this stage, it may be noted that except for this Nonghali LP School, the schools in which she worked hitherto were Government schools. She, therefore, joined Noghali DCLP School under protest and subsequently challenged the legality whereof in her said representation dated 14.5.2004 to the Deputy Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills (the respondent No. 3) and prayed for her transfer to any Government school. In her representation, the petitioner expressed the family problems faced by her such as causing untold misery and hardship to her minor-children, her infirm and aged mother and her elder brother, who has been bed-ridden for more than 25 years and also of the remote location of the school as the reason for seeking her transfer. Her representation apparently did not find favour with the respondent authorities. 2. It is also the case of the petitioner that in May, 2003, she fell ill, was advised to take rest and constant medication, and, accordingly, informed the respondent No. 4 of her inability to attend the school from 5.5.2003 to 30.11.2003 on medical grounds. Her representation apparently did not find favour with the respondent authorities. 2. It is also the case of the petitioner that in May, 2003, she fell ill, was advised to take rest and constant medication, and, accordingly, informed the respondent No. 4 of her inability to attend the school from 5.5.2003 to 30.11.2003 on medical grounds. According to the petitioner, she was hospitalized for treatment for B.U.B. in the Ganesh Das Hospital during that period, but the respondent No. 4, without showing sympathy for her misfortune, proceeded to withhold her pay for the said period and also gave wrong information to the respondent No. 3 about her absence from school. In the meantime, on 3.11.2003, the Managing Committee of the School decided to appoint, and appointed, one Philakyntiew Mynsong, who had then been serving as the substitute teacher during the absence of the petitioner, as the officiating teacher in the school. It would appear that the representation of the petitioner for her transfer was not entertained by the respondent No. 3, who, on the contrary, by the letter dated 11.7.2005 asked her to resume her duty immediately. According to the petitioner, acting upon the instruction of respondent No. 3, she reported for duty on 19.7.2005, but was not allowed to resume her duty after two days by respondent No. 4 on the ground that the Managing Committee had already released her following her transfer. This prompted her to approach the respondent No. 3 by her letter dated 23.8.2005 informing him of her inability to join her duty. The respondent No. 3, however, by his letter dated 23.9.2005 informed her that her request for transfer was pending before respondent No. 1 and also required her to show cause as to why action should not be taken against her for negligence of duty. The petitioner immediately explained her position, but respondent No. 3 did not bother to take action nor did he allow her to join her duty. Her subsequent representation to respondent No. 3 to direct respondent No. 4 to allow her to join her post and pay her pending salaries also failed to evoke positive response. On the contrary, respondent No. 3 issued the impugned order, which was subsequently approved by respondent No. 3. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory, and is liable to be quashed. 3. On the contrary, respondent No. 3 issued the impugned order, which was subsequently approved by respondent No. 3. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory, and is liable to be quashed. 3. Both the State respondents arid the Managing Committee of the school contested the writ petition by filing their respective affidavits-in-opposition. In the affidavit-in-opposition of the State respondents, it is stated that the petitioner was transferred to Nonghali LP School as she was actually appointed as a non-Government teacher, and her transfer cannot be said to be illegal and that no decision could be taken on 3.4.2003 about resumption and continuation of her duty in the school as her grievances were not found to be genuine requiring redressal therefor. It is asserted by the State respondents that the petitioner never applied for medical leave supported by certificate and that she by her own letter dated 11.2.2003 addressed to respondent No. 4 had informed him about her inability to come to the school anymore and requested for arrangement of another teacher in her place and for sending her pending salary to her shop at Nongmynsong. The State-respondents aver that on the submission of the show cause by the petitioner in reply to the latter dated 7.10.2005 of respondent No. 3 the matter was left to the Managing Committee of the School for necessary action as she was under their direct control, who thereafter resolved to terminate her services, and the same was subsequently approved by respondent No. 3. According to the answering respondents, the petitioner submitted a number of representations to cover up her unauthorized absence in the school, and the inspection conducted on 11.8.2004 in the school revealed that she was absent from duty since May, 2003. This is in addition to the report received by him from the Syeim of Hima Khyrim about her continuous absence from duty. It is, thus, submitted by the State-respondents that there is no infirmity in the impugned order or of denial of justice to the petitioner warranting the interference of this Court. 4. This is in addition to the report received by him from the Syeim of Hima Khyrim about her continuous absence from duty. It is, thus, submitted by the State-respondents that there is no infirmity in the impugned order or of denial of justice to the petitioner warranting the interference of this Court. 4. In the counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 4, which is the Managing Committee of the School, it is asserted that the petitioner was right from day one not cooperative, and was, rather, inimical towards the Managing Committee of the School and that she verbally as well as by her letters dated 28.2.2002 and dated 11.2.2003 informed the Committee that she would not be attending duty any more as she had sought for transfer to a Government school, and it was not her duty to teach in the school and that she never furnished a medical certificate for the period between May. 2003 and November, 2003 to substantiate her claim that she was actually sick. According to respondent No. 4, the petitioner had written the letters dated 10.9.1996, 5.10.1996, 5.11.1996, 8.9.1999, 1.5.2000 and 30.4.2002 with other letters to the Managing Committee to excuse her from attending her duty due to, among others, ailments or family problems, etc. and she would remain absent on other occasions for weeks altogether without information or explanation. Respondent No. 4 also avers that despite her negligence towards her duty no punitive action was taken by the Managing Committee against her in the hope that she would amend herself and resume her duty faithfully, but it was learnt that she was all this time running tea-stalls at Nongmynsong and Tynring, and had for all practical purposes abandoned her job as a teacher in the school. The answering respondent further states that the conduct of the petitioner dislocated the functioning of the school with the result that she had to manage the school by herself, which has an average strength of one hundred students a year from Nursery to Standard IV. The respondent points out that she had to seek the intervention of respondent No. 3 for appointing the said Philakyntiew Mynsong as officiating teacher since 2001 and that respondent No. 3, in fact, wrote to her vide the letter dated 5.1.2005 about the long absence of the petitioner and asked her to take necessary action in this connection. The respondent points out that she had to seek the intervention of respondent No. 3 for appointing the said Philakyntiew Mynsong as officiating teacher since 2001 and that respondent No. 3, in fact, wrote to her vide the letter dated 5.1.2005 about the long absence of the petitioner and asked her to take necessary action in this connection. While reiterating the averments of respondent No. 3 in his counter, respondent No. 4 further points out that when the Managing Committee received notice from respondent 3 concerning the joining of duty by the petitioner again, the Managing Committee vide the letter dated 23.9.2005 requested him to transfer her from their school immediately due to her negligence of duty and her irresponsible behavior for the past 10 years. It is also pointed out by the answering respondent that when the second show-cause notice was sent by respondent No. 3 to the petitioner about her transfer case and negligence of her duty, she replied that her absence from duty was with the understanding of the Managing Committee, but there was no such understanding between them. According to the answering respondent, it was due to combination of several acts of omission or commission indicated above that the Managing Committee was compelled to take the impugned action, which is perfectly justified on those facts and circumstances, and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived, and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 5. Mr. K. Khan, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the termination of the petitioner from service is illegal and arbitrary inasmuch as no reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to her. He maintains that the Nonghali DCLP School is a government aided school governed by the Assam Education Department Rules and orders where under the school is required to conduct departmental enquiry prior to issuing the impugned order of termination and that when no departmental enquiry was held by the Managing Committee of the school, the impugned termination order is without jurisdiction, and cannot be sustained in law. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order be quashed by reinstating the petitioner to her post with full back wages. To buttress his contentions, the learned Counsel strongly relies on (i) Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509 , (ii) D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 and (iii) (2007) 2 GLT 803. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order be quashed by reinstating the petitioner to her post with full back wages. To buttress his contentions, the learned Counsel strongly relies on (i) Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509 , (ii) D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 and (iii) (2007) 2 GLT 803. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that the impugned termination order was issued without obtaining the prior approval of the respondent No. 3, and the ex post facto approval or the approval obtained subsequently cannot cure the defect of not following the mandatory provisions of law. On the other hand, Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, the learned Counsel for the State respondents, supports the impugned termination order and contends that it was the petitioner who, by her letter dated 11.2.2003 addressed to the respondent No. 4, has forfeited her right to retain the post held by her as she unequivocally indicated therein her intention to abandon her job and requested him to arrange another teacher in her place. He further submits that when the medical leave applied, for by the petitioner was not supported by medical certificate, that too, issued by an authorized Medical Officer, the question of granting her a medical, leave could not arise, and she had all along been on unauthorized leave till her service was terminated, and was rightly fired, for which she cannot have any legitimate grievance. The fact that the petitioner made representation after representation for her transfer to a Government school cannot be a ground for her absence from duty. He, therefore, contends that the undisputed facts of this case do not warrant observance of natural justice or the holding of departmental enquiry, and to do so would reduce the concept of natural justice to a farcical exercise. In support of his contentions, the learned State counsel draws my attention to Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh (2006) 8 SCC 647 and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 237 . He strenuously urges that this is not a fit case for this Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. While supporting the contentions of the learned State counsel, Ms. N.G. Shylla, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4, submits that the conduct of the petitioner alone is sufficient to non-suit her. He strenuously urges that this is not a fit case for this Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. While supporting the contentions of the learned State counsel, Ms. N.G. Shylla, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4, submits that the conduct of the petitioner alone is sufficient to non-suit her. She takes me through paragraph Nos. 7, 9 and 10 of the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 4 to show the reprehensible manner in which the petitioner conducted herself. The learned Counsel particularly emphasizes the fact that the petitioner did not deny or rebut the contents of those paragraphs and contends that admitted facts need not be proved and further that when there was no plausible explanation for her admitted misconduct even at the time of hearing of the case before this Court, holding a departmental enquiry would amount to an exercise in futility. The learned Counsel relies on Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal (1999) 7 SCC 332 in support of her contentions. She, therefore, submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity calling for the interference of this Court. 6. There is no dispute at the bar that no departmental enquiry envisaged under the provisions of the Assam Education Department rules and orders, which are applicable to the State of Meghalaya, were followed before terminating the services of the petitioner. At this stage, it needs to be recorded that the petitioner is admittedly neither a member of civil service of, nor is she holding a civil post under, the State of Meghalaya and is, therefore, not entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It is, however, an undeniable fact that under the provisions of the applicable Assam Education Department rules and orders, the petitioner was certainly entitled to a departmental enquiry before she was terminated from her services. Therefore, on the undisputed position of the parties that no departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner before her termination from service, the question to be determined is whether such act of omission or commission on the part of the respondent No. 4 will vitiate the impugned termination order. A perusal of the Assam Education Department rules and orders will show that the concept of reasonable opportunity of hearing is also incorporated therein. A perusal of the Assam Education Department rules and orders will show that the concept of reasonable opportunity of hearing is also incorporated therein. Consequently, an employee of a Government Aided School like the petitioner is to have clear notice of the charge which she is called upon to meet before the departmental enquiry commences and after she gets the notice and is given the opportunity to offer her explanation, the enquiry must be conducted according to the rules laid down therein and consistently with the principles of natural justice. At the end of the enquiry, the enquiry officer, where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, appreciates the evidence, records his conclusions and submits his reports to the disciplinary authority. On receipt of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority is required to furnish the enquiry report to the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority will thereafter, take his decision in accordance with law. The question whether breach of the principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to strike down an order passed in violation thereof came up for consideration before the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta case (supra), which observed: 22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of "real substance" or that there is substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural Justice is followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation (1971)1 WLR 1578 (per Lord Reid. and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University (1971) 1 WLR 487. Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority (1980) 1 WLR 582 and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. Ealing Magistrates' court, ex p Fannaran (1996) 8 Admn LR 351 (Admn LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Supp P. 89) (1998) where Straughton, LJ held that there must be "demonstrable beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. The latest addition to this view is R. Ealing Magistrates' court, ex p Fannaran (1996) 8 Admn LR 351 (Admn LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Supp P. 89) (1998) where Straughton, LJ held that there must be "demonstrable beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. Lord Wool in Lloyd v. Mcmaho (1987) 2 WLR 821: WLR 862 has also not disfavored refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural Justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959) NZLR 1014, however, goes halfway when it says that as in the case of bias, it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is "real likelihood - not certainty - prejudice". On the other hand. Garner Administrative Law (8th edn., 1996. pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. Oh the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin(1964) AC 40, Meggary, J, in John v. Rees (1969) 2 WLR 1294 stating that there are always "open and shut cases" and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that "the useless formality theory" is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural Justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that "convenience and Justice are often not on speaking terms". More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the "useless formality" theory in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton (1990) IRLR 344 by giving six reasons. (See also his article "Should Public Low Remedy be Discretionary" 1991 PL, p. 64) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the "useless formality.theory" has been made much earlier in "Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow" by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Mulloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th edn., 1994, pp. De Smith (5th edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favor or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that courts can, in exercise of their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases that as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1996) 5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. (Case citations supplied) Though the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta case (supra) refrained from examining the correctness or otherwise of the "useless formality" theory, it nevertheless in para 21 held: 21. It is, therefore, clear that if on admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the court need - not issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, in certain circumstances, be loath "to interfere with an illegal order although it" would be lawful to do so. This proposition of law is re-affirmed by the Apex Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545 where it was held: 43. The High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, in certain circumstances, be loath "to interfere with an illegal order although it" would be lawful to do so. This proposition of law is re-affirmed by the Apex Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545 where it was held: 43. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. See Champalal Binani v. CIT (1999) 4 SCC 579 . The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it may be lawful to do so. In a given case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the applicant. Furthermore, this Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India which needs to be exercised in a case where the impugned judgment is found to be erroneous if by reason thereof substantial justice is being done. See S.D.S. Shipping (P.) Ltd. v. Jai Container Services Co. (P.) Ltd. (2003) 4 SCC 44. Such a relief can be denied, inter alia, when it would be opposed to public policy or in a case where quashing of an illegal order would revive another illegal one. This Court also in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is entitled to pass such order which will do complete justice to the parties. 7. It is against the propositions of law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-cited cases that I propose to deal with this case. The appointment of the petitioner at Annexure-A/1 clearly indicates that her appointment was as a non-Government teacher at Mawbar DCLP School. By the order dated 14.6.1991, she was transferred to Smt. Jr. Basic School, Mawryngkneng, which is a Government School, but was again transferred to Nonglait DCLP School, which is a non-Government School vide the order dated 21.4.1993. In the year 1995, the petitioner was again transferred to Unmir DCLP School, Mawryngkneng Block in terms of the transfer order dated 23.3.1995. By the order dated 7.4.1995, she was re-transferred to Nonglait DCLP School. In the year 1995, the petitioner was again transferred to Unmir DCLP School, Mawryngkneng Block in terms of the transfer order dated 23.3.1995. By the order dated 7.4.1995, she was re-transferred to Nonglait DCLP School. The representation made by the petitioner to the Deputy Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills at Annexure A-8 against her transfer order will reveal that she was basically aggrieved by the fact that she was transferred to a non-Government School. A teacher appointed in a non-Government School cannot obviously demand to be posted in a Government School. Anyway, that is one part of the story of this case. The other, but more important, part of the history of this case is that the petitioner admittedly abstained from attending her school with effect from 5.5.2003 till 30.11.2003 without taking leave whereupon her salaries were withheld by the respondent No. 4. According to the petitioner, due to ill-health and pending consideration of her application submitted to the respondent No. 3 for her transfer to a Government School, she did not attend the school and was asked by the respondent No. 3 in his letter dated 11.7.2005 to resume her duty immediately. It is also her case that when she did go to resume her duty, she was not allowed to do so by the respondent No. 4 whereupon she was compelled to approach the respondent No. 3 again, but the latter rather issued the letter dated 23.8.2005 requiring her to explain the reason for not joining duty. One thing led to another and ultimately, the impugned order was issued. Before proceeding further, it will be apposite to refer to her letter dated 11.2.2003 (Annexure-IA to the counter of the respondent No. 3) addressed to the respondent No. 4, which is as under: Dated: Tynring The 11th February, 2003. To The Secretary/President. Managing Committee, Nonghali LP School. Sir, This is to inform you that due to illness, I will not be able to attend school from now on. This might cause disturbances for the smooth functioning of the school especially for the students. From my side, I would like to request you to kindly arrange another teacher in place of place. Regarding the salary due to him/her shall be remained the same as we did earlier. Further I will not be able to come there anymore since no transfer order has been received from the D.I. office. From my side, I would like to request you to kindly arrange another teacher in place of place. Regarding the salary due to him/her shall be remained the same as we did earlier. Further I will not be able to come there anymore since no transfer order has been received from the D.I. office. Anyway if there is any matter for discussion with me to the office just meet me at my residence at Nongmynsong or you can contact to this number - 2000398. In connection with my pending salary, if possible, kindly send it to my shop at Nongmynsong. Thanking you. Yours faithfully, Smt. P. Kharmuli Teacher, Nonghali LP School. 8. At this stage, it may be recorded that one Philakyntiew Mynsong, a native of Nonghali village, was retained as a substitute teacher ever since 2001 when the petitioner was undergoing her training and had been assisting the respondent No. 4 till she was given officiating appointment with effect from 7.3.2005. The unrebutted averments of the respondent No. 4 are that the petitioner maintained uncooperative and inimical attitude towards the Managing Committee of the school and had on many occasions verbally and also by her letters dated 28.2.2002 and 11.2.2003 (Annexure-IA) informed the Managing Committee that she would not be attending her duty anymore as she had sought for transfer to a Government school and that it was not her duty to teach in the school. The other averments of the respondent No. 4 about the negligence of the petitioner to attend her duty have been reproduced earlier, which are not denied or disputed by her by filing a rejoinder-affidavit. In my opinion, the unrebutted averments of the respondent No. 3 and 4 coupled with the letter dated 11.2.2003 (Annexure-IA) sent by the petitioner have persuaded me to draw one, and only one, conclusion, i.e., she had willingly abandoned her post as early as 11.2.2003. Besides, the tone and tenor of the letter of the petitioner at Annexure-IA plainly demonstrate that the petitioner was by then no longer not only not interested in continuing her service but also stopped considering herself to be not a subordinate of the respondent No. 4 and, by extension, of the Managing Committee of the school. The petitioner even expected the respondent No. 4 to meet her at her residence and to send her salary at her shop. The petitioner even expected the respondent No. 4 to meet her at her residence and to send her salary at her shop. The petitioner certainly exhibited a streak of insubordination, which can warrant further disciplinary action against her. The petitioner was admittedly bunking off her school without leave from May 2003 till 19.7.2005 when she went to resume her duty, but was rightly shown the door by the respondent No. 4. The fact that the petitioner had along been seeking her transfer to a Government School could not be a justification for skipping her duty, and until and unless she was transferred by the competent authority, she ought to have dutifully attended the school. From the conduct of the petitioner highlighted above, the omission on the part of the respondent No. 4 to held departmental proceeding before terminating her services does not cause any prejudice to her. On the contrary, to quash the impugned order and to direct her reinstatement to her former post will be travesty of justice. 9. The exercise of departmental enquiry is noting but to afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to a delinquent employee before an adverse action such as dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank are taken against him. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the employee to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether the non-holding of departmental enquiry will vitiate the termination order will, in my judgment, depend upon the real likelihood of causing prejudice to the delinquent employee. Again, whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to him or not on account of non-holding of departmental enquiry will, in turn, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, this Court, after duly considering the undisputed materials on record evidencing a clear case of misconduct and of insubordination or of gross negligence of duty is of the view that no different consequence would have followed even if departmental enquiry were held, it would be perversion of justice to strike down the order terminating the services of the employee and order his reinstatement with all the consequential benefits. It will amount to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and, in the words of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 , "thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an unnatural expansion of natural justice which in itself is antithetical to justice." In the instant case, on the indisputable facts on record, the inference is irresistible and the conclusion inescapable that the petitioner has, for all practical purposes, consciously and intentionally abandoned her post. The strange conduct of the petitioner right from the time she joined her post till she was refused permission to resume her duty reinforces the allegation of the respondent No. 4 that she was all this time was running tea stalls at Nongmynsong and Trying villages. She does not, in the least, deserve the sympathy of this Court. Therefore, the non-holding of department enquiry by the respondent No. 4 against the petitioner, on the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be a ground for quashing the impugned order. The petitioner is not entitled to the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Resultantly, this writ petition is devoid of merit and, accordingly fails. The impugned order is upheld. However, on the peculiar fa6ts and circumstances of this case, I direct the parties to bear their respective. Petition dismissed.