JUDGMENT V. Jagannathan, J.— This second appeal has a long history behind it. It dates back to the year 1955 when a suit was filed for declaration and possession and more than 53 yean have passed since then and still the plaintiff is litigating this case far possession of the suit properties, in regard to which, superior courts have declared more than once that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit properties, entitled to possession. 2. Secondly, this cue also furnishes All example of how an order of a law tribunal can (sic) the successful plaintiff from enjoying the fruits of the decree. 3. How an order pawed by a tribunal can have the effect of bringing to a halt .the judgments of the superior courts in another aspect, and finally this case also calls for an interpretation of Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and whether by the said provisions, the hands of the civil court can be tied, even when the question concerns the binding effect of the order of the Land Tribunal 4. Though this litigation had its beginning in 1965, and has reached this stage in 2006, the only silver lining is that the original plaintiff is still alive at the ripe age of 85 years. 5. Tracing the background, facts of this case in a nutshell, are to the effect that, the appellant herein being the plaintiff in O.S. No. 199/65 sought for declaration and possession in respect of the suit schedule property bearing No. 320/1 measuring 2 acres 11 guntas, 320/2 measuring 1 acre 24 guntas situated at Nerliggi village, Javgal Hubli, Arasikere Taluk against one Channegowda and Ramegowda, sons of Dasegowda (defendants 1 and 2 in the suit) and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff on 30.8.72. 6. The defendants therein preferred regular appeal in R.A. 88/72 and it was dismissed on 2.4.1973. Aggrieved by that, the defendants preferred R.S.A before this court in R.S.A. No. 612/73 and it was also dismissed on 21.3.79. 7. The successful plaintiff took the matter to the execution court by filing execution case No. 37/80 and possession was delivered to the plaintiff on 16.4.80. 8. Aggrieved by that, the defendants preferred R.S.A before this court in R.S.A. No. 612/73 and it was also dismissed on 21.3.79. 7. The successful plaintiff took the matter to the execution court by filing execution case No. 37/80 and possession was delivered to the plaintiff on 16.4.80. 8. The 3rd defendant in the present suit who is the contesting defendant and the 2nd defendant mentioned above went before the Land Tribunal and the 3rd defendant filed Form-7 seeking occupancy rights in respect of the suit properties, the 2nd defendant was shown M the owner and the said application was filed on 28.3.79 soon after the dismissal of the second appeal RSA 612/73 and the Land Tribunal passed its order on 16.7.79 granting occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd defendant. 9. The plaintiff in the instant case was not a party to the said proceedings before the Land Tribunal nor was any notice issued to her as she was residing at different village than where the Land Tribunal office was situated. Thereafter, the plaintiff, on finding that the defendants were interfering with the suit property where she has grown crops, was compelled to initiate 145 proceedings under Cr.P.C against the 3rd defendant and the said proceedings culminate on 11.4.83 on the ground that the 3rd defendant has been in possession as tenant subsequent to the grant of occupancy rights in his favour. Thereafter the plaintiff initiated final decree proceedings in F.D.P. No. 6/95 subsequent to decision for delivery to her as mentioned above on 16.4.80. She claimed means profits against defendants 2 and 3 and she was unsuccessful following dismissal of her claim on 21.9.89. Regular appeal filed by the plaintiff on 7.9.89 was also dismissed on 5.4.91 and the second appeal preferred by her was also dismissed on 3.1.92 in R.S.A. No. 944/91. 10. The third round of litigation began when the plaintiff filed the present suit O.S. No. 327/98 ones again seeking declaration of title of the suit and also for injunction and in the alternative for possession, if for some reasons the possession was not found to be with her. In the said suit, defendants 1 and 2 remained absent and did not file any written statement. In the said suit, defendants 1 and 2 remained absent and did not file any written statement. Only the 3rd defendant contested the suit by taking up the plea that he was a tenant from 1962 onwards under 2nd defendant and that occupancy rights were granted in favour of the 3rd defendant by the Land Tribunal. The 3rd defendant also set up the defence of adverse possession, The trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part, in so far as declaring her to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties. However, the relief of injunction and possession was declined on the ground that the possession was found with the 3rd defendant and moreover, the 3rd defendant had been granted occupancy rights by the Land Tribunal and us such, the civil court cannot go into the validity of an order passed by the Land Tribunal in view of the bar contained Under Section 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 11. Aggrieved by part decreeing of the suit, the plaintiff preferred regular appeal R.A. No. 14/92. As it was dismissed she moved this court in second appeal R.A. 1102/94 and it was allowed. The 3rd defendant then took the matter to the Apex Court and in Civil Appeal No. 1325/02 the Apex Court remanded the mater to this court for fresh disposal. The said order of the Apex Court was passed on 31.1.08 and pursuant to the same, R.S.A. No. 1102/94 was restored to file and this court had heard learned Counsel for the parties. 12. The brief history of the case narrated above coupled with the feet that the plaintiff had filed the first suit O.S. No. 123/55 on the file of the learned Munsifif, Hassan, seeking declaration and possession in respect of the suit properties and was successful in getting a decree in her favour and further the appeal preferred by the defendants in R.A. No. 70/56 being dismissed and second appeal preferred by the defendants also being dismissed by the High Court of Mysore (as it was then called) and the plaintiff then moved the execution court in Ex. No. 138/57 and took delivery of the suit land through her father-in-law on 31.1.57 and again her possession was threatened by the defendants, which once gain compelled her to file another suit for injunction in O.S. No. 254/63 which suit was ultimately withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit, which was O.S. No. 199/63, all these undisputed facts go to show-that this litigation has been going on for more than 85 years and the plaintiff is now aged 65 years, as stated by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 13. It is with the above background that one will have to appreciate the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties and though both the Counsel argued at length and placed reliance on several decisions of the Apex Court and also of this court, the scope of this appeal will have to be confined to the substantial questions of law raised for consideration and also the substantial questions of law which trim in the light of the contentions urged by the teamed Counsel for the parties. 14. This court had framed following substantial questions of law for consideration while admitting this appeal 1. Whether in view of the admitted fact that the 3rd defendant claims to have taken the land on lease from the 2nd defendant against whom the plaintiff/appellant has obtained a decree for declaration of tine and possession, the order of the Land Tribunal registering the 3rd defendant as an occupant in respect of the suit land would be binding on the plaintiff? 2. Whether the courts below were correct in law in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to consider whether the order of the Land tribunal registering the 3rd defendant as an occupant is binding against the plaintiff? 3. Whether the plaintiff/appellant was entitled to a decree for possession against the 3rd defendant? 15. 2. Whether the courts below were correct in law in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to consider whether the order of the Land tribunal registering the 3rd defendant as an occupant is binding against the plaintiff? 3. Whether the plaintiff/appellant was entitled to a decree for possession against the 3rd defendant? 15. In addition to the above questions of law, in view of the submission made by the learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent Smt Sona Vakkund that the appellant herein had preferred a writ petition challenging the order of the Land Tribunal and the said of the learned Single Judge, the 3rd defendant who is the contesting defendant herein has preferred writ appeal and the said writ appeal is pending and therefore this court cannot proceed with the present appeal and as against the above submission, learned Counsel for the appellant contending that the pendency of that appeal cannot come in the way of this court deciding this second appeal, I am of the view that one more substantial question of law requires to be framed in addition to the above and that a as under: Whether the pendency of the writ appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 31388/04 cornea in the way of this court deciding this second appeal? 16. Learned Counsel Sri. 16. Learned Counsel Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa for the appellant/plaintiff at the outset submitted that the plaintiffs has succeeded on two earlier occasions as could be seen from the proceedings which commenced in O.S. No. 123/55 ending in possession being taken by her on 31.1.57 and once again the appellant succeeded in O.S. No. 199/65 and possession being taken on 16.4.80, yet the courts below closed their eyes to the above undisputed events and has gone on to reject the claim of the appellant for possession merely on the ground of Land Tribunal order being in favour of the 3rd defendant Learned Counsel in this connection argued that the order of the Land Tribunal was obtained by the defendants 2 and 3 in collusion and to deprive the appellant of the fruits of the decree obtained by her in O.S. No. 199/63 and it was only after the regular second appeal was dismissed on 21.3.79 that the defendants 2 and 3 colluded with each other and an application was filed before the Land Tribunal after disposal of the R.S.A. and the said application dated 28.5.79 came to be heard and disposed of within two months on 16.7.79 by the order of the Land Tribunal in favour of the 3rd defendant and the appellant herein was not made as a party to the said proceedings nor a notice was served in regard to which there is no dispute between the parties and all these factors go to establish that the defendants 2 and 3 obtained the order of the Land Tribunal only to defeat the fruits of the decree obtained by the appellant in O.S. No. 199/65 being enjoyed by her. Therefore, the order of the Land Tribunal? not binding on the appellant and as such, the trial court could not have held that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Land Tribunal in view of the bar contained Under Section 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 17. Therefore, the order of the Land Tribunal? not binding on the appellant and as such, the trial court could not have held that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Land Tribunal in view of the bar contained Under Section 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 17. Learned Counsel argued that a careful perusal of the provisions of the said Sections will nudes it clear that it is only question relating to nature of the land and question concerning the tenancy aspect that the civil court cannot go into those aspects of the matter which fall within the purview of the Land Tribunal, and as regards the validity of the order passed by the Land Tribunal and its binding effect is concerned, the civil court ought to have gone into the said question and the bar contained in the aforesaid Sections of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, cannot come in the way of civil court deciding the said question as to the binding nature of the order of the Land Tribunal. 18. In this connection learned Counsel further submitted that as the order obtained by the defendants 2 and 3 was of a collusive nature and obtained behind the back of the appellant in violation of principles of natural justice, the said order of the Land Tribunal is void ab initio and as the possession by the 3rd defendant was not a lawful possession in view of the 2nd defendant himself not being the owner nor in lawful possession of the suit properties, the 2nd defendant himself became a trespasser and as such anyone deriving interest from a trespasser will also become a trespasser and therefore the trial court did not consider all these aspects of the matter but blindly followed the bar contained Under Section 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act by observing that the Land Tribunal order is binding on the plaintiff. The said view taken by the trial court and affirmed by the lower appellate court is contrary to the well established principles of law laid down by the Apex Court and also this court 19. The said view taken by the trial court and affirmed by the lower appellate court is contrary to the well established principles of law laid down by the Apex Court and also this court 19. Referring to the definition of tenant and landlord as contained in the Land Reforms Act, a submission is made that the 3rd defendant does not satisfy the definition of a tenant nor 2nd defendant definition of a owner and therefore the order of the Land Tribunal was not binding on the plaintiff and both the courts below did not examine all these aspects of the matter. 20. Another submission made is that the 2nd defendant who was a party to the R.S.A. No. 612/73 never whispered before this court that he was the landlord and that between him and the 3rd defendant there existed landlord tenant relationship and the said silence on the part of the 2nd defendant and further conduct of the 2nd defendant who has not contested the present suit, by not filing the written statement, will go to show that the order of the Land Tribunal is nothing but an order obtained by the defendants 2 and 3 with a sinister purpose. It was also submitted in this connection that the case of the 3rd defendant is that he was lessee under the 2nd defendant, and even this ground urged by the 3rd defendant is not tenable one because of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act prohibiting any kind of lease subsequent to the venting of the land with the Government, except in those cases where the Act has made special provisions. 21. In support of the above submission, learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions reported in Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 AIR 2000 1 , Shankar Bhairu Bamane Vs. Syndicate Bank, Manipal, Nipani Branch and Others, ILR (1998) KAR 3028 ; Sri Muniyellappa Vs. 21. In support of the above submission, learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions reported in Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 AIR 2000 1 , Shankar Bhairu Bamane Vs. Syndicate Bank, Manipal, Nipani Branch and Others, ILR (1998) KAR 3028 ; Sri Muniyellappa Vs. B.M. Krishnamurthy and Others, AIR 1977 Kant 137 and ILR 2001 Kar 2836 to submit that in the foots and circumstances of the case the jurisdiction of the civil court is not entirely barred an further the power of this court to examine the finding of the trial court which are booed on the findings of the Land tribunal, has not been occluded by Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 22. Learned Counsel in the essence submitted that even if the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded by the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, yet the civil court can examine the oases where the tribunal does not act in accordance with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 23. 22. Learned Counsel in the essence submitted that even if the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded by the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, yet the civil court can examine the oases where the tribunal does not act in accordance with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 23. As for as the pendency of the writ appeal is concerned, learned Counsel Sri A.V. Gangadharappa argued that the said proceedings cannot come in the way of this court disposing of the second appeal which has arisen out of the suit filed toy the plaintiff for declaration, injunction and possession and secondly it is argued that even the writ petition filed by the appellant has been allowed by Betting aside the order of the Land Tribunal and the question that arises out of the pendency of the writ appeal may at the most the landlord tenant relationship and the competency of the Land Tribunal to grant occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd defendant, whereas the suit filed by the plaintiff is for declaration, injunction and possession and the plaintiff had taken up the contention that order of the Land Tribunal was not binding on her and therefore when the plaintiff has not questioned the order of the Land Tribunal in regard to grant of occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd defendant or the tenant, the question of the writ appeal filed by the 3rd defendant therefore requiring this second appeal proceedings being kept in abeyance till the decision of the writ appeal court therefore does not arise and referring to a decision of this court reported in ILR 2001 Kar 2836 learned Counsel submitted that mere pendency of the writ appeal cannot by itself can come in the way of deciding the second appeal and if the said ground urged by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondent is accepted, then there will be no end to the litigation, but it would prolong the litigation unnecessarily. For all these reasons, learned Counsel argued that the pendency of the writ appeal therefore cannot in any way come in the way of this court deciding this second appeal. 24. For all these reasons, learned Counsel argued that the pendency of the writ appeal therefore cannot in any way come in the way of this court deciding this second appeal. 24. One other submission made concerning the death of 1st respondent is that, the 1st respondent did not contest the matter at all before the trial court and as such, not bringing the L.Rs of the said 1st respondent cannot in any way affect the case of the parties nor can there be any prejudice caused to any of the parties. 25. Yet another submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the stand taken by the 2nd respondent before the Land Tribunal to the effect that he had leased out the suit properties in favour of the 3rd respondent as far back in 1972, itself goes t show that when the suit filed lay the plaintiff in O.S. No. 199/65 was pending till the disposal of R.S.A. No. 612/73 on 21.3.1979, the question of the 2nd respondent leasing out the suit properties to the 3rd respondent will not arise as the same would be hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore referring to the above contentions and the rulings cited, the learned Counsel argued that the view taken by the courts below that the plaintiff is not entitled for possession because of the order of the Land Tribunal cannot be upheld either on facts or in law and therefore he prayed for the second appeal being allowed and the plaintiffs prayer for possession also be granted. 26. On the other hand, the learned Counsel Smt. Sona Vakkund for the contesting respondent No. 3 put forward the following contentions; It is her submission that the 1st respondent died and the L.R.s of the 1st respondent was not brought on record and in view of the averment by the plaintiff that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 jointly dispossessed her, it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to have brought the L.Rs of the 1st respondent on record. 1 and 2 jointly dispossessed her, it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to have brought the L.Rs of the 1st respondent on record. As far as the possession aspect is concerned, the learned Counsel supported the judgments of the Courts below in so far as declining to grant the said relief to the plaintiff lay contending that the plaintiff was fully aware of the order of the Land Tribunal and the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C and subsequent dismissal of the final decree proceedings in F.D.P. No. 6/85, wherein the plaintiff had claimed mean profits against the respondents 2 and 3 and further, the dismissal of the Regular appeal filed by her and so also the second appeal filed by the plaintiff being dismissed, all these events go to indicate that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit properties and therefore when the proceedings had reached finality with the dismissal of R.S.A. No. 941/91 and the plaintiff having not taken any further steps, the findings of the courts below that the possession was with the 3rd defendant cannot be termed as erroneous and the courts below have rightly declined to grant the relief of possession to the plaintiff. 27. The next submission made is that though the plaintiff was fully aware of the order of the Land tribunal, it was not questioned by her at that point of time, but however the subsequent conduct on the part of the appellant in questioning the order of the Land tribunal in the writ petition, itself goes to show that she has given up her claim for possession of the suit properties and as the 3rd respondent has filed Writ appeal questioning the order of the learned single judge, the decision of the Writ Appeal court therefore will have to be awaited. Referring to the bar contained under Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent argued that there is an order passed lay the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd defendant and the Civil court cannot entertain any question being raised touching upon the order of the Land Tribunal. In view of the aforesaid bar, irrespective of the order passed by the Land Tribunal being right or wrong, yet, the Civil Court cannot get any jurisdiction to examine the order of the Land Tribunal. 28. As far as the submission of the appellants Counsel concerning collusion between respondents 2 and 3 is concerned, the learned Counsel argued that there is no pleading forthcoming from the plaintiff as could be seen from the plaint averments and as such, any evidence not backed by the necessary pleadings cannot be looked into and moreover, the details of collusion or fraud are not forthcoming in the plaint and therefore there is no compliance of Order 6 Rule 4 of the C.P.C. As such, the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellant regarding collusion or fraud can have no basis. 29. Yet another submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 is that the plaintiff had suppressed the final decree proceedings which ultimately led to the dismissal of the R.S.A. filed by her and non-mentioning of these facts in the plaint therefore disentitles the plaintiff from seeking the relief of injunction and rightly the courts below haw declined to grant the said relief. In this connection, the learned Counsel also referred to the final decree proceedings documents Exs.D25 and D26 to submit that the plaintiff had slept over her right for long and now she cannot be permitted to say that the respondents 2 and 3 colluded with each other and obtained order from the Land tribunal behind her back. As far as the notice to the plaintiff is concerned, the submission made is that the public notice what is required to be given under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act in this regard have been duly complied by the land tribunal. Therefore no defect can be found in the order of the Land tribunal 30. As far as the notice to the plaintiff is concerned, the submission made is that the public notice what is required to be given under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act in this regard have been duly complied by the land tribunal. Therefore no defect can be found in the order of the Land tribunal 30. In order to draw support for the aforementioned submissions and more particularly as regards the submission that the civil court cannot go into the question of examining the validity of the order passed by the land tribunal, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 placed reliance on a ruling of this Court reported in 1983(2) Kar .L.J. 246 and contended that an order made by the land tribunal even if it is made in contravention of the rules of procedure is nonetheless the order of the tribunal which gets protection of Section 132(2) of the Land Reform Act end it cannot be questioned by a suit in a civil court. As regards particulars to be furnished under Order 6 Rule 4 concerning the plea of collusion or fraud is concerned, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Ramesh B. Desai and Others Vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others, AIR 2006 SC 3672 Insofar as the submission concerning the absence of pleadings is concerned, the support is drawn from the rulings of the Apex Court reported in ILR 2003 Kar 2253. In the light of the aforementioned submissions and the rulings referred to, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 argued that the findings of the courts below being concurrent findings of facts, this Court therefore cannot interfere in the second appeal having regard to the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. and as such the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 31. Keeping in view the aforesaid contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties and the rulings cited by them and also after carefully going through the entire record of this case and the judgments of the courts below, I proceed to answer the substantial question of law raised for consideration hereunder. 32. 31. Keeping in view the aforesaid contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties and the rulings cited by them and also after carefully going through the entire record of this case and the judgments of the courts below, I proceed to answer the substantial question of law raised for consideration hereunder. 32. The first and most important question of law is as to whether the order of the land tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd defendant ie., the 3rd respondent herein, can be said to be binding on the plaintiff. Before I answer this question with reference to the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, few facts which are not in dispute will have to be mentioned again. 33. The plaintiff filed a suit in O.S. No. 199/65 for declaration and possession and it was against the respondents 1 and 2. The said suit was decreed on 30.8.72 and the regular appeal filed against it by the aforesaid defendants in R.A. No. 83/72 was dismissed on 2.4.73 and the second appeal was also dismissed on 213.1979 in R.S.A. No. 612/73. In other words, the decree of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff declaring her to be the owner of the suit properties and also granting hear possession, had reached finality say the dismissal of R.S.A. No. 612/73 on 21.3.79. The 3rd respondent herein, filed an Application in Form No. 7 for grant of occupancy rights on 20.5.79 and set up the 2nd defendant as the owner in the laid proceedings. The plaintiff was not a party to the said proceedings, nor anything was on record to allow that she was served with the notice of the land tribunal proceedings. Order of the land tribunal was passed on 16.7.79. What is clear from the above dates in respect of the proceedings mentioned therein is that despite the three courts namely the trial court, the appellate court and the High Court confirming the ownership and possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit properties, the defendants 2 and 3 went before the land tribunal and an application was filed after two months from the date of judgment of this Court in R.S.A. No. 612/73. In the application that is filed before the land tribunal, the only parties were the 2nd defendant who was shown as the owner and the 3rd defendant as the tenant. 34. By no stretch of imagination could the 2nd defendant projected himself as the owner when he had suffered the decree in O.S. No. 199/65 and failed successfully in regular appeal as well am the regular second appeal. The stand taken by the 3rd defendant before the land tribunal was that the suit lands have been leased by the 2nd defendant to the 3rd defendant When this Court had confirmed the declaration of title and possession of the plaintiff by dismissing the second appeal filed by the defendants, the question of either the 2nd defendant claiming himself to be the owner or the 3rd defendant claiming himself to be the tenant under the 2nd defendant before the land tribunal do not arise. Therefore the above facts clearly brings to light the attempt made by the defendants 2 and 3 depriving the plaintiff of the suits and the decree obtained by her which rendered in R.S.A. No. 612/73 on 21.3.1979 in her favour. The plaintiff in her pleadings has clearly stated that the defendants 1 to 3 created certain documents by colluding with each other and tried to nullify the right of the plaintiff in respect of the suit properties. 35. This averment in para-5 of the plaint coupled with the point of time at which the application was filed before the land tribunal can leave no doubt in any one's mind that the very purpose of approaching the land tribunal by the defendants 2 and 3 and 28.5.79 i.e., after the disposal of the second appeal by this Court, itself is an indication of the attempt made by the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of the suits of the decree obtained by her which was confirmed by both the appellate court as well as by that Court by dismissing the appeals preferred by the defendants. 36. 36. Coupled with the above facts, which cannot be disputed in so far as the events having occurred in the order mentioned above and the fact that the appellants was not made a party before the land tribunal nor any notice being served on her at the place where she was residing i.e., in a public village than the village in which the land tribunal is situated, will therefore render the decision of the land tribunal void and non-eat This conclusion is reached by me in the tight of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the under mentioned cases. 37. In the case of Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 the following observations made are relevant for the purpose of this case; Now, there is a fundamental distinction between a proceeding which is collusive and one which is fraudulent. "Collusion in judicial proceeding is a secret arrangement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose". (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 212). In such a proceeding, the claim put forward to fictitious, the contest over it is unreal and the decree passed therein is a more mask having the similitude of a judicial determination and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. But what the proceeding is alleged to be fraudulent, what is meant is that the claimant has managed to obtain the verdict of the court in his favour and against his opponent by practising fraud on the court. Such a proceeding is started with a view to injure the opponent, and there can be no question of its having been initiated as the remit of an understanding between the parties. While in sham, in a fraudulent suit it real and earnest?. 38. This Court in the case of Muniyellappa v. B.M. Krishnamurthy and Ors. reported in ILR 1977(1) 700, speaking through his lordship Govinda Bhat, the Chief Justice, dealt into the aspect of compliance of rules of natural justice by tribunals, and made the following observations at paras 10 and 13; 10. 38. This Court in the case of Muniyellappa v. B.M. Krishnamurthy and Ors. reported in ILR 1977(1) 700, speaking through his lordship Govinda Bhat, the Chief Justice, dealt into the aspect of compliance of rules of natural justice by tribunals, and made the following observations at paras 10 and 13; 10. It is a fundamental requirement of our system of law that all Tribunals or Authorities vested with the power to adjudicate upon the rights of parties effecting their rights to life or properly, shall comply with the Rules of Natural Justice. This basis requirement is not an empty formality. Violation of the Rules of Natural Justice renders the decision void even where the law provide for an appeal hi Ridge v. Baldwin (1), the House of Lords held that a decision given without regard to the principles of Natural Justice is void. In General Medical Council v. Spackman (2), Lord Wright said: If the principle of natural justice ore violated in respect of any decision, it is indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision. 13. Persons affected by the provisions of the Act expect their rights being adjudicated upon by the Tribunals in a fair and just manner conforming to standards expected of all impartial Tribunals inspiring public confidence; openness, fairness and impartiality are the three essentials which are required of any Tribunal which is entrusted with the power of adjudicating upon the rights of persons to loci and property. Openness requires the publicity of the proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underling the decision fairness requires adoption of a clear procedure which enables the parties to know their rights, to present their case fully and to know the case which they have to meet; impartiality requires the freedom of Tribunals from the influence, real or apparent, of extraneous agencies. These requirements constitute the essence of the rules of Natural Justice. If the principles of Natural Justice are violated by the Tribunal, its decision must be declared to be no decision and therefore void. 39. These requirements constitute the essence of the rules of Natural Justice. If the principles of Natural Justice are violated by the Tribunal, its decision must be declared to be no decision and therefore void. 39. Another reason for holding the order of the land tribunal void, is that the very basis for grant of occupancy rights is depend upon the authorities before the land tribunal satisfying themselves as to tenant-landlord relationship and unless the person seeking occupancy rights coram within the definition of "tenant?" and the person who has leased the land comes within the definition of "landlord", the question of the land tribunal going into the aspect of occupancy rights will not arise. This therefore takes us to the definition of "tenant" and "landlord" as well as the 'land owner' as contained in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and they are as under: 2(34) "tenant" means an agriculturist who cultivates personalty the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4; (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the Karnataka Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961; (iia) a person who cultivates personalty any land on lease under a lease created contrary to the provisions of Section 5 and before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act. (iii) a person who is a permanent tenant and (iv) a person who is a protected tenant? It is clear from the above definition that a lease must have been created by a landlord to lend validity to the possession of the person claiming tenancy. A landlord is also defined thus: 2(20) "landlord" means a person who has leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant. The owner is also denned thus: 2(21) "land owner" means an owner of land and includes a trustee or mortgagee with possession thereof. 40. Referring to the above definitions, this Court in the case of Revanappa v. Muniyappa and Ors. The owner is also denned thus: 2(21) "land owner" means an owner of land and includes a trustee or mortgagee with possession thereof. 40. Referring to the above definitions, this Court in the case of Revanappa v. Muniyappa and Ors. air 1998 Kar 3021 has observed that: a person in order to claim the statue of landlord must have a semblance of right in the property to place another man in lawful possession of the property and if a trespasser were to lease property to another person, it hardly requires any logic to say that such a lease is totally invalid and confers no right on a person claims occupancy rights. 41. The above observations are applicable to the instant case, in as much as even before defendants 2 and 3 went before the land tribunal, therefore already was a decree in favour of the plaintiff which have been confirmed by the appellate court as well as by this Court holding that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties and is entitled to possession. 42. Therefore, when the 2nd defendant went before the land tribunal and posed himself as landowner he will have to be deemed as nothing but a trespasser and therefore any person who claim any interest from a trespasser also will become a trespasser. As between the defendants 2 and 3 there was no existence of landlord and tenant relationship by virtue of the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff in two earlier suits which have been confirmed by this Court in two record appeals as already mentioned at the beginning of the judgment, and hence the possibility of even remotely considering the 2nd and 3rd defendants as the owner and tenant respectively does not and cannot arise. Therefore the order passed by the land tribunal becomes totally invalid, as it cannot confer any right at all on a person who was not a tenant but only a trespasser. This Court in the aforementioned case of Revenappa has also observed in para-9 that when no right is vested for the trespasser, the question of trespasser getting the lawful lease also does not arise. 43. This Court in the aforementioned case of Revenappa has also observed in para-9 that when no right is vested for the trespasser, the question of trespasser getting the lawful lease also does not arise. 43. For the foregoing reasons, I answer to the substantial question of law concerning the binding effect of the order of the land tribunal on the plaintiff is concerned by holding that the said order of the land tribunal cannot bind the plaintiff. 44. Coming to the question of jurisdiction of the Civil court in respect of an order passed by the land tribunal conferring occupancy rights to concerned, before I refer to the decision of the Apex Court in this regard, it is necessary to extract the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, which provisions are as under: 132. Bar of jurisdiction: (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by [x x x], the Deputy Commissioner, [an officer authorised under Sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83, [the Tribunal] [the Tahsildar], the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. (2) No order [x x x], the Deputy Commissioner, [an officer authorised under nub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83.] [the Tribunal] [the Tahsildar], the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, or the Sate Government made under the Act shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court. 133. (2) No order [x x x], the Deputy Commissioner, [an officer authorised under nub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83.] [the Tribunal] [the Tahsildar], the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, or the Sate Government made under the Act shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court. 133. Suite, Proceedings etc., involving questions required to be decide by the Tribunal; (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force- (i) no civil or criminal court or officer or authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land, [x x x] decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March 1974; (ii) such court or officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal or decision; (iii) all interim orders issues or made by such court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be; 45. The courts below have declined to grant the relief of possession to the plaintiff similarly on the ground that the land tribunal has granted occupancy rights in favour of the 3rd respondent and therefore he is in possession. As such in view of the bar contained in the aforementioned Sections, the trial court cannot examine the said aspect of the matter. No doubt, a plain reading of the above provisions indicate that the Civil court shall have no jurisdiction to deal with any question which is required to be settled or decided, by the authorities mentioned in Section 132 and Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that no order of the authorities mentioned therein shall be called in question in any Civil court or criminal court and Section 133 further makes it clear by specifically mentioning that the Civil court or criminal court shall not decide the question as to whether the land is not a agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1.3.74. 46. 46. A careful reading of the aforesaid Clause (1) of Sub-section (1) of Section 133 therefore gives an indication as to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil court to deal with the questions referred to above in Clause 1 of Section 133 of Sub-section (1). 47, In other words, in my view, if the question that is called upon to be answered by the Civil court though concerns an order of the land tribunal, yet if the said question falls outside the ambit of the question that Is mentioned in Clause (1) of Section 133, the Civil court can certainly examine the said aspect of the matter. Hence, the prohibition or bar, is only in respect of the question relating to nature of the land and the question concerning the tenancy right of a persons. All other matters which fail outside the above two questions can be gone into by the Civil court and if it is found in a particular case that the order of the land tribunal is void, abinitio or non-existence or its daemon in not the decision At all, became the tribunal did not act according to the fundamental principles of judicial procedures, in such a case, the Civil court jurisdiction cannot be said to be ousted notwithstanding the bar contained in Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act This conclusion of mine is also based on the following decisions. 48. In the case of Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. 48. In the case of Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 Privy Council 105 one of the questions that arose for consideration is as to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court, even where the statutory principles of judicial procedure and speaking for the Privy Council, Lord thankerton dealt with a similar situation which arose out of Sea Customs Act, 1878 and dealing with the question as to the exclusion of the Civil court jurisdiction in view of Section 191 of the Sea Customs Act and answering the contention put forward to the effect that the discretionary order by an officer of the customs can only be challenged by way of an appeal under Section 188 and that the jurisdiction of the civil court was excluded, Thankerton J., observed thus: It is now necessary to determine whether the order of the Collector of Customs, dated 20th June 1933, which dismissed the appeal under Section 188, and which was confirmed by the Governor - General in Council on an application under Section 191, excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain a challenge of the merits of that decision. It h settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (emphasis by me) 49. The bur contained under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act was alto considered by this Court in the case of Raviraja Shetty v. Bhoopala Shetty ILR 2001 Kar 2836 and at para-9 of the said decision, this Court also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.V. Subbachari v. B.K. Joyappa ILR 2000 Kar 2505, and has quoted the Apex Court's observations in regard to applicability of Section 133: Thus it can be seen that the defendants are not claiming tenancy under the plaintiffs, but under a third party. If the tenancy claim of the defendants is not under the plaintiffs, but under a third person, no question of tenancy can arise as between the plaintiffs and defendants. In such a case the only question is as to whether the plaintiffs are the title holder in possession or the person whom the defendants claim to be their lessor has title to the properly. In these circumstances, the question of tenancy as between the parties does not arise and accordingly Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act also is in applicable, I am supported in this view by the decision of a learned a ingle Judge of this Court in Gudappa Achari v. Seshappa Upadhyaya. In the light of the aforesaid two decisions and in the light of the fact that the defendants are not claiming any tenancy right plaintiff, I am clearly of the view that Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is not applicable to the case. (emphasis by me) 50. In another decision in the case of Noor Mohd. Khan Ghouse Khan Soudagar Vs. Fakirappa Bharmappa Machenahalli and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1217 , dealing with the question concerning the civil court's jurisdiction being barred under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the Appex Court has observed thus in paras- 39 and 40; 39. In this case the Corporation instituted a suit claiming possession from the respondent contending that the respondent was a trespasser and claiming damages for unauthorised properties. The defence of the respondent we that he was a tenant and entitled to protection under the Mysore Tenancy Act After remand by the High Court when the matter was being heard by the trial court, the respondent Applied for amendment of written statement claiming protection under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and prayed that the suit should be stayed by the Civil Court and the matter referred by the Civil Court and the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision as the Tribunal was empowered to decide whether a person is a tenant or not. Repelling the contention on behalf of the respondent that Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in suits for possession where the defendant claimed to be a tenant as utterly unsound this Court held that Section 133 cannot apply of lands which were held by a person on lease from the local authority or where the lease had expired and the local authority sues for possession, a mere statement of the defendant that he is a tenant would not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. On a consideration of the oases referred to above, it is clear that it was incumbent on the High Court to decide the several questions that arise for consideration. The plea of the appellants that the decisions of the Civil Courts directing the 1st respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant have become final and was no more available to him to be raked under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act also folk for decision. Equally the plea that the questions that arise in the appeals are not within the competence of the Tribunal, also ought to have been gone into. Before referring the issue to the Tribunal, the High Court ought to have come to a conclusion that on the facts of the case the issue as to whether the 1st respondent is a tenant has arisen. 40. The High Court ought to have also considered whether any restriction on the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts placed under the Act is applicable to the High Court also. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not entirely barred as the Act only provides for reference of certain issues for decision before the Revenue Tribunal and after receipt of the finding on such issues to record a judgment on such finding. The appeal of the Civil Courts according to the Civil P.C. and the jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing appeals and revisions under certain circumstances have not been excluded. (emphasis by me) 51. The appeal of the Civil Courts according to the Civil P.C. and the jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing appeals and revisions under certain circumstances have not been excluded. (emphasis by me) 51. The trial court did not go into the question of binding effect of the order of the land tribunal because of the bar contained in Sections 132 and 133 of the Land Reforms Act It is the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of the land tribunal was obtained by the 3rd defendant i.e., the 3rd respondent herein only to prevent the plaintiff enjoying the suits of the decree passed in her favour in O.S. No. 199/65 and also to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of confirmation of the said decree by the lower appellate court as weft as by this Court when such being the undisputed fact, in view of the application before the land tribunal being filed immediately after the dismissal of the second appeal R.S.A. No. 612/73, the trial court ought to have considered this aspect of the matter and whether in the said circumstances, the order of the land tribunal could be said to have been binding on the plaintiff when the plaintiff has been declared as the absolute owner entitled for possession of the suit properties by three courts earlier. 52. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court did not go into this aspect at all. Therefore, there is merit in the contention put forward by the learned Counsel Sri. 52. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court did not go into this aspect at all. Therefore, there is merit in the contention put forward by the learned Counsel Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa for the appellant .that merely, because an order of the land tribunal is produced before the trial court, if the civil court declines to go Into the binding effect of the order, it will possible for any person to defeat the fruits of the decree which had attained finality with the dismissal of the second appeal filed by the defendants on 21.3.1979, being enjoyed, and if this is permitted, then, no sanctity can be there, for the judgments of the superior courts and if the said reasoning of the trial court were to be accepted, any person can go before the land tribunal and file an application and set up another person as the land owner and obtained occupancy rights and produce the order before the Civil court, which would then have the effect of almost rendering the decree obtained by a person which is also confirmed by the superior courts, in effective. 53. The trial court therefore ought to haw seen that such attempts taken by certain persons with the sinister motive are not encouraged by accepting the order of the land tribunal blindly and citing the bar under Section 132 and 133 as having the effect of the jurisdiction of the civil court the conduct of the respondents 2 and 3 was only to deprive the plaintiff of the benefits she got under the decree and it was also with a view to prolong the litigation. When the cases of such nature therefore arises, the civil court cannot take (sic) under Sections 132 or 133 and mechanically hold that they have no jurisdiction. 54. In this rgard it is also relevant to note the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Thomas Antony Vs. Varkey Varkey, AIR 2000 SC 1 . When the cases of such nature therefore arises, the civil court cannot take (sic) under Sections 132 or 133 and mechanically hold that they have no jurisdiction. 54. In this rgard it is also relevant to note the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Thomas Antony Vs. Varkey Varkey, AIR 2000 SC 1 . In the said case, where, the defendant claimed himself to be a tenant in possession of property in the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession, whether the civil court has to straightaway refer the matter to the land tribunal or should examine the contentions put forward was considered and the Apex Court in this regard made the following observations; A Civil court is not obliged to make a reference to the land tribunal as per Section 125(3) of the Act (Kerala Land Reforms Act) merely because a party has raised a contention that he is a tenant or a Kudikidappurkaran and the civil court has power to consider whether such contention has been raised without any legal foundation or with the only intention to gain time by protracting the litigation. If the civil court is of the opinion that there is not even a remote possibility of the plea being upheld, the court can proceed to dispose of the suit without resorting to the circumlocution route via land tribunal. The further observation made are also relevant to be extracted here; 21. From the aforementioned provisions the statutory scheme is clear that when a question regarding status of a person as a tenant or as a kudikidappukaran arises in any suit or proceeding before a Civil Court that Court shall refer the matter to the Land Tribunal for a decision on that question only. On receipt of the decision of the Tribunal on the question the trial Court shall decide the suit or proceeding accepting the decision of the Tribunal on the question referred to it. While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a frivolous, malafide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a frivolous, malafide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. The statutory provisions, in our considered view, in-vis-age a case where a bonafide and Legally sustainable plea of tenancy it taken by the party that question shall be referred to the Tribunal. It is of significance that in Sub-section (6) of Section 125 a provision is made that the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall for the purposes of appeal be deemed to be a part of the finding of the Civil Court It follows that while the trial Court is to accept the decision of the Tribunal and base its decision in the suit or proceeding on the same, no such constraint is placed on the appellate Court while deciding the appeal arising from the suit or proceeding. Before the appellate court it is open to the parties to challenge the finding recorded by the trial court on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal, as any other finding. The Tribunal has been created as a special forum for adjudication of the question of status of a person who claims to be a tenant or kudikidappukaran. The legislative scheme appears to be that at the trial stage adjudication on the question should be confined to one forum i.e., the Tribunal and the Civil Court should not go into the vary same question again after the decision of the Tribunal is received by it. 55. The legislative scheme appears to be that at the trial stage adjudication on the question should be confined to one forum i.e., the Tribunal and the Civil Court should not go into the vary same question again after the decision of the Tribunal is received by it. 55. Applying the aforesaid provisions of law to the case on hand, the Civil court in the instant case, when confronted with the order of the land tribunal, though cannot go into the question of nature of the land or whether the person claiming occupancy rights being a tenant or not, which are outside its scope, yet, could have consider the more important aspect of whether the order of the land tribunal can have any legal binding effect on the plaintiff particularly in the tight of the plaintiff hove not succeeded in the earlier suits in O.S. No. 199/65 and the decree of the trial court having been confirmed right up to this Court in R.S. No. 612/73 and in the light of the disposal of the second appeal on 21.3.79 and subsequent filing of the application before the land tribunal on 28.5.1979 whether the order of the land tribunal could have been held to be binding on the plaintiff and more mo, in view of the plaintiff being not a party to the said proceedings before the land tribunal and being not served with any notice at all. 56. The trial court has totally lost this aspect of the matter and so also the lower appellate court, and hence in the light of the aforesaid decisions, my answer to the second substantial question of law raised for consideration is that the courts below were totally in error in recording a finding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to examine the order of the land tribunal. 57. Coming to the 3rd substantial question of law raised for consideration, the suit of the plaintiff is for declaration, injunction and possession. 57. Coming to the 3rd substantial question of law raised for consideration, the suit of the plaintiff is for declaration, injunction and possession. The plaintiff took possession of the suit properties pursuant to the decree passed in O.S. No. 199/65 and the execution proceedings in Ex.CAMt.37/fiO also indicating that the plaintiff was put in possession as on 16.4.1980 through the court process, the possession taken by the plaintiff was the possession taken in accordance with law and in accordance with the judgments of the trial court, appellate court and this Court and also in accordance with the order passed in the execution proceedings. 58. But pursuant to the land tribunal proceedings, an order was passed in favour of the 3rd respondent granting him the occupancy rights and the plaintiff therefore lodged a complaint with the police which led to 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings and thereafter she also initiated final decree proceedings in F.D.P. No. 6/83 for mean profits from the date of filing of the suit till the date of taking possession. The said F.D.P.6/85 was examined by holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to mean profits as she was not able to pinpoint as to the persons who were in possession of the suit properties and from what point of time the said persons were in possession and therefore as the evidence was not vary convincing in this connection, her claim for mean profits was rejected. No doubt as rightly pointed out by the teamed Counsel for the respondent No. 3, the regular appeal filed by the plaintiff was also rejected and so also the second appeal preferred by her dismissed in R.S-A. No. 944/91. 59. Although the above proceedings indicates that the plaintiff was not in possession in view of the order passed in R-A.No.79/89 and R.S.A. No. 944/91, the very fact that the plaintiff also sought for the alternative relief of possession in her suit itself was sufficient for the trial court to have decreed the suit of the plaintiff even as far as delivery of possession is concerned. 60. 60. Since the title to the suit properties is not in dispute and the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit properties also having been confirmed by the lower appellate court as well as by this court and the defendants having not challenged the said finding by preferring any crow objections or appeal before the lower appellate court or before this Court, it is clearly established that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit properties and as such, the possession has to follow the title. Therefore own if the plaintiff was not found to be in possession because of the proceedings in F.D.P.6/85 and the subsequent proceedings in R.A. No. 79/89 and R.S.A. No. 944/91, yet nothing prevented the trial court from decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for possession am well, when the plaintiff is declared to be the absolute owner of the suit properties. Therefore the appellant herein is also entitled to decree of possession against the 3rd defendant and the answers the said substantial question of law. 61. The last of the substantial questions of law that requires to be answered is as to the pendency of the writ appeal preferred by K-3 against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition Sled by the appellant herein challenging the order of the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of R-3. The submission of the learned Counsel is R-3 is that, as the writ appeal is pending against the cutler of the learned Single Judge, this court has to wait till the decision is rendered in the said writ appeal. As far as this submission is concerned, I do not find any force in the said submission for the following reasons. 62. The writ petition was filed by the appellant herein calling in question the grant of occupancy rights in favour of R-3 by the Land tribunal by its order dated 16.7.1979. This court had allowed the said writ petition filed by the appellant herein by its order dated 14.11 2006, Though the writ appeal is sail to have been fifed by R-3, the details as to the writ appeal are not forthcoming though the writ appeal number is given as W.A. No. 1553/2008. This court had allowed the said writ petition filed by the appellant herein by its order dated 14.11 2006, Though the writ appeal is sail to have been fifed by R-3, the details as to the writ appeal are not forthcoming though the writ appeal number is given as W.A. No. 1553/2008. The question that is likely to arise before the writ appeal court is as to the legality of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition. The subject matter of the writ petition was the order of the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of R-3, whereas the present second appeal has arisen out of the judgment rendered by the trial court in O.S. No. 327/1988 and the triad court had declared that the appellant is the absolute owner of the suit properties but only declined to grant the relief of injunction and possession. The said decree of the trial court, though was partly in favour of the appellant, it is also confirmed by the lower appellate court in R.A. No. 14/1992. 63. This second appeal has arisen out of the concurrent findings of the courts below declining to grant the relief of permanent injunction and possession to the appellant. This court having answered the substantial questions of law raised for consideration in favour of the appellant and against the view taken by the courts below, pursuant to the said conclusions reached and answers given to the questions of law raised, all that remains for this curt is t decide the outcome of that appeal in the light of the aforesaid findings recorded. 64. In other words, right from the suit O.S. No. 327/1988 upto this second appeal, the focus has been as to the binding effect of the order of the Land Tribunal on the plaintiff and as to the jurisdiction of the civil court to examine the order of the Land Tribunal in the light of the admitted facts and in the light of the plaintiff having succeeded in the earlier suit O.S. No. 199/1965, both as regards her claim for declaration of title and possession. Therefore, the question of considering the nature of the land or the question relating to the tenancy right claimed by R-3 was not directly involved in the entire proceedings which began with the suit being filed by the plaintiff for declaration and possession. Therefore, the question of considering the nature of the land or the question relating to the tenancy right claimed by R-3 was not directly involved in the entire proceedings which began with the suit being filed by the plaintiff for declaration and possession. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the scope of this second appeal is entirety different from the scope of the writ appeal and as the nature of the relief that is claimed in these two proceedings are entirety different, I do find enough force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that pendency of the writ appeal cannot a ground to refrain from deciding this second appeal, which has arisen out of the suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration and possession. 65. In the instant case, the only relief with regard to which the appellant has grievance is as regards the courts below declining to grant her the relief of possession while declaring her to be the absolute owner of the suit properties. As this court has found from examination of the entire material on record that the order of the Land Tribunal was passed only subsequent to the second appeal filed by the defendant being dismissed by this court on 21.3.1979 and seconder, as the appellant herein was not made a party to the Land Tribunal proceedings nor was there any notice issued to the appellant in accordance with law, the view taken by this court is that the order of the Land Tribunal cannot have any binding effect on the plaintiff. Moreover, in view of the observation of this court in the case reported in I.L.R. 2001 Kar 2836, that mere pendency of the writ petition by itself cannot be a reason for invoking the powers under Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act and if there is not even a remote possibility of the said plea being upheld by the Land Tribunal, the civil court need not stay the proceedings in terms of Section 133 in all the oases and any such stay would unnecessarily prolong the litigation, there is considerable merit in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the regard. 66. 66. Applying the very tune reasoning in the decision concerned, to the instant case, when the order of the Land Tribunal has been held to be not binding on the plaintiff in view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that pendency of the writ appeal wherein the question involved is altogether different from the questions of law that have been framed for consideration by this court in this second appeal, the submission made by the learned Counsel for R-3, therefore, does not merit any consideration. Accordingly, the last of the substantial questions of law stands answered. 67. Coming to the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for R-3, insofar as the ruling in the case of Shivappa Bhimappa v. Nagappa Bhimappa reported in 1963(2) Kar.L.J. 248, is concerned, it has to be mentioned that the facts and circumstances of the said case are totally different from the one with which we axe concerned in this second appeal inasmuch as, it was not a case where there was already a decree in favour of the person as to the absolute title to the suit properly is concerned and despite that decree having become final, the aggrieved party moved the Land Tribunal and obtains an order of occupancy rights in his favour. Secondly, in the very same decision of Shivappa Bhimappa's case, it has also been held that the order of the Land Tribunal gets protection from Section 132(3) and that protection, of course, is available only in regard to matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal and not to Ors. In other words, it is only in respect of the matters concerning the nature of the land or the person claiming a right being a tenant or not that the protection under Section 132(2) gets extended and not to others. In the instant case, the question did not fall within the ambit of the above two matters and, therefore, the question of the protection under Section 132(2) coming to the aid of the order passed toy the Land Tribunal don not also. 68. In the instant case, the question did not fall within the ambit of the above two matters and, therefore, the question of the protection under Section 132(2) coming to the aid of the order passed toy the Land Tribunal don not also. 68. As far the decision in the case of Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta reported (2006)5 S.C.C. 636, is concerned, learned Counsel for R-3 placed reliance on the said decision to contend that Order 6 Rule 4 of the C.P.C. requires complete particulars of fraud to be stated in the pleadings and the allegations of fraud are to be stated in the plaint and particulars will have to be furnished. The learned Counsel also drew my attention to paragruph-22 of the aforesaid decision in this regard. 69. Having carefully gone through the observations made in the said paragraph by the Apex Court, I am of the view that, in the instant case, we have seen that in the plaint itself, at paragraph-5, the appellant has stated that the defendants, in collusion, got the documents created, to deprive her of title to the suit properties. In fact, a careful reading of the entire plaint reveals the circumstances under which the plaintiff had made such an averment as to the collusion between the defendants and in paragraph-3 of the plaintiff the appellant has averred that, pursuant to the judgment rendered in O.S. No. 199/1965 and decree being passed in her favour on 30.8.1972 and the appeal preferred also being dismissed on 2.4.1973 and so also the second appeal being dismissed in R.S.A. No. 612/1973, and the appellant thereafter taking steps to execute the decree and all these averments will also have to be read in conjunction with the plea taken at paragraph-5 of the plaint. 70. Moreover, it is settled law that the pleadings of the parties will have to be construed liberally and one cannot expect an illiterate litigant to state everything as if she is an expert in the pleadings and the procedures. The entire plaint will have to be read as a comprehensive whole and then, one has to find out whether there is a plea to the effect that the defendants have defendants with each other to deprive the plaintiff of her fruits which she got under the decree in O.S. No. 199/1965. The entire plaint will have to be read as a comprehensive whole and then, one has to find out whether there is a plea to the effect that the defendants have defendants with each other to deprive the plaintiff of her fruits which she got under the decree in O.S. No. 199/1965. In my view, the pleadings will have to be read as a whole and while doing so, the court will have to take note of the entire pleadings into account and approach the matter from a commonsense angle rather than purely from technical angle. 71. Commonsense cannot be relegated to cold storage while construing the pleadings, particularly the pleadings of the parties who are illiterate, or ignorant of the niceties of the procedures and also of the trial lawyers from village side who may not be well-versed in these aspects. Therefore, it cannot be said that there are no pleadings and, that the evidence of the plaintiff cannot be looked into. For the above said reasons, the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for R-3 reported in Ramesh B. Desai and Others Vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others, AIR 2006 SC 3672 , cannot be of any assistance to R-3, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. 72. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgments of the courts below insofar as declining to grant the relief of possession is concerned, the same are set aside and it is held that the appellant is entitled to possession of the suit properties. 73. As far as the relief of permanent injunction, in concerned, I do not see any need to interfere with the findings of the courts below on this aspect In other respects, the suit of the plaintiff, therefore, stands decreed as prayed for. 74. As far as costs is concerned, the history of this litigation, stated in the very beginning of the judgment will go to show that the appellant has been fighting this litigation over and over again and it all started in the year 1955 when O.S. No. 123/1955 was filed by her and was decreed in her favour and again O.S. No. 199/1965 was filed by her which also ended in her favour with the dismissal of the second appeal on 21.3.1979. However, as the judgment rendered by this court in R.S.A. No. 1102/1994, which arose out of the present suit O.S. No. 327/1966 was set aside by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1325/2002 by order dated 31.1.2008 and the matter stood remitted to this court, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be squarely met if coats is awarded to the appellant from the date when the matter was taken up by this court after being remanded for fresh consideration. 75. Accordingly, the costs is awarded from the said period onwards and an amount of Rs. 15,000/- would be the costs, which would be just and reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Mallamma W/o Malleshappa v. Channegowda S/o Ninge Gowda, Ramegowda