Judgment : This Civil Revision Petition was admitted on 24-9-2004. 2. Heard Sri A. Pulla Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the Revision Petitioner and Sri P.Venkat Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the respondents. 3. The present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the unsuccessful petitioner being aggrieved of an order dt.18-5-2004 made in File No.F2/4994/1993 by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District under Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter in short referred to as ‘the Act’ for the purpose of convenience). 4. Sri Pulla Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the Revision Petitioner had taken this Court through the contents of the order made by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case the said order cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the Revision Petitioner is a purchaser and very moment the purchase had been made, this litigation had been thought of by the so-called alleged heirs of the protected tenant, that too after a long lapse of time. The learned Counsel would maintain that may be that no specific period of limitation as such had been specified under Section 32 of the Act, but however, such action, if any, to be initiated within a reasonable time. The conduct of the parties also to be taken into consideration. Further, the learned Counsel also would maintain that the original alleged tenant died long ago and as on the date of purchase, such alleged tenant was not in existence at all and after the petitioner bona fide purchased the property from the owners who have been in possession of the property for sufficiently a long time, subsequent thereto, the alleged heirs of the protected tenant on the ground that they are entitled for the restoration of the possession had initiated these proceedings after a long lapse of time, that too showing the purchaser alone as a party and without impleading the original owners from whom the petitioner purchased the property. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the relevant provisions of the Act in general and also Sections 32 and 91 of the said Act in particular. The Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions. 5. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the relevant provisions of the Act in general and also Sections 32 and 91 of the said Act in particular. The Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions. 5. Per contra, Sri Venkat Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the respondents, would maintain that the pattedars of the land in question executed a registered sale deed bearing No.1403/88 dt.19-7-88 and the mutation of revenue records had been effected in favour of the Revision Petitioner pursuant thereto and hence the respondents filed a petition before the M.R.O., praying for succession of protected tenant rights in their favour under Section 40 of the Act on 6-8-88. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the learned M.R.O., after making thorough enquiry, granted succession in favour of these parties. The respondents filed petition under Section 32 of the Act on 3-3-90 praying for restoration of possession of the land and the M.R.O. issued notice to the Revision Petitioner and the Revision Petitioner also filed objections. The Counsel also would contend that the M.R.O. after conducting enquiry passed orders in proceedings No.A/2032/88 holding that the respondents are entitled for restoration of the possession under Section 32 of the Act on 13-6-91. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the series of events and the proceedings dt.15-6-91, 12-3-92, 13-5-92, 23-6-92, 15-3-93, 29-6-93, 27-6-95, 18-5-2004 and 30-8-2004 as well and also would further contend that the present Civil Revision Petition was filed as against the order dt,18-5-2004 made in file No.F2/4994/1993 of the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and however no revision as such was filed as against the order in Appeal No.F2/4994/93 and in a way one order had attained finality and the other order alone had been challenged. Incidentally, the learned Counsel also pointed out that even that proceeding had been initiated after a long lapse of time and not within the period of limitation and hence viewed from any angle, in the light of the fact that both the Primary Authority and the Appellate Authority had recorded concurrent findings, in the light of the limitations imposed on this Court in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Act, the Civil Revision Petition to be dismissed. The Counsel also relied on certain decisions. 6. Heard the Counsel and perused the findings recorded by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. The Counsel also relied on certain decisions. 6. Heard the Counsel and perused the findings recorded by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. 7. The original land owners of the land bearing Sy.No.160 an extent of Ac.3.33 situated at Patloor village, Marpally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District are Ramakrishna Dixit, Smt.Laxmi Bai and Janardhan Dixit. It is not in serious controversy that the Revision Petitioner purchased the said property under registered sale deed document No.1403/88 dt.2-7-88 and got his name mutated by proceedings No.A/1978/1988, dt.30-7-88 made by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Marpally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Thus by virtue of the sale and mutation, the Revision Petitioner had been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property from the date of purchase and prior thereto it is stated that the vendor had been in possession of the property for sufficiently a long time. The respondents filed petition dt.3-3-90 under Section 32(1) of the Act taking a stand that their grand-father was a protected tenant of the land bearing S.No.150 (old) corresponding to S.No.160 (new) of an extent of ac.3.33 gts. and he died about 20 years back leaving behind him his son Ramaiah and the said Ramaiah died leaving behind him his two sons, the respondents herein and that they got the succession granted in their name vide proceedings No.A/2032/1988, dt.31-1-90 under Section 40 of the Act and they are entitled for restoration of the land under Section 32(1) of the Act aforesaid. Section 32 of the Act dealing with procedure of taking possession reads as hereunder:- 1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession. 2) No landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form. 3) On receipt of an application under sub-Section (1) or sub-section (2) the Tahsildar shall, after holding an enquiry pass such order thereon as he deems fit. 2) No landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form. 3) On receipt of an application under sub-Section (1) or sub-section (2) the Tahsildar shall, after holding an enquiry pass such order thereon as he deems fit. 4) Any person taking possession of any land or dwelling house otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall, without prejudice to his liability to the penalty provided in Section 96, be liable to forfeiture of the crops, if any, grown on the land to the payment of such costs as may be awarded by the Tahsildar or by the Collector on appeal from the Tahsildar. 8. The Revision Petitioner after receiving notice appeared to have raised the objections. The Mandal Revenue Officer concerned by order dt.13-6-91 made in File No.A/2032/1988 had allowed the petition under Section 32 of the Act and thus the petitioner was dispossessed under a panchanama dt.15-6-91 and no doubt it is stated that this action had been taken without waiting for expiry of the limitation period specified under Section 93 of the Act. The Revision Petitioner aggrieved by the order dt.13-6-91 made in File No.A/2032/1988 by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned had preferred an appeal No.F2/5354/95 on the file of the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District taking a stand that he is a bona fide purchaser and neither the respondents nor their grandfather had been in possession of the tenancy lands at least from the year 1962-63 onwards and hence the order made by the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer is liable to be set aside and the possession to be restored to him. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, may be, keeping in view the object of Section 32(1) of the Act and taking into consideration that the legal heirs of the protected tenant and the rights of such legal heirs to be protected, came to the conclusion that such restoration of possession is justified and accordingly dismissed the appeal. 9. On a careful perusal of the order made by the Appellate Authority, several of the particulars and details are lacking. 9. On a careful perusal of the order made by the Appellate Authority, several of the particulars and details are lacking. The date of actual dispossession or whether in fact at a particular point of time, there was voluntary surrender or abandonment of any rights by the grandfather of these legal heirs, these aspects are not clear. It is also not in serious controversy that the original land owners were not shown as parties and the litigation was fought as against the purchaser, the present Revision Petitioner only. It is also pertinent to note that these alleged legal heirs who are claiming rights by virtue of the protected tenancy of the grandfather appear to have slept over their rights for sufficiently a long time and it is also pertinent to note that immediately after the purchase made by this purchaser, the Revision Petitioner, this litigation had been thought of. While appreciating the reasonableness or otherwise of an action, the conduct of the parties also may have to be taken into consideration. Section 91 of the Act dealing with revisions reads as hereunder:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, an application for revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order passed on appeal by the Collector or Board of Revenue on the following grounds:- (a) that the original or Appellate Authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) that the original or Appellate Authority failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) in following the procedure or passing the order, the original or Appellate Authority acted illegally or with material irregularity. 10. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in PONNALA NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PANTAIAH (1998) 9 SCC 183 ) wherein the Apex Court at paras 2 and 3 observed as hereunder:- “So far as the first contention is concerned, it must be noted that only documentary evidence was produced before the authorities below on the basis of which judgments were rendered against the petitioner by the lower appellate court as well as by the High court. The theory of "oral surrender" has been disbelieved by the appellate court by relying on evidence in the shape of entry in tenancy register which shows that the respondents' predecessor was a protected tenant all throughout and that entry was never changed. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he relied upon a khasra entry which shows that in 1954 he was put in possession as an owner of this land and there was an endorsement that in prior years he was in possession since three years. In which capacity was he in possession prior to 1954 is a question which could have been examined only in the light of the petitioner's own evidence on oath. He did not think it fit to enter the box to prove that case. Under these circumstances it was rightly held by the lower appellate court and as confirmed by the High court that the theory of oral surrender of protected tenancy rights prior to 1954 cannot be believed. The first contention, therefore, fails. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. It may be because of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime. Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. But all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. Surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner. Therefore, this second contention on the facts of the present case cannot be sustained. It has also to be noted that no plea of adverse possession was put forward by the petitioner in support of his case.” 11. Certain submissions were made by Sri Venkat Reddy that inasmuch as no specific period of limitation is specified under Section 32(1) of the Act, the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness, because of the long lapses of period, need not seriously detain this Court unless and until the parties had totally altered the situation by making substantial improvements and the like and in the absence of such material, the impugned Order in the Civil Revision Petition cannot be found fault. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in KOTAIAH v. PROPERTY ASSOCN. OF THE BAPTIST CHURCHSES (PVT.) LTD. (AIR 1989 S.C., 1753) Wherein the Apex Court at paras 18 and 19 observed as hereunder:- “In sum……………………. (i) The protected tenant has a right to become full owner of the lands in his possession. He becomes the owner when the Government issues a notification under Section 38 (E ). We are told that the Government had issued such a notification on. 1/10/1973, relating to the District where the lands in question are situated. It was about three years earlier to termination of the appellants' tenancy by the Association. If the appellants had a right to become owners of the tenanted lands, the question of terminating their tenancy would not arise. (ii) The protected tenant cannot be dispossessed illegally by the landlord or anybody else. If so dispossessed, the Tehsildar either suo motu or on application must hold a summary inquiry, and direct that the land be restored to the protected tenant. That is the mandate of Section 38 (E) and the Explanation thereof. (iii) The landlord by himself cannot dispossess the protected tenant even if the tenancy is terminated in accordance with the law. The landholder will have to take recourse to Sec. 32. He must approach the Tahsildar to hold an enquiry and pass such order as he deems fit. (iv) Section 38 (D) prohibits the landholder from alienating the tenanted land to third parties. If the landholder intends to sell the land, he must give notice in writing of his intention to the protected tenant. The first offer must be given to the protected tenant. It is only when the protected tenant does not exercise the right to purchase, the landholder could sell the land to third parties. The alienation made in contravention of these provisions has no legal effect. So return to the case. The contention of the Association that it is in de facto possession and entitled to symbolic possession is unavailable and indeed, unacceptable. , Firstly, there cannot be any dispute in this case about the protected tenancy rights of the appellants. The revenue documents like Pananipatrika and final record of agricultural tenancy clearly establish that the appellants were recognised as protected tenants. Secondly, it was not the case of the Association that Rev. , Firstly, there cannot be any dispute in this case about the protected tenancy rights of the appellants. The revenue documents like Pananipatrika and final record of agricultural tenancy clearly establish that the appellants were recognised as protected tenants. Secondly, it was not the case of the Association that Rev. Rutar Ford Padri and Vundru Padri first offered the land to the appellants before they transferred the same to the Association. Therefore, in the light of the statutory provisions to which we have called attention, the appellant's title cannot be said to be legitimate.” 12. Incidentally Section 38-E of the Act also had been relied on. It is no doubt true that the object with which Section 32 of the Act had been introduced cannot be totally ignored. Equally, at the same time, while conducting an enquiry, all the parties who can throw light relating to the factual matrix of a particular enquiry to be put on notice. When the actual date of dispossession and whether it is a case of voluntary surrender or whether it is a case of abandonment at the time of the grand father, when these facts are not clear, definitely it may not be within the knowledge of the purchaser who came into the picture at a later point of time. In the absence of the original owners who sold the property in favour of the present Revision Petitioner – purchaser and without putting those parties on notice, conducting an enquiry and making an order of this nature in the absence of details and particulars, in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be sustained. It is made clear that when the question of reasonableness to be appreciated, all the factors viz., the bona fides of the parties, the conduct of the parties to be taken into consideration. In the light of the same, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that the impugned Order in the present Civil Revision Petition cannot be sustained and the same was not made in accordance with law. Accordingly, the same is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the Primary Authority and the Primary Authority to proceed further with enquiry in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by this Court and make an order afresh after putting notice on all the concerned parties. Accordingly, the same is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the Primary Authority and the Primary Authority to proceed further with enquiry in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by this Court and make an order afresh after putting notice on all the concerned parties. Inasmuch as all the concerned parties to be put on notice, the matter is remitted to the Primary Authority and it is no doubt true that inasmuch as the impugned action is being found fault and the Civil Revision Petition is being allowed, in normal course the possession to be restored to the Revision Petitioner, but, however, since for sufficiently a long time the respondents have been in possession of the property by virtue of an order already made, let the status quo be maintained by the Primary Authority for a period of 3 months and let the Primary Authority complete the enquiry within the said period and pass appropriate orders. 13. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is hereby allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.