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2008 DIGILAW 664 (BOM)

PUDUMJEE PULP AND PAPER MILLS KAMGAR SANGH v. PUDUMJEE PULP AND PAPER MILLS

2008-05-02

D.Y.CHANDRACHUD

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ORAL JUDGMENT:- The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 23rd April, 2008 passed by the Industrial Court at Pune declining to accede to a prayer for interim relief. The dispute relates to the action of the employer by which a General Secretary of the Union came to be suspended and a domestic ' enquiry was commenced. On 18th February, 2008 a notice to show cause was issued to the workman by the management recording that on 16th February, 2008 at 8.40 a.m. he had summoned a Co-workman by the name of Kalpanarayan Yadav who was in service since 7th January, 2008 and threatened him against reporting for work from the next day failing which, the worker was informed, that serious consequences would epsue. The management called upon the General Secretary of the Union to show cause. Immediately upon receipt of the letter, the General Secretary, by his reply dated 18th February, 2008 stated that the issue relating to workers coming from other States into the State of Maharashtra was causing unrest. In fact, in his letter the General Secretary used the expression that this was in the nature of a "bomb". The letter contains a rather transparent threat to the management that "the bomb was liable to explode" at any point of time. On 3rd March, 2008 the management issued an order of suspension and a charge-sheet containing an allegation of misconduct to the effect that the General Secretary of the Union, who is also a workman, was guilty of a breach of discipline. Subsequently on 12th March, 2008 the workman purported to withdraw his earlier letter. 2. A complaint of unfair labour practices has been instituted by the union in which an application was made for an interim direction for the revocation of " the order of suspension; a direction to the management to initiate discussions with the complainant-union, including the General Secretary viz. the chargesheeted workman, and to allow all the office bearers of the union including the General Secretary to inspect the premises and to hold a meeting with the members. The contention of the union is that this relief is in recognition of its statutory rights under section 20(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 3. The contention of the union is that this relief is in recognition of its statutory rights under section 20(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 3. The Industrial Court by its order dated 23rd April, 2008 noted that interim relief against the order of suspension was not pressed. Insofar as the further relief of holding discussions and permitting entry into the work place was concerned, the Industrial Court was of the view that since the workman was prohibited from entering the work place in pursuance of the order of suspension, no such relief could be granted at the interlocutory stage. 4. At the hearing of the present proceedings which have been instituted to challenge the order of the Industrial Court dated 23rd April, 2008, Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that he would concede that even though the workman in question is a General Secretary of the Union, the management does have a right to effect an order of suspension from service pending disciplinary proceedings. That aspect of the relief therefore seeking an" order of revocation of suspension has not been pressed. 5. The learned counsel submitted that under section 20(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 the office bearers, members of the office staff and the members of a recognized union are entitled to (i) hold discussions on the premises of the undertaking with the employees concerned, who are members of the union; (ii) to meet and discuss with the employer the grievances of the employees; and (iii) to inspect any place where any employee of the undertaking is employed in order to effectuate the purpose of preventing or settling an industrial dispute. Hence, it was submitted that even if the General Secretary may have been suspended, that would not debar him from exercising the right under section 20(1)(c). 6. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the First respondent that in the present case the existing industrial settlement was to expire on 31st March, 2008. The complaint of unfair labour practices was filed on 28th March, 2008. As a matter of fact, on the date on which the complaint was filed, no charter of demands was pending and it was urged that there was no pending industrial dispute. The complaint of unfair labour practices was filed on 28th March, 2008. As a matter of fact, on the date on which the complaint was filed, no charter of demands was pending and it was urged that there was no pending industrial dispute. Two Charters of demand were submitted in April, 2008, after the institution of the complaint, one by the President of the Union and the other by the Secretary. The learned counsel stated that as a matter of fact discussions are going on. However, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the allegation is that he was responsible for unrest within the factory which led to the filing of a police complaint on 17th March, 2008. A domestic enquiry has already been instituted against the workman on a charge of misconduct; the first date of the enquiry was 21st April, 2008 and the enquiry now stands adjourned to 7th May, 2008. It has been urged on behalf of the management that there is an apprehension of unrest if the suspended workman is allowed to enter upon the factory premises. At the same time, it has been urged on behalf of the management that it accepts the rights of the recognized union and is in fact holding discussions with all the other office bearers, save and except the charge sheeted workman. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I am of the view that this is not a fit and proper case for the exercise of the extra ordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for more than one reason. First and foremost, the charge-sheeted workman's letter dated 18th April, 2008 would reveal that in response to a notice to show cause that was issued by the management alleging that the workman had threatened a co-worker against entering upon the work place or reporting for work from the next date, the charge-sheeted workman administered a threat to the management against employing a worker coming from outside the State of Maharashtra. The charge sheeted workman alleges that there was unrest and threatened the management that the employment of non-Maharashtrian workers was in the nature of a bomb which was liable to explode. 8. This Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 must pass orders that would be in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. India is a secular republic. 8. This Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 must pass orders that would be in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. India is a secular republic. The fabric of the nation as a cohesive and stable entity cannot be disrupted on account of the pursuit of a narrow exclusionary agenda. The unhindered movement of human resources within and outside the State is one of the cherished principles of free India. Excluding persons from outside the State from residing within the State and pursuing lawful avocations is fundamentally contrary to the provisions of Article 19(1)( d). This Court will be justified in not extending the protective arm of its constitutional jurisdiction to those who practice a doctrine of hatred against those who have settled here from outside the State. The nation represents a cohesive and unified entity which shall not be allowed to be broken down by an ideology of fragmentation, so far as it lies in the constitutional power of the Court to do so. 9. In a situation such as the present, where the Secretary of a union has threatened the management against employing a worker coming from outside the State, the ends of justice would require that a charge-sheeted worker should not be allowed to enter the factory. Undoubtedly, the office bearers of a union have statutory rights under section 20(1)(c). However, the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction is not warranted in the facts of every case; particularly in a case such as the present where there is a grave apprehension that the charge-sheeted workman would create unrest within the factory and where the course of events justifies the apprehension. 10. The observations in this order shall not come in the way of disciplinary proceedings. Nothing contained herein shall amount to a finding of fact on the allegation of misconduct. There is no merit in the writ petition which shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.