JUDGMENT N. Kumar, J : This appeal is preferred by the wife challenging the judgment and order passed by the Family Court dismissing the petition for divorce. 2. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are referred to in the Family Court. 3. The petitioner-wife presented a petition under Section 13(1) (ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking dissolution of her marriage with the respondent by a decree of divorce. The case of the petitioner is that, she married the respondent in the year 1986, in accordance with Hindu rites at Hole Alur town, Gadag; after marriage they led a happy marital life for one year. Respondent was a permanent resident of Betegeri. Since she was serving as nurse in Bijapur Govt. hospital, he used to visit her to consummate their marriage; as a result of wedlock, she delivered a male. child - Prahalad on 4.1.1988; the delivery was not normal and her health was not congenial for which she was taking treatment; unfortunately 12 days after the child was born, respondent's father died; respondent insisted that the petitioner should attend the funeral, but she was unable to attend on health grounds. This is how ill-will between the parties commenced. Thereafter, the respondent did not come to any understanding with the petitioner to perform his marital obligations; he did not care for her and started living a disturbed, shabby and senseless life. From that day onwards, they lived separately. He has treated the petitioner with cruelty and deserted her for 18 years. Therefore, she preferred the petition for divorce. 4. After service of notice, respondent entered appearance and filed detailed statement of objections admitting their marriage, birth of child and that they were living separately, but denied that he forced her to attend his father's funeral. He did not know any work except that of a coolie and stayed at Betegeri; when the petitioner persuaded him to come to Bijapur on the pretext that her mother and uncle had promised to find him a job, respondent stayed there for about 2 weeks; petitioner's uncle took him to find a job for 2-3 days, but gave up his efforts; thereafter, the mother and uncle of the petitioner started humiliating him; therefore he came back to Betegeri and requested the petitioner to meet him regularly in that place, but she did not heed to his request. This attitude kept going for some time and he started understanding reality. In fact he is ready and willing to live with her. Even now to meet his son, he goes to the petitioner's house, but she treats him with cruelty; he has neither demanded money nor deserted her. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the petition. 5. The petitioner examined herself as PW1. The respondent got himself examined as RWl. No documents were produced on either side. The Family Court, on consideration of the aforesaid material, raised the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent had deserted her company? 2) Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent subjected her to cruelty? 3) What order? 6. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Family Court held that the petitioner has failed to prove that the respondent has deserted her company and also that he has treated her cruelly and therefore, dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the petitioner is before this Court. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned judgment of the Family Court, contended that the couple have been living separately for the past 18 years; their son who is now aged 20 years is completely being educated by the mother and is studying engineering course; No love lost between the parties; the marriage is completely broken. Relying on the judgments of the Apex Court, he submitted very separation for 18 years is sufficient to hold cruelty as understood in law is established and the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce. Even otherwise, respondent is admittedly living separately and it is he who left the petitioner. He has not only deserted her without any just cause but, he has not even bothered to take care of the petitioner and her son. In that view of the matter, a case of desertion is also made out. 8. Per contra, Learned Counsel for the respondent supporting the impugned order, submits that the petitioner has not produced any evidence to substantiate the plea of desertion and cruelty.· On the contrary, the evidence on record shows that the respondent is visiting her frequently and there is no separation at all and absolutely no material is produced to prove the act of cruelty; as such the impugned order does not call for interference. 9. 9. The material on record discloses that, the petitioner was employed as staff nurse in the year 1983 much prior to her marriage. The respondent has studied only up to IV Standard. He is working as a worker in a cotton mill. In 1986, their marriage took place according to Hindu rites governing the parties. On 4.1.1988 a male child was born who is named as Prahalad. According to the petitioner, it was not a normal delivery. Unfortunately on the 12th day after his birth, respondent's father died, she was unable to attend the funeral which the respondent insisted. That is how ill-will started between the parties. It is not in dispute that the petitioner resides in Bijapur with her mother, uncle and son, whereas the respondent resides at Betegeri and used to visit her. An attempt was also made to secure a job for him, but it did not fructify. According to him, petitioner started humiliating him and ill-treating him which forced him to quit the house at Bijapur Except the oral assertion on the part of the respondent in this regard, there is no other material to substantiate the contention that he withdrew from the company of the wife because of humiliation meted out by her. But the fact remains, he withdrew from her company from 1989-90. Though it is contended that he was frequently visiting his wife and son, there is no material to substantiate the said contention. On the contrary, it is the petitioner's version that the respondent was only interested in her salary than herself; he married, her having an eye on her salary; for the first 45 years after marriage, she used to hand over her salary to him, but since he did not handle the responsibility of taking care of the family, she had to stop the said practice. The material on record also discloses that there was some force used which, of course, is not supported by evidence. 10. The fact remains, thereafter they have been living separately. Meanwhile, the child was admitted to school. He appears to be a bright student, having scored 74% in SSLC and is now studying engineering course. The very fact that the respondent pleads complete ignorance about the course his son is studying shows, he did not even care about him. 10. The fact remains, thereafter they have been living separately. Meanwhile, the child was admitted to school. He appears to be a bright student, having scored 74% in SSLC and is now studying engineering course. The very fact that the respondent pleads complete ignorance about the course his son is studying shows, he did not even care about him. There is nothing on record to show that he has met the expenses of his son's education. Likewise there is no record to show that he bothered to take care of his wife for the last 18 years. Because of the salary which the petitioner was drawing by virtue of her employment, she was able to lead a decent life, give good education to her son, though her husband deserted her. It is in this background having waited sufficiently, she decided to put an end to this agony and hence, preferred this petition for a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty. 11. Clause (i-a) of Section 13 specifies cruelty as one of the grounds of divorce. Cruelty contemplated by the sub-Clause is both physical and mental. It is not possible to define mental cruelty exhaustively. Lord Reid in Gollins vs Gollins dealing with cruelty has observed as under: “No one has ever attempted to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty and I do not intend to try to do so. Much must depend on the knowledge and intention of the respondent, on the nature of his (or her) conduct, and on the character and physical or mental weakness of the spouses, and probably no general statement is equally applicable in all cases except the requirement that the party seeking relief must show actual or probable injury to life, limb or health.” To the same effect was the observation of Lord Pearce: “It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition to cruelty, but when reprehensible conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is, I think, cruelty if a reasonable person, after taking due account of the temperament and all the other particular circumstances would consider that the conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called on to endure it.” The Supreme Court in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 , held as under: “Section 13(1) (i-a) uses the words ‘treated the petitioner with cruelty’. The word 'cruelty' has not been defined. Indeed it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical the Court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties. It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents. Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon vs Sheldon the categories of cruelty are not closed. Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty. It is further observed that: “Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that the party has after solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty. What do these words mean? What should be the nature of cruelty? Should it be only intentional, wilful or deliberate? Is it necessary to prove the intention in matrimonial offence? We think not. We have earlier said that cruelty may be of any kind and any variety. It may be different in different cases. It is in relation to the conduct of parties to a marriage. That conduct which is complained of as cruelty by one spouse may not be so far the other spouse. There may be instances of cruelty by the unintentional but inexcusable conduct of any party. The cruel treatment may also result by the cultural conflict of the spouse. In such cases, even if the act of cruelty is established, the intention to commit suicide cannot be established. The aggrieved party may not get relief We do not think that was the intention with which the Parliament enacted Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The context and the set up in which the word 'cruelty' has been used in the Section, seems to us, that intention is not a, necessary element in cruelty. That would has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. The context and the set up in which the word 'cruelty' has been used in the Section, seems to us, that intention is not a, necessary element in cruelty. That would has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.” Again the Supreme Court in the case of Chanderkala Trivedi Vs. Dr. S.P. Trivedi, (1993) 4 SCC 232 , observed as under: “Whether the allegation of the husband that she was in the habit of associating with young boys and the findings recorded by the three Courts are correct or not but what is certain is that once such allegations are made by the husband and wife as have been made in this case then it is obvious that the marriage of the two cannot in any circumstance be continued any further The marriage appears to be practically dead as from cruelty alleged by the husband it has turned out to be at least intimacy of the' husband with a lady doctor and unbecoming conduct of a Hindu wife.” The Supreme Court in the case of V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs), (1994) 1 SCC 337 held as under: “Mental cruelty in Section 13(1) (i-a) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would made it not possible for that party to live with the other in other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the -parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be ashed to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be ashed to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made.” Following the judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of Romesh Chander Vs. Savitri, AIR 1995 SC 851 , held as under: ‘If the marriage was dead and there was no chance of it being retrieved, it was better to bring it to an end. In this case, the marriage is dead both emotionally and practically. Continuance of marital alliance for name-sake is prolonging the agony and affliction. It cannot be disputed that the husband has not been dutiful and conscious of his responsibilities either towards his wife or his son. He did not contribute anything towards upbringing of the child. Yet the marriage being dead, the continuance of it would be cruelty, specially when the child born out of the wedlock of the appellant and the respondent as far back as 1968 having now grown and being in service.’ Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court following the aforesaid judgment in the case, Satish Sitole Vs. Ganga, 2008 AIR SCW 5190, has affirmed the said legal position. 12. Cruelty is one of the ground for granting a decree of divorce. However, the word “Cruelty” has not been defined. It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition to cruelty. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is a conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. 12. Cruelty is one of the ground for granting a decree of divorce. However, the word “Cruelty” has not been defined. It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition to cruelty. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is a conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. It may be intentional or unintentional. The cruelty may be mental or physical. 13. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem to determine. It is a question of fact and degree. The nature of injuries inflicted, the extent of physical force used, the time and place of inflicting injuries, the part of the body affected, medical records showing the treatment given, the money spent on treatment, eye witness if any, the cause for such assault, would give an insight to determine the physical cruelty pleaded as a ground of divorce. The Court would be justified in insisting on some evidence as a proof of physical cruelty and thereafter to proceed to assess to the evidence to record a finding of cruelty. 14. But if the case pleaded is of mental cruelty, the problem presents difficulty. Mental cruelty is a conduct which one party inflicts upon the other party, such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. First the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel conduct complained of Secondly, the impact of such conduct on the mind of the other spouse. In trying to find out the impact of such conduct, one should have knowledge and intention of the spouses, their character and physical and mental weakness. It is also necessary to have a fair knowledge of the setting in which they are Jiving. The type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social condition, the education they had, the cultural background and the human values to which they attach importance. 15. The Judge who is deciding a case of cruelty more so mental cruelty should be sensitive to the feelings and in understanding the trauma of the parties. Otherwise he will not be able to appreciate and understand the intricacies involved in a sensitive conjugal relationship. 15. The Judge who is deciding a case of cruelty more so mental cruelty should be sensitive to the feelings and in understanding the trauma of the parties. Otherwise he will not be able to appreciate and understand the intricacies involved in a sensitive conjugal relationship. The Judge should not import his own notions of life and go parallel with them. Actually there is a generation gap between the Judge and the parties. It would be less better if he depends on precedents. It is necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular there is a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house, person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standards in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. 16. If the spouses are living separately for considerable time, and there is no love lost between them, the marriage is dead, emotionally and practically there is no chance of it being retrieved, continuance of marital relationship for name sake itself constitutes cruelty of mind. In such circumstances, trying to find out who is the cause for such sorry state of affairs would be an exercise in futility. The only purpose which it may serve is to compensate the wronged spouse monetarily by way of damages for agony and suffering underwent for no fault of that spouse. That is the price one spouse has to pay to the other for wrong done. It will also be a consideration for the freedom, the spouse would enjoy after severance of the matrimonial bondage. 17. In the instant case, the case pleaded is that of mental cruelty. Unfortunately, the Trial Court has dealt with this matter like a civil suit, insisting on adherence to strict rules of evidence to support the said plea and has proceeded to find out whether the conduct of the respondent was harmful and injurious to the petitioner vis-a-vis bodily injury. In the instant case, the case pleaded is that of mental cruelty. Unfortunately, the Trial Court has dealt with this matter like a civil suit, insisting on adherence to strict rules of evidence to support the said plea and has proceeded to find out whether the conduct of the respondent was harmful and injurious to the petitioner vis-a-vis bodily injury. This is how it has misdirected itself in approaching the issue of cruelty. It has given much importance to humiliation and insult as put forth by the respondent and has come to the conclusion that it is not proved by any acceptable evidence. Merely because at some point the parties visited each other, it has reached the conclusion that there is no ill-treatment. It finds fault with the petitioner in not explaining the manner in which she was being treated. It has recorded a finding that she has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty. The material on record clearly establishes that the marriage is irretrievably broken. Attempts at reconciliation were not successful. Having regard to past experience and material on record, it would be a futile exercise to make any further attempt of reconciliation. Unfortunately, it is the wife who is seeking divorce; she is not seeking any compensation from the husband; all that she wants is to put an end to the terrible mental agony she is undergoing for so many years. Continuance of the marital relationship any longer serves no purpose. The respondent has been totally insensitive to the feelings of the petitioner. It is a case of complete neglect. The said state of affairs itself constitutes cruelty in the facts and circumstances of the case. As stated above, the Learned Judge has not kept in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions which squarely applies to the facts of the case and has misguided himself on material facts resulting in miscarriage of justice. Facts are not in dispute. The case of cruelty pleaded is made out. 18. The next ground urged is desertion. Desertion has been made a ground for divorce under clause (i-b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act. Facts are not in dispute. The case of cruelty pleaded is made out. 18. The next ground urged is desertion. Desertion has been made a ground for divorce under clause (i-b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act. This expression has been defined in the explanation attached to sub-Section (1) of the said Section which lays down that "in this sub-Section the expression ‘desertion’ means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. The essence of desertion is the abandonment of one spouse by the other for no good cause. Desertion is not withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of common obligations of the married state. What amounts to desertion in a particular case depends upon the circumstances and mode of life of the parties. But, there can be no doubt that an active withdrawal from cohabitation and breaking off the marital relations is an indication of an intention of the husband to foresake his wife. It is well settled that the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case and those facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those facts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual act of separation. Desertion of a wife by the husband is a breach of matrimonial duty. 19. The material on record clearly discloses that it is the respondent who withdrew from the company of the petitioner without just and sufficient cause. Virtually he has abandoned his wife and son. He has failed to perform matrimonial obligations towards his wife and parental obligation towards his son who is now aged 20 years. The respondent has not contributed anything towards the upbringing of the child and has not cared for his wife; the marriage is dead both emotionally and practically. It is a case of complete neglect. He has not bothered about his wife for nearly 18 years. He has not lived with her. The respondent has not contributed anything towards the upbringing of the child and has not cared for his wife; the marriage is dead both emotionally and practically. It is a case of complete neglect. He has not bothered about his wife for nearly 18 years. He has not lived with her. Because of her employment she had to live in Bijapur, her place of work. It cannot be construed as an act of desertion by her. It is not the case of the husband, that he wanted her to leave the employment and he was capable of taking her to his place, as he wanted her company. On the contrary the evidence on record discloses that he was after her salary. Only when the wife refused to hand over the salary to him the trouble started and he deserted her. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the ground of desertion pleaded by the petitioner is made out. 20. In the result, we pass the following order: The appeal is allowed. The petition for divorce filed under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act is allowed. The marriage between the husband and wife i.e. respondent and petitioner respectively is dissolved by the decree of divorce. Parties to bear their own costs.