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2008 DIGILAW 665 (PNJ)

State Of Haryana v. Rani Devi

2008-03-11

AJAY K.MITTAL

body2008
Judgment Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. 1. This appeal by the State of Haryana is directed against the order dated 27.9.2005 passed by the Commissioner under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (for brevity, the Act) whereby the respondents have been awarded a total compensation of Rs. 3,98,304/- which includes interest and expenses. 2. Put shortly, the facts of the case are that Jagdish Parshad (since deceased) was employed as a driver on a monthly salary of Rs. 12,000/- with the appellants herein on bus bearing registration No. HR-66/0312. On 23.07.2003, he stopped the bus near N.C. College, Ishrana and on checking, he found that nut-bolts of the rear tyres of the bus were open. On seeing this, he was shocked and suffered heart attack resulting into his death. The applicants being legal heirs of Jagdish Parshad filed a claim petition under Section 22 of the Act for grant of compensation. 3. Upon notice, the appellant-State filed reply admitting the factum of employment of the workman and the incident as alleged by the claimants, but denied the liability to pay any compensation on the ground that the workman himself was negligent as it was his duty to get the bus mechanically checked up in the workshop before starting the journey. 4. The Commissioner on the basis of the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion that Jagdish Parshad died due to heart attack which occurred out of and in the course of employment. Accordingly, the claim petition was allowed by the Commissioner vide order dated 27.9.2005 awarding a total compensation of Rs. 3,98,304/- (Rs-Three lacs ninety eight thousand three hundred and four only) including interest and expenses to the claimants. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the records with their assistance. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the cause of death i.e. heart attack, of the workman was not attributable to his employment as there was no scope for any stress or strains in his duties. In support of his submissions, the learned State counsel relied upon the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Jyothi Ademma v. Plant Engineer, Nellore and Anr. 1999-2006(2) Supreme Court on Acquittal and Relief Judgments 892. It is further submitted that the amount of compensation and the rate of interest awarded by the Commissioner are on higher side. 7. 1999-2006(2) Supreme Court on Acquittal and Relief Judgments 892. It is further submitted that the amount of compensation and the rate of interest awarded by the Commissioner are on higher side. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents controverting the aforesaid submissions, argued that the death of the workman-driver had taken place due to heart attack out of and in the course of his employment as at the time of death, he was driving the bus and, therefore, the claimants had been rightly granted the compensation by the Commissioner. He relied upon the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sarasu and Ors., and two judgments of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in the cases of Divisional Controller, North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Marembee and Ors., and Divisional Controller, North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sangamma and Ors., in support of his submission. The learned Counsel urged that the quantum and rate of interest awarded to the claimants cannot be said to be excessive. 8. The primary and the core question that requires to be adjudicated in this appeal is whether the cause of demise of the workman, i.e. heart attack, could be attributed to and arising out of his employment? 9. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that an employer is required to pay compensation to a workman who suffers personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act reads thus: Section 3(1):- If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. 10 The attention of this Court is now focused on the terminology personal injury caused to a workman by accident. A Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while dealing with similar issue in Sangammas case (supra), held in paras 7 and 8 as under: 7. 10 The attention of this Court is now focused on the terminology personal injury caused to a workman by accident. A Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while dealing with similar issue in Sangammas case (supra), held in paras 7 and 8 as under: 7. In the light of our conclusion that the workman had died on account of heart attack suffered by him in the course of the employment, the only other question that would arise for consideration is, whether the heart attack suffered by a conductor of a transport vehicle in the course of his employment, can be termed as a personal injury suffered by a workman on account of accident arising out of and in the course of his employment? Before we proceed to consider the said question, it is useful to refer to Section 3(1) of the Act, which reads as hereunder: 3(1): If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. From the reading of Section 3(1) of the Act what would emerge is that an employer is liable to pay compensation, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, to a workman if such workman suffers personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, the question is what should be the meaning attached or given to the words personal injury caused to a workman by accident? According to Chambers 21st Century dictionary, injury means hurt, damage, impairment, annoyance. Therefore, in our considered view the development of just pain or for that matter any other pain, would be an injury caused to the person. However, to make an employer liable to pay compensation for such an injury suffered by the workman, such an injury must have been caused to the workman on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, if on account of chest pain or heart attack, if a workman dies, the question would be whether such an event can be construed as an accident? If such an event can be construed as an accident, the employer would be liable to pay the compensation to the legal representatives of the workman under the Act. Therefore, if on account of chest pain or heart attack, if a workman dies, the question would be whether such an event can be construed as an accident? If such an event can be construed as an accident, the employer would be liable to pay the compensation to the legal representatives of the workman under the Act. No doubt, as noticed by us earlier, it is the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that development of chest pain or heart attack is a natural event which every human being would be prone to and merely because a workman like the conductor in a bus suffers chest pain or heart attack in the course of employment cannot be construed as an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. We are unable to accede to the said contention. The reasons are more than one. Firstly, we will have to keep in mind the context under which the word accident is employed in Section 3(1) of the Act. There cannot be any dispute that the Act is a beneficial legislation intended to safeguard the interest of the workman who generally belong to the less fortunate section of the society. Section 3 of the Act provides for the payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act, if any personal injury is caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The object of Section 3(1) of the Act is to ensure financial assistance and to relieve the workman and his family members of the hardship they may suffer on account of a personal injury that may be caused to a workman in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It is well settled that while interpreting the beneficial legislation, in the absence of the language employed in the legislation being clear and unambiguous and does not give scope for views more than one, the courts will have to interpret the legislation or the provisions of the legislation keeping in mind the object and purpose of legislation. If it is so understood, it is not possible to give a restricted meaning to the word accident under Section 3(1) of the Act so as to exclude the death of a workman in the course of employment on account of heart attack. If it is so understood, it is not possible to give a restricted meaning to the word accident under Section 3(1) of the Act so as to exclude the death of a workman in the course of employment on account of heart attack. The word accident in the context in which it is employed has to be given a very wide and liberal meaning to make Section 3 of the Act purposeful and meaningful, so that, the object of the legislation is achieved. If it is so done, the word accident can be understood in the context as an event or incident taking place unexpectedly or suddenly. In fact, this view of ours gets support from the meaning given to the word accident in Chambers 21st Century Dictionary wherein the meaning of the word accident has been stated as: an unexpected event which causes damage or harm; something which happens without planning or intention; chance; managed it by accident. 8. Therefore, if a workman suffers a personal injury unexpectedly or suddenly and such personal injury suffered by the workman can be attributed to the work undertaken by the workman or has some connection to the nature of the duties discharged by a workman, such an injury suffered can be treated as a result of the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. In the instant case, the evidence on record shows that the workman was working at Chittarpur depot of the appellant and he had boarded the bus in the early hours of the day to carry out his duties as conductor. It is on record that after the bus proceeded around 40 km., the workman developed chest pain and when the same was informed to the driver of the bus, the driver stopped the bus at Naladurg Bus Stand and admitted the workman to Ashwini Hospital. Among several causes for chest pain, one of the causes is strain and stress of work. Under these circumstances, the nature of work one undertakes, whether it be caring a load on the head, or driving a vehicle or working as a conductor or carrying out more strenuous work, where physical exercise is involved, have strain and stress of the work on the individual. Under these circumstances, the nature of work one undertakes, whether it be caring a load on the head, or driving a vehicle or working as a conductor or carrying out more strenuous work, where physical exercise is involved, have strain and stress of the work on the individual. Further, for development of chest pain or heart attack, physical exercise or physical strain alone is not the cause; even the mental strain also could be a cause for chest pain or advancing the heart attack. Therefore, even assuming that the workman had the block of the arteries of his heart, the free flow of blood to the heart could be effected on account of the strain of work. Therefore, since admittedly, the workman at the time when he developed chest pain was conducting the bus as its conductor, it is reasonable to infer that he died on account of personal injury suffered by him in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. We would also like to point out that taking a view, different from the one we have expressed above, would be defeating the very object of the legislation. As noticed by us earlier, the Act is a beneficial legislation intended to give some security to the workman. We are of the considered view that the provisions of the Act are in the nature of a mini insurance scheme to the workmen. Therefore, the liability of the employer under the Act is conceptually quite different from the liability under tort. Therefore, the interpretation to the provision of the Act calls for a broad and liberal construction, lest its evident object is defeated. It is necessary to point out that while death is a natural event of life, the cause like heart attack or any other ailment cannot be considered as natural event that would take place, as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The strain of the work may be mental or physical; depending upon the nature of the work one takes up and the physical and mental condition of an individual, a person may suffer heart attack. The heart attack suffered, sometime, if immediate and proper medical care is provided, may save the life of the patient. In this case the workman was on duty and was admitted to a moffusil hospital. The heart attack suffered, sometime, if immediate and proper medical care is provided, may save the life of the patient. In this case the workman was on duty and was admitted to a moffusil hospital. It is not the case of the appellant that the best medical treatment was made available to the workman when he complained of chest pain. 11. The aforesaid view was followed by the Madras High Court in Sarasus case (supra). Another Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court expressed similar view in Marembees case (supra) 12. Under Section 3(1) of the Act, it is required to be established that there was some casual connection between the death of the workman and his employment. No liability is fastened on the employer if the workman dies due to disease which he was suffering from. However, if the employment has contributed or has accelerated the death, or the death was direct result of disease coupled with the employment, in that eventuality, it would be held that death was due to employment and the employer was liable. 13. According to the factual findings recorded in the present case, the Commissioner after appreciating the evidence on record concluded that the deceased workman-Jagdish Parshad who was employed as a driver while on duty driving bus No. HR-66/0132, on checking found that the nut and bolt of rear tyres were open and due to that he suffered tension which caused heart attack resulting into his death as the same was aggravated by the strain attributable to the work to be done by the deceased. No evidence contrary to the aforesaid view of the Commissioner had been produced by the employer. In the light of the aforesaid findings, the Commissioner had rightly concluded that the death had occurred as a consequence and in the course of employment and, therefore, the claimants were entitled to compensation under the Act. 14. In all fairness to the learned State counsel, reference is made to a judgment reported in Jyothi Ademmas case (supra). In the said case, the deceased was suffering from chest disease and was being treated for such disease earlier also. It was recorded that the job of the deceased was only to switch on or off and in such circumstances, it was opined by the doctor that there was no stress or stain in his duty. In the said case, the deceased was suffering from chest disease and was being treated for such disease earlier also. It was recorded that the job of the deceased was only to switch on or off and in such circumstances, it was opined by the doctor that there was no stress or stain in his duty. Such is not the position in the present case and the aforesaid pronouncement of the Apex Court does not help the appellants. 15. In view of the precedents cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents and the fact that the workman suffered heart attack due to stress and strain in his duties, this Court is of the opinion that the Commissioner has rightly held the employer liable to pay the compensation, the amount of which is correctly based on the monthly wages and age of the workman at the time of death. Therefore, finding no ground to interfere in the impugned order, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.