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2008 DIGILAW 668 (BOM)

Maroti s/o. Vishnu Borkar v. State of Maharashtra

2008-05-02

P.V.HARDAS, R.M.SAVANT

body2008
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. With the consent of learned Counsel for the parties Rule made returnable forthwith and heard. 2. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a person who claims to be a producer member of the Respondent No.10 Narsinh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., Indapur, district Osmanabad, claims the following substantive reliefs : B) To issue writ of quo-warranto or any other writ, order or directions in the like nature directing the Respondents Nos.3 to 9 not to function as Administrative Member of Narsinh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., Indapur, taluka Washi, district Osmanabad. C) To issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions in the like nature the Respondent No.1 and 2 may kindly be directed not to allow the respondent No.3 to 9 to function as administrative board in Narsinh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., Indapur, taluka Washi, district Osmanabad with further directions to appoint any Government officer as Administrator during election process and till new body elected committee enters in the office of the said Karkhana. 3. On account of the supervening event of the State Government having issued an order dated 5-1-2008, the petitioner has by way of amendment vide prayer clause (C-1) prayed for the following additional relief : C-1) To issue writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or directions in the like nature the impugned order dated 5-1-2008 passed by the Regional Joint Director (Sugar) and Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Nanded may kindly be quashed and set aside. 3. The undertone of the sum and substance of the grievance of the petitioner appears to be that a Board of Directors, democratically elected is not being allowed to take charge of the affairs of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory andin the guise of issuing orders under the various provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, hereinafter referred to for short as the said Act, the existing Administrative Committee of 7 persons is allowed to continue indefinitely. 4. The factual matrix involved is stated thus : The Respondent No.10, Narsinh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Limited was registered on 12-5-1999. In terms of section 73(1)(b) of the said Act, a provisional Committee was appointed for period of three years i.e. upto year 2002. The term of the said Provisional Committee was extended by period of one year i.e. upto 2003. The factual matrix involved is stated thus : The Respondent No.10, Narsinh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Limited was registered on 12-5-1999. In terms of section 73(1)(b) of the said Act, a provisional Committee was appointed for period of three years i.e. upto year 2002. The term of the said Provisional Committee was extended by period of one year i.e. upto 2003. It appears that the said Provisional Committee had filed Writ Petition No. 2123 of 2003 seeking directions against the authorities to hold election to the Board of Directors of the said sugar factory. The District Collector in the said petition filed an affidavit stating that the election process has started. In view thereof, the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court by observing that the process will be completed in terms of the election programme. It appears that for one reason or the other, the election process did not culiminate into an elected body coming into office. The Provisional Committee, therefore, was continued from time to time. However, looking to the mandate of Section 73(1A)(b) and in view of the fact that the existing Provisional Committee had not taken steps to hold elections the State Government exercising powers under Section 73-H of the said Act appointed an Administrator vide order dated 2-12-2005. However, it appears that by order dated 7-12-2005, the said order dated 2-12-2005 appointing an Administrator came to be stayed and the Provisional Committee was granted extension upto 30-6-2006. Thereafter, by an order dated 10-11-2006, the stay granted on 7-12-2005 was vacated and by the said order an Administrative Board of seven members was appointed under the said Section 73-H to manage the affairs of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory. 5. The said order dated 10-11-2006 appointing an Administrative Board was challenged by some of the members of the said Provosional Committee by filing Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2006. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by this Court on the ground that the State Government has the power to change the first Provisional Committee. The dismissal of the said petition was by order dated 1-12-2006. However, from the point of view of the present petition, it would be suffice to note that there was no challenge as to whether an Administrative Board appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act could continue beyond the period prescribed in the said section. 6. The dismissal of the said petition was by order dated 1-12-2006. However, from the point of view of the present petition, it would be suffice to note that there was no challenge as to whether an Administrative Board appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act could continue beyond the period prescribed in the said section. 6. The petitioner and one another member Dhananjay Arun Gapat filed Writ Petition No. 8225 of 2006 seeking a direction against the Collector, Osmanabad to hold and complete the election process of the Respondent No.10 by continuing the election process, started by publication of provisional voters list dated 13-10-2006 and complete it strictly adhering to the provisions of law and rules. The said Writ Petition was allowed by this Court by judgment and order dated 1-2-2007 by accepting the statement made on behalf of the Collector in the affidavit filed by him and directed the process of election of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory to be completed by 27-5-2007. This Court also issued certain directions in respect of the provisional voters list which was prepared and directed the Collector to decide all objections in respect of the said provisional voters list in accordance with law and thereafter to publish the final voters list and hold the election according to the concerned Rules. 7. Thereafter, the Collector, Osmanabad filed a Civil Application No. 3487 of 2007 in the said Writ Petition No. 8225 of 2000 and prayed for extension of six months to complete the said election process. This Court by order dated 3-5-2007 allowed the said application and granted the extension sought for. It appears that the Collector fixed the cut-off date for inclusion in the voters list as 30-6-2000 which triggered of filing of two more petitions being Writ Petition No. 2029 of 2007 and Writ Petition No. 1286 of 2007 challenging the fixing of the said cut off date by the Collector. Suffice it to say that the said writ petitions came to be dismissed by order dated 3-5-2007. It appears that thereafter one of the petitioners i.e. Prabhakar Ramrao Ganpat filed a Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 13092 of 2007. Suffice it to say that the said writ petitions came to be dismissed by order dated 3-5-2007. It appears that thereafter one of the petitioners i.e. Prabhakar Ramrao Ganpat filed a Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 13092 of 2007. The said Special Leave Petition was disposed of by the Apex Court on 15-2-2008 by recording the consensus of the parties that the cut off date for voters list would be 30-6-2005 instead of 30-6-2000 as was fixed earlier. It appears that a representation was made by the founder Chairman of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory to the Hon’ble Minister concerned and the other governmental authorities seeking to bring to their notice the legal position and requesting the continuance of the election process by appointing a Government Officer as Administrator instead of the Administrative Board appointing under Section 73-H of the said Act, as the said Board could not function beyond a period of six months from the date of its appointment. The instant petition, as indicated above, has been filed challenging the continuance of the Administrative Board and to conduct the elections through a Government Officer who should be appointed as Administrator. 8. The above petition was filed on 25-1-2007 and was appearing for admission from time to time. It appears that the petitioner invoking the provisions of the Right to Information Act had sought information from the Respondent No.2 as to whether the term of the Administrative Board appointed by the impugned order dated 10-11-2006 is over or not. The concerned authority by its reply dated 29-11-2007 informed the petitioner that the term of the Administrative Board has already expired and that there is no extension granted to the said Board. It appears that thereafter the State Government invoking the powers conferred by Section 157 of the said Act issued an order on 4-1-2008 exempting the Respondent No.10 from the provisions of the said Act which provision in the instant case was Section 73-H of the said Act and thereby extended the term of the Committee by another order dated 5-1-2008 purportedly issued under Section 77A of the said Act. The said order was placed on record by the State Government vide an affidavit filed by one Popatrao Sakharam Punde, Regional Joint Director of Sugar, Nanded. The said order was placed on record by the State Government vide an affidavit filed by one Popatrao Sakharam Punde, Regional Joint Director of Sugar, Nanded. It is this order dated 5-1-2008 which is challenged by the petitioners by amending the petition and incorporating prayer clause C-1. 9. In so far as the Respondents are concerned though the State Government according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner had sought time on numerous occasions, no affidavit was filed for a considerable period of time and an affidavit dated 7-1-2008 came to be filed only after order dated 4-1-2008 was issued by the State Government, exempting the said Society from the provisions of the said Act and continuing the existing administrative board by another order dated 5-1-2008. What is significant to note is that it has been accepted in the said affidavit that the Administrative Board appointed vide order dated 10-11-2006 can remain in office only for a period of six months and thereafter the members thereof are not entitled to hold office. Considering the position in law, it is stated that the State Government issued the said order dated 4-1-2008 granting exemption to the Respondent No.10 from the provisions of Section 73-H of the said Act. It has also been mentioned that the Collector could not hold the elections in view of the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court which directly involved the issue regarding fixing of cut off date for preparation of voters list and therefore, it required the issuance of an order dated 5-1-2008 under Section 77-A of the said Act continuing the Administrative Board and accordingly, an order dated 5-1-2008 came to be issued under Section 77-A (1)(F)(ii) of the said Act. 10. On behalf of the Respondent No.8, an affidavit in reply has been filed. In the said affidavit, the reasons as to why the elections to the Board of the Respondent No.10 could not be held have been stated. It is sought to be contended that the petitioner’s uncle one Shankarrao Borkar who was ex Chairman of the Respondent No.10, i.e. of the first Provisional Committee was responsible in the Respondent No.10 committing a default in holding the elections. It is sought to be contended that the petitioner’s uncle one Shankarrao Borkar who was ex Chairman of the Respondent No.10, i.e. of the first Provisional Committee was responsible in the Respondent No.10 committing a default in holding the elections. It is also sought to be contended that the above petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that the earlier Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007 challenging the order dated 10-11-2006 has been rejected by this Court. 11. We have heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties. On behalf of the petitioners, Shri V. D. Salunke, learned Counsel submitted that though the Respondent No. 10 sugar factory has been registered as long back as in the year 1999 inspite of a period of almost 10 years having elapsed, the management of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory has as yet not passed on to a democratically elected body. The election process, according to Shri Salunke, has not been allowed to be culminated with a sole intent to favour the persons manning the Administrative Board who are belonging to the party in power in the State. Shri Salunke, the learned Counsel submitted that inspite of directions passed in Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2006 as also directions passed in the earlier litigation i.e. Writ Petition No. 3679 of 2002 still the election process has not been taken to its logical conclusion. The learned Counsel submitted that though a Provisional Committee could be appointed under Section 73-(1A)(b) of the said Act, the life of the said Provisional Committee could be for a maximum period of five years. The State Government having appointed a provisional Administrative Committee in the year 1999, the term of the said Provisional Committee came to an end in the year 2005. The State Government, therefore, had by order dated 2-12-2005 issued under Section 73-H of the said Act appointed an Administrator to manage affairs of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory and, therefore, appointment of an Administrative Board by order dated 10-11-2006 was totally unsustainable in the eyes of law. 12. The learned Counsel further submitted that in any event the Administrative Board having been appointed on 10-11-2006 could not continue beyond 9-5-2007 as the maximum period for which an Administrator can continue under Section 73-H is for a period of six months. 12. The learned Counsel further submitted that in any event the Administrative Board having been appointed on 10-11-2006 could not continue beyond 9-5-2007 as the maximum period for which an Administrator can continue under Section 73-H is for a period of six months. The learned Counsel further submitted that the real intent of the State Government in continuing the Administrative Board can be seen from the fact that the State Government vide order dated 4-1-2008 whilst the above petition has been pending for admission has issued an order invoking Section 157 of the said Act thereby exempting Respondent No.10 sugar factory from the provisions of the said Act and especially Section 73-H thereof. Not only this, the State Government by further order dated 5-1-2008 has continued the Administrative Board till the elections are concluded of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory. This, according to the learned Counsel, has been done with the sole intent of continuing the seven member Administrative Board which comprises of persons who are close to the powers that be in the ruling coalition in the State. The learned Counsel as regards invocation of powers under section 157 of the said Act thereby exempting the Respondent No.10 Society from the provisions of the said Act relies upon the unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8040 of 2006 - Ramesh Mane versus State of Maharashtra and others - judgment to which one of us (P.V. Hardas, J.) was a party. In the said judgment, the Division Bench has held that the provisions of Section 157 of the said Act could not be invoked so as to continue the Committee which otherwise is not entitled to continue under the provisions of the said Act. The Division Bench has further held that the said provision cannot be applied in respect of persons in management of the Society but could be applied to a Society. The relevant extract from para 15 and para 16 are reproduced hereunder : 15. ... . In the present case, what the impugned order purports to do is to grant exemption to the provisional Board of Directors and though the Statute prescribes that their term shall come to an end and no further extension can be granted, yet the Government while exercising powers under section 157 of the Act does precisely what the statute prohibits. . In the present case, what the impugned order purports to do is to grant exemption to the provisional Board of Directors and though the Statute prescribes that their term shall come to an end and no further extension can be granted, yet the Government while exercising powers under section 157 of the Act does precisely what the statute prohibits. Apart from the fact that the impugned order grants exemptional to the provisional Board of Directors, which is wholly impermissible in law, the impugned order extends the term of the provisional Board of Directors beyond the maximum period specified by the Statute. 16. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order is unsustainable in law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. By resorting to the invocation of Section 157 of the Act, the Government is defeating the very purpose and the object of the Act which is to develop co-operative movement in the State. The object and purpose of the Act can only be achieved if the elected representatives of the society step into power. The provisions of the Act have been engrafted for achieving the object of the Act. Elections to the Co-operative Societies should be held at the earliest and, therefore, the provisions of Section 73-(1A) (b) contemplates that no extension can be granted to the provisional Board beyond the maximum period provided under the said section. Since the constitution of the provisional Board is referable to Section 73(1A)(b) and this has been reiterated by the respondent in the impugned order, no other provision can be pressed into aid. In this petition we are not primarily concerned with the operation of the provisions of Section 73A of the Act. It is true that the term of the provisional Board of Directors as per the impugned order would come to an end on 28.1.2008. Just few days remained for the provisional Board to cease to function. However, since the impugned order is an order passed dehors the provisions of the Statute, we are impelled to quash and set aside the impugned order. Shri Salunke submitted that the election process is not being allowed to be completed in view of the vested interest that the members of the Administrative Committee have in their indefinite continuance. However, since the impugned order is an order passed dehors the provisions of the Statute, we are impelled to quash and set aside the impugned order. Shri Salunke submitted that the election process is not being allowed to be completed in view of the vested interest that the members of the Administrative Committee have in their indefinite continuance. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to a communication addressed by the Collector, Osmanabad to the Government Pleader wherein the Collector has informed the Government Pleader that the Chairman of the Administrative Committee as well as the other members are hindering the completion of the election process. 13. In so far as the point of res judicata is concerned, it is submitted that the issue raised in the present petition was not an issue in Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007. The issue in the present petition is whether an Administrative Board could be appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act in view of the fact that Section 73-H of the said Act mandates that if the Provisional Committee or the Board of Directors is removed, the registering authority has to take over management or appoint an Administrator and, therefore, no Administrative Board can be appointed. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel that assuming that an Administrative Board could be appointed the said Administrative Board could not continue beyond 9-11-2007. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel the point in issue in the present petition is whether the Administrative Board could continue beyond the period prescribed in Section 73H of the said Act. The learned Counsel submitted that the order dated 5-1-2008 which is a supervening event was also not the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that since the subject matter of said Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007 and the above writ petition is different, the principles of res judicata are not attracted. 14. On behalf of the Respondents No.1 and 2, Shri Khandare, the learned Government Pleader submitted that though directions have been issued by this Court from time to time as regards the conduct of elections to the Board of Directors of the Respondent No.10, the same have not been culminated for one reason or the other. 14. On behalf of the Respondents No.1 and 2, Shri Khandare, the learned Government Pleader submitted that though directions have been issued by this Court from time to time as regards the conduct of elections to the Board of Directors of the Respondent No.10, the same have not been culminated for one reason or the other. The learned Government Pleader submitted that in the latest round of litigation as regards the cut off date for inclusion in the voters list the issue had reached the Apex Court by way of a Special Leave Petition filed by one of the persons who has filed a petition in this Court. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the said Special Leave Petition has been disposed of by the Apex Court by its order dated 10-2-2008. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the elections have not taken place or have not culminated in a democratically elected Board of Directors in view of the litigation which has been initiated from time to time. In so far as the order dated 4-1-2008 is concerned, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the said order had to be issued in view of the fact that the present Administrative Board appointed under Section 73-H could not continue beyond a period of six months and in view of the fact that it would take sometime for elections to culminate in an elected body being put incharge of the affairs of the Respondent No.10. In so far as the order dated 5-1-2008 i.e. an order issued continuing the Administrative Board, the learned Counsel submitted that the said order has been issued under Section 77(A)(F) (ii) (4) of the said Act. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the order dated 15-2-2008 passed by the Apex Court accepting the consensus amongst the parties as regards cut off date there would now be no impediment in holding the elections and, therefore, there was no need to disturb the present position regarding the management of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory. 15. On behalf of the Respondent No.8, Shri Dhorde, the learned Counsel opposed the petition and questioned its maintainability on the point of application of the principles of res judicata. 15. On behalf of the Respondent No.8, Shri Dhorde, the learned Counsel opposed the petition and questioned its maintainability on the point of application of the principles of res judicata. The learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner having filed Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007 challenging the said order dated 10-11-2006, the present petition filed by the petitioner challenging the appointment of the Administrative Board under Section 73-H was not maintainable in view of the dismissal of the said Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2006. The learned Counsel submitted that the elections to the Respondent No.10 sugar factory have not finally culminated on account of the litigation initiated resulting in challenge to the provisional list of voters. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.8 submitted that since the Respondent No.10 sugar factory is in the midst of crushing season, it would not be advisable to interfere with the present management of the Respondent No.10 sugar factory. The learned Counsel submitted that the functioning of the Respondent No.10 is proper and it is only the petitioner who is making grievance about the continuance of the Administrative Board appointed vide order dated 10-11-2006. 16. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.3 who is the Chairman of the Administrative Board, adopted the arguments of Shri Dhorde and also sought the dismissal of the petition on the point of res judicata. On behalf of the Respondents Nos.11 to 24, Shri N. P. Patil Jamalpurkar appearing for the said Respondents supported the submissions made by Shri Salunke as regards the continuance of the said Administrative Board by order dated 5-1-2008. 17. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. The moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Administrative Board appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act could at all to be appointed and whether the said Administrative Board can be allowed to continue beyond the term prescribed under Section 73-H of the said Act. It would, therefore, be relevant to reproduce Section 73-H of the said Act. 73H. (1) It shall be the duty of the committee of every society to arrange for holding the election of its members before the expiry of its term. It would, therefore, be relevant to reproduce Section 73-H of the said Act. 73H. (1) It shall be the duty of the committee of every society to arrange for holding the election of its members before the expiry of its term. (2) [Whether there is a wilful failure on the part of the committee to hold the election to the committee before the expiration of its term, the committee] shall cease to function on the expiration of its term and the members thereof shall cease to hold office and the Registrar may himself take over the management of the society or appoint an Administrator (who shall not be from amongst the members of the committee the term of which has so expired) and the Registrar or Administrator shall hold election within a period of six months and the committee shall be constituted before the expiration of that period.] 18. It would be pertinent to note that the State Government has the power under Section 73 (1A)(b) to nominate the first Provisional Committee to manage the affairs of a Co-operative sugar factory newly established. The life of the first Provisional Committee is initially for a period of three years and thereafter can be extended by a further period of two years. Therefore, the maximum term of the Provisional Committee can be of five years. In the instant case, the term of the Provisional Committee came to an end sometime in 2005 and since the elections were not held by the Provisional Committee, vide order dated 2-10-2005, the State Government in exercise of the powers under Section 73H appointed an Administrator. However, by order dated 7-12-2005, the said appointment of the Administrator came to be stayed and by a further order dated 10-11-2006 an Administrative Board came to be appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act. The term of the said Administrative Board came to an end on 9-11-2007 in view of the statutory prescription that an Administrative Board could continue only for a period of six months. The State Government to get over the said difficulty invoked the provisions of Section 157 of the said Act by exempting the Respondent No.10 from the provisions of Section 73H of the said Act and thereafter by a subsequent order dated 5-1-2008 continued the Administrative Board in terms of the said order dated 5-1-2008. The State Government to get over the said difficulty invoked the provisions of Section 157 of the said Act by exempting the Respondent No.10 from the provisions of Section 73H of the said Act and thereafter by a subsequent order dated 5-1-2008 continued the Administrative Board in terms of the said order dated 5-1-2008. We find considerable merit in the submission of Shri Salunke that the said Administrative Board could not continue beyond 9-11-2007 on which date the statutory period of six months comes to an end. The invocation of Section 157 by the State Government in the instant case, in our view is wholly unsustainable. As held by the Division Bench inthe judgment cited supra in Writ Petition No. 8040 of 2007, the said power could not be exercised to continue a Committee which otherwise could not be continued under the provisions of law. This, in our view, would amount to perpetuate an illegality as the Administrative Board is thereby allowed to continue beyond the statutory period prescribed. It is not as if the State Government is powerless, it can act through the Registrar of Co-operative Societies who is sufficiently empowered under the provisions of the said Act to appoint an Administrator to look after the affairs of the Committee. Why the same has not been done in the instant case only leads credence to the allegations of the petitioner that the same has been done to favour the Administrative Board whose members are close to the powers that be in the ruling coalition. In so far as the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the Administrative Board has been continued in exercise of powers under Section 77A(1)(f)(ii) of the said Act is concerned, we are baffled by the said submission made on behalf of the State Governemnt and its authorities. In our view, a reading of the said provision ex facie makes it clear that the said provision is not at all applicable in the facts of the instant case. In fact the instant case does not fall in any of the categories mentioned in the said Section 77A. It was then sought to be faintly submitted before us that the instant case fits in clause (1-a) of Section 77A(1) of the said Act. We are unable to countenance such a submission. In fact the instant case does not fall in any of the categories mentioned in the said Section 77A. It was then sought to be faintly submitted before us that the instant case fits in clause (1-a) of Section 77A(1) of the said Act. We are unable to countenance such a submission. It appears that the State Government finding that the term of the Administrative Board has come to a end has sought to rely upon a provision which is not at all applicable. The said order dated 5-1-2008 is, therefore, unsustainable and is, therefore, required to be set aside. 19. In so far as the order dated 4-1-2008 passed under Section 157 of the said Act is concerned, the same, in our view, is covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8040 of 2007 (supra) to which one of us (P.V. Hardas, J.) was a party. On the application of the said judgment, the issuance of the said order dated 4-1-2008 is wholly unsustainable. Though the said order is not directly challenged, since it is the fountainhead of the order dated 5-1-2008, and since we are setting aside the said order dated 5-1-2008, we do not deem it fit to express any further about the said order dated 4-1-2008 other than what we have already expressed hereinabove namely; that the said order is unsustainable. 20. In so far as the point of res judicata which has been urged with great vehemence on behalf of the Respondent, in our view, the present petition is maintainable. It would be pertinent to note that Writ Petition No. 7613 of 2007 though filed challenging the order dated 10-11-2006 was as regards the appointment of the Administrative Board under Section 73-H of the said Act. It was not as regards the term of the Board. This Court had dismissed the petition on the ground that such an Administrative Board could be appointed under Section 73-H of the said Act, therefore, the issue as regards whether an Administrative Board could be appointed stands concluded. However, the issue as regards its term was not a subject matter of the said writ petition. Another aspect to be noted is that the order dated 5-1-2008 which is a supervening event was not a subject matter of the said writ petition and which is a subject matter of the above petition. However, the issue as regards its term was not a subject matter of the said writ petition. Another aspect to be noted is that the order dated 5-1-2008 which is a supervening event was not a subject matter of the said writ petition and which is a subject matter of the above petition. In our view, therefore, present petition is not hit by the principles of res judicata and is maintainable. In view of the clear mandate of Section 73-H of the said Act, the Administrative Board cannot continue beyond a period of six months. In the light of the view that we have taken as regards the invocation of Section 157 in issuance of order dated 4-1-2008 and the continuance of the Administrative Board by order dated 5-1-2008 by invocation of Section 77-A of the said Act, we are of the view that the said order dated 5-1-2008 is required to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The Administrative Board, therefore, cannot continue. We, therefore, allow the petition by making the Rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (C) and prayer clause (C-1). The Respondents Nos.1 and 2 are directed to take steps to appoint any competent Government Officer as an Administrator for overseeing the election process and till the new Committee enters in office. . Rule is accordingly made absolute. At this stage, prayer for stay is made. In the facts of the case wherein the Administrative Board is continued beyond the statutory period prescribed, prayer refused.