JUDGMENT 1. Both these appeals are against the order dated 9.8.06 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing W.P. No. 18400/02 and quashing the award dated 20.08.01 in Reference Nos. 70/91 and 71/91 by the Labour Court, Mangalore and directing the management to pay a service compensation of Rs. 30,000/- to each of the five petitioners. W.A. No. 1548/06 is by the management and W.A. No. 1967/06 is by the workmen. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to hereinafter as workmen and management. 2. The management recruited the workmen as Junior Assistant cum Typists (Tally Workers) on daily wages and on temporary basis in its Special Cell for Handling Imported Fertilizers which was established for extra work of imported fertilizers. The import of fertilizers having come to an end during April, 1987 and consequently, the engagement of the workmen was not renewed. Aggrieved by the non renewal, the workmen approached the conciliation officer disputing that non renewal resulted in refusal of work. On failure of conciliation, the dispute came to be referred to the Labour Court, Mangalore, for adjudication. The Labour Court, rejected the reference, which was challenged by the workmen in W.P. No. 18400/02. Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition, quashed the award and has directed the management to pay to each of the five workmen, Rs. 30,000/- as compensation. The management has preferred the appeal to set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition and to restore the award passed by the Labour Court. The workmen have filed the appeal to set aside that portion of the order of the learned Single Judge by which the learned Single Judge has denied the relief of reinstatement by awarding service compensation and also pray for grant of consequential reliefs. 3. We have heard Sri. V.S. Naik, learned Counsel for the workmen and Sri. S.N. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the management. 4. Sri. S.N. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel contended that, learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the petitioners were not workmen in the employment of the appellant/management and that they were engaged on contract for specific period on temporary basis. He further contended that, the finding by learned Single Judge that, workmen worked for 240 days continuously in a calendar year under employer is erroneous. He further contended that, the finding by learned Single Judge that, workmen worked for 240 days continuously in a calendar year under employer is erroneous. He contended that workmen had worked in terms of the contract for certain period which is purely temporary in nature. He contended that, inference drawn by the learned Single Judge with regard to lack of details of the project or the appointment orders issued to workmen from time to time and that workmen had worked for 240 days is not correct and since workmen were engaged for different periods which should not be combined to say that each of them had worked for 240 days in a year. He contended that, there is no violation of Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act) and the finding that, workmen had worked for a period of 240 days, is contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned Senior Counsel contended that, learned Single Judge is not justified in directing payment of service compensation of Rs. 30,000/- to each of the workmen as the same is illegal and arbitrary. He further contended that in view of the appeal of the management being meritorious, appeal filed by workmen Is devoid of merit. 5. Per contra, Sri. V.S. Naik, learned Counsel for the workmen contended that, workmen had worked with the appellant - company from 1985 to 1987 i.e., more than 240 days as contemplated under Section 25B of the Act and hence, their non-continuance/non-renewal amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and since the termination of their service was without compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Act, they sought conciliation which having failed, reference was made to the Labour Court for adjudication. He contended that, Labour Court had acted illegally and with material irregularity in negating the reference and hence, writ petition was filed. He contended that, learned Single Judge having rightly considered the matter and having found that the action of management is illegal, has allowed the writ petition. According to the learned Counsel, instead of directing reinstatement with consequential benefits, ordering payment of retrenchment compensation only, is incorrect .and highly erroneous. He contended that, learned Single Judge having rightly considered the matter and having found that the action of management is illegal, has allowed the writ petition. According to the learned Counsel, instead of directing reinstatement with consequential benefits, ordering payment of retrenchment compensation only, is incorrect .and highly erroneous. According to learned Counsel, learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the record of the case and Is justified in allowing the writ petition but has committed an error in respect of aforesaid aspect and hence modification is required directing reinstatement of the workmen with consequential benefits. Learned Counsel contended that, the appeal filed by the management is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have perused the record relating to writ petition before the learned Single Judge and the annexures filed by both parties in these appeals. 7. In order to appreciate the case of the parties, it is useful to notice an appointment order dated 12.09.1985 issued to Krishnamurthy S., which reads as follows: Dear Sir, We are pleased to offer you a temporary appointment as 'JUNIOR ASSISTANT-CUM-TYPIST (TALLY CLERK)' in our company on a daily wage of Rs. 20/- (Rupees twenty only) per day on the following terms and conditions: 1. This appointment is on temporary basis for a fixed period from 18th September 1985 to 10th January, 1986. 2. Your services automatically stand terminated with affect from the close of work of 10th January 1986. 3. You will not be entitled to any other allowances. 4. During the above period of service, your services are liable to termination without assigning any reason whatsoever and without notice. 5. You will be governed by the Company's rules in force from time to time regarding service conditions. 6. You should be prepared to serve in any department of the company, if posted. 7. You have to make your own conveyance arrangement to and from the place of work. 8. This appointment shall not confer any right whatsoever on you for absorption in services of the company, or continuation of your appointment beyond the period specified in this appointment letter, or preference for appointment in the company in future, or for any relief. 9. Your above appointment is subject to production of a discharge certificate from your present/previous employer(s) if any, and production of original Degree. Diploma and other academic certificates. 9. Your above appointment is subject to production of a discharge certificate from your present/previous employer(s) if any, and production of original Degree. Diploma and other academic certificates. If you are agreeable to the above terms and conditions, you may sign the duplicate copy of this appointment letter in token of your acceptance and report for duty on 18th September. 1985 at 9.00 a.m. It is also useful to notice the appointment order issued on 16.01.1987 to the said workman, which reads as follows: Dear Sir, We are pleased to offer you a temporary appointment as 'JUNIOR ASSISTANT-CUM-TYPIST (TALLY CLERK)' in our company on a daily wage of Rs. 20/- (Rupees twenty only) per day on the following terms and conditions: 1. This appointment is on temporary basis for a fixed period from 16th January 1987 to 13th April, 1987. 2. Your services automatically stand terminated with affect from the close of work of 13th April 1987. 3. You will not be entitled to any other allowances. 4. During the above period of service, your services are liable to termination without assigning any reason whatsoever and without notice. 5. You will be governed by the Company's rules in force from time to time regarding service conditions. 6. You should be prepared to serve in any department of the company, if posted. 7. You have to make your own conveyance arrangement to and from the place of work. 8. This appointment shall not confer any right whatsoever on you for absorption in services of the company, or continuation of your appointment beyond the period specified in this appointment letter, or preference for appointment In the company in future, or for any relief. If you are agreeable to the above terms and conditions, you may sign the duplicate copy of this appointment letter in token of your acceptance and report for duty on 16th January, 1987. (Underlining is by us) There is no dispute that the appointment orders issued originally and subsequently to the other four workmen are identical. 8. A perusal of the terms and conditions of appointment would go to show that the writ petitioners are not workmen but employed on contract basis for a fixed period. After expire of period, new appointment order with conditions were issued. 8. A perusal of the terms and conditions of appointment would go to show that the writ petitioners are not workmen but employed on contract basis for a fixed period. After expire of period, new appointment order with conditions were issued. However, the learned Single Judge has committed a factual error in holding that the letter of appointment does not show the employment was not a contract which stipulated that it comes to an end with the expiry of project or scheme. Learned Single Judge has failed to notice that the workmen were engaged on contract basis and for fixed period. Learned Single Judge has derived support to allow the writ petition on the basis of the judgment in the case of S.M. Nilajkar and Others Vs. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553 We are, therefore, of the opinion that the workers are not workmen for the purpose of Section 25F of the Act, but employed on contract basis only. Since they were engaged for specific periods, Section 2(oo) of the Act Is not attracted. Soon after the expiry of the specific period and the workmen's services were discontinued, it is not a retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act. 9. The above extracted appointment orders which were produced by the management - Company, consistently and categorically state that the workmen's appointment with the Company was purely contractual for a fixed period. The workmen were engaged only for the fixed period. The management has put an end to the contract with effect from April, 1987 which in our opinion, cannot be termed as either termination by way of illegal retrenchment from the service. Even assuming that the workmen had worked for 240 days continuously, In our opinion, cannot claim that their service should be continued because the number of 240 days does not apply to them in as much as their service was purely contractual. The termination of the contract of the workmen in view of the expiry of the period does not amount to retrenchment and therefore, does not attract compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. In the case of Kishore Chandra Samal Vs. The Divisional Manager, Orissa State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., Dhenkanal, AIR 2006 SC 3613 on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for management, the facts were that the workman was engaged for specific period/specific term. 10. In the case of Kishore Chandra Samal Vs. The Divisional Manager, Orissa State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., Dhenkanal, AIR 2006 SC 3613 on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for management, the facts were that the workman was engaged for specific period/specific term. The workman was retrenched at the end of each period. The Labour Court held that the workman served continuously for many years and that the provisions of Section 25F of the Act had not been complied with and the termination of his service is illegal and unjustified and consequently directed to reinstate the workmen. The said award was set aside by the High Court and when questioned, Hon'ble Supreme Court has reversed the finding, holding as follows: 7. The position of law relating to fixed appointments and the scope and ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) and Section 25-F were examined by this Court in several cases. In Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ram Krishan and others etc., AIR 1996 SC 332 It was observed as follows: 4. It would thus be clear that the respondents were not working throughout the season. They worked during crushing seasons only. The respondents were taken into work for the season and consequent to closure of the season, they ceased to work. 5. The question is whether such a cessation would amount to retrenchment. Since it is only a seasonal work, the respondents cannot be said to have been retrenched in view of what Is stated in clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Labour Court and the High Court is illegal. However, the appellant is directed to maintain a register for all workmen engaged during the seasons enumerated hereinbefore and when the new season starts the appellant should make publication in neighbouring places in which the respondents normally live and if they would report for duty, the appellant would engage them in accordance with seniority and exigency of work. 8. This proposition was re-Iterated by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Anil Bapurao Kanase Vs. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and another, AIR 1997 SC 2698 . 8. This proposition was re-Iterated by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Anil Bapurao Kanase Vs. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and another, AIR 1997 SC 2698 . It was noted as follows: The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the Judgment of the High Court of Bombay relied on in the impugned order dated 28.3.1995 in Writ Petition No. 488 of 1994 Is perhaps not applicable. Since the appellant has worked for more than 180 days, he is to be treated as retrenched employee and if the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is applied, his retrenchment Is illegal. We find no force in this contention. In Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and Ors. 1995 (5) SCC 653 in para 3, this Court has dealt with engagement of the seasonal workman In sugarcane crushing; In para 4 It is stated that it was not a case of retrenchment of the workman, but of closure of the factory after the crushing season was over. Accordingly, in para 5, it was held that it is not 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. As a consequence the appellant Is not entitled to retrenchment as per Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Since the present work is seasonal business, the principles of the Act have no application. However, this Court has directed that the respondent management should maintain a register and engage the workmen when the season starts in the succeeding years in the order of seniority. Until all the employees whose names appear In the list are engaged In addition to the employees who are already working, the management should not go in for fresh engagement of new workmen. It would be Incumbent upon the respondent management to adopt such procedure as is enumerated above. 9. Recently, the question was examined In Batata Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh 2005 (7) Supreme 165 Section 2(oo) of the Act reads as follows: Section 2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include: (a) ... (b) ... (b) ... (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-removal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. 10. The decision in S.M. Nilajkar's case (supra) has no application because In that case no period was indicated and only indication was the temporary nature of engagement. In the instant case in all the orders of engagement, specific periods have been mentioned. Therefore, the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity. 11. Learned Single Judge has drawn support for allowing the writ petition based on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar (supra). Said decision was considered and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Samrala Vs. Sukhwinder Kaur, AIR 2006 SC 2905 wherein it has been held as follows: 7. The respondent, within a span of about 18 months, was appointed thrice and disengaged thrice. As noticed hereinbefore, she was appointed on a contractual basis. The appointments were temporary ones. She was aware that her services could be terminated without notice. She accepted the terms and conditions of the said offers of appointments without any demur. 8. Section 2(oo) of the Act defines retrenchment to mean termination by the employer of service of the workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include: 2.(oo)(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on Its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation In that behalf contained therein;" 9. Although there was no fixed period of contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned and thus, no question of its renewal on its expiry, but there existed a stipulation in the contract that the Executive Officer has the power to dismiss her without issuing any notice. The question, which now arises for consideration, is whether Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act is attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. We would, in this behalf, may take note of some precedents operating in the field. 11. The question, which now arises for consideration, is whether Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act is attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. We would, in this behalf, may take note of some precedents operating in the field. 11. In Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar (2006) 3 SCC 81 : 2006 SCC 473 It was held: (SCC p.84, paras 11-12) 11. The appellant is a Municipal Council. It is governed by the provisions of a statute. The matter relating to the appointment of employees as also the terms and conditions of their services indisputably are governed by the provisions of the relevant Municipal Act and/or the rules framed thereunder. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the matter relating to the employment in the Municipal Council should be governed by the statutory provisions and thus such offer of appointment must be made by a person authorised therefor. The agenda in question was placed before the Executive Council with a view to obtain requisite direction from it wherefor the said letter was written. The reason for such appointment on contract basis has explicitly been stated therein, namely, that one post was vacant and two employees were on leave and in that view of the matter, services of a person were immediately required in the Council. Thus, keeping in view the exigency of the situation, the respondent came to be appointed on the terms and conditions approved by the Municipal Council. 12. We have noticed hereinbefore that the respondent understood that his appointment would be short-lived. He furthermore understood that his services could be terminated at any point of time as it was on a contract basis. It is only in that view of the matter, as noticed hereinbefore, that he affirmed an affidavit stating that the Municipal Council of Samrala could dispense with his services and that they have a right to do so. 12. S.M. Nilajkar and Others Vs. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553 was distinguished therein stating: (Raj Kumar case, SCC pp.84-85, para 13) 13. In the decision of this Court in S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager 2003 (4) SCC 27 whereupon the learned Counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance, this Court was concerned with a different fact situation obtaining therein. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 3553 was distinguished therein stating: (Raj Kumar case, SCC pp.84-85, para 13) 13. In the decision of this Court in S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager 2003 (4) SCC 27 whereupon the learned Counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance, this Court was concerned with a different fact situation obtaining therein. In that case, a scheme for absorption of the employees who were appointed for digging, laying cables, erecting poles, drawing lines and other connected works was made which came into force with effect from 1-10-1989, and only those whose names were not included for regularisation under the said scheme, raised disputes before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Mangalore. The termination of the services of casual mazdoors by the management of Telecom District Manager, Belgaum, thus came to be questioned in the reference made by the appropriate Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act. This Court, having regard to the contentions raised by the respondents that the appellant therein was engaged in a particular type of work, namely, digging, laying cables, erecting poles, drawing lines and other connected works in the project and expansion of the Telecom Office in the district of Belgaum was of the opinion:(S.M. Nilajkar case, SCC p.37, para 13) '13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; (ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment. 13. Raj Kumar (supra) has been followed by this Court in The Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Subhash Chand and Another, AIR 2006 SC 1263 holding: (Subhash Chand case, SCC p.798, paras 9 & 11) 9. 13. Raj Kumar (supra) has been followed by this Court in The Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Subhash Chand and Another, AIR 2006 SC 1263 holding: (Subhash Chand case, SCC p.798, paras 9 & 11) 9. It is contention of the appellant that the respondent was appointed during the 'wheat season' or the 'paddy season'. It is also not in dispute that the appellant is a statutory body constituted under the Punjab and Haryana Agriculture Produce Marketing Board Act. In terms of the provisions of the said Act, indisputably, regulations are framed by the Board laying down the terms and conditions of services of the employees working in the Market Committees. A bare perusal of the offer of appointment clearly goes to show that the appointments were made on contract basis. It was not a case where a workman was continuously appointed with artificial gap of 1 day only. Indisputably, the respondent had been re-employed after termination of his services on contract basis after a considerable period (s). 11. The question as to whether Chapter V-A of the Act will apply or not would be dependent on the issue as to whether an order of retrenchment comes within the purview of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act or not. If the termination of service in view of the exception contained in Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act Is not a 'retrenchment', the question of applicability of Chapter V-A thereof would not arise. 12. In view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifying the law declared in the case of S.M. Nilajkar (supra), it was the later decision which ought to have been followed by the learned Single Judge and in not doing so, an error has come to occur. Learned Single Judge without properly perusing the appointment orders issued to the workmen and their subsequent renewal, by misconstruing that the workmen have completed 240 days of service in an year and hence, Section 25F of the Act is attracted and for non compliance of the conditions therefor, the impugned action of the management was held to be bad. Learned Single Judge without properly perusing the appointment orders issued to the workmen and their subsequent renewal, by misconstruing that the workmen have completed 240 days of service in an year and hence, Section 25F of the Act is attracted and for non compliance of the conditions therefor, the impugned action of the management was held to be bad. In view of the position stated supra and the record of the case, since the appointment and renewal of the workmen was on contract basis and for specific/fixed period, they do not fall within the meaning of workman under Section 2(oo) of the Act and their service does not fall within the meaning of continuous service under Section 25B of the Act and hence, the provision of Section 25F is not attracted. 13. In our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge has not properly considered the record of the case, has misconstrued the position of law and has committed an error. Incidentally, learned Single Judge has also recorded a finding that the workmen are appointed on daily wages and on temporary basis. On the contrary, the Labour Court has referred to the oral and documentary evidence on record and has recorded finding on fact, which being neither perverse nor arbitrary, did not call for interference in the writ petition. Since the Labour Court has correctly appreciated the material on record, in our view, the writ petition filed by the workmen was devoid of merit and ought to have been dismissed. In not doing so and by quashing the award, the Learned Single Judge has committed an error. Hence, the Impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. 14. Workmen have not established any legal right and the violation thereof, considering which the reference was rightly rejected by the Labour Court. As has been made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mamni, AIR 2006 SC 2427 in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, instead of reinstatement, compensation was awarded. In the instant case the workmen are not entitled to relief as held by Labour Court and for the reasons stated therein. Hence, workmen are not entitled to be awarded the compensation. Consequently, direction issued by learned Single Judge in that regard is unsustainable and we are constrained to set aside the same. 15. In the instant case the workmen are not entitled to relief as held by Labour Court and for the reasons stated therein. Hence, workmen are not entitled to be awarded the compensation. Consequently, direction issued by learned Single Judge in that regard is unsustainable and we are constrained to set aside the same. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following: ORDER (I) W.A. 1548/2006 filed by the management Is hereby allowed. Order dated 9.8.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 18400/2002 is hereby set aside and the writ petition is held as devoid of merit and shall stand dismissed. Consequently, W.A. No. 1967/2006 filed by workmen stands dismissed. (ii) Award dated 20.08.2001 passed in Reference Nos. 70/1991 and 71/1991 by the Labour Court, Mangalore, is hereby restored. 16. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout. SRBMJ & ANVGJ: 5.11.2008. W.A. No. 1548/2006 c/w W.A. No. 1967/2006 ORDER 17. After judgment was pronounced, Sri. S.N. Murthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the Management very fairly submitted that the Management had filed the writ appeal mainly on principle and was not really against the payment of service compensation of Rs. 30,000/- to each of the workmen. Now that the stand of the Management has been vindicated, the Management is agreeable to pay to each of the workmen Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) ordered by the learned Single Judge. 18. We appreciate the good gesture on the part of the learned senior counsel and the Management. 19. In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to grant four weeks' time to the Management to pay Rs. 30,000/- to each of the writ petitioners/workmen so that there would be some succour to them. 20. This order/arrangement has been made, keeping in view the submission made by Sri. S.N. Murthy. We do hope and trust that the Management will pay the amount to the workmen concerned within the aforesaid period.